Sidebilder
PDF
ePub

Ex parte BROWN.

$800.00 which has not been given by the petitioner. It is further stipulated that the

(Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma. Dec. time for giving of said bond has not yet

18, 1909.)

1. HABEAS CORPUS (§ 30*)-WHEN LIES-IRREGULARITY IN PROCEDUre.

elapsed. It is further stipulated that the attorney for the petitioner in error may have 10 days from this date in which to file brief Habeas corpus does not lie to correct mere in support of his application, and that the irregularity of procedure, where there is jurisdic-state shall have 10 days additional to file antion. There must be illegality or irregularity sufficient to render the proceedings void.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. § 25; Dec. Dig. § 30.*] 2. COURTS (8 74*) - COUNTY COURTS - CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.

The jurisdiction of a county court in criminal cases is the same in all respects, whether its sessions are held at the county seat or at a county court town.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Dec. Dig. § 74.*]

3. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 83*)-JURISDICTION.

When there is jurisdiction of the party and of the offense for which he was tried, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Dec. Dig. § 83.*]

4. COURTS (§ 36*)-COUNTY COURTS-PRESUMPTIONS AS TO JURISDICTION.

County courts are entitled to the same presumption of jurisdiction as are the district

courts.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. 144; Dec. Dig. § 36.*]

(Syllabus by the Court.)

swering brief. It is further hereby stipulated between the parties, that the court may fix a bond in such sum as it may deem proper for the appearance of the petitioner, pending the hearing herein.

"Dated at Guthrie, Oklahoma, this the 11th day of November, 1909. "Freeman E. Miller,

"Attorney for Petitioner. "J. W. Reece,

"County Attorney, Payne County. "Chas. L. Moore,

"Assistant Attorney General."

"Agreed Statement of Facts.

"It is hereby agreed by and between Ralph Brown and the state of Oklahoma that the following are the facts in the matter:

"That on September 30, 1909, there was filed by the clerk of the county court of Payne county, Okl., in his office at Stillwater, the county seat of Payne county, an information, duly verified, presented by J. W.

Application of Ralph Brown for writ of Reece, county attorney, substantially charghabeas corpus. Writ denied.

The petitioner, Ralph Brown, on November 11, 1909, filed in this court a petition signed and verified by his oath, wherein he avers that he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty by one W. A. Fox, sheriff of Payne county, at and in the common jail of said county, and for the reasons stated therein petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus be allowed, and that he be discharged. On said date there was also filed a stipulation and agreed statement of facts, as follows:

"Stipulation.

"The petitioner by his attorney, Freeman E. Miller, having filed his application for habeas corpus, in the above-entitled cause, the state of Oklahoma, by J. W. Reece, county attorney of Payne county and by the Attorney General, waive the issuance of a formal writ in the above-entitled matter, and waive the presence of the petitioner and submit the cause to the court upon an agreed statement of facts hereto attached and marked 'Exhibit A' and made a part of this stipulation. It is further stipulated and agreed that the petitioner is now actually confined in the county jail of Payne county, under judgment and sentence of the county court of said county, for an alleged violation of the liquor law, penalty assessed being $200.00 fine and 90 days in jail, and that the county court fixed an appeal bond in the sum of

ing said Ralph Brown with having, on June 10, 1909, unlawfully sold one pint of whisky to Wm. Walker for the price of $1. That said defendant, Ralph Brown, was on October 4, 1909, duly arrested on warrant under said information, and on October 4, 1909, said defendant was duly arraigned on the charge contained in said information in the county court of Payne county, Okl., at Stillwater and entered his plea of 'Not guilty,' and his bond fixed by said court in sum of $400. That on the 4th day of October, 1909, said county court at Stillwater set said cause for assignment at Stillwater for trial, on the 19th day of October, 1909, and defendant had due notice that cause would be assigned on that day for trial at future day. That on October 15, 1909, defendant filed in said county court at Stillwater, Okl., his written request and demand that the same be set down and assigned for trial at Stillwater. That afterwards on October 15, 1909, said county attorney filed his affidavit in said cause deposing and saying that public convenience and the convenience of the parties in interest and of the witnesses require that the hearing in the above cause be had at Cushing, Payne county, Okl. That afterwards on said 15th day of October, 1909, said county court at Stillwater, the state and defendant being present, overruled said demand and request of defendant for trial at Stillwater, and ordered and adjudged that said

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Reporter Indexes

cause be assigned for trial at Cushing, Payne | considered by said county court at the said county, Okl., on the 1st day of November, town of Cushing, and in all things over1909, and to all and each said defendant duly ruled when so sitting, to which action of objected and excepted. That on Monday, No- the court the defendant at the time duly exvember 1, 1909, the county court of Payne cepted. county convened and opened in regular term at town of Cushing, Payne county, Okl., with Hon. P. D. Mitchell, county judge, present as presiding judge; and there were also present Lulu M. Regnier, county court stenographer and ex officio clerk of county court, Al Goldsby, deputy sheriff, J. W. Reece, county attorney, and also other attorneys.

"That on said Monday, November 1, 1909, the county court of Payne county, Okl., sitting at town of Cushing, took up in order all cases set for trial for that day, and by reason of other cases standing for trial with priority, the case of State v. Ralph Brown was not called for trial until Tuesday, the 2d day of November, 1909. That afterwards on November 1, 1909, the said defendant duly filed in the county court at Cushing, Okl., his special appearance and objection to the jurisdiction of said county court sitting at Cushing to try said cause or to make any order or proceedings therein, for the reason that said court sitting at Cushing had no jurisdiction to try, hear, or determine the same, or to make any order or proceeding therein, which objection was by the county court sitting at Cushing in all things overruled, to which action of the court the defendant at the time duly excepted. That on November 2, 1909, the said cause was called for trial, and the objection of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court having been overruled, and the defendant having excepted thereto as aforesaid, all at the town of Cushing, Okl., the court ordered said trial to proceed; and thereupon a jury was duly impaneled, and said cause was tried at the town of Cushing, Okl., by a jury, and afterwards on the same day said jury returned into the court sitting at the town of Cushing as aforesaid their verdict finding the defendant guilty as charged in the information, and fixing his punishment at a fine of $200 and imprisonment in the county jail for 90 days. That afterwards on the 4th day of November, 1909, the defendant filed in said county court sitting at Cushing his motion for a new trial, one of the grounds therein stated being that said court sitting at Cushing had no jurisdiction to hear, try, or determine said cause, or to make any order or proceeding therein; and that afterwards on November 5, 1909, the said motion for a new trial was heard and considered by the said county court at the town of Cushing, and in all things overruled, to which ruling of the court the defendant at the time duly excepted. That afterwards on said November 5, 1909, the said defendant filed in said county court at the town of Cushing, aforesaid, his motion and application in arrest of judgment, which motion and applica

"That thereafter on said November 5, 1909, the said county court, while sitting at the town of Cushing aforesaid, sentenced the said defendant in said cause and entered upon his record of the proceedings of said court an entry thereof, finding him guilty as charged in the information, and sentencing him as a punishment therefor to pay to the state of Oklahoma a fine of $200 and to serve a term of 90 days in the county jail of said county, and to pay the costs of the prosecution, to which action, order, and judgment of the court the defendant at the time duly excepted. That a true and correct copy of said judgment and sentence is hereto attached as 'Exhibit A,' and made a part hereof. That a commitment on said judgment and sentence was issued by said county court on the 5th day of November, 1909, and said defendant is now confined in county jail of Payne county, Okl., by W. A. Fox, sheriff, by virtue of said commitment and judgment and sentence. That the presence before this court of Ralph Brown, defendant, is hereby waived. said defendant, Ralph Brown, at all times herein mentioned, was and is a legal resident of the immediate vicinity of town of Cushing and within two miles of the county court room in said town of Cushing. That said defendant, Ralph Brown, on the 20th day of October, 1909, presented his appearance bond in said cause, and same was duly approved, and he was at liberty, until judgment and sentence was passed upon him on November 5, 1909, as above. That said appearance bond is hereto attached as 'Exhibit B' and made a part hereof.

That

"Witness our hands this 11th day of November, 1909.

"Freeman E. Miller,.

"For Petitioner.

"Chas. West, Atty. Gen.,

"Chas. L. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen.,. "J. W. Reece, Co. Atty.,

"For Respondent."

Freeman E. Miller, for petitioner. Chas. West, Atty. Gen., Chas. L. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., and J. W. Reece, Co. Atty., for the State.

DOYLE, J. (after stating the facts as above). This proceeding presents but one question: Did the county court of Payne county, convened at the court town of Cushing, have jurisdiction of the party and of the offense for which he was tried?

Article 13, c. 19, p. 255, of the Session Laws of 1907-08 entitled "An act to provide for holding sessions of the county court of Payne county, Oklahoma, at the town of Cushing, in said county," provides for holding sessions

the town of Cushing. Section 2 of said act | trict courts, county courts, courts of jus-
reads as follows: "Sec. 2. The jurisdic-
tion of said court shall be the same in all
respects as if exercised at the county seat.
Any person instituting proceedings in said
court may file, at the time, an affidavit,
showing that the convenience of the parties
in interest requires the hearing to be had at
said town, and it shall be so ordered; pro-
vided, that such parties may subsequently
agree to transfer such hearing to the county
seat." The petitioner at every stage of the
proceedings objected to being tried at Cush-
ing. Counsel for petitioner contends that
the trial, conviction, and sentence in the
county court of Payne county convened at
Cushing was illegal, null, and void for want
of jurisdiction, and argues ingeniously that
the affidavit provided for in said section 2
is a necessary prerequisite to obtaining ju-
risdiction to try the cause at the town of
Cushing. He places particular stress upon
the clause fixing the time the affidavit should
be filed. That portion of said section reads
as follows: "Any person instituting proceed-
ings in said court may file, at the time, an
affidavit, showing that the convenience of
the parties in interest requires the hearing
to be had at said town, and it shall be so
ordered." Counsel in his brief says: "The
phrase 'at the time' can refer to no time
other than the time when the proceedings
are instituted, and in this case they were
instituted when the information was filed on
September 30, 1909. They certainly had
been 'instituted' long before October 4, 1909,
when defendant was arraigned and entered
his plea of not guilty to the charge, and
long before October 15, 1909, when the de-
fendant's written demand for a trial at Still-
water was overruled by the county court and
when the county attorney filed the affidavit
for a transfer of the cause to the town of
Cushing. As we view it, the law simply
means that the county court at Stillwater
never has jurisdiction to try a cause except
by retransfer under the agreement of the
parties if the affidavit for transfer has been
filed at the time the proceedings are insti-
tuted, and, on the other hand, if the affidavit
is not filed at the time' the proceedings are
instituted, the court at Stillwater has full
and complete jurisdiction of the case, from
which it cannot be ousted by an affidavit
subsequently filed, after arraignment and
plea and written demand for trial by the
court at Stillwater." We cannot believe
that this contention is well founded. As we
view this provision, it furnishes merely a
rule of practice applicable in a certain class
of cases. The jurisdiction of the county
court of Payne county is the same in all
respects, whether the sessions are held at
the county seat or at Cushing.

tices of the peace, municipal courts, and such
other courts, commissions or boards, inferior
to the Supreme Court, as may be established
by law." In section 11 of said article 7 it
is provided: "There is hereby established in
each county of this state a county court,
which shall be a court of record." In sec-
tion 12 of said article 7 it is provided:
"County courts shall have jurisdiction con-
current with justices of the peace in misde-
meanor cases, and exclusive jurisdiction in
all misdemeanor cases of which justices of
the peace have not jurisdiction." In section.
13 of said article 7 it is provided: "The
county court shall be held at the county
seat, but the Legislature may provide for
holding sessions of the county court at not
more than two additional places in the coun-.
ty." Section 2007, Snyder's St., provides:
"In the several counties of this state com-
mencing on the first Mondays of January,
April, July and October of each year, except
as otherwise herein provided, county court
shall convene at the county seat and con-
tinue in session so long as the business may
require: provided, that said court shall al-
ways be open for the transaction of all pro-
bate business in their respective counties."
Section 2009, Snyder's St., further provides:
"If there is only one place other than the
county seat at which it is provided by law
for holding terms of the county court, the
terms of said court at such place shall com-
mence on the first Mondays of February,
May, August and November of each year,
and continue in session for the period of 3
weeks, if the public business requires it."

It appears from the agreed statement that the October term of the county court of Payne county convened at Cushing on Monday, November 1st, as prescribed by section 2009, Snyder's St., above quoted, and, in the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction to try this class of misdemeanors, the petitioner was there tried, convicted, and sentenced for a violation of the prohibition law. Where the power of a court in a particular matter is derived directly from the Constitution, it is not a special jurisdiction, and jurisdiction will be presumed unless the contrary appears of record. Ex parte Earl Howard, 2 Okl. Cr. —, 103 Pac. 663. Section 5137, Snyder's St., provides: "The proceedings of this court are construed in the same manner, and with like intendments, as the proceedings of courts of general jurisdiction, and to its records, orders, judgments and decrees, there are accorded like force, effect and legal presumption as to the records, orders, judgments and decrees of district courts." We are of opinion that the manner and method of assigning criminal cases for trial by the county court of Payne county, at the county seat or Section 1, art. 7, of the Constitution, pro- at the town of Cushing, is not jurisdictional, vides: "The judicial power of this state and therefore does not present a question shall be vested in the Senate, sitting as a that will be reviewed in a habeas corpus

Dig. § 515; Dec. Dig. § 212.*]

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent.

it is provided that: "No court or judge shall | but the right of appeal cannot be given from inquire into the legality of any judgment or any other tribunal. process, whereby the party is in custody, or discharge him when the term of commitment has not expired in either of the cases following: * (2) Upon any process issued on any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction."

**

3. COURTS (§ 212*)-APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF SUPERIOR COURTS-POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO CONFER-INFERIOR COURTS."

The board of supervisors of a county, though exercising judicial functions, is not an ing that the superior court shall have appellate inferior court within Const. art. 6, § 5, providjurisdiction in cases arising in. justices' and other inferior courts, as the term "inferior courts" are courts established for the administration of justice, charged with the exercise of judicial power as a substantive duty, but with limited jurisdiction usually confined to the lim

created, and police, municipal, and recorders' courts are examples of inferior courts within the Constitution.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 515; Dec. Dig. § 212.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 4, pp. 3580-3582.]

Upon principles which may be considered well settled by a series of decisions of this court, the writ of habeas corpus does not lie to correct mere irregularity of procedure, where there is jurisdiction. There must be illegality or irregularity sufficient to render the proceedings void for want of jurisdic-its of the city or town for which they are mainly tion. Ex parte Charles Johnson, 1 Okl. Cr. 414, 98 Pac. 461; In re Geo. McNaught, 1 Okl. Cr. 528, 99 Pac. 241; Ex parte Flowers, 2 Okl. Cr., 101 Pac. 860; Ex parte Earl Howard, supra; Ex parte Mingle, 3 Okl. Cr. 104 Pac. 68; Ex parte Justus, 3 Okl. Cr. -, 104 Pac. 933. The statutes contain 37 acts creating county court towns. It is to be regretted that many of these acts were drawn carelessly and with a total disregard of legal certainty, and there seems to have been no effort to secure uniformity in their various provisions. These various acts were necessarily fruitful of legal questions. To relieve this condition the general law was passed, to wit, article 9, c. 14, p. 191, Sess. Laws 1909, providing for uniformity in the sessions of county courts in the several counties in the state, and repealing all laws in conflict therewith. This act became effective

June 11, 1909. The constitutionality of this law is unquestionable.

Viewing the law as we do, the application for writ of habeas corpus for the release of the petitioner will be denied.

FURMAN, P. J., and OWEN, J., concur.

4. COURTS (§ 212*)—APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF SUPERIOR COURT-POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO CONFER-INFERIOR COURTS.

Irrigation Act (St. 1897, p. 254, c. 189) § 4, authorizing an appeal to the superior court from an order of the board of supervisors of an irrigation district, is in conflict with Const. the county, in proceedings for the formation of art. 6, § 5, providing that the superior court shall have appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in justices' and other inferior courts, as the act attempts to authorize an appeal from an order of the board of supervisors which is not an inferior court.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. § 515; Dec. Dig. § 212.*]

mandate by Walter Chinn and others against In Bank. Original petition for a writ of the Superior Court of San Joaquin County to compel the court to proceed with the hearing and determination of an appeal.

Writ denied.

Benj. F. Wulff, for petitioners. L. L. Dennett, for defendant.

LORIGAN, J. It appears from the petition for the writ that P. E. Lindstrom and CHINN et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF others made application to the board of suSAN JOAQUIN COUNTY. (S. F. 5,298.) pervisors of San Joaquin county for the formation of an irrigation district in said coun(Supreme Court of California. Nov. 19, 1909.) ty to be known as "the South San Joaquin 1. COURTS (§ 1*)-SOURCE OF JUDICIAL POWER Irrigation District." The application was -LEGISLATIVE INTERFERENCE. made under the provisions of the act of Where the jurisdiction of courts, original or 1897 (St. 1897, p. 254, c. 189, Gen. Laws 1906, appellate, is fixed by the Constitution, the Leg-p. 501), and such proceedings were had in islature cannot limit or extend it. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. 2; Dec. Dig. § 1.*]

2. COURTS (§ 212*)—APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF SUPERIOR COURT-POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO CONFER.

Const. art. 6, §§ 1, 5, providing that the judicial power shall be vested in enumerated courts, including superior courts, and that the superior court shall have appellate jurisdiction "in such cases arising in justices' and other inferior courts *** as may be prescribed by law," confers on the Legislature power to provide the method and extent to which an appeal from justices' and inferior courts may be taken,

the matter that on March 22, 1909, an order granting the application for the formation of the district was made by the board, and the objections of the petitioners for this writ against the inclusion of their lands within said district were overruled. Section 4 of the irrigation act provides for an appeal directly to the superior court of the county from such order of the board of supervisors, said appeal to be taken and heard in the same manner as appeals from the justice's court to the superior court, with power con

court-and the right of appeal cannot be given from any other tribunal.

ferred on the superior court to enter a judg-| from a court-either a justice or inferior ment affirming, modifying, or reversing the order of the board of supervisors appealed from. The present petitioners, being dissatis- The contention of the petitioners here fied with the order made by the board of su- necessarily is that, because the board of supervisors in the matter of the formation of pervisors in the exercise of powers confersaid irrigation district, perfected an appeal red upon it may sometimes act judicially, to the superior court of San Joaquin county, therefore it constitutes a court-an inferior in conformity to said section 4 of the act, court-from whose judicial action the Legisand, the matter coming up for hearing before lature may provide an appeal under the consaid court, the appeal was dismissed, the su- stitutional provision pertaining to the apperior court holding that it had no jurisdic- pellate jurisdiction of the superior court. tion to entertain it for the reason that the Undoubtedly a board of supervisors may provision of the act attempting to confer ap- perform functions which are judicial in pellate jurisdiction on the superior court, to their character, as it may perform, and entertain an appeal from the order of the mainly does, those that are executive and board of supervisors, was unconstitutional ministerial. It exercises, in fact, in a minor and void. The petitioners thereupon applied degree, the powers of the general governto this court for a writ of mandate to compel ment-executive, judicial, and ministerial. the respondent-the superior court of San As said in People v. Provines, 34 Cal. 521, Joaquin county-to proceed with a hearing 528: "The word 'supervisors' when applied and determination of said appeal. An alterna- to county officers has a legal signification. tive writ was issued, to which a demurrer The duties of the officers are various and was interposed, and the matter is submitted manifold-sometimes judicial and at others for decision on that demurrer.

legislative and executive. From the necesIt is provided by the Constitution (article sity of the case it would be impossible to 6, § 1) that the judicial power of the state reconcile it to any particular head; and shall be vested in the Senate, in the Su- therefore in matters relating to police and preme Court, District Courts of Appeal, su- fiscal regulations of counties they are alperior courts, justices of the peace, and "such lowed to perform such duties as may be eninferior courts as the Legislature may estab- joined upon them by law, without any nice lish in any incorporated city or town, or examination into the exact character of the city and county." Section 5 of the same powers conferred. But, because a board of article, after declaring in what cases the supervisors may exercise judicial functions, superior court shall have original jurisdic- it is by no means an inferior court within tion, provides that they "shall have appel- the meaning of that term as employed in the late jurisdiction in such cases arising in jus- Constitution relative to the appellate juristices' and other inferior courts in their re- diction of the superior courts. The term spective counties as may be prescribed by "inferior courts" has a well-recognized meanlaw." It is a well-recognized principle that ing. They are courts established for the adwhere the judicial power of courts, either ministration of justice, charged with the original or appellate, is fixed by constitu- exercise of judicial power as a substantive tional provisions, the Legislature cannot ei- duty, but with limited jurisdiction in that ther limit or extend that jurisdiction. While regard, and that jurisdiction usually confinit is true that under the constitutional pro- ed to the limits of the city or town for visions conferring appellate jurisdiction up- which they are mainly created. Police courts, on the superior courts the matters to which municipal courts, and recorders' courts are, that jurisdiction on appeal shall pertain-to for example, inferior courts. But they are what extent and in what manner the pro- courts-inferior courts-as that term is emceedings or action of justices' or inferior ployed in the constitutional provision bearcourts may be reviewed-is not provided for, ing on the appellate jurisdiction of the subut is left solely to the determination of the perior court, and are the character of courts Legislature, still an express limitation is im- to which that appellate jurisdiction applies. posed as to the character of tribunals whose Courts are tribunals which exercise funcproceedings may be reviewed in the exer- tions of a strictly judicial character, and it cise of its appellate jurisdiction, and it can is only inferior courts, as such, that the be exercised in case of appeals from "jus- constitutional provisions respecting appeals tices'" or "inferior courts" only. All the to All the to the superior court has reference to. authority that is given to the Legislature, Boards of supervisors, common councils, and under the constitutional provision last referred to, is to provide the method and extent to which an appeal from these courts may be taken. It has no power to enlarge the tribunals from which it may be taken, because the constitutional provision has expressly declared of what those shall consist. The appeal to the superior court, when pro

other local boards, while they may be invested with mixed powers, including, among others, the power to act judicially in a matter before them, are not courts. At best, they are, in the exercise of that power, proceeding as quasi judicial bodies, something quite distinct from courts, and in no manner do they constitute inferior courts, as

« ForrigeFortsett »