Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K.B., to Admiral 'MY DEAR SIR, 'Celorico, 2nd August, 1810. 'I have been much gratified by the receipt of your letter of the 24th July; and I assure you that I shall have much pleasure in co-operating with you for the public service. 'I doubt not that, before you left England, the King's servants gave you all the information in their power regarding the state of affairs in the Peninsula; but lest they should not, I will give you an outline of them in this letter. 'Since the battle of Ocaña in November last, and the subsequent passage of the Sierra Morena in January, there has been no Spanish army in the field capable of making any resistance to the French. The allied British and Portuguese army under my command in this quarter, and the corps of the Marquis de la Romana, consisting of about 10,000 or 12,000 men, without cavalry, on the frontiers of Estremadura and Portugal, are all that we have capable of opposing the enemy in front. There are small detachments of Spanish troops in the mountains of Ronda, between Gibraltar and Cadiz; in the Alpujarras in Grenada, and in Cuenca; and there is a body of troops still assembled with O'Donnell in the southern parts of Catalonia. But the operations of these troops are necessarily confined to enterprises on the enemy's flanks and rear, during the time they may be occupied in the siege of the fortified posts on the coast which still remain in the hands of the Spaniards, from the mouth of the Ebro to Cadiz; and to give countenance and assistance to the numerous bands of partizans which are carrying on a destructive warfare against the enemy in all parts of the Peninsula. The enemy's force in Spain consists of 250,000 men, according to the best accounts I can make of it. Of this force, above one third is engaged in the operations against this army. About 50,000 or 60,000 men, in three corps, are in Andalusia, of which 20,000 are engaged in the operations at Cadiz ; 15,000 * The above letter (the draft of which was missing from the Duke of Wellington's papers) has been supplied by P. C. Le Geyt, Esq., Secretary to the late Admiral Sir R. Keats, since the extract from it, misdated 8th August, 1810, was printed at page 315, and for which it should be substituted. or 16,000 about Seville, &c. protecting their rear, and Sebastiani, with the remainder, towards Grenada, &c. There are two strong corps in Catalonia and Aragon, but most of these troops are in the garrisons; and there are about 20,000 or 30,000 men about Madrid, in the Asturias, Biscay, Navarre, and keeping up the communication by the high road from France. From this relative view of the disposition of the two contending parties in the Peninsula, you will observe that the enemy have extended themselves to such a degree, that even with their large force they can make no rapid progress towards the final subjugation of the country till they shall have defeated this army, or obliged it to evacuate Portugal. They cannot carry on the siege of Cadiz in the south, and I doubt their being able to carry on that of Tarragona, or that of Tortosa in the east; and till we are removed, the whole machine appears brought to a stand. It happens, unfortunately, that we can receive but very little, if any, assistance from any of the bodies of troops, which I have above described as being still in existence, excepting from the Marquis de la Romana. However, being aware of the advantage of continuing upon the Peninsula, I propose to maintain my ground as long as I can, and I shall risk nothing at any great distance from the sea. I shall withdraw gradually towards Lisbon in proportion as I shall find myself pressed by the enemy; and, at last, if I should find that the chances are at all equal, I propose to try the event of a battle; if I should find they are not so, I shall embark the troops. 'We have transports prepared in the Tagus for this purpose, and I think it not improbable that I shall be able to bring away with me a part of the Portuguese army; but besides this army, it will be necessary to have some means prepared of carrying off the corps under the command of the Marquis de la Romana. When we shall go, this corps will be entirely cut off, and we must remove it as well as our own troops. I had, therefore, written to General Graham to request that he would apply to Admiral Pickmore to have the transports at Cadiz not immediately required for the troops sent round to the Tagus, from whence they can easily be sent to any point south of the Tagus, at which the course of the operations in this country might render it more convenient that the Marquis de la Romana should embark. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will attend to General Graham's application upon this subject. 'When matters shall come to a crisis here, it will be very desirable that we should have a large naval force in the Tagus; and as it does not appear that the enemy is now in a situation to attempt any thing at Cadiz, I would suggest to you to come round to the Tagus with your squadron at that moment. I am so strongly of opinion that no serious attack can be made at Cadiz, till we shall have been obliged to evacuate Portugal, that if I had not received the intimation of the wishes of the King's Government upon the subject, which I consider tantamount to positive orders, I should bring round to the Tagus for the contest General Graham and the greater part of the force under his command. So far for the general operations in the Peninsula. In respect to those at Cadiz, in which you are more immediately concerned, it is desirable that you should turn your mind at an early period, and should state your opinion to the Admiralty on the naval contest which there will be, sooner or later, in the inner harbour of Cadiz. As usual, the Spaniards left in the power of the enemy large naval means, in the merchants' yards at Trocadero, and they have others in the forests beyond Chiclana, &c., &c.; and I have heard from all quarters that they are actively employed in constructing craft. I apprehend that you cannot depend upon the Spanish seamen in this contest, although the Spaniards may be able to supply vessels. But, upon the whole of this subject, Government should have early information, if they have it not already. 'Adverting to the probable state of affairs at the moment that I might be obliged to evacuate Portugal, it has occurred to me, that as I shall immediately remove the army to the south of the Peninsula, we may, for some days at least, be stronger than the enemy engaged in the blockade of Cadiz, and that we might be able to strike a blow which should deprive them of their naval establishments on the Trocadero, &c. It is desirable that our minds should be turned to this object; and I will write to General Graham to request that he will have all the military information upon the subject, to enable me to decide on the enterprise, if it should be in my power to attempt it. In respect to other objects, you will observe that, even though I should be obliged to retire from Portugal, there are still many strong places on the coast of Spain, by means of which the contest in the Peninsula may be kept up. Tarragona, Tortosa, Peñiscola, Valencia, Alicante, Carthagena, as well as Cadiz, are fortified and garrisoned, and possibly each, but certainly most of them, are in a situation to receive important assistance from his Majesty's fleet. I do not know whether your station extends beyond Cadiz, but if it does not, the influence which you must possess over Sir Charles Cotton would induce him to attend to these places. From the character which I have heard of you, I have written to you with the freedom and confidence of an old acquaintance, which I beg you will attribute to my zeal for the cause in which we are both engaged, and to my desire to cooperate cordially with you for its success. 'I beg to be kindly remembered to Captain Cockburn*, and that you will |