Appellate Term, First Department, December, 1917. [Vol. 102. of the defendant. Ellis indorsed it and as stated by the arbitrator in his report the defendant "needed the money badly to meet its payroll and satisfy materialmen," and having no banking facilities delivered it to one Walker, who is the vice-president of the defendant company, who took it to the plaintiff for the purpose of raising money upon it. As to what the arrangements were between Walker and the plaintiff regarding the note the report says, "I find that Mr. Fullman's (plaintiff) version of the agreement with Walker with relation to the disposition of the Olson note was the correct one. That the note was transferred absolutely to him for $750, the balance of the proceeds to be applied in reduction of his bill against Mr. Walker for $650." The arbitrator also found that the plaintiff subsequently loaned the defendant the sum of $100 as claimed by him. Having thus found in plaintiff's favor upon the only questions submitted to him by the arbitration agreement the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment in his favor for the sum of $100, but the arbitrator then proceeded to determine as a matter of law that Walker, the vice-president of the defendant company, had no authority to transfer the note to the plaintiff and apply any portion of its proceeds to the payment of the debt of $650 owing by him, and that consequently the plaintiff was liable to the defendant in a sum expressing the difference between the sum of $750 theretofore received by the defendant and the amount of the note, less the sum of $100, as a fee for its collection. It may be said here that the indebtedness of Walker was for legal services rendered, largely for and in the incorporation of the defendant company. The arbitrator states in connection with this transaction that," Walker was applying the balance of the note to a bill that troubled him and at that time on the Misc.] Appellate Term, First Department, December, 1917. financial side Walker and the company were pretty much the same thing." The determination of this question by the arbitrator involved passing on the direct or implied authority of Walker or of ratification of his acts by the defendant. Nothing of this kind was submitted by the arbitration agreement and " The law is well settled that the power of arbitrators is confined strictly to the matters submitted to them, and if they exceed that limit their award will, in general, be void." Dodds v. Hakes, 114 N. Y. 260-263. As before stated the award was filed with the clerk on August thirtieth but the judgment was not entered until September 4, 1917. Rule 5 of the rules governing these proceedings declares that" The arbitrator shall make his award in writing and file the same forthwith, together with his opinion, if any, with the clerk of the proper district. Unless both parties file a request in writing not to enter judgment, the clerk shall within two days after the filing of the award enter judgment in accordance therewith, provided the award has been filed within thirty days from the date of filing the consent." The consent bears date of August 3, 1917. The clerk's duties were mandatory and he certainly had no power to enter judgment after the expiration of two days. Judgment reversed, with thirty dollars costs to the appellant. BIJUR and PHILBIN, JJ., concur. Judgment reversed, with costs. 5 Appellate Term, First Department, December, 1917. [Vol. 102. JOHN J. FELIN & COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Appellant, v. ANGELO PETIX, Respondent. (Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department, December, 1917.) Negotiable instruments — bills, notes and checks - obligations of subse quent indorsers. While by the certification of a check the drawer and all prior indorsers are released, such certification does not affect the obligations of subsequent indorsers to their indorsee. APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, borough of Manhattan, first district, in favor of the defendant. William A. Reynolds (Chas. J. Katzenstein, of counsel), for appellant. Charles Novello, for respondent. GUY, J. The plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing the complaint in an action brought by the indorsee of a certified check against the last indorser thereof. The bank on which the check was drawn refused payment because of a question concerning the signature of the payee. The only point of law involved in this case is: Does the certification of a check by the bank on which it is drawn merely release the maker and all prior indorsers, or also release indorsers subsequent to the certification? The court ruled that a check once certified could pass from hand to hand, and the bank alone would be liable, thus discharging indorsers who indorsed subsequently to the certification. The rule seems to be that while the maker and all prior indorsers are released by certification of a check (See First Nat. Misc.] Appellate Term, First Department, December, 1917. Bank of Jersey City v. Leach, 52 N. Y. 350) such certification cannot affect the obligations assumed by subquent indorsers to their indorsee. Section 115 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides: "Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified indorsement, warrants: (1) That the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be; (2) That he has a good title to it; (3) That all prior parties had capacity to contract." Section 116 of the act provides that every indorser who indorses without qualification warrants to all subquent holders in due course the matters above set forth as contained in section 115, and that the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting, and in addition "engages that on due presentment it shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it." The provision of section 324 that " Where the holder of a check procures it to be accepted or certified the drawer and all indorsers are discharged from liability thereon" obviously applies to indorsers at the time of certification and cannot be deemed to operate as a release of a subsequent indorser from obligations assumed by him after the certification. Judgment reversed, with thirty dollars costs, and judgment directed in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of sixty-five dollars, with interest thereon from the 7th day of February, 1917, and appropriate costs in the court below. BIJUR and PHILBIN, JJ., concur. Judgment reversed, with costs. Appellate Term, Second Department, December, 1917. [Vol. 102 RUDOLPH W. LoTz, Respondent, v. STANDARD VULCANITE PAN COMPANY, Appellant. (Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, December. 1917.) Jurisdiction-meaning of " any equity jurisdiction" - depositions Muncipal Court of city of New York - Municipal Court Code, § 27(4) — Laws of 1916, chap. 610. constitutional law The term "any equity jurisdiction as used in section 18 of article VI of the Constitution of 1894 must be construed to mean jurisdiction of proceedings and remedies which were recognized at the time of the adoption of said Constitution as distinctly equitable in their nature, which an examination of a party before trial, at that time, was not. "The Section 27 (4) of the Municipal Court Code, added by chapter 610 of the Laws of 1916, and which provides: deposition of a party to an action in this court or of a person who expects to be a party to an action about to be brought in this court may be taken at his own instance or at the instance of an adverse party, or by a co-plaintiff or co-defendant at any time before or during the trial, in the same manner as such depositions are taken under the provisions of law applicable to like cases in the supreme court," does not attempt to confer upon the Municipal Court of the city of New York " any equity jurisdiction" and is not in conflict with the constitutional provision above mentioned. APPEAL by defendant from an order of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, borough of Brooklyn, fourth district, bearing date October 22, 1917, denying defendant's motion to vacate an order made by a justice of said court, and dated September 13, 1917, directing the examination of defendant as an adverse party before trial. Louis J. Halbert, for appellant. Louis A. Jaffer, for respondent. |