132. Rule of Scotch Law with regard to Responsibility. In one of the most important cases which came before the High Court of Justiciary, the Lord Justice Clerk (Hope), after examining, commenting upon, and approving of the law as laid down in the answers of the Judges to the questions of the House of Lords, said: "A man must believe, not that crime is wrong in the abstract, (for most madmen do admit murder to be wrong and punishable in the abstract,) but that the particular act committed under the influence of the motive which seems to have prompted it was not an offence against the law," in order to exempt him from punishment. In another case, it was said: "It was quite clear that if a man knew what act he was committing, and if he knew further the nature of that act and its consequences and effects, he was criminally answerable for it. But if, on the other hand, from the oppression of mental disease, he was unable to know what was the act he was committing, or, knowing it, if he was in such a condition from insane delusions as not to be able to understand the nature of the act, and to appreciate its consequences and effects, then he was in such a state of insanity that he was not answerable. But in order to constitute this insanity, it must be clearly made out that at the time of committing the act the prisoner was labouring under mental disease in the proper sense of the term, and that the mental disease was the cause of the act. Nothing but mental disease which overpowered the reason constituted insanity in the eye of the law." Again, it has been laid down that if a person knows what he is doing that is to say, if he knows the act he is committing, if he knows the true nature and quality of the act, and apprehends and appreciates its consequences and effects-that man is responsible for what he does. Again, it has been said: "The question for your [the jury] consideration is, whether the party had any notion that the act was one of which the law would take cognizance, for that is the only test which a jury is at liberty to take. We see, then, that there has been The Lord Advocate v. Gibson, 2 Broun, 332. 3 Lord Advocate v. Milne, 4 Irvine, 301. very + Lord Advocate v. Yates, Arkley, 238. See also The Lord Advocate v. Smith & great uniformity in the rulings of the Scotch Judges, and that these correspond very closely with the law as it has been laid down in England. 2133. American Rule as to Responsibility-One of the cases in which the whole subject was discussed with greatest ability in America was that of Abner Rogers, junior, who was tried for the murder of the warden of the Massachusetts State Prison in 1844.1 Shaw, C. J., in charging the jury, said: "In order that punishment may operate by way of example to deter others from committing criminal acts when under temptation to do so by presenting a strong counteracting motive, the person tempted must have memory and intelligence to know that the act he is about to commit is wrong, to remember and understand that if he commits the act he will be subject to the punishment, and reason and will to enable him to compare and choose between the supposed advantage or gratification to be obtained by the criminal act and the immunity from punishment which he will secure by abstaining from it. A person, therefore, in order to be punishable by law, or in order that his punishment by law may operate as an example to deter others from committing criminal acts under like circumstances, must have sufficient memory, intelligence, reason, and will, to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong in regard to the particular act about to be done, to know and understand that it will be wrong, and that he will deserve punishment by committing it."2 ***"If, then, it is proved to the satisfaction of the jury that the mind of the accused was in a diseased and unsound state, the question will be whether the disease existed to so high a degree that for the time being it overwhelmed the reason, conscience, and judgment, and whether the prisoner, in committing the homicide, acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse. If so, then the act was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary Campbell, 2 Irvine, 1; Lord Advocate v. Blyth, Shaw, Justiciary, 567; Muray, 15 Nov. 1858, 3 Irvine, 263; Dingwall, 5 Irvine, 466; Lees, 2 Broun, 484. 1 A careful and full report of this case was published by Messrs. Biglow and Bemis counsel for the defendant, and it is from that admirable report that we have derived our knowledge of the case. 2 Report, p. 275. 1 act of the body without the concurrence of a mind directing it." This rule has been almost universally acted upon since that time. In the case of The People v. McFarland, which was tried in New York during five weeks of the year 1870, and in which the accused was charged with murder, the presiding Judge, (the Hon. John K. Hackett,) in charging the jury, said: “In using the phrase 'state of sanity,' I am to be understood throughout as meaning thereby this, the state in which a man knows the act he is committing to be unlawful and morally wrong, and has sufficient reason to apply such knowledge and to be controlled by it. In using the phrase 'state of insanity,' I am to be understood throughout as meaning the state under which a man is not accountable for an alleged criminal act because he does not know that the act he is committing is unlawful and morally wrong, and has not reason sufficient to apply such knowledge and to be controlled by it." "To constitute a crime, the accused must have been acted upon by motives and governed by will." And again he charged: "In order, then, to constitute a crime, a man must have memory and intelligence to know that the act he is about to commit is wrong, to remember and understand that if he commits the act he will be subject to punishment, and reason and will to enable him to compare and choose between the supposed advantage or gratification to be obtained by the criminal act and the immunity from. punishment which he will secure by abstaining from it. If, on the other hand, he have not intelligence and capacity enough to have a criminal intent and purpose, and if his moral or intellectual powers are so deficient that he has not sufficient will, conscience, or controlling mental power, or if, through the overwhelming violence of mental disease, his intellectual power is for the time obliterated, he is not a responsible moral agent, and is not punishable for criminal Report, p. 277, * See Freeman v. People, 4 Denio, 19; Com. v. Heath, 11 Gray, 303; Com. v. Mosler, 4 Penn. St. 267; State v. Spencer, 1 Zabriskie, 196; Vance v. Com., 2 Virg. C., 132; Com. v. Farkin, 3 Penn. L. J. 482. 38 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr., N. S. 57, 87; Report of Charge to Jury, printed at New York York in 1870, p. 5. * Ib., p. 14. acts." Although there have been some decisions which would seem to throw doubt upon the view as presented above, we must hold that these are authoritative statements of the American law. 134. Rule of Law as applicable in cases of Mania.— From all this, it follows that in cases of mania, where the insanity is general, affecting the whole field of the individual's thought and the whole range of his action, where it deprives him of all rational knowledge of what he is doing or saying, and of all appreciation of the immorality of the act, the individual is to be held exempt from punishment, and the only right the State has in reference to him, is to take such precautions as will prevent him doing the like mischief again. The rule of law as applied to questions of general intellectual mania is easily understood, and the question which is to be answered by the jury in such cases is by no means difficult The symptoms are so palpable, the mental confusion, instability, and incoherence are so great, the abrogation of reason is so apparent, that little practical doubt can be felt by any as to the irresponsibility of the person who is laboring under this disease. Still the fact has to be affirmatively made out. But the jury are entitled, in coming to their con 1 Report of charge, p. 12. There are other points in this charge which will have to be alluded to in another place. In the trial of Montgomery at Rochester, N. Y., (1871,) Darwin Smith, J., charged the jury that, There is now no room for doubt as to the rule of law in this State, a man must have sufficient knowledge, reason, capacity, and mental power, to understand not merely that his act is a violation of law, but that it is intrinsically wrong.' Every human being endowed with reason knows that to take the life of a human being is against the law of nature and of God. It is not sufficient that he knows the thing is an offence against human laws, but he must have reason and capacity to know that he is not only violating the laws of man but the laws of God and nature." And in the case of Scannell, who was tried in April, 1873, Brady, J., said, "That insanity, considered in its legal aspect, may be stated thus: It means such a defect of reason as would render the prisoner unconscious of the nature and character and consequences of his act, and of its unlawfulness and immorality. A man is, by the law of this State, responsible for his acts when he knows what he is doing, is capable of distinguishing right from wrong, understands the consequences of his act, and that it is in violation of the laws of God and man. In other words, if the prisoner was in such a state of mind as to know that the deed was unlawful and morally wrong, he is responsible; otherwise not. If he was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, did not know that the act he was committing was unlawful and morally wrong, you cannot convict him of murder." clusion as to the state of the prisoner's mind, to judge of his conduct during the trial, and upon that ground alone to find him insane, although no evidence has been given as to his state of mind at the time of the inquest. But although no ground for hesitation can exist with reference to the irresponsibility of the maniac during an actual attack of the disease, some questions of nicety may arise as to whether he was or was not enjoying a remission of the malady at the time the act was committed, and as to whether the freedom from disease of such lucid interval would constitute legal responsibility or not. This question is, however, dealt with in another place.2 135. Partial Intellectual Mania in relation to Responsibility. Two of the answers of the Judges to the questions which were put to them after the trial of Macnaghten bore upon this subject. These answers have been quoted in another place, and all that will be necessary in this place will be the statement of the substance of these answers. When a man labors under a delusion, he believes it to be true. Now, a man acts upon what he believes, and not upon what is. A monomaniac would therefore be expected to act as if the untrue belief which is caused by his disease was a belief corresponding to actual fact. He is justified in doing so. If in doing so he commits a crime, he will by law be held to be in the same position as to punishment as a sane man acting as the insane man did, and situated as the insane man believed he was situated, would have been. In other words, a party laboring under delusion must be considered in the same relation as to responsibility as if the facts in respect of which the delusion exists were real. [179] With regard to partial intellectual mania, it seems to us reasonable that the insanity which does exist should relieve from responsibility only in case the act, which would otherwise bring the individual within the criminal law, is connected with the erroneous impressions which are traceable to disease. We have seen that for many purposes the monomaniac must be regarded as a sane man. We shall see hereafter that he must Reg. v. Goode, 7 Adol. & E. 536. See Chap. XX., p. 537. |