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of their continued service on agreed terms was mentioned as having a pecuniary value "incalculably great," for the protection of which the courts would act. On the same day that the foregoing decision was rendered the same court announced its conclusions in a case involving much the same principles (Eagle Glass Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, p. 152). In both these cases the District Court had granted a temporary injunction, which had been reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and in both the action of the Circuit Court of Appeals was reversed and the injunctive right granted. An additional point in the present case was as to threats of violation by an organizer, and the motive and purpose behind his activities, as to which leave was given to connect other persons within the jurisdiction of the court with such acts of the organizer named.
In Bossert v. Dhuy (p. 129) the Court of Appeals of New York considered the action of union carpenters in instigating a boycott against an open-shop establishment. Bossert's factory had been selected from among several as the one against which a boycott would first be declared, and the proprietors had secured an injunction, which was on this appeal reversed. The doctrine of the court, as already laid down, was referred to, and the acts found justifiable as being for the benefit of the membership and in good faith, rather than for any malicious purpose or for the destruction of the plaintiff's business.
That the union had gone beyond legal bounds in its boycott of àn employer was found by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Harvey v. Chapman (p. 128). The entire controversy apparently arose out of the failure of the employer to discharge his clerks on account of their neglect in the matter of the payment of dues to the union. The court held that there was no apparent justification for the conduct of the union in picketing and boycotting, it having no real dispute with the employer, and his employees not being engaged in the dispute.
The same court had before it a case in which rival organizations of moving-picture operators were involved (Martin v. Francke, p. 127). The proprietors of the theater, and their operators, who were members of the Knights of Labor, sought an injunction against a boycott and the advertising of the theater as unfair to organized labor. Although no actual loss in attendance was shown on account of the picketing, the rival union was enjoined from interfering with the rights of the employers and their employees. A quite similar case was brought before the Supreme Court of Minnesota, though in this instance the operator employed was not a union man. An injunction was sought to prevent the picketing of the theater and the carrying of a banner announcing that the proprietor was unfair to organized labor. It was held that the term "unfair" had a limited
meaning pertaining to the relations of the employer with organized labor, without implying moral shortcomings or lack of integrity, and since the effort was made to further the interests of the union, and not as a malicious interference with the right of the employer, no injunction would be allowed. It was said, however, that if, upon a hearing, the charges made were found true, proper relief would be afforded (Steffes v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, p. 125). A like conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of Montana in a case (Empire Theater Co. v. Cloke, p. 123), where the dispute arose over the refusal of the company to employ five members of the Musicians' Union at every exhibition of moving pictures. It was denied that the plaintiff had any vested right in the patronage of the defendants, or of any one else choosing to withhold it; nor had persons wishing to patronize the theater any vested rights of patronage; but they must take it on the terms imposed or leave it as they saw fit. Admitting that such dictation is offensive, it was held that attempted dictation is always present, and that the public must choose whether it will yield, such dictation not being an unlawful invasion of liberty if it amounts to nothing more than a demand which a person has a legal right to make, upon the alternative of his displeasure.
Involving circumstances quite similar to the Martin case above, is one (Tracey v. Osborne, p. 138), ni which an organization of shoe workers sought to restrain a rival union from causing employers to break agreements to employ members of the plaintiff union. Agreements had been made by the authorized agencies of the complaining union whereby employers should be furnished with labor by that union, so long as it was able to do so, and for that period members of the union should be employed to the exclusion of all others. The lawfulness of such agreements was sustained by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, and efforts to procure the breach of contracts of this nature were held to be an invasion of rights warranting the issue of the injunction.
Any distribution of cases involving labor disputes is difficult, in view of the fact that strikes involve picketing, and picketing is for the purpose of a boycott, while injunctions are sought to prevent whatever specific. act appeals to the aggrieved party as the vital or vulnerable point of attack. The cases grouped under this head therefore involve matters of picketing, conspiracy, etc. In a case passed upon by a United States district court, the obligation of a telephone company to maintain its service as set forth in its charter was pleaded, and a decree asked for, directing the company to render its service and maintain its equipment as a duty paramount
to the private interests of the company and all other persons whatsoever. It was replied that the inability to render service was due to the acts of strikers and sympathizers, who prevented the employment of repairmen, and an injunction was issued against interference with the company's employees. The contention was then raised that the injunction attempted to restrain the strikers from actions claimed to be lawful under the antitrust act as amended by the se-called Clayton Act. The court found that this act, sometimes called "Labor's Bill of Rights," also recognized the rights of the employer and of the public, and limited the acts it would justify to those which are lawful and peaceful, accepting as a fair test of peaceful picketing the inquiry as to whether these acts would be lawful if no strike existed (Stephens v. Ohio Telephone Co., p. 165). The injunction was not modified, the court holding that no actions permitted by the Clayton Act were interdicted by it. A circuit court of appeals also sustained an injunction, though with modifications, in a case. (Tri-City Central Trades Council v. American Steel Foundries, p. 158), where pickets had assaulted employees, threatening any who might take employment with the employers. All picketing was enjoined by the decree entered by the district court, but the court of appeals held that peaceful picketing was lawful. The principles governing strikes for higher wages and improved conditions were passed upon, such action being declared lawful, though if there is an unlawful conspiracy to destroy business, even lawful acts of striking employees may be restrained. The mere fact that business is interrupted was said not to determine the lawfulness of a strike, or of persuasion or picketing in the interests of a lawful strike; but the question of legality is to be decided upon the facts in each case. The status of former employees on strike was touched upon, being described as one of a temporary suspension of relations, but not one of an absolute determination of them; so that such interference as might lawfully be engaged in could not be said to be an act of mere intermeddlers.
An injunction was granted by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington (Alaska Steamship Co. v. International Longshoremen's Association of Puget Sound, p. 160), conspiracy and violence being shown, also interference with interstate commerce. Lawful picketing was recognized, but it was said that slight violence or intimidation would have much weight in determining its character. The right to strike was maintained, but no overt act obstructing the use of the complainant's property is justifiable. Reference was made in this case to the Clayton Act, but the privileges enounced were held to have been exceeded. Another case in which an injunction was granted was that of the Niles-BementPond Co. v. Iron Molders' Union (p. 172), in which a district court
for the Southern District of Ohio found strikers guilty of assaults and violent conduct participated in by members of the union and even the strike committee, with no apparent effort on the part of the union to discourage such wrongful conduct. The right to strike and maintain a peaceful picket was declared, but abuse and intimidation. were said to have no place.
An agreement of members of the union not to work with nonunion men was again upheld (Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers', etc., Union, p. 162), the complainant in this instance being an electric company whose opportunity to make contracts was being interfered with because other mechanics would not work on buildings on which nonunion employees were engaged. An injunction sought for was therefore refused by a lower court, this finding being approved by the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The same court granted a new trial in a case in which damages had been awarded by the court below by reason of the acts of strikers and pickets, a part of the damages allowed being for the expense of guards to protect the company's property. (Max Ams Mach. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, p. 164.) It was inferable that a portion of this expense was for guards employed after the issue of the injunction, and as it could not be assumed that the injunction would be violated, the court decided that such expense should be borne by the company itself if it wished to continue the guards, and it was for the allowance of this cost that the new trial was ordered.
Where an employer was engaged in the conduct of business on the open-shop plan, and both union and nonunion men had been employed, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the union men are within their rights in withdrawing from the employment, but may be enjoined from interfering with other contracts by means of a secondary boycott or blacklist. Damages by reason of the violation of an alleged contract by the officers of the union to furnish labor were held not to be available, since the officers had no power to make a binding bargain, unless authorized thereto in some definite way by the men themselves. (W. A. Snow Iron Works (Inc.) v. Chadwick, p. 171.) The illegality of a secondary boycott was also maintained by the Supreme Court of New York (Justin Seubert Inc., v. Reiff, p. 136), where there was an effort to compel the use of a union label; an injunction was therefore issued, and the question of damages was submitted to a referee.
A novel feature in a case passed upon by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire (White Mountain Freezer Co. v. Murphy, p. 169) was as to the right of the labor commissioner of the State to be exempt from testifying in a labor dispute, with regard to which he had obtained particulars by reason of attempts on his part to act as a conciliator. The court held that there was no confidential relation in
volved, but that his status was comparable to that of a subordinate court, so that he might be called upon to give evidence. It may be noted that the situation was changed by an act of the legislature making it impossible for the commissioner thus to give testimony in the future. The dispute in this case arose over an attempt to procure the unionizing of the shops, and questions as to whether the action of the union could be classed as a conspiracy and whether organized picketing was unlawful, were carried to the supreme court, which decided that under the circumstances the strikers were called upon to give evidence as to the lawfulness of their motives in declaring the strike, and that the legality of picketing would be determined by the facts shown in a disclosure of the methods used.
Punishment for contempt was considered by the Chancery Court of New Jersey in a case, Flockhart v. Local No. 40 (p. 163), in which the conduct of an alleged violator of an injunction was said to indicate an assumption on his part that he could by some means evade punishment for any act that he thought necessary for the success of the strike. In view of the persistence of the offenses jail sentences for 40 and 20 days were imposed upon two offenders, but there was a subsequent remission of the unexpired portion of the sentence on the ground that there had been a sufficient penalty to convince the offenders that they must obey the injunction.
Unfortunate events that frequently accompany labor disputes, resulting fatally in two cases noted, were considered by the California" Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Colorado. In the first instance (People v. Schmidt, p. 133), the court affirmed the conviction and sentence to life imprisonment in the case of a person charged with responsibility for the death of a person named, on the occasion of the destruction of the Los Angeles Times Building in 1910. The case turned largely on the nature of the evidence which connected the defendant with the events leading up to the explosion and its consequences; the principles governing convictions for conspiracy are also briefly discussed. The connection of the party with the different activities was held to be shown by the various items of circumstantial evidence developed, and the conviction was affirmed.
In the case before the Colorado court (Zancannelli v. People, p. 173), the action of the court below in convicting the appellant for murder was reversed, the circumstances being such that the court was not able to content itself with a simple reversal, but showed the animus of the prosecution and the court, and the nature and number of the errors to be such that if they had not been "written into the record as they are, under the seal of the trial court, we could not believe that such things had occurred in the trial of a cause in a court of record."
Another case that may be noted in this connection is one in which the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed a sentence of imprisonment