CHAPTER stance to a transfer of our alliance from France to En

VIII. gland-a proceeding to which the people of the United

1796. States would not submit. Indeed, he considered all the

articles relating to privateers and ships of war, as "constructive of the treaty with France," to her disadvantage, an unnecessary interference in the pending European struggle, and a dishonorable departure from an impartial neutrality. The alleged danger of war with Great Britain, if the treaty were rejected, he thought, might be laid quite out of the case. Britain would at any time make war upon us whenever it was her interest to do so. The proclamation of neutrality had not, in his opinion, done any thing toward preserving peace, nor would the present treaty. Nothing had kept Britain from making war upon us but the success of the French arms, and that success, greater now than ever, would still restrain her. France had given us our independence, and would maintain it for us. Upon the argument in relation to France, Preston, another Virginia member, dwelt with still greater emphasis. He esteemed the treaty a shameful dereliction of our friends, and in direct conflict with all sense of obligation, gratitude, and friendship. Page denounced the treaty as unconstitutional. It invaded the powers of Congress to regulate commerce, and on the subject of British debts it usurped the powers of the judiciary. Findley argued that, as long as the British held Canada, the possession of the Western posts would contribute but little toward peace with the Indians, in which their principal value was supposed to consist.

It was urged, by way of reply to these multifarious objections, that we had, in fact, no claim for the negroes carried away, and that, such being the case, we had committed the first violation of the treaty by obstructing the collection of British debts, an act which justified the

VIII.

retention of the posts, and so left us no claim for dam- CHAPTER ages on that account. As to the British debts, the larger their amount, the more imperiously did honor and justice 1796. require their payment. The renunciation of the power of sequestrating debts was vindicated not only on the ground of justice, but as essential, since the late vote of the House of Representatives, to the maintenance of American credit. Williams and Cooper, of New York, declared their personal knowledge as to the value of the Indian trade, and the certainty that the greater part of it would fall into American hands. Goodhue replied to the criticisms on the commercial clauses of the treaty. He knew the value of the East India trade, which Swanswick and Smith had attempted to depreciate. There were thirty vessels from Salem, in his district, engaged in that traffic, and their participation in it was an object of envy to the merchants of Great Britain and Ireland, excluded by the monopoly of the British East India Company from any share in a lucrative commerce thus conceded to us-a feeling strongly evinced in a recent debate in the Irish House of Commons. As to the West India trade, why expect Great Britain to abandon her favorite Navigation Act in our special favor? Why not urge the same complaints against Spain, Portugal, Holland, France herself, for they all, except when under the pressure of war, pursued precisely the same policy? As to the compensation for spoliations, the parties most interested, so far from regarding it as futile, were perfectly satisfied, and looked anxiously for the ratification of the treaty. It was to be expected that the commissioners on that subject, and those also on the subject of British debts, would act like honest men, and decide, not from considerations of country, but of justice and evidence. Some gentlemen of the opposition, not content

1

CHAPTER With criticising the particular provisions on the subject VIII. of commerce, had substantially taken the ground that no 1796. commercial treaty with Britain was needed. Strange

doctrine in the mouths of men ready, at the very previous session of Congress, to force her into a commercial treaty by special restrictions on her commerce!

As to contraband and neutral rights, the law of nations had been the rule and limitation of our concessions. That neutral bottoms should make free goods was a novel doctrine to which Great Britain had never assented, and to which even France, in spite of her express treaty agreement with us, did not conform. Could we, without a single ship of war afloat, undertake to dictate the law of nations to Great Britain? And was it not wise, since, in certain cases, she would seize our provisions when bound to the ports of her enemies, at least to provide that cargoes so seized should be paid for? As to the alleged inconsistency of some of the articles with the rights of France under her treaty with us, there was in one of the articles an express saving of all those rights.

"Are we reduced to that low situation," asked Hillhouse, "that we may not grant indulgences to a foreign nation for the sake of obtaining advantages to ourselves when such nation happens to be at war with France? That would be making us a colony in good earnest. The independence and freedom of America depended, he believed, not upon the good or the ill will of any nation upon earth, but solely on the will of the people of the United States."

The prospect of obtaining another and a better treaty by further negotiation had been held out by Madison and others. This point was well handled by Coit of Connecticut. He would like to see the gentleman

VIII.

from Virginia, wrapped up in his mantle of doubts and CHAPTER problems, going on a mission to the court of London to clear up this business. High as his respect was for that 1796. gentleman's abilities, he yet feared they would prove incompetent to the task, even if aided by the collection said to be making of the speeches in the House of Representatives on the treaty-making power. However gentlemen might declare that the construction of our Constitution must lie with ourselves, unless, by a construction consistent with reason and the common sense of mankind, we could satisfy the world that we were not bound by the treaty, we should be pronounced a faithless nation; nor could a vote of the House of Representatives, against the sense of the president and Senate, and a great proportion of the American people, be expected to remove the imputation. What hope, under such cir cumstances, that Great Britain would consent to renew the negotiation?"

While these debates were going on in the House, the people out of doors, especially those of the commercial cities, grew more and more agitated. The danger, should the treaty be rejected, that a war with Great Britain would follow, began to inspire serious alarm. Insurance against capture could no longer be obtained, and commerce received a sudden check. Petitions began to pour in from all sides-from New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Boston, and from numerous other places, in favor of ratification. Much to the chagrin of Findley and Gallatin; such a petition came even from the trans-Allegany region which they represented. Nor were the opponents of the treaty idle. They held counter-meetings and got up counter-petitions. The Boston Democrats, encouraged by the recent re-election of Samuel Adams as governor, and by their success in choosing to the state Sen

VIII.

CHAPTER ate Austin and Eustis, two of their leaders, ventured to call a town meeting, in hopes to counterbalance the pe1796. tition in favor of ratification got up by the merchants. In this, however, they were sadly disappointed, the town meeting having voted decidedly in favor of ratifying. The number of petitioners was about equal on either side, but the decided weight of wealth and intelligence was with the friends of the treaty. The opposers, indeed, in the commercial cities consisted, for the most part, of men who, in spite of their clamor about spoliations, had little or nothing to lose, headed by a few persons of wealth and intelligence, some impelled by the spirit of faction, and others by that deep antipathy to Great Britain, the residuum of the Revolutionary struggle, which formed the ruling motive of the mass of their party. The agitation throughout the country became, indeed, so great as to impress the warnings repeatedly given that the rejection of the treaty might not only occasion a British and an Indian war, but might endanger even the Union itself.

Bond, the British chargé des affaires, had already intimated that, if the House refused the appropriations for carrying the treaty into effect, the Western posts would not be given up. He insisted, also, on an explanatory article in relation to a clause in Wayne's treaty with the Indians, by which they had stipulated to allow no trader to reside among them unless licensed by the authorities of the United States, and which seemed to be in conflict with the provision of Jay's treaty for a mutual free trade with the Indians. This demand was reasonable enough, and the manner of it was unexceptionable. Yet it was felt as an unwise pressure at a moment when the treaty was hanging balanced in the House, especially as the prior stipulation in Jay's treaty