according to the course of the civil and maritime law, until, in the reign of Henry VIII., a statute was passed which enacted that these offences should be tried by commissioners of oyer and terminer under the king's great seal, and that the proceedings should be according to the law of the land. (Blackstone, Commentaries, iv. 268; Hale, Pleas of the Crown, ii. 16.) By 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 28, all offences tried in the Court of Admiralty are to be punished in the same manner as if committed on land. (§ 12). A similar provision is introduced in 9 Geo. IV. c. 31, for consolidating and amending the law relating to offences against the person. (§ 32). In the act for establishing the Central Criminal Court in London (4 Wm. IV. c. 36), the judges are empowered to determine offences committed within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England, and to deliver the gaol of Newgate of any person committed for any such offence. (§ 22). The Admiralty sessions are held twice a year, in March and October, at the Old Bailey. The judge of the Admiralty presides, and two of the common law judges sit with him. The proceedings do not usually occupy more than three or four days in the year. By 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, which is an act "to improve the practice and extend the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty of England," the Dean of Arches is empowered to sit as assistant to or in place of the judge of the court; and advocates, surrogates, and proctors of the Court of Arches are admitted in the Court of Admiralty. The judge of the Admiralty is empowered to make rules of court, and is to enjoy all the privileges which pertain to the judges of the superior courts. There is a clause which enables the court to try any questions concerning booty of war which may be referred to it by the Privy Council. The court is empowered to adjudicate on claims for services and necessaries to any ships which may not have been on the high seas, but within the body of a county, at the time when such services were rendered. Evidence may be taken viva voce in open court, or before commissioners. The court can direct issues on questions of fact arising in any suit to be tried before some judge of the

superior courts of common law; and is empowered to direct new trials, or to grant or refuse them; the exercise of the last-mentioned right to be subject to appeal. Other alterations are made, for which reference should be made to the act.

The Prize Court is the only tribunal for deciding what is, and what is not, lawful prize, and for adjudicating upon all matters civil and criminal relating to prize. By "prize" is to be understood every acquisition made jure belli (by the law of war), which is either itself of a maritime character, or is made, whether at sea or by land, by a naval force. All acquisitions by war belong to the sovereign power in the state, but are usually, by the law of each particular state (as in England by several acts of parliament), distributed in certain proportions among the persons who took or assisted in taking them. But the property in the thing captured is held by English jurists, agreeably to the general practice of the law of nations, not to be absolutely taken from the original owners, until, by the sentence of a properly authorized court, it has been condemned as lawful prize. We had, as it should appear, no court authorized to adjudicate on property captured by land-forces, or booty, as it is commonly termed by writers on the law of nations; but, when occasion required, commissioners were specially appointed for the purpose. The 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, enacts that the High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction to decide all matters and questions concerning booty of war when referred to it by the Privy Council (§ 22.) But property captured by the naval force forms the peculiar province of the Prize Court of the Admiralty. "The end of a Prize Court," says Lord Mansfield, "is to suspend the property till condemnation; to punish every sort of misbehaviour in the captors; to restore instantly, if upon the most summary examination there does not appear sufficient ground; to condemn finally, if the goods really are prize, against everybody, giving everybody a fair opportunity of being heard." (Douglas's Reports, p. 572, &c.) The Prize Court has also jurisdiction in matters of capture in port or on land, when the

capture has been effected by a naval force, or a mixed naval and military force. Vessels taken under the treaties for the suppression of the slave-trade are adjudicated by a mixed commission, composed of English and foreign commissioners.

In 1840 an act was passed (3 & 4 Vict. c. 66) to make provision for the judge, registrar, and marshal of the Court of Admiralty. It fixes the salary of the judge at 4000l., with a retiring pension of 20001. after fifteen years' service, or on becoming permanently disabled from performing his duties. It also prohibits the judge from sitting in parliament. The salary of the registrar is 1400l., without fees. In time of war, or in case of a great increase of business, the registrar's salary may be increased to 2000l. He must perform his duties personally; but if, in case of illness or absence, he neglects for two days to appoint a deputy, the judge is empowered to appoint one, and to fix his salary, which is to be paid out of the salary of the registrar. The registrar is appointed by the judge, and must be a proctor of not less than ten years' standing. In case of necessity, the judge may direct the registrar to appoint an assistant, subject to the approval of the judge, with a salary of 1200l. One of the duties of the registrar is to attend the hearing of appeals before the Privy Council, instead of the registrars of the Court of Chancery, on whom this duty devolved under 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 41. The marshal's salary is 500l., without fees, and may be increased to 8007. in time of war, or if the business of the court should increase sufficiently. The fees of the court are carried to an account called the fee fund, out of which all the officers are paid except the judge.

The business and fees of the Court of Admiralty are always much greater in time of war. From 1778 to 1782 Judge Marriot received 4500l. a year, the salary being 8007., and the fees averaging 37001. a year. On the return of peace his salary was increased to 9807.; and his total income during the peace averaged 13807. a year. In 1794 the salary of the office was increased by the addition of 4001, a year. In the first ten years of the French revolutionary war, the income of Sir W.

Scott averaged 5700l. a year, the salary being 2500l. and the fees 32001. About a thousand cases a year were determined by the court during the war. (Evidence of Dr. Nichol before Select Committee on Admiralty Courts, in 1833; reprinted in 1843 by order of the House of Com mons.) The Prerogative and Admiralty Courts were presided over by one judge on two occasions in the last century, from 1710 to 1714, and from 1773 to 1778. The Parliamentary Committee of 1833 recommended that the two judges of these courts should sit interchangeably, when occasion may require, either in one court or the other.

All sovereign states which are engaged in maritime war establish Admiralty Courts, for the trial of prizes taken by virtue of the commissions which they have granted. In determining prize cases, the Admiralty proceed on certain general principles which are recognised among civilized nations. Thus the commission which empowers the Prize Court to determine cases of prize, requires it to "proceed upon all and all manner of captures, seizures, prizes, and reprisals of ships and goods, which are or shall be taken, and to hear and determine according to the course of the Admiralty and the law of nations."

The Court of Admiralty for Scotland was abolished by 1 Wm. IV. c. 69. The representative of the nominal head of the court (the Lord High Admiral) was the judge; and there were inferior Admiralty jurisdictions, in which the law was administered by admirals-depute. The cases formerly brought before this court are now prosecuted in the Court of Session, or in that of the sheriff, in the same way as ordinary civil causes. The Court of Justiciary has become the tribunal for the decision of the more important maritime offences. The inferior jurisdictions not dependent on the High Court of Admiralty were not abolished by the above act. (Burton's Laws of Scotland.) There is an Admiralty Court in Ireland, but a prize commissioner has never been sent to it. By § 108 in the Corporations Reform Act (5 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 76) all chartered Admiralty jurisdictions were abolished, but that of the Cinque Ports,

was expressly reserved. In several of our colonies there are Courts of Vice-Admiralty, which not only have authority both as Instance Courts and Prize Courts, but have also, in certain revenue cases, concurrent jurisdiction with the colonial Courts of Record. (Stokes, On the Colonies, p. 357.) From the Vice-Admiralty Courts of the colonies an appeal lies, in instance causes, to the Court of Admiralty in England; and from the Court of Admiralty in England an appeal lies, in instance causes (whether originating in that court or coming before it by appeal), to the king in council; to which body the powers in maritime as well as ecclesiastical causes were transferred from the High Court of Delegates by 2 & 3 Wm. IV. c. 92. From prize causes, whether in the ViceAdmiralty Courts or in the Court of Admiralty in England, the appeal lies directly to certain commissioners of appeal in prize causes, who are appointed by the king under the great seal, and are usually members of his privy council, and whose appointment is generally regulated or recognised by treaties with foreign nations.

For the law on the whole of this subject, see Dr. Browne's View of the Civil Law, and the Law of the Admiralty; and Comyn's Digest, tit. "Admiralty."

ADMIRALTY, DROITS OF. [DROITS OF ADMIRALTY.]

ADOPTION, from the Latin adoptio. By the Roman law, if a person had no children of his own, he might make those of any other person his children by adoption. The relation of father and son at Rome originally differed little from that of master and slave. Hence, if a person wished to adopt the son of another, the natural father transferred (mancipated) the boy to him by a formal sale before a competent magistrate, such as the prætor at Rome, and in the provinces before the governor. [MANCIPATION.] The father thus conveyed all his paternal rights, and the child, from that moment, became in all legal respects the child of the adoptive father. If the person to be adopted was his own master (sui juris), the mode of proceeding was by a legislative act of the people in the comitia curiata.

The history of Rome abounds with instances of adoption. Thus one of the sons of L. Æmilius Paulus, the conqueror of Macedonia, was adopted by the son of Scipio Africanus the Elder, and thus acquired the name of Publius Cornelius Scipio; he was also called Æmilianus, to point out the family of his birth; and when he had destroyed Carthage, in the third Punic war, he received, like his adoptive grandfather, the appellation of Africanus, and is usually spoken of in history as Scipio Africanus the Younger.

Women could not adopt a child, for by adoption the adopted person came into the power, as it was expressed, of the adopter; and as a woman had not the parental power over her own children, she could not obtain it over those of another by any form of proceeding. Under the emperors it became the practice to effect adrogatio by an Imperial Rescript, but this practice was not introduced till after the time of Antoninus Pius (A.D. 138-161).

There was also adoption by testament: thus Julius Cæsar the Dictator adopted his great nephew Octavius, who was thenceforth called Caius Julius Cæsar Octavianus, until he received the appel lation of Augustus, by which he is generally known. But this adoption by testament was not a proper adoption, and Augustus had his testamentary adoption confirmed by a Lex Curiata. gustus in his lifetime adopted his stepsons Tiberius Nero and Claudius Drusus, the former of whom succeeded him in the empire. (Tacitus, Ann. i. 3; Suet. Tiberius, 15.) Tiberius, by the order and during the lifetime of Augustus, adopted his nephew Germanicus, though

Au

Tiberius had then a son of his own. Germanicus died in the lifetime of Tiberius; and on the death of Tiberius, Caligula, the son of Germanicus, became emperor. These adoptions by Augustus and Tiberius were designed to secure the succession to the imperial power in their family. At a subsequent period, the emperor Claudius adopted his step-son Domitius, afterwards the Emperor Nero, to the prejudice of his own son Britannicus. Tacitus remarks that Nero was the first stranger in blood ever adopted into the Claudian Gens. (Tacitus, Ann. xii. 25.) In the time of Augustus, the Julian law on marriage was enacted (B.c. 18), which contained heavy penalties upon celibacy, and rewards for having children. This law was so extremely unpopular, that, Suetonius says, it could not be carried until some of the obnoxious clauses were modified. (Suetonius, Aug. 34.) Afterwards, however, a law passed, called, from the Consuls who proposed it, Lex Papia Poppaa; and sometimes Lex Julia et Papia Poppæa, because it was founded on the Julian law on marriage, by which many privileges were given to those who had children; and among other things, it was declared that, of candidates for prætorships and other offices, those should have the preference who had the greatest number of children. This occasioned an abuse in the adoption of children. Tacitus says that in the time of Nero a "pestilent abuse was practised by childless men, who, whenever the election of magistrates or the allotment of provinces was at hand, provided themselves with sons by fraudulent adoptions; and then when, in common with real fathers, they had obtained prætorships and provincial governments, they instantly released themselves from their adopted sons. Hence the genuine fathers betook themselves with mighty indignation to the senate," and petitioned for relief. This produced a Senatus consultum, that fraudulent adoptions should not qualify for public office or capacitate a person for taking property by testament. (Tacitus, Annal. xv. 19.)

The eleventh title of the first book of Justinian's Institutes is concerning adoption. The Imperial legislation altered

the old law of adoption in several respects. It declares that there are two kinds of adoption: one called adrogatio, when by a rescript of the emperor (principali rescripto) a person adopts another who is free from parental control; the other, when by the authority of the magistrate (imperio magistratus) he who is under the control of his parent is made over by that parent to another person, and adopted by him either as his son, his grandson, or a relation in any inferior degree. Females also might be adopted in the same manner. But when a man gave his child to be adopted by a stranger, none of the parental authority passed from the natural to the adoptive father; the only effect was, that the child succeeded to the inheritance of the latter if he died intestate. It was only when the adopter was the child's paternal or maternal grandfather, or otherwise so related to him as that the natural law (naturalia jura) concurred with that of adoption, that the new connection became in all respects the same with the original one. It was also declared that the adopter should in all cases be at least eighteen years older than the person whom he adopted. Women were not empowered by the legislation of Justinian to adopt; but after having lost children of their own by death, they might by the indulgence of the emperor be permitted to receive those of others in their place. A slave, on being named a son by his master before a magistrate, became free, but acquired no filial rights.

Adoption (εἰσποίησις, ποίησις, θέσις) was common among the Athenians, and a man might adopt a person either in his lifetime or by his testament, and either a male or a female. The adopted person was transferred by the adoption from his own family and his own demos, to those of the adopter.

:

Adoption was no part of the old German law it was introduced into Germany with the Roman law, in the latter part of the middle ages. The general rules concerning adoption in Germany are as follow; but there are some variations established by the law of the several states.

The man who wishes to adopt must have no children of his own, or the adop