Misc.] Supreme Court, February, 1918. tinguished from mere formal compliance). (2) If the law intended that the county clerk's signature should be affixed to the notice, its omission was not a jurisdictional error and the case falls within the rule that laws enacted in the interest of the public welfare or convenience, for the protection of human life, in regard to the rights of franchise and providing remedies against either public or private wrongs, should be liberally construed with a view to promote the object in the mind of the legislature. On the other hand, statutes in derogation of common rights, or conferring special privileges on individuals or corporations, should be construed strictly against those specially favored. The requirements of a statute which are mandatory must be strictly construed while those which are directory should receive a liberal construction for the accomplishment of the purpose of the act. As a general rule statutes relating to remedies and procedure are to be construed liberally, with the view to the effective administration of justice. 36 Cyc. 1188. Statutes in regard to the franchise and elections should be construed liberally in favor of the voters. As was stated in People ex rel. Hirsh v. Wood, 148 N. Y. 146: "The object of election laws is to secure the rights of duly qualified electors, and not to defeat them. Statutory regulations are enacted to secure freedom of choice and to prevent fraud, and not by technical obstructions to make the right of voting insecure and difficult." I am mindful of the fact that a situation may arise. where an official failure to perform a duty demands a resubmission of the questions, especially so, if the petition was suppressed and no notices posted or published within the time prescribed by law, and the voters misled or kept in ignorance of the submission of the questions, but nothing of that sort was claimed here. Supreme Court, February, 1918. [Vol. 102. The petition of the electors was properly made out and filed, the certified copy thereof filed with the county. clerk, the notices, correct in form and substance, were duly posted and published, a full and fair vote was recorded, and all under a proceeding which complied with the terms of the statute. The will of the electors as expressed at the polls should be upheld. The motion for resubmission, therefore, is denied, without costs. Motion denied, without costs. THE MORRIS PLAN COMPANY OF BUFFALO, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM G. MILLER, Impleaded, etc., Defendant. (Supreme Court, Erie Special Term, February, 1918.) Motions and orders - corporations - contracts — courts — when motion to vacate garnishee order denied — Code Civ. Pro. § 1391. A New York corporation which has a factory in another state is for all purposes a resident of the state of New York, and though the wages of a judgment debtor employed in said factory are paid there the situs of his contract of employment is in the state of New York; and a motion to vacate a garnishee order, issued under section 1391 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the ground that money due and to become due to him on said contract is beyond the reach of the courts of the state of New York, will be denied. MOTION by the judgment debtor, William G. Miller, to vacate an order of garnishment under section 1391 of the Code of Civil Procedure. L. L. Ottaway, for judgment debtor. J. J. Price, for judgment creditor. SEARS, J. The judgment debtor moves to vacate a garnishment order under section 1391 of the Code of Civil Procedure because of the following facts: The Misc.] Supreme Court, February, 1918. judgment debtor is a resident of Pennsylvania where he is employed by the Welch Grape Juice Company, a New York corporation which has a factory in Pennsylvania where the judgment debtor works and also has a factory in the state of New York. The Welch Grape Juice Company pays the judgment debtor in Pennsylvania; all his work has been performed in Pennsylvania except during the autumn of 1917 when the judgment debtor worked for the Welch Grape Juice Company in this state for about two months. It is the judgment debtor's contention that Pennsylvania is the situs of the employment contract and that the money due and to become due thereon is beyond the reach of the courts of the state of New York. Unless the situs of the contract between the judgment debtor and the Welch Grape Juice Company is within the jurisdiction of this court the order in question must be vacated. National Broadway Bank v. Sampson, 179 N. Y. 213; Flynn v. White, 122 App. Div. 780. It is well settled that the situs of debts and obligations usually is in the domicile of the creditor but the attachment laws of our state have changed this rule and recognize the right of a creditor to attach a debt or credit owing or due to a non-resident by a person within the jurisdiction where the attachment issues. Carr v. Corcoran, 44 App. Div. 97. The provisions of section 1391 of the Code of Civil Procedure are analogous to the provisions of the Code in relation to attachment and the rule applicable to attachments is applicable here. The situs of the contract in this case, therefore, is the residence of the Welch Grape Juice Company. It is firmly established that the residence and the domicile of a corporation are in the jurisdiction of its origin. Douglas v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 209; Bridges v. Wade, 113 App. Div. 350. In Flynn v. White, 122 App. Div. 780, to be sure, it Supreme Court, February, 1918. [Vol. 102. was held that a New York business man whose home was in New Jersey, yet who was in daily attendance at his regular office for the transaction of business in New York city, kept his money on deposit in the banks of that city and made the contract out of which the obligation grew there, which by its terms was payable in New York city, was sufficiently within the state of New York so that the debt there in question was subject to attachment in this state, despite the fact that his technical domicile may have been in New Jersey. I do not think that that case is controlling here. The Welch Grape Juice Company is, in my opinion, for all purposes a resident of this state and is not a resident of the state of Pennsylvania, and the situs of the contract for the employment of the judgment debtor therefore is also in this state. Motion, therefore, is denied. Motion denied. FRANK H. FREEMAN, Plaintiff, v. LOUIS ENGEL, Defendant. (Supreme Court, Erie Special Term, February, 1918.) Pleading - allegations of — complaint — demurrer tracts actions - Personal Property Law. Nothing in the Personal Property Law forbids a notice of a sale of property retaken by a conditional vendor being given prior to the expiration of the thirty days for redemption provided the time of sale is fixed subsequently thereto. Where a complaint alleges that defendant sold to plaintiff an automobile upon a conditional contract of sale under which the title was to remain in the vendor until full payment of the purchase price; that on the 7th day of September, 1917, plaintiff was in default in his payments under said contract and that the defendant in the exercise of his rights seized the machine and on the eleventh day of September served notice and advertised the car for sale on the 11th day of October, 1917, to satisfy the unpaid balance due on the purchase price, with interest, Misc.] Supreme Court, February, 1918. insurance charges and storage, a demurrer to the complaint for legal insufficiency of the allegations to constitute a cause of action will be sustained, and plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings will be denied, and the complaint dismissed, with costs of the motion. MOTION by the plaintiff for judgment on the pleadings. Bartlett & Roberts, for plaintiff. Saperston & McNaughton, for defendant. WHEELER, J. The complaint alleges that the defendant sold to the plaintiff an automobile upon a conditional contract of sale, by which the title was to remain in the vendor until paid for, according to the terms of the contract; that on the 7th day of September, 1917, the plaintiff was in default in his payments under said contract, and the defendant, in the exercise of his rights, seized the machine, and on the eleventh of September served notice and advertised the car for sale on the 11th day of October, 1917, to satisfy the amount remaining unpaid, with interest, insurance charges and storage. It is conceded the car was sold on said day, pursuant to said notice. The plaintiff contends that under the provisions of the Personal Property Law the defendant could not lawfully sell the car at the time stated, but was required to wait full thirty days before giving notice or advertising the property for sale, which would require the vendor to retain the property taken full forty-five days before making a sale to satisfy the vendor's claim; and that, inasmuch as the sale was made prior to the expiration of that time, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount paid by him on the contract, for which he sues. To this complaint the defendant demurred, as insufficient in law to constitute a cause of action. |