that, when no such removal was necessary, as for the short time which delirium lasts, all the necessary comforts and conveniences could be supplied at the patient's own residence. A mention of the points in which mania differs from delirium may be of some use.1

2 383. Mania distinguished from Delirium.-In mania the patient is capable of recognizing persons and things, and is alive to the circumstances which occur in his presence. In delirium the patient is generally unable to make any distinctions, memories are confounded with perceptions, and are often more real than sensual impressions. It follows that in delirium there is an entire absence of the power of reasoning which is a faculty of relations, and where comparison is impossible there also ratiocination is unattainable. In delirium there is a chaos of ideas, not one stone of the mental house has been left upon another; the individual is sane in nothing; ideas have lost all the molecularity which gives them colerence. In mania, however, this is not the case. The individual does reason; the laws of association have been tampered with, but they still exist. The individual can at times be coherent and rational. He retains command over his muscles, will occasionally understand and laugh at a joke, can occasionally follow for a short time the windings of a conversation, and can often be made to see the ridiculous character of his conduct. His senses are acute, the bodily functions are undisturbed. The health is not materially impaired, and the presence of mania is not a cause for the apprehension of immediate death, although it does shorten life. In [269] delirium, on the other hand, there is muscular prostration, sensation is impaired, every bodily function is more or less interfered with, and the disease with which it is associated is speedily terminated by death or by restoration to complete health. As delirium is, as it were, a parasite upon another disease, its life is determined by that of the disease of which it is the concomitant; when that is aggravated it is increased; when that is removed it ceases to exist. One other feature

1 See with regard to delirium Georget in Dict. de Médecine, t. vi., p. 395; Esquirol in Dict. des Scien. Med., t. yiii., art. Délire. See also Etudes Cliniques des Maladies Mentales, M. Morel, t. i., p. 124; Griesinger Syd, Soc. ed. (1871) § 130.

has been remarked with regard to this morbid condition which is not unworthy of notice, and that is, that while mania never occurs until after the age of puberty, delirium has, like death, "all seasons for its own."

PART II.

THE LEGAL RELATIONS OF DELIRIUM.

384. Where there are Lucid Intervals.—1270 In relation to delirium there can be no question as to the existence of lucid intervals. Sir John Nicholl has said, "in cases of permanent, proper insanity, the proof of a lucid interval is matter of extreme difficulty, and for this among other reasons, namely, that the patient so affected is not unfrequently rational to all outward appearance without any real abatement of his malady; so that, in truth and substance, he is just as insane in his apparently rational as he is in his visible raving fits. But the apparently rational intervals of persons merely delirious, for the most part, are really such. Delirium is a fluctuating state of mind created by temporary excitement, in the absence of which, to be ascertained by the appearance of the patient, the patient is most commonly really sane. Hence, as also, indeed, from their greater presumed frequency in most instances in cases of delirium, the proba bilities a priori in favour of a lucid interval are infinitely stronger in a case of dilirium than in one of permanent, proper insanity, and the difficulty of proving a lucid interval is less in the same exact proportion in the former than it is in the latter case, and has always been so held by this Court."2

2385. The Caution with which Wills made during an Interval of Delirium are to be Received. When, then, lucid intervals can be proved to exist in the course of delirium, it would be very unjust to deprive individuals who may be thus affected of exercising those privileges which during

Two cases are described by Dr. Maudsley in the Journal of Mental Sci. (vol. xiii, p. 59,) which illustrate some of the distinguishing features of these two conditions. * Brogden v. Brown, 2 Addams, 441. See also Evans v. Knight, 1 Add. 229, and Lemann v. Bonsall, 1 Add. 383.

health they have a right to enjoy. Thus testamentary dispositions made during the intervals of frebrile delirium ought, if the lucidity of the interval can be proved, to be upheld. It is not, by any means, uncommon to find that wills made under such circumstances are (271) disputed, and there may be reason for this if there is the least suspicion of improper or undue influence exercised upon the mind of the testator. The purpose of the law is to strengthen the weak against the strong; and there is an Indian fable which says that the God Bralima inquired of the Spirit of Power, "Who is stronger than thee?" and the Spirit answered, "Cunning." The law ought, and is, to be most careful in inquiring into the volitional character of every act done by those who are weak, and it is upon this principle that courts of equity extend their especial protection to sailors and marines. So it is that, in those cases in which wills have been executed during a sane interval in an attack of delirium, great caution is required in ascertaining that neither intimidation nor fraud of any kind was made use of, because, as we have seen, the mind is invariably enfeebled even during the existence of these lucid intervals, and what would not to a strong man seem a motive is compulsion to a weak one.

2386. As to Contracts entered into during the Intervals in Delirium.-The law, while it ought to allow and does allow the full exercise of the testamentary power under the conditions indicated above, would do well to exclude such individuals from the exercise of other rights, such as that of entering into contracts, or ought to give them the same protection and support as it does to minors, whose contracts are good if they are advantageous to the interests of the infant, but not otherwise. At least, it ought to be an acknowledged rule that all contracts entered into during the lucid intervals of a disease accompanied by delirium, should be looked upon with suspicion, and a presumption should exist as to their invalidity. This presumption, however, might be liable to be rebutted by proof that the delirium was only an occasional symptom of the disease, that the attacks were of short duration, and that, when the individual was free from delirium, he was calm and rational.

2 387. Delirium and Testamentary Capacity.—With regard to the capacity to make a will, one or two cases may be cited. In that of Evans v. Knight,' the testator died upon the 24th of April of pneumonia. The latter stages of this disease had been marked by delirium, and it was proved that he had executed his will only three days before that on which he died. Two medical men were examined in this case: one, who had seen the testator on the 21st, or the day on which he made his will, deposed that "he was not in a state of sound mind, memory, and understanding, or capable of doing any act requiring the exercise of thought, judgment, and reflection." The other, who had seen the testator on the 23d, expressed an opinion that it was extremely "improbable that the deceased should have been free from wandering and mental affection on a day so shortly before he saw him as the 21st." It was, however, proved that he had given instructions for a will without having any suggestions made to him by the solicitor, who reduced them to writing, that subsequently they were read over to him, and that he had signified his approval and subscribed them. Not only did the act itself and the way it was done prove him to be rational, but several witnesses testified that, during the whole time he was giving his instructions, he was calm and conducted himself with perfect propriety, and as he would have done before he was taken ill. In this case the Court pronounced in favor of the disposing power of the deceased.

In another case, that of Brogden v. Brown,' the testatrix died of an acute disease after an illness of ten days. For two or three days before her death, she was at frequent intervals delirious. She executed her will on the evening of the day preceding her death, and its validity was called in question on the ground that she was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution. The evidence of two medical men, who were examined in this case, was very like that of the two physicians in the last-mentioned case. They both regarded her as incapable of making a will at the time alleged, and they had somewhat good grounds to go upon, as they had seen her only a few hours before the time at which

the will was made. The evidence of a third medical gentleman was in favor of the theory of disposing capacity, as he regarded the delirium due to paroxysms of pain suffered by the deceased, and was of opinion tnat, during the absence of pain, there would also be a complete absence of the abnormal mental symptoms. It was proved that the will was read over to the deceased, and that, when it was placed before her as she sat propped up in bed, she signed her name in the usual way, with the accustomed dash below. The validity of this testament was held to be established by the Court.'

388. The Nature of the Act to be considered.—[278] It will be evident to any one who peruses any of the cases which have come before the courts of this country, that the circumstances connected with the testamentary act are those which are most carefully considered in the decision of questions of capacity, when there is a possibility that the individual may have been deprived of the disposing power by the existence of mental unsoundness; or, in other words, the testamentary capacity of an individual is to be determined mainly by the nature of the act itself. If it is such a will as we should have expected the individual to make while he was in a state of health, if the disposition of his property has been guided by his normal feelings and affections, if it is in no way inconsistent with his known desires and wishes, there will be a strong presumption in favor of the validity of the testament. Again, if it is consistent in itself, the presumption is strengthened, and so it will be if the will is only a slight and reasonable alteration of a former testamentary instrument executed by the individual while in a state of health. All these circumstances bear closely upon the question as to whether a will made by an individual in a supposed interval between attacks of delirium should be regarded as indeed the will of the testator, and established, or as an instrument extracted by undue persuasion or fraud from a person who was not capable of expressing a rational desire with regard to his property, and shall in consequence be held in

See also Cook v. Goude and Bennett, 1 Hagg. 577; King v. Farley, 1 Hagg. 562; Waters v. Howlett, 3 Hagg. 790; Bird v. Bird, 2 Hagg. 142; Martin v. Wotton, 1 Lee, 130; Bittleston v. Clark, 2 Lee, 229; Marsh v. Tyrrell, 2 Hagg., Ecc. Rep. 122.