House of Commons, if men are returned by the force of bribery, who would be replaced by better men if there was no bribery. In a rich country, where men are ambitious of political distinction, and the system of representation exists, bribery also will probably always exist. Public opinion, or positive morality, will perhaps never be strong enough to stop the practice entirely. If it cannot be entirely stopped, the question is how it can be reduced to the least possible amount. It is generally assumed that the State should in some way attempt to suppress bribery at elections; but it might be worth consideration whether the State should make any attempt to prevent it by penal measures. It is not certain that, where there are large constituencies, there would be more bribery at elections if there were no laws against it; nor is it certain that worse members would be returned by such constituencies than at present. One objection to bribery being permitted, or not declared to be a legal offence, might be that the State would, by such permission, allow the purchase of votes as a thing indifferent, instead of declaring it to be a thing that ought to be punished. And it may be urged that the electors, instead of looking to due qualifications in their representative, would only look to his ability to pay, and would give their vote solely to him who paid most for it; which is the case even now in some constituencies, as experience has proved. But if this is not the case at present to any great extent in the largest constituencies; if in such bodies there are many to whom a bribe is not offered, and many who from various reasons would not accept it, what reason is there for supposing that there would be more bribery in such constituencies if there were no laws against it? When the constituencies are large and collected on a comparatively small surface, and when the time of the election is limited to a few days, bribery cannot be very effectually carried on, though it is true that there is time enough before the election for the opposite parties to canvass actively, and to divide a large constituency into districts for the purpose of better securing the votes. Still the numbers of the electors, their proximity, and the

shortness of the time, are obstacles to bribery. The proximity of the electors to one another might be supposed to favour bribery, because the trouble of dealing with a large number on a limited surface is less than the trouble of dealing with an equal number who are dispersed over a larger surface. This argument must be allowed to have its weight; but it is overweighed by another. In political discussions we must assume some principles as true. If the assumptions are not generally admitted, the conclusion will not convince those who deny the assumptions. If the assumptions are admitted to be true, it only concerns all parties to see that the conclusion is fairly drawn. It is here assumed that a majority of the electors in the largest constituencies, and a great majority of the educated class, admit that it is a mean, a dishonest act, to receive money for a vote; and they will also admit that a vote ought to be given to the man whom the voter thinks best qualified to be a representative. It is also assumed that opinion is more powerful in a dense than in a scattered population, and that the example and the opinion of a few men of character have more weight than the example and opinion of a much greater number of men who have no character or only a bad one. Now, when bribery is forbidden by law, it must be done se cretly: when it is forbidden by opinion, it will for that reason also be done secretly; and there are many acts the public doing of which is more restrained by opinion than by law. There are some acts which the law can hardly reach, and yet men do not for that reason take the less pains to do them secretly. If the buying of votes were not a legal offence, it is true that the purchase might be made openly. But it is not probable that it would be so; for there is no reason why that bribery which is now known or believed to be done in secret, and is condemned not because it is illegal, but for other reasons, would receive less condemnation if it were done openly. Nor is it probable that many candidates who now give bribes through agents who take all possible means to conceal themselves and their employers, in order to avoid

legal penalties, would choose to let their agents do it openly, simply because the legal penalties were removed. It is concluded, then, that the attempt would be to do it secretly from various motives, and mainly from respect to opinion, which condemns the act. But as the only fear would be the fear of opinion, it is certain that, though done secretly, it would not be managed with all the caution that it now is, and that the fact of a candidate being a purchaser of votes, or the fact of money being paid for votes, would be known beyond all doubt. As the law now stands, it is a very difficult thing to bring the proof of bribery home to a candidate; so expert are the agents in all the means for baffling investigation. When bribery is said and believed to have been practised at an election, who will undertake to prove that the candidate was privy to it, though he may be able to prove that large sums were expended in bribery? But if it should be known beyond all doubt that a man purchased votes at an election, or if it should be known beyond all doubt that money was given for votes, and if the fact were so notorious that it could be published with safety, either a man would on that account not buy votes at all, or that opinion does not exist against bribery which we have assumed to exist. If it does exist, in order to prevent bribery we must operate on the giver of the bribe rather than the receiver; on the few who can be dealt with, rather than on the many. It is here assumed that if bribery should be notoriously practised at an election, every body would believe that the candidate on whose behalf money was given, was privy to it or consented to it. Whether the money was his own or another person's, makes no difference in his moral offence, if he consents to have his seat by such means; and he who openly published the fact of bribery and charged the candidate with it, would do good service, and should need no legal defence except to prove the fact.

Bribery is most practicable and is most practised when the constituencies are small. When they are large and scattered over a large surface, bribery is also easily practicable. It is also practicable

and practised even when the constituencies are large and collected on a comparatively small surface; and it may cost no more to bribe a considerable portion of such constituencies than to bribe the whole or a majority of a small constituency. But the fewer persons there are to deal with, the less is the chance of detection; and therefore if the same sum will secure a seat in a small and in a large constituency, the small constituency appears to offer the better opportunity to the briber. Now as small constituencies may be and are bribed under the existing laws, so they might be bribed if there were no penalties against bribery. But for the reason already given the candidate would do it secretly, and yet the fact of bribery might become notorious, and the condemnation of opinion might fall upon him. At any rate there. is no reason for supposing that there would be more bribery in small constituencies than there is at present, if the penalties against bribery were repealed.

The modes suggested for preventing bribery are by penal enactments or by secret voting, or by both. As to penal enactments, many things have been and may be suggested; but the history of legislation teaches us that the ingenuity of the law-maker is always left far behind by the ingenuity of the law-breaker. It is impossible to say that any provision of any kind would exclude all the means of evading a law which have been and may be devised. If penal enactments however could greatly diminish bribery or reduce it to a small amount, the object would be substantially accomplished. But experience also teaches that the success of laws in preventing things forbidden is not exactly in proportion to the severity of the enactments.

The arguments urged to show that secret voting would greatly reduce the amount of bribery are insufficient: in the case of small constituencies, the arguments fail; in the case of large constituencies, secret voting might render bribery somewhat more troublesome. But it is probable that no penal enactments will ever materially diminish the amount of bribery in small constituencies, and that it will always be practised in such places,

legislature have not hitherto been in earnest in their attempts to prevent bribery at elections.

If there are to be penalties for bribery at elections, they should fall solely on the candidates. It may be objected that if this were so, attempts would be made in the heat of contested elections to charge a man with bribery who was innocent of it, and it is easy to suppose that unprincipled men would sometimes attempt to maintain such a charge. But as the proof of bribery by a candidate is not easy, even when he has actually bribed, it would not be made easier if he had not bribed. And as the case against him should be proved by most unexceptionable evidence, so the failure to substantiate a charge should be visited with costs heavy enough to deter dishonest men from making it. There remains a difficulty which arises out of the expenses incident to elections as they are now carried on, which are paid by the candidate, and are not expenses incurred for the purpose of buying votes directly or indirectly: these are expenses of printing, of committee-rooms, and of other things which are incident to what is considered fair canvassing. If public opinion were what it ought to be, or if the system of representation were placed on a sound basis, the candidate should pay nothing. The necessary expenses should be paid by the electoral district. There are no doubt difficulties connected with this branch of the subject, which could only be satisfactorily removed by those who are fully conversant with the nature and practice of elections. When the legislature shall take these matters in hand, and fairly grapple with all the difficulties attendant on elections, people will then believe that they really wish to put an end to the corrupt purchase of votes; when they shall see the legislature attempt to secure the purity of the elected as much as the purity of the electors, and not visit with equal or similar penalties the man who attempts to buy his way into the House of Commons by violating the Law, and the man who assists him by taking the bribe that is offered.

The effect that secret voting might probably have in preventing bribery, has been much considered of late years and

with great ingenuity of argument on both sides. An Argument in favour of the Ballot,' by W. D. Christie, M.P., contains also reference to the opinions of the late Mr. Mill, Mr. Grote, and others on this subject. A pamphlet entitled 'Is the Ballot a Mistake?' by S. C. Denison, contains, among other arguments against the ballot, the argument against its being likely to prevent bribery, and also much valuable historical information on the subject of voting at elections.

The mode in which bribery was managed at the election at Sudbury in 1841 is explained in the Report of the Commissioners to inquire into the existence of Bribery in the Borough of Sudbury, 1844.' It was fully proved that "Systematic and extensive Bribery prevailed at the last election of Members of Parliament in this Borough." (Commissioners Report.) Sudbury was disfranchised in 1844 by the act 7 & 8 Vict. c. 53.

The mode of investigating alleged cases of bribery by Election Committees is explained under ELECTIONS. The House of Commons have shown on several recent occasions a determination not to flinch from investigating cases of bribery; a circumstance which encourages us to expect that the subject will soon receive from them the consideration that its importance entitles it to. [CHILTERN HUNDREDS.]

BRICK, used in building, and too commonly known to require description. It is noticed here as an article on which a tax is levied. The activity of this manufacture is one of the most unerring indications of prosperity. In 1756 a tax on bricks and tiles was proposed by the ministry, but they were forced to give it up. (Walpole's Letters, iii. 203.) Mr. Pitt proposed bricks as an article of taxation in his budget of 1784; and though the opposition to such a tax was very great, his measure was carried, and an excise duty upon them was imposed by 24 Geo. III. c. 24. The duty was at first 2s. 6d. per 1000 on bricks of all kinds, or less than one-half of the present rate of duty. By 34 Geo. III. c. 15, an additional duty of 1s. 6d. per 1000 was imposed. In 1802 distinctions, which are still retained, were introduced in the denominations of bricks,