stantly know, that his authority is derived from a source to which all his army look up for preferment, and from which alone he can draw security for himself. Establish the principle, that all his officers and men should be advanced according to seniority and gradation, leaving to him the sole authority of sending this colonel to one service and that to another, and what is the consequence? That the army be comes the property of the general more than the king. Just so of the company. If the civil and military officers do not look to home for preferment, if their fortunes are to depend solely on the chief governor, what more have they to do than to court his favour, by entering into his views. If he should desire to disobey the instructions, his army is ready to support him, for the parent power has yielded up the means of drawing the expectations of the body to itself. Unhappy land thus art thou devoted to the continuance of that pernicious system which has devastated thy fields, which has drenched. itself in thy blood, and fattened on thy spoils! Thus, miserable people, are you to be abandoned to the merciless and insatiable lusts of a successive band of sanguinary adventurers, before whose eyes no punishment is set up equal to the temptations which the luxuries of your land present to them! Would it not be better to say to the governor which you shall send out, act as you please in Hindostan for these four years to come? Do as you like; all I shall require from you is to give me an account of your transactions when you

return?

My bill was charged with erecting a fourth estate in the legislature. Did it erect any estate which did not exist at the time? The court of directors was the fourth estate, and my bill only changed the nature of that estate. It changed it from an estate without efficacy, to one which promised to have it. It changed it from one which, from its quality, was liable to much delusion, to one which, by being incessantly under the eye and inspection of parliament, was less liable to imposition, or to misconduct. It changed it from one not controlable, to one constantly under check, and removeable by address from either House. Could the commissioners have continued in office one moment after an address? They could not, like the present ministers in the last parliament, come to reason against the address. They must have retired. If that board had been nominated and removeable by the crown, I may venture to suspect that the bill would not have been so harshly treated in another House.

Had I made the board removeable by the crown, it might not have been so palatable to the last House of Commons; but to the other branches of the legislature, I think I may ven

ture to suspect it would have been more agreeable. I have been accused of grasping at power. Did I shew such a disposition? The road was open. I had only to be instrumental to the influence of the crown, to the increase of that influence which I had contributed to diminish, and the road to power was open. But it would neither have been honourable to myself, nor safe for the people. I chose my course; and I do not regret the personal consequences. This bill, on the contrary, increases the influence of the crown, without reforming the abuses of India; it goes a length which mine never presumed to go; and, indeed, it is too much the character of the present ministry to subject the country to very great and alarming inconveniencies, for very uncertain, and, at best, but very slender good.

With regard to the regulations which are proposed with respect to presents, I think that in the year 1784 they are idle and ridiculous. They were made in the year 1773They were then made as strong as they can be now, and they have been of no avail. The only efficacious plan of putting an end to this and every other abuse is, by the institution of a vigorous government. Place vigorous powers in the hands of men constantly under the eye of parliament, and what are the consequences? If they should come down and say, "We sent out strict injunctions, but they have been disobeyed,” the answer would be apt and conclusive, " Why do you not remove the disobedient officer? Instantly appoint his successor, and bring home the delinquent." Such was the prospect which I had in the appointment of commissioners; and so far am I from thinking that the institution of such a board would have given immense influence to the ministers who should appoint, that even now, when I shall hardly be suspected of wishing permanency to the ministers in being, I am most earnestly desirous that they should invest commissioners with the complete power of the Indian affairs; so anxious am I for the permanency of the Indian government.

But I was asked, why should the Indian government be rendered more permanent than the British? It is more necessary, in my opinion, that there should be more permanency in a distant government than in a near one. Shocks in the one cannot be observed when they happen, and the effect of changes might not be seen in time to be remedied. My board had not complete permanency, but it had a chance for permanency by its constitution. From what source has all the weakness of the Indian government sprung? From the variations which happened in our government at home. Why has Mr. Hastings presumed to disobey the orders of government? Because he has dependence on a party, which, in the

chance of changes may be able to protect him by the time that his disobedience is known. I see an honourable gentleman (Major Scott) smile. Perhaps that honourable gentleman's smile means to insinuate, that his great friend's dependence is on a power not liable to the changes of party, and from which all the calamities of the reign have originated. Perhaps it is too true, and too visible, that the present bill is the production of the same fountain. The time may come, and I trust it is not far distant, when the eyes of that quarter will be opened to the true interests of the crown and the people.

To sum up my objections to the first part of the bill, they are these. It provides for a weak government at home by the division of the power; and it perpetuates the abuses in India, by giving additional authority to the officers abroad. It is unstatesman-like in its principles; for it absurdly gives the power of originating measures to one board, and the nomination of officers for the execution of those measures to another. It increases influence without vesting responsibility; and it operates by dark intrigue, rather than by avowed authority.

In regard to the second part of the bill, consisting of the regulations, I think, and always did, that the zemindars and polygars ought to be restored to their possessions, and that the rents should be fixed and settled by a rule of past periods, and not of future inquiry. Begin fresh inquiries and assessments, and you give authority to the very evils which you profess to remove. I consider all the prohibitory clauses against presents, as mere words, and must do so in recollecting how much has already been tried, and to how little effect.

Mr. Fox here referred to the conduct of General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, of which he spoke in the most handsome terms; he alluded to the memorable expression of Lord Thurlow, "that he wished the ship had gone to the bottom that conveyed them to India;" an expression which he softened, by saying, that he made the wish" because he could spare them out of the world." He treated this language in terms of strong indignation.

The third part of the bill, which he should take notice of, I was that which related to the mode of trial intended to be adopted, instead of a trial by jury. He had no objection to that part which legalized evidence to be taken in India, and properly transmitted here; but what he never could give his assent to, was the abolishing the trial by jury; for although it was equally necessary for both judge and jury to possess a sound head, good sense, and an honest heart, yet the nature of their stations were widely different, one was to judge of the

matter of fact, the other of the law; the jury had merely to consider of the evidence before them: and the only similar trial to the one in question that he knew of, was that of a court-martial; but that materially differed, as every soldier at the time of his enlisting knew what tribunal he must submit to; but in the present instance, persons gone out to India went out on the faith of being tried, if occasion offered, by the then known laws of the land, and not by any arbitrary mode that might be afterwards adopted; and if the present bill was not to affect any that were already gone abroad, it was, in fact, doing nothing. In a court martial a man was tried by his peers, by men brought up in the same school, in the same profession, with the same notions of honour and discipline; but here was a material difference, and as the clauses were framed, it appeared to him intended more as a screen for delinquents, than as a punishment; for there were but two kind of accusers, and who were they? Why, the company or the crown. Now, supposing Mr. Hastings coming home; would the attorney general accuse him? No; certainly he would not, for the grave chancellor had declared the man innocent already. Well, then, would the company accuse him? Certainly not; for it would be an absurdity to suppose that the company who were his servants, his domestics, would dare to accuse him; therefore the tribunal might fairly be called a bed of justice, for justice would sleep upon it.

The India company would be sure not to accuse him, for at the time he was committing the depredations in Oude, to stop the mouth of the company, he sent them home an investment; and to curry favour, employed the son of the chairman, in direct opposition to the orders he had received from home; of course he was secure from the company, and had nothing to do but to make his peace with government; for he certainly was as much at their mercy as he would be in the most arbitrary and despotic country that ever was formed; for the mockery of three peers to be chosen, and six commoners, was absurd to a degree, as every person must know that the crown would have the appointment of the whole, and what chance did an individual stand who was to have the crown for his accuser, and to chuse the judges, to try and determine? He was extremely severe on the reflections that had been cast on him, relative to invading the charter, and pointed out by what means it would now entirely be taken away from the proprietors; therefore he cautioned them to be careful, not in the blindness of their zeal for a man, however fair his character might be, to suffer him to do that which they would hereafter be sorry for, when too late. He concluded by say

ing, he would not trouble the House any more at present, as he should have an opportunity in the committee, and he hoped several times before the bill passed, of pointing out to the country the danger there was in passing this bill, and the mortal stab it would give to the constitution of this country.

After a long debate, the House divided on the question, That the speaker do now leave the chair,

BILL FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE ESTATES FORFEITED IN THE REBELLION OF 1745.

August 2.

"HIS day Mr. Dundas moved for leave to bring in a bill to enable his majesty to grant to the heirs of the former proprietors, upon certain terms and conditions, the Forfeited Estates in Scotland, which were vested in a board of trustees by an act passed in the 25th of George the second, and to repeal the said act. Mr.

Pitt seconded this motion.

The

Mr. Fox said, the proposition had his most hearty approbation. The execution of some, and the confiscation of the estates of others, had sufficiently atoned for their crimes; and their descendants had been punished by forty years deprivation of their fortunes for the faults of their ancestors. principle of restoration was just, generous, politic, and humane, and he did not see that any one could form an objection to it. He approved so much of the principle, that he thought the proposition ought not to stop where it did; if the principle was good, it ought to be carried as far as it would go, and, therefore, it ought to extend to all forfeitures of estates in England, as well as in the highlands of Scotland for the same rebellion. Gentlemen would feel, that he alluded particularly to the case of a noble lord, to whom he had the honour of being related, he meant the Earl of Newburgh, the present representative of the Derwentwater family. He did not wish to speak of crimes long since committed, and long since atoned for; nor did he mean to justify rebellion; but this much he