tional insanity. That it does occur is a fact beyond dispute. That in every case in which it is set up as a defence it should be proved in such a way that the jury cannot doubt that, in relation to the act in question, the prisoner was not sane, and had not the power of choosing or refraining, or, in other and clearer words, that even while he did it, it was not his act, we have seen ought to be imperative, and that such proof will very seldom be forthcoming, as the disease is in itself very rare, we must believe. 259. Civil Capacity of the Morally or Emotionally Insane.—199] With regard to the civil ability of men laboring under any form of partial moral insanity, we would, as in the case of monomania, assert that they should be allowed to exercise all their civil privileges which they are not clearly incapable of exercising without hurt to themselves or others; and they ought, at the same time, to be deprived of the exercise of every civil right which they are incapable of performing without injuring the interests of others, or doing harm to themselves. Thus, it would have been ridiculous to deprive the gentleman we have mentioned, who was in the habit of stealing towels, of his right to exercise the franchise, to represent his county in Parliament, or to manage his own estate. On the other hand, any one who, like the woman mentioned in an earlier part of this work, had an irresistible desire to throw her children in the fire, would be ineligible for the place of a nurse, and no contract entered into with her for such services would be binding upon the contractor. Still she ought-under due precautions-to be allowed to perform other duties of which she was clearly deemed capable. And, as boys get certificates from their school or other masters to say of what they are capable, so might those persons have certificates from reliable medical gentlemen with reference to their capability of certain works, and their faithful performance of certain duties. Of course a person who is morally insane is liable for any damage done to the persons or property of others. Thus, a kleptomaniac would be liable for the price of anything he stole if the article could not be restored to its rightful owner, and even if it were restored, he ought to be held liable for all the expenses incurred in its recovery, and for any actual loss caused by its absence. Wherever the insane acts are of such a nature as to deprive others of their peace and happiness, to which they have a right in virtue of their membership of a social body, then restraint, and, if necessary, confinement in a lunatic asylum ought to be resorted to. On the other hand, we need hardly, after what we have already advanced on this subject, say that punishment for crimes which directly result from the morbid condition is useless and unjust. There are cases of moral insanity, however, in which the fear of punishment will restrain from the commission of crime. But where it will it generally has, and therefore we find the insane tendency manifested 200 with regard to the appropriation of useless and valueless articles, the theft of which would scarcely constitute the crime of larceny. In all cases, therefore, the tests which have been already suggested are applicable to cases of moral mania. The test so frequently laid down with regard to the moral conceptions of the individual has as often been shown to be of little use. Many of the morally insane are capable of understanding the difference between right and wrong, but there is much difference between understanding the simple meaning of a proposition as stated, and the existence of that proposition as a rule of life. Words are all very well, but they are often apart from a life. A man may be able to understand a command in one sense and not in another. He may be unable to make a rule applicable to his own conduct. Thus, the Bosges man, who thought it was right in him to steal the wives of other men, and wrong in others to steal his own wife, had not sufficient intelligence to comprehend any real distinction. Now, many persons are in a similar position with regard to moral facts, sometimes, as in the case of the moral idiot, from want of mental power to enable them to understand these relations, and sometimes, as in moral mania, from an entire distortion of the faculties which appreciate moral distinctions-a distortion brought about not by positive defect existing in early life, but which is due to the incursion of organic disease. In all these cases, then, where, through any of these defects or aberrations, the individual is made incapable either of understanding the right and wrong, the commanded and forbidden, the rewarded or punished, or where, understanding these as abstract propositions, he is unable to make them influence his life, the individual should be held irresponsible in relation to any acts which may be within the influence of these morbid impressions. But where the individual is able to understand, and capable of applying, these principles to his conduct for a guide, and yet does not do so, there we have moral turpitude, and not moral imbecility or mania. In such a case the individual is a criminal and ought to be punished. In this place, then, we need not dwell upon the questions of testamentary capacity or the power of entering into contracts. The principles of the law in relation to these matters have already been fully discussed, and the application of them to the facts must now, after such various and miscellaneous illustration, be easy. One of the moral monomanias considered in the preceding chapter claims some attention in this place. Suicide may, as we have seen, be the act of a sane or of an insane man. We must there fore consider It 260. Suicide in relation to Insurance.-Suicide in a fit of temporary insanity does not avoid a policy which does not contain an express provision that death by such means shall avoid it. "It appears to me clear," said. Lord Hatherly, (then Vice-Chancellor Wood), "that where there is no express provision in the policy, that in the event of the insured dying by his own hand the policy shall become void, that the policy is not vacated by the circumstance of his having died by his own hand while in a state of temporary insanity. was held by the House of Lords in Fauntleroy's case2 that it would be contrary to public policy to insure a man a benefit upon his dying by the hands of public justice; and as it would be contrary to the policy of the law for any such express contract to be made, so no such contract could be implied in the policy to pay the amount in such an event, and accordingly, although nothing was said in the policy one way or the other, the law would infer as a condition that the execution of the insured, in consequence of a crime com How v. The Anglo-Australian, etc., Life Ass. Co. 7 Jur. N. S. 673. The Amicable Insurance Soc. v. Rolland, 2 Dow. & C. 1; 4 Bligh N. S. 194. See also Moore v. Woolsey, 4 Ellis & B. 243. mitted by him, was not one of the cases in respect of which the policy would become payable. So the argument might be pursued, although I do not know that any case has been so decided, to the same extent, in the case of a person committing suicide while in a sane state of mind, thus committing a felony and losing his life thereby; but I know of no rule of law that can justify me in extending that to the case of a person committing suicide while in a state of insanity, and therefore committing no legal offence." 2261. Suicide in relation to Insurance.-The law upon this point seems to be firmly established. An insurance company is not liable on a policy if the person insured voluntarily deprives himself of life, and it seems to have been held over and over again in this connection that voluntary suicide can be committed by a person who is insane, and that the mere act of suicide itself gives no indication of the mental condition of the person who kills himself. The real question to be decided in all these cases is whether the insanity was of such a nature as to deprive the individual of all volition, or that "the act of self-destruction was not the result of the will and intention of the party adapting the means to the end, and contemplating the physical nature and effects of the act." This has indeed been the question which almost in every case has been left to the jury. Thus, in one case, they were asked to say whether it was an act voluntarily done, in another, to decide whether the condition of the deceased at the time of his death was such that he could not distinguish between right and wrong, or such that he did not know he was doing an act which would produce death. In Isett v. The Americau Insurance Company, the 6 See also Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co. 21 Pa. St. 466; Dormay v. Borradaile, 10 Beay. 335. 2 Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Man. & G. 639; Cleft v. Schwabe, 3 C. B. 437; Dufaur e. Professional Ins. Co. 25 Beav. C02. See also Dean v. American M. L. Ins. Co. 4 Allen, (Mass.) 96; Eastabrook v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. 51 Me. 224; Nunick v. Mut. Bencfit Life Ins. Co. 3 Brews. 502; St. Louis Mut. Ins. Co. v. Graves, 6 Bush, (Ky.) 200; Cooper v. Mass. Mut. Ins. Co. 102 Mass, 227. Cooper v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. 102 Mas. 227. + Fowler e. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 4 Lansing, (N. Y.) 202. Mallory v. Travellers' Ins. Co. N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1870. See also Van Zandt v. Mnt. Benefit Life Ins. Co., May's Law of Ins. p. 371. 1 Ins. L. J. 715. jury were instructed that if the insured at the time of his death was conscious that his death would result from the discharge of the pistol in his hands, though he was laboring under mental depression or disturbance of mind, or if he destroyed his life because he was suffering from some physical imfirmity, and for the purpose of escaping from such infirmity, his death was such as would relieve the company from the necessity of paying the policy to his representatives.' In another case, Mr. Justice Miller said: "It is not every kind or degree of insanity which will so far excuse the party taking his own life as to make the company insuring liable. To do this, the act of self-destruction must have beeen the consequence of insanity, and the mind of the deceased must have been so deranged as to have made him incapablə of using a rational judgment in regard to the act he was committing. If he was impelled to the act by an insane impulse, which the reason which was left to him did not enable him to resist, or if his reasoning powers were so overthrown by his mental condition thet he could not exercise his reasoning faculties on the act he was about to do, then the company was liable. On the other hand, there is no presumption of law, prima facie or otherwise, that self-destruction arises from insanity; and if you believe, from the evidence, that the deceased, although excited or angry or distressed in mind, formed the determination to take his own life, because in the exercise of his usual reasoning faculties he preferred death to life, then the company is not liable, because he died by his own hand within the meaning of the policy." And the doctrine there laid down was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. But in all these cases the law as laid down in Borradaile v. Hunter' was followed. The doctrine there enunciated was that it might "well be conceded that the case would not have fallen within the meaning of the condition (death by his own hand) had the death of the assured resulted from an act committed under the influence of delirium, or if he had, in a paroxysm of fever, precipitated 3 פיי Gay v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. 9 Blatch C. Ct. (U. S.) 142. BR. INS.-25 |