money from the sheriff of Darke county in the said case. This reply is inconclusive, for the parties in question may have received notes or some form of security and payment, even if they did not receive money from the sheriff of Darke county. Hence upon this feature of the case the reply is not good against demurrer. The demurrer to the reply was properly sustained and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. MARSHALL, C. J., and ROBINSON, JONES, MATTHIAS, DAY, and ALLEN, JJ., concur. WANAMAKER, J., not participating. SPONSELLER v. SPONSELLER. (No. 18236.) (Supreme Court of Ohio. May, 1924.) (Syllabus by the Court.) Court may 1. Husband and wife 299(1) approve agreement adjusting alimony. In a case where a wife sues for alimony, a court has the power to approve an agreement made by the husband and wife adjusting such alimony. 2. Judgment 481-Consent decree adjusting alimony held not subject to collateral attack. Where a court acquires jurisdiction over such subject-matter and the parties, a consent decree adjusting alimony cannot be collaterally attacked. 3. Judgment 90-When consent decree adjusting alimony may be vacated stated. If such decree has been fraudulently procured, or obtained without consent, a party may have such consent decree vacated at the same term, or thereafter vacated or modified, under sections 11631 and 11635, General Code. 4. Estoppel ~91(1)—Husband held estopped from collaterally attacking consent decree adjusting alimony. Where a wife petitions for alimony, and the court by decree has approved an agreement between the husband and wife adjusting alimony, whereby the husband agrees to convey property to the wife on condition that she resumes marital relations with him, and thereafter she, in good faith, carries out the agreement, the husband is estopped from collaterally attacking the validity of such decree. William and Sadie Sponseller were husband and wife. On July 6, 1920, Sadie, the wife, filed her action asking partition, claiming ownership in fee simple of an undivided one-third part of certain premises in Crawford county, Ohio, and also for an accounting of rents and profits. The title to the other two-thirds of the premises was conceded to be in the husband. Other issues in relation to the conveyance of 261⁄2 acres to one Spaide and a mortgage to one Drexel were tried by the Court of Appeals and determined in favor of the plaintiff and will not be disturbed by this court. The alleged title to the one-third of the premises which plaintiff claims in her petition rests upon a certain decree made in a former case which will be referred to later. William Sponseller, the husband, filed his answer and cross-petition to this partition case in which he made the following defense: That on November 22, 1912, the wife filed her petition in the Crawford county common pleas court, praying for alimony; that, without trying the cause, the alimony case was dismissed by mutual agreement on consideration that they should resume their relations as husband and wife, which mutual agree ment was carried into effect; and that the decree awarding to plaintiff the undivided one-third of the premises was made without notice to the husband, was without authority in law, and was a cloud upon his title to the premises. He therefore asked that plaintiff's petition in partition be dismissed and the decree for alimony in the former case be canceled and expunged, and for such general relief as he might be entitled. The decree in the previous alimony case, rendered on November 27, 1912, stated that the cause came on to be heard "on the pleadings and the evidence, and was submitted to the court, upon the same and the agreement of the parties herein, and the court being fully advised in the premises, and on consideration thereof finds that plaintiff was at the time of the filing of her petition herein, and amendment thereto, and still is, a bona fide resident of said county of Crawford and that there is a separation of plaintitt from defendant in consequence of ill treatment on his part against her, and that by reason thereof, and said agreement of the parties herein, the plaintiff is entitled to alimony out of the real estate of the defendant hereinafter described, which is subject to the life estate of said Sarah A. Sponseller, the widow of one Samuel Sponseller, deceased. It is therefore considered, ordered, adjudged, and decreed by court that said plaintiff, Sadie Sponseller, have and possess as Error to Court of Appeals, Crawford and for alimony the equal one undivided third County. part of the following described lands and tenements of defendant subject to said life estate, to wit: [Description of the premises.] It is further considered, ordered, adjudged and decreed by court that the said defendant, William Sponseller, within 20 days thereof, execute and deliver over to plaintiff his certain deed of genFor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes Suit by Sadie Sponseller and William H. Sponseller. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and cause remanded, and defendant brings error. firmed.-[By Editorial Staff.] Af (144 N.E.) infidelity, as it appears from the journal entry that the court in fact heard the case upon the pleadings and evidence and found that there was a separation because of ill treatment on the part of the husband. Even if eral warranty conveying unto her the said equal one undivided third part of said lands and tene`ments subject to said life estate, and in default thereof this judgment and decree shall operate as and for such deed and so much thereof as would show the transier of the title | to said undivided equal one-third part of said the journal entry should be construed as real estate subject to said life estate shall withdrawing all charges made by either parbe certified by the clerk of this court to the county recorder of said county for record. The court further finds that the charge made by the defendant as to the infidelity of the plaintiff is not sustained, and that defendant admits herein that said charges are not true, and all charges made by either party against the other are withdrawn. It is further considered, and adjudged by court that defendant pay all the costs herein taxed at $, and execution for such said costs is hereby awarded." ty, it at least discloses that it was an agreed entry whereby the parties settled the case by agreeing that the wife should "have and possess as and for alimony the equal one undivided third part" of the premises described. [1-3] The court having jurisdiction in the alimony case, both of the subject-matter and of the parties, had the right to enter the decree it did. The decree having been made by the agreement of the parties was an adjudication as effective as if the merits had This action in partition was filed in the been tried, and was not subject to collateral common pleas court, which awarded parti- attack. Where the court has jurisdiction of tion and an accounting. The cause was ap- both the subject-matter and the parties, and pealed to the Court of Appeals, and in that a consent decree has been entered by the court was heard upon its merits and sub-court, such a decree is not even subject to mitted upon the pleadings and the evidence. direct attack, except for irregularity or fraud The Court of Appeals found from the issues in its procurement. In Harding v. Harding, joined in favor of the plaintiff, awarded par- 198 U. S. 317, 335, 25 Sup. Ct. 679, 684 (49 tition of the premises, as prayed, gave judg- L. Ed. 1066), Mr. Justice White quotes the ment to the wife for $866.66 on the Spaide following principle, as sustained by a large transaction, found the wife to be surety only number of authorities therein cited: on the Drexel notes and mortgage, found the wife to be entitled to an accounting for rents and profits, and remanded the cause to the common pleas court for that purpose. Thereupon the plaintiff in error instituted proceedings in error in this court, seeking a reversal of the decree of the Court of Ap peals. O. W. Kennedy and Gallinger & McCarron, all of Bucyrus, for plaintiff in error. L. C. Feighner, of Bucyrus, for defendant in error. "Decrees so entered by consent cannot be reversed, set aside, or impeached by bill of review or bill in the nature of a bill of review, except for fraud, unless it be shown that the consent was not, in fact, given, or something was inserted as by consent that was not consented to." If the decree of November 27, 1912, was not obtained by consent, or was procured by fraud, the husband had ample authority to have such consent expunged by the court during the term, or the entry vacated or modi stated: JONES, J. In the suit for alimony filed tied after the term by a direct attack, under sections 11631 and 11635, General Code. It by Sadie Sponseller on November 22, 1912, is not necessary to refer to the large number the court heard the case on the issues joined, of authorities supporting the principle anfound that the plaintiff was a bona fide resi-nounced as to the effect and validity of judgdent of the county, and that there was a sep-ments by agreement. These are collated in aration of the wife from the husband "in the numerous text-books relating to that subconsequence of ill treatment on his part ject, among which we find the following rule against her." The court thereupon awarded her alimony under section 11998, General Code, decreeing that the wife should "have and possess as and for alimony the equal one undivided third part" of the premises described. There is no doubt, in the judgment of this court, that the decree entered by the court in the former alimony case was a decree by the consent of the parties. The phrase "agreement of the parties" is twice used in the journal entry. However, it is claimed by plaintiff in error that the court had no jurisdiction to render any decree, since the closing words thereof stated that "all charges made by either party against the other are withdrawn." There may be some doubt as to whether said charges so withdrawn do not relate to the charges of 144 N.E.-4 * * "Courts have the general power of entering judgment by consent of the parties, and a judgment may properly be entered by a court for the purpose of carrying out a settlement and compromise of a suit. In one sense consent to the entry of a judgment appears to give it greater force than ordinary judgments. This is due to the fact that consent excuses errors and operates to end all controversy between the parties. In spite of the foregoing peculiarities of judgments by consent, the law has been broadly laid down that as between parties sui juris, and in the absence of fraud, a judgment or decree of a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and rendered by consent of the parties, though without any ascertainment by the court of the truth of the facts averred, is as binding and conclusive be tween the parties and their privies as if the | in doing so, may adjudge the conveyance of real suit had been an adversary one, and the con- property by one to the other, in pursuance of clusions embodied in the decree had been ren- such agreement." dered upon controverted facts and due consideration thereof by the court." 15 Ruling Case Law, pp. 643–646. The question we have here was featured and queried in the case of Olney v. Watts, 43 Ohio St. 499, 3 N. E. 354. There the hus-vious, under this record and the finding of band attempted to obtain a modification of a former alimony decree. It appeared that "If, however, it shall, in the further progress of the case, appear that the former decree, in stead of being in the nature of alimony payable in installments for the support of the wife, was in the nature of a permanent division of the husband's property, and that the parties fixed the same by their own agreement, and the action of the court in the premises was simply an affirmance of the agreement by consent, this, if alleged and proved, may turnish a complete defense. As to that we express no opinion now." Substantially the same arguments as are now urged by counsel for plaintiff in error were made in the case of Julier v. Julier, 62 Ohio St. 90, 56 N. E. 661, 78 Am. St. Rep. 697. Julier's wife had obtained a divorce for his aggression on a petition containing a prayer for general relief. An agreement with respect to alimony had been made between the husband and wife, where, in consideration of sums paid to her, the wife re leased her dower in the husband's real estate. The jurisdiction of the court to render the decree relating to the release of dower was contested, for the reason that the wife's dower right was not the subject-matter before the court for adjudication. The court held that under her prayer for general relief it was empowered to adjust the rights of the parties in respect to alimony, and, in the course of the opinion, Williams, J., said, at page 111 (56 N. E. 664): "It appears to be well settled that in awarding the alimony, the court may, in its discretion, and generally will, confirm and carry into effect by its decree, any agreement which the parties have entered into concerning the same, that the court deems just and reasonable, and [4] However, there is another reason why this judgment should be affirmed. Even if it be conceded that the husband had a right to make a collateral attack upon the consent decree obtained in November, 1912, it is obthe Court of Appeals on appeal, that the plaintiff in error cannot prevail. It seems that the Court of Appeals heard the issue whether the decree was made without notice to the defendant or with the consent of the parties, and found in favor of the wife upon that issue. The evidence given by the wife, supported by that of her son and two of her daughters, tended to prove that the former alimony case was called by the court, and the evidence of the plaintiff submitted therein; that at the close of the plaintiff's testimony a settlement was arrived at between the parties and their counsel, whereby marital relations were to be resumed upon the condition and understanding that the husband was to give to the wife an undivided one-third of the property and to keep and educate the children; and that the trial judge was informed of this agreement prior to the making of the decree. After the making of that settlement and the resumption of marital relations on the part of the husband and wife, if this testimony be true, the present contention of plaintiff in error evinces an attempt upon his part to deny the wife the fruits of the compromise after she has in good faith carried out her agreement by resuming her marital relations with him. Under the authority of the principle announced in Sanborn v. Sanborn, 106 Ohio St. 641, 140 N. E. 407, the husband is clearly estopped from questioning the validity of the consent agreement in this proceeding. It is conceded that after the agreement was made the parties lived together as husband and wife for nearly eight years. Should there be a future separation between this husband and wife, wherein alimony may again be prayed for, a court would no doubt give consideration to the extent of alimony allowed and approved in the former decree. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. MARSHALL, C. J., and DAY and ALLEN, JJ., concur. MATTHIAS, J., concurs in propositions 1 and 2 of the syllabus, and in the judgment. WANAMAKER, J., not participating. (144 N.E.) to it. At the time of said purchase the West PENNSYLVANIA CO. v. WEST PENN RYS. Penn Railways Company owned 23,192 shares CO. (No. 18334.) (Supreme Court of Ohio. June 3, 1924.) (Syllabus by the Court.) 1. Judgment 847-Assignee of valid judgment may recover thereon in any court of competent jurisdiction of same state. of the stock of the Wheeling Traction Company, and at a later date purchased 171 additional shares, thereby acquiring all the outstanding stock of the Wheeling Traction Company. After the purchase of said Judgments the West Penn Railways Company brought an The assignee and owner of a valid judgment action as assignee and transferee of said rendered in any court of record in Ohio may judgments against the Pennsylvania Commaintain an action and recover another judg-pany in the court of common pleas of Allen ment thereon in any court of competent jurisdiction within this state. 2. Judgment 920-Record and proof of ownership sufficient in action on judgment stated. In such action no other proof is necessary than the record of such former judgment and competent evidence of a valid assignment and transfer thereof. 3. Judgment 908-Action on Judgment maintainable against one of two judgment debtors, who are joint tort-feasors, without service on the other. Where a judgment has been rendered against two joint tort-feasors, an action can be maintained and final judgment rendered upon the record of such judgment against one of such judgment debtors, even though no service of summons is made upon the other judgment debtor. There being no contribution between joint tort-feasors, the record of such judgment is a joint and several liability. county, Ohio, basing its claims for judgment solely upon the rendition of the former judgments and its present ownership thereof. The Pennsylvania Company entered its voluntary appearance in that action and filed an answer admitting the rendition of said judgments, and that said judgments were rendered against the Pennsylvania Company and the Wheeling Traction Company jointly, and that said companies were jointly charged with negligence, and that the Pennsylvania Company had always been ready and willing to pay one-half of said joint judgments, but that the Wheeling Traction Company had refused to pay its half thereof. The answer further alleges that by reason of the ownership by the West Penn Railways Company of a large amount of stock of the Wheeling Traction Company, and the payment by the West Penn Railways Company to said judgment creditors of the full amount of their respective judgments, the transfer of said judgments to the West Penn Railways Com Error to Court of Appeals, Allen County. Action by the West Penn Railways Com-pany amounted to a conspiracy whereby it pany against the Pennsylvania Company. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.-[By Editorial Staff.] was sought to compel the Pennsylvania Company to pay the entire amount of said judgments. It further alleged that the purchase of said judgments in the manner aforesaid amounted to a payment and satisfaction thereof, and that said pretended payment of Pennsylvania Company. The reply filed by the West Penn Railways Company made denial of those allegations. Upon the trial an agreed statement of facts was submitted, in which certified transcripts of the judgments were admitted, and it was also admitted that "no merger or consolidation of the West Penn Railways Company and the Wheeling Trac tion Company was ever had, but that each have ever since maintained independent or said judgments was in law a fraud upon the MARSHALL, C. J. On February 8, 1916, a collision occurred between an interurban car of the Wheeling Traction Company and one of the trains of the Pennsylvania Company, as a result of which three passengers on the traction car were seriously injured, to wit, John J. Williams, Charles B. Strahl, ganizations." and J. F. Lee Strahl. Each of said passen- In this proceeding the Pennsylvania Comgers brought actions against both railroad pany contends against the right of the West companies jointly for damages in the com- Penn Railways Company to acquire the joint mon pleas court of Mahoning county, Ohio, judgments rendered against the Wheeling and each of said passengers recovered a Traction Company and the Pennsylvania judgment against both railroads jointly. Company, and contends that such acquisiThe judgments so rendered were not being tion amounted to a payment and satisfac paid by either of said defendants, and, execu- tion thereof, and further contends that, intions being threatened, the West Penn Rail- asmuch as the three judgments were renderways Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, ed in an Ohio court, no action can be mainpurchased all of said judgments and had tained to recover another judgment upon the same properly assigned and transferred such judgments in another Ohio court. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes On the first of these propositions it ap-der to procure an attachment and garnishpears from the agreed statement of facts ment of moneys due to the Pennsylvania that the West Penn Railways Company did Company payable in Allen county. It may not own all of the stock of the Wheeling be wondered why the West Penn Railways Traction Company, and for this reason its Company did not merely bring proceedings action in purchasing the judgments would in aid of execution in that county, instead of not amount to a payment and satisfaction of asking for a new judgment, and it may be the judgments, and the further fact that the wondered, on the other hand, how the Penn. West Penn Railways Company acquired the sylvania Company has been prejudiced by balance of the stock of the Wheeling Trac- the suit for judgment rather than a proceed. tion Company at a date subsequent to the ing in aid of execution. One proceeding purchase of said judgments, would not aid would not be materially more or less exin producing that result. We are further pensive than the other. Neither would one of the opinion that, even if the West Penn be materially more or less annoying than the Railways Company had owned all of the other. stock of the Wheeling Traction Company at the time of the purchase of such judgments, it would have made no difference. It appears from the admitted facts that there never had been any merger, and that separate corporate organizations had always been maintained. This specific admission is fully supported by other detailed admissions in the statement of facts, showing that separate and distinct boards of directors managed the affairs of said corporations, and this court or any other court may not thus collaterally inquire in an independent action into the relations of the two corporations to determine whether such relations were in violation of the corporate laws of the state of the residence of the one or the other. The Wheeling Traction Company, being a corporation organized under West Virginia laws and the West Penn Railways Company being organized under Pennsylvania laws a determination of the corporate status of either of those companies can only be made in a proper proceeding in the courts of one or the other of those states. In this independent action the presumption obtains than they were separate and distinct corporations and this presumption becomes absolutely conclusive in view of the admissions contained in the statement of facts. Upon consideration of the statement of facts, the court of common pleas of Allen county reached the conclusion that the West Penn Railways Company was the owner of the judgments rendered in Mahoning county, and, the Pennsylvania Company being in court, and the Wheeling Traction Company not having been served with summons and not being in court, judgment was rendered against the Pennsylvania Company for the full amount of the judgments. The Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment, and this court can find no error in that affirmance. [3] There being no contribution between joint tort-feasors, and the full amount of the judgment being recoverable against either of the defendants, the assignee of the judgments could proceed against either or both, and the judgment against the Pennsylvania Company is therefore valid, even though the Wheeling Traction Company was never served in the suit in Allen county. [1, 2] The rights of a judgment creditor or the assignees of a judgment creditor to bring successive suits to recover successive judgments have been determined by this court in the affirmative in several early cases which have been approved in later cases. That proposition has full approval in Headley v. Roby, 6 Ohio, 521; Tyler's Ex'rs v. Winslow, The West Penn Railways Company having 15 Ohio St. 364; Moore v. Ogden, 35 Ohio purchased the judgments from the owners St. 430. The principle has been approved in thereof, and it appearing from the admitted | Doyle v. West, 60 Ohio St. 438 (54 N. E. 469), facts that full value was paid therefor, it and the principle is discussed at length on only remains to inquire whether an action page. 446 of the opinion. can be maintained in the court of common pleas of Allen county to obtain a judgment in that county by the assignee and transferee of judgments rendered in the court of common pleas of Mahoning county. The objection urged by counsel for the Pennsylvania Company is that such an action cannot be maintained unless there is some particular reason why such action is necessary. It is on the other hand the contention of the counsel for the West Penn Railways Company that the mere existence of one judgment does not preclude the entry of another judgment, even though the only proof submitted is the record of such former judgment. It is, however, contended that it was necessary to bring the latter suit in or We are unable to see that any injustice has been done by the rendition of the additional judgment, except in the matter of additional costs. But, inasmuch as an answer was filed setting up a defense of fraud and conspiracy which was not sustained by the trial court, the Pennsylvania Company may not justly be heard to complain of the additional costs. Section 11628, General Code, gives to the trial court a discretion in the award and taxation of costs according to the equities of the case, and, if it should be made to appear that a judgment creditor is seeking to obtain repeated adjudications and to have one judgment after another entered upon the same cause of action and against the same |