acted with good motives, and, on the con- Evi in this country and reviewed the authorities | tion of the jury, for the purpose of enabling on the subject. See Kirk v. Territory, 10 Okl. them to determine whether witnesses who 46, 60 Pac. 797. It should also be observed have testified for the state have been misthat instructions numbered 20 and 33, above taken or testified falsely, as the court told quoted, are in direct conflict with each oth- the jury in instruction No. 14." Evidence er, and bearing upon the same subject, as of the good character of the accused is usuthey do, the jury was left to grope in the ally admitted in cases of circumstantial dark as to the true rule of law to be applied evidence against the defendant, and also in in such case. cases where the commission of the offense The defendant also complains of the ac- is admitted, and the plea of self-defense is tion of the court in giving instruction No. interposed. In the latter class of cases, such 46. That instruction is as follows: "The evidence is introduced, not for the purpose jury are instructed that in this trial testi- of disputing or contradicting the witnesses mony of the previous good character of the who have testified against the defendant, defendant as a peaceable law-abiding citi- but more particularly for the purpose of zeń is proper evidence to be submitted to showing that the defendant, when he comthe jury, and should always be considered mitted the fatal act, did so under an honest by the jury in connection with the other and conscientious belief that it was necesevidence and circumstances in this case, sary for the protection of his person or his and if the jury find from all the evidence, life. It tends, in fact, to show that he including the evidence of good character, that there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, they should acquit. If, however, the jury believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime in question as charged in the information, it will be your sworn duty as jurors to find the defendant guilty, even though the evidence may satisfy your minds that the defendant, previous to the commission of the alleged crime, had sustained a good reputation as a peaceable, law-abiding citizen; but the evidence of good character is to be considered with all the other evidence in the case in determining whether the witnesses who have testified to facts tending to incriminate him have been mistaken, or have testified falsely or truthfully." The particular objection made by defendant to this instruction goes to the latter part of the instruction, in which the court told the jury that the evidence of good character is to be considered "in de termining whether the witnesses who have testified to facts tending to incriminate the defendant have been mistaken, or have testified falsely or truthfully." While this gun. He was talking there; nothing in reportion of the instruction may not have been so prejudicial to the defendant that it materialy affected the verdict in the case, still it is contrary to the authorities. Latimer v. State, 55 Neb. 609, 76 N. W. 207, 70 Am. St. Rep. 403; State v. Van Kuran, 25 Utah, 8, 69 Pac. 60. In the former of these cases, the court, speaking of an instruction containing substantially the same provision as the latter part of the foregoing instruction, said: "When one is accused of crime, evidence of his previous good character is admissible, in his behalf, upon the theory that, being of good character, it is improbable that he would have committed the crime with which he is charged, and it is for the jury to weigh and consider and give such effect as they think it entitled, in considering and determining whether the accused is guilty of the crime with which he is charged; but this Since a new trial may be had in this case, there is one further question that it will be necessary for us to consider. In the trial in the lower court, one J. E. Creswell was called as a witness on behalf of the state, and in course of the examination he was asked what occurred in his saloon at Payette in October, 1907, in regard to any threat the defendant might have made. To this counsel for defendant objected. The court overruled the objection, and the witness answered as follows: "Defendant had a gun in his possession, and was changing it from one pocket to another so that I saw the gard to anything. I tapped him on the shoulder, and said, 'You had better leave that with me until you get ready to go home.' He stepped around the end of the bar, and partly taking it out of his pocket, and I took it the rest of the way out and put it in the safe. He came in there and was standing there changing it from one pocket to another, so that I seen he had his gun; but he had said nothing at that time, and I tapped him on the shoulder and told him to step around the end of the bar, and that he had better give the gun to me, or leave it until he was ready to go home, and he did, and I put it in the safe and kept it there for about a week. When he got ready to go home, he wanted me to give it to him; said he had that gun for a purpose and might need it. A little bit afterwards he said he wanted it when he got ready to go home; It ZATION-MEETING OF BOARD-NOTICE. Codes, the county commissioners of each county it. He came to get it about a week after-12. TAXATION (§ 482*) -ASSESSMENT-EQUALI- We do not find any other question in this record that requires or deserves our further consideration. The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded, with direction to the trial court to sustain the motion to quash and set aside the information. This will not prevent the prosecutor from filing an information for manslaughter if he feels that the evidence will justify a trial on that charge. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded. SULLIVAN, C. J., and STEWART, J., con cur. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, Under the provisions of section 1701, Rev. change is authorized to be entered upon the Dec. Dig. § 491.*] 4. TAXATION (§ 482*) - EQUALIZATION-RAIS- HEARING-WAIVER. Where the board of equalization has made an order proposing a raise on the valuation of any specific property, and the person against whom such property is assessed thereafter appears at the time and place fixed for the hearing, on such proposed change and protests against the same and submits his evidence, he thereby waives the service of notice and cannot thereafter be heard to object to the action of the board on the ground that he was not served with notice. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, 5. TAXATION (§ 333*) - ASSESSMENT - DEDUC- The deduction allowed to the taxpayer on FIRST NAT. BANK OF WEISER et al. v. account of unsecured debts due to bona fide WASHINGTON COUNTY et al. (Supreme Court of Idaho. Nov. 27, 1909.) 1. TAXATION (§ 347*) - ASSESSMENT-COUNTY ASSESSOR-POWERS-AGREEMENT WITH TAX PAYERS. The county assessor has no power or authority to bind the county or its board of equalization by any agreement he may make or enter into with the taxpayer as to the valuation to be placed upon any specific property, or the waiver of deductions and exemptions. His duties are prescribed by law, and the taxpayer is chargeable with notice of the scope of his authority and the power with which he is invested and the limitations thereof. He is required to assess all the taxable property of his county at its "full cash value," and has no authority to assess it otherwise. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 580; Dec. Dig. § 347.*] residents of this state, as provided for and treat- [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Under the provisions of sections 1682, 1683, i 7. TAXATION (§ 333*) - ASSESSMENT - UNSE- [ valuation of the bank's assets, the stockholdCURED DEBTS-DEDUCTION-CONDITION. One claiming the right to deduct unsecured debts must personally waive the right to plead the bar of the statute of limitations against any of the claims listed and for which he claims a deduction. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Dec. Dig. 333.*] 8. TAXATION (§ 402*) - ASSESSMENT - BANK STOCK-EXTRATERRITORIAL DEPOSITS. The owner of bank stock is not entitled to a proportionate or corresponding reduction in valuation thereof for the purpose of taxation on account of any of the capital, surplus, or undivided profits of such bank being deposited in any bank or banks outside of the state. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Dec. Dig. § 402.*] (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from District Court, Washington County; Ed. L. Bryan, Judge. Action by the First National Bank of Weiser and its stockholders to review the action of the Board of Equalization of Washington County ordering certain property assessed against the bank, and in also ordering a raise in the valuation of the capital stock of the bank as the same had been assessed against the stockholders. Judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendants appeal. Judgment affirmed in part, and reversed in part. Harris & Smith and Richards & Haga, for appellants. Lot L. Feltham, for respondents. AILSHIE, J. This action was instituted in the district court for the purpose of reviewing the action of the board of equalization of Washington county in ordering the furniture and fixtures of respondent the First National Bank of Weiser placed on the assessment roll for 1907, and in also raising the assessment on the shares of the capital stock in the respondent bank as assessed against its stockholders. A writ issued, and the board of equalization, acting through its clerk, made return to the writ, and after a hearing thereon the district court made an order vacating and setting aside the order of the board both in assessing the furniture and fixtures of the bank and in raising the assessed valuation of the capital stock of the bank. This is an appeal from the order and judgment of the district court. The facts are as follows: On about June 29, 1907, the respondent bank listed its shares of stock for taxation, furnishing the assessor with a statement of the names of the stockholders, together with the number of shares of stock owned by each, the capital stock of the bank, surplus, and undivided profits, and made a notation on the list as follows: "First National Bank capital stock @ 60%, $50,000. No exemptions to be claimed." The bank claims that it had an agreement with the assessor, at the time it furnished the list, that, in consideration of the stock being assessed upon a basis of $30,000 for the entire ers would not claim any offset on account of any unsecured debts owing to bona fide residents of the state. The stock was accordingly assessed by the assessor at $30 per share. On July 9, 1907, the board of equalization ordered the furniture and fixtures of the bank placed on the roll and assessed at a valuation of $600, and at the same time ordered that the assessment of the shares of the capital stock of the bank be raised $18 per share, making the total assessment of such stock $48 per share. On July 10, 1907, the clerk of the board gave notice of the proposed raise as authorized and provided for in section 1699, Rev. Codes. On July 22, 1907, in compliance with the requirements of the notice, the bank and also the stockholders appeared through counsel and filed a protest against the proposed raise and also against the assessment of its furniture and fixtures, and supported such protests with affidavits. A hearing appears to have been had before the board on the 22d, 24th, and 26th days of July, and on the latter date the board made its order denying the application both as to the furniture and fixtures of the bank and the proposed raise of $18 per share on the capital stock of the bank and ordered that the assessment be made as proposed by the order of July 9th. It is conceded on this appeal that the action of the board in ordering the bank furniture and fixtures placed on the assessment roll and assessed at the sum of $600 was without jurisdiction and is void, and consequently that portion of the order will not be considered or discussed by us in this opinion. It is contended by the appellants, however, that the action of the district court in ordering canceled and vacated the order of the board of equalization in raising the assessed valuation of the capital stock of the bank was error, and that it should be reversed. In the first place, it is a well-established rule in this court that the writ of review will only issue where a tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction as such tribunal, board, or officer, and there is no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law. It has likewise been held that if the order made by the inferior tribunal, board, or officer, was within its jurisdiction, however erroneous the action may have been, it cannot be reached by writ of review. People v. Lindsay, 1 Idaho, 394; Rogers v. Hays, 3 Idaho (Hasb.) 597, 32 Pac. 259; Chemung Mining Co. v. Hanley, 11 Idaho, 302, 81 Pac. 619; Dahlstrom v. Portland Mining Co., 12 Idaho, 87, 85 Pac. 916; Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Wood, 13 Idaho, 794, 93 Pac. 257; Utah Association of Credit Men v. Budge, 102 Pac. 691. The question therefore which presented itself to the trial court and presents itself to this court on appeal is not whether the board acted erroneously in raising the valuation on | point, however, at which counsel for resuch bank stock, but whether it had taken spondent makes the persistent contention the necessary steps required by law to give it jurisdiction to act at all. If the board had pursued the statutory and jurisdictional steps, even though it drew an erroneous conclusion from the evidence submitted as to the value of the stock, its action in making the raise cannot be disturbed on writ of review. The writ does not lie, under our statute, to review the facts of the case, except in so far as the facts are essential to determine the jurisdictional question. Our further consideration of the case must therefore be devoted to an examination of the statutory requirements as applied to the action taken by the board. In the first place, the assessor had no power or authority to bind the county or its board of equalization by any agreement he might enter into with the taxpayers. His duties are prescribed by law, and the taxpayer has notice of the scope of his authority and the power with which he is invested and of the limitations thereof. The duty of the assessor is to assess all of the taxable property of his county at its "full cash value," and he has no legal right or authority to assess property in any other manner or at any other valuation. So, in this case, any agreement or understanding had between the bank and the assessor could in no manner bind the county or its board of equalization and has no place in the consideration of this case. that his clients were never accorded their day in court, in that they were never served with notice prior to the raise of assessment. This contention, we think, grows out of a misapprehension of the effect of the order of the board of equalization and the direction and requirements of section 1692 of the Rev. Codes. Under the provisions of the latter section, the board of county commissioners of each county in the state is required to meet on the second Monday in July, in each year, as a board of equalization, for the purpose of examining the assessment roll and equalizing the assessment of property throughout the county, and of enforcing and compelling the assessment of property, and raising, or causing to be raised, any assessment of property which in the judgment of the board has not been assessed at a fair cash value. The time of the holding of this meeting is fixed by law, and that within itself is notice to every taxpayer. In addition, thereto, the clerk of the board is required to publish notice of the time and place of meeting of the board of equalization. No personal or separate notice, however, is required to be given to the taxpayer of any contemplated action to be had at this meeting. The board met, and after an examination of the roll, among other things, ordered that the capital stock of the First National Bank of Weiser be raised from $30 per share to $48 per share. Under the provisions of the statute, such an order is not final and is not extended on the tax roll. It amounts merely to a proposal by the board that the taxpayer's property should be raised in assessed valuation to the extent designated in the order, and that if the taxpayer has any reason or cause to show why the proposed raise should not be made he must appear at a time and place to be designated in the notice given by the clerk and make a showing. Section 1699, Rev. Codes, provides, among other things, as follows: "All persons whose assessment is altered, modified, or affected in the amount of valuation of property charged to them, shall be notified by the clerk of said board, by letter deposited in the United States mail, postpaid and addressed to such person interested, at least ten days before the final action is taken in fixing and equalizing such assessment, of the day fixed when he may be heard upon the matters affecting the assessment of his property for taxation, which shall be on the fourth Monday in July of each year, or as soon thereafter as he can be heard or his matter be reached." Such proceeding is in conformity with the general rules of practice in acquiring jurisdiction before all judicial and quasi judicial bodies. Notice is given to the party whose rights are to be affected; but it cannot be a general blanket notice, but must specify the In the second place, the board of equalization is vested by law with the power and authority to equalize assessments and to direct and require the assessor to assess any taxable property that has escaped assessment, increase any valuation, or add to the amount, number, quantity, or value of any property when a faulty, inaccurate, or incomplete list has been furnished or rendered. Section 1672, Rev. Codes, authorizes and directs the assessment of the shares of stock held by any person in any banking association located in this state, organized under the laws, either of the United States or of this state, subject, however, "to all deductions allowed in the assessment of other moneyed capital, and subject to the restriction that taxation of such shares must not be at a greater rate than is assessed on any other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of the state in the place where such bank is located." It is therefore clear that the board of equalization of Washington county, when considering the raise of assessment on the shares of the capital stock of the respondent bank, was in session pursuant to and in conformity with the statute of this state and was dealing with a subject over which it had jurisdiction. If therefore it acquired jurisdiction of the person of the taxpayer or taxpayers involved, it was clearly not acting without its jurisdiction, and the writ that it is proposed to raise the assessed | stock, were entitled to an offset in the valuation of the taxpayer's property would aggregate of $21,876.60 for unsecured debts be very vague and uncertain; but a notice due from such stockholders to bona fide that it is proposed to raise the property $18 residents of this state. The board declined per share in valuation is specific. The tax- to allow the deductions, and this action on payer may be satisfied with the raise and the part of the board is urged here in supnot care to object or make any protest; but, port of the judgment of the district court. if it was proposed to raise him $50 per Such action was not fatal to the jurisdiction share, he might have objections to make. of the board of equalization. In the first Consequently the law requires that he be place, no statement was ever filed by the notified of the proposed change, and that, stockholders themselves either with the asif he has cause to show, he appear at a sessor or before the board of equalization. specified time and place to present his ob- At no time did they ever list the "unsecured, jections. That is just what was done in solvent debts due them from others includthis case. ing deposits in any bank or with any banking firm or association," as is required by the form of statement which is made a part of section 1685, Rev. Codes. Even if they had complied with the law in filing statement and demanding deductions, they could not combine their indebtedness and claim the aggregate as a deduction against the aggregate assessment of their stock. The deductions are allowed to each stockholder separately against the stock owned by him individually. One stockholder cannot be allowed deductions for the indebtedness of another stockholder. Under the provisions of section 1701, Rev. Codes, the board is required to again meet on the fourth Monday in July for the purpose of hearing the objections that may be made by any party whose assessment is proposed to be changed, corrected, modified, or altered in any respect. The provisions of that section were complied with in this case. The board met, and the respondent bank, together with its stockholders, appeared and filed their protest and presented their objections to the proposed raise. Any change, correction, or alteration made in the assessment is not extended on the roll until after this final order is made. It is so provided by section 1700, Rev. Codes. In other words, a raise, alteration, or change proposed by the board at its first meeting, under section 1692, does not become final until after final action has been taken thereon under the provisions of section 1701, Rev. Codes. We had occasion to consider the question of notice under these provisions of the statute in Inland Lumber & Timber Co. v. Thompson, 11 Idaho, 508, 83 Pac. 933, 114 Am. St. 274, and we are still in entire accord with what was there held. What is said here is in conformity with the decision of the court in that case. Reading sections 1682, 1683, and 1685 together, it seems that the Legislature intend, ed that every taxpayer shall list all "solvent debts" due him, and all deposits he may have in any bank, together with all shares of stock he may hold in any national or other bank, and that he is entitled to a deduction from the total amount thereof in the sum of his "unsecured debts due to bona fide residents of this state." This is emphasized by the affidavit on the list or statement which immediately precedes the blank spaces on the notice to be filled in with the names of the persons to whom the debts are due and the amounts thereof. This affidavit must be made by the taxpayer. It has reference to matters that are within his personal knowledge and deals with a personal claim and right that the taxpayer may set up. The object of requiring him to list his debts and the names of his creditors is for the purpose of enabling the officers to verify the truth of the statement and to subject the taxpayer to the pains and penalties of perjury if he swears falsely. While the bank is authorized and required to list the names of its stockholders and the number of shares held by each, it has no authority to claim the deductions to which the taxpayer is entitled. The information which the bank is required to furnish is within the knowledge of the bank and a matter of record on its books; but the stockholder's indebtedness is not within its knowledge, and, besides, it has no way of binding the stockAt the hearing before the board of equal- holders by the affidavit and statement or decization, on the protest filed by the bank larations of its officers. Further, the taxpayand its stockholders, an affidavit was filed er who claims such deduction is required to by the president and cashier of the bank in specifically waive the right to plead the bar which it was shown that six of the stock- of the statute of limitations to any of the There is still another reason, however, in this case, why the respondent is not in a position to complain of any lack or defect of notice, even if notice had not been given. After the first order was made for a raise in the assessment of the stock in respondent's bank, the bank and its stockholders made a personal appearance before the board of equalization at the time and place designated and presented their protests and objections to the proposed raise. This was a waiver of notice, and served all the purposes that were intended to be accomplished by the issuance and service of the notice itself. Moore v. Koubly, 1 Idaho, 55 (58); Godfrey v. Douglas County, 28 Or. 448, 43 Pac. 171; O'Dell v. Rogers, 44 Wis. 136; Hayes v. Shattuck, 21 Cal. 52. |