disadvantage. And what yet more increased our loss was, that Spain might give France an opportunity of importing their wool under the sanction of the treaty, which restored both to France and Spain the privileges of the family-compact. By this France would be able to manufacture this article, and afterwards serve us with the commodity which we before made ourselves. And as it was a species of cloth which our wool would not make, we should be obliged to purchase it from France, under the disadvantage of their having the labour, and we the loss of the artificers; they the emolument, and we the loss of the manufacture.

Thus, having shewn in what manner the advantages of reciprocity were to be estimated in this treaty, he proceeded to several other articles. Among these was the importation of brandies into this country. He had before manifested, that in no possible manner could this treaty diminish the smuggling of this article into the country. And now he meant to evince, that the revenue could not possibly be benefited under the idea of a greater quantity of brandy being imported into the country. 600,000 gallons were the estimate of the brandies imported here. But of this quantity, only 160,000 gallons was the quantity imported annually from France. It was, therefore, evident that the rest must be chiefly imported from Spain, or some other countries on that part of the continent. Consequently, lowering the duties of what were imported from France could not increase the revenue; for, as what was imported from thence was evidently so disproportionate to what we imported from Spain and other countries, no increase of consumption in French brandies could possibly be expected. Unless the constitutions of the people could be altered, he believed a greater quantity could not be consumed than what was at present. He, therefore, could not conceive any advantages of revenue, or indeed commerce, to be derived from lowering the duties on this article. He then proceeded to the cotton manufactory. This, he said, was chiefly supported by the working of a raw material, of which no less a quantity than seventeen million of pounds of cotton wool was used. But of this quantity half was imported from France, Portugal, and the Brazils. Was not this an alarming circumstance to a manufacture of such consequence as the cotton, fustain, and velvet was to this country? By this treaty, France herself might withhold two millions of the quantity we used, and keep it for her own rising manufactures. And if we were deprived of this raw material, one of our greatest manufactures would be destroyed, or at least transplanted to France. What was there in the treaty to compensate for such an essential loss to the commerce of the kingdom? He knew of none. Much had

been said with regard to its reciprocity, but with all his examination of it he could not find one article in which any trace of that reciprocity existed.

Proceeding thus through several articles of our commerce, he adverted to our situation with Portugal with respect to the present treaty. As to the idea of our renewing or preserving the Methuen treaty, he had not the least expectation. We had not preserved to ourselves the only chance which could give us any pretence to ask it with confidence. Portugal knew that we had formed a treaty which precluded us from every possibility of making any advantage of any proposal we might offer, and she might think proper to reject. She would, therefore, not be inclined to give us a benefit for a bonus we had it not in our power to bestow; for notwithstanding we had a reserve to reduce her wines one third below those of France, yet as we had no means of giving, or rather selling, this advantage to any other, should she refuse it, she could have no reason to accept a proposition tending so much to her disadvantage. What gave a pretence for a treaty was, to have it in your power to offer to one, what, if rejected, you might, with advantage, offer to another. But this you could not expect in the present instance of Portugal wines, and therefore, he did not perceive on what species of confidence we could expect the Methuen treaty to be continued. What was to compensate for the advantage which we lost? 150,000l. of salt fish we annually sent to that country. Where could we find a market for this invaluable article of our commerce? If any where, we should expect to have it in France. For as we lost a benefit in consequence of giving them an advantage, we certainly had a right to expect from them a compensation. But could we expect this? No! They had a fishery of their own. They, therefore, would not take ours. Where, then, would the right honourable gentleman find the reciprocity in this particular? None could be found. It was consequently evident, that here a most material sacrifice was offered to the pretences of France. We lost not only this sale of our produce, as it might be called, but we lost this opportunity of reaping those advantages from our fisheries, which rendered them the nurseries of our seamen.

The right honourable gentleman had made some extraordinary observations concerning the importation of wines into this country, in consequence of the treaty. He did not conceive that any particular advantage could ever be derived from this concession-if it might be so called. Wines were certainly a luxury, and a most agreeable species of luxury, with which we could not dispense. But surely, their importation

on one third less duty than before would not prove the least advantageous to the country from any pretended equivalent that might be offered us. With respect to the equivalent which we were to have for the reduction of the duties on French wines, so as to admit them more freely into our ports, what article had we the privilege of exporting into France? He knew of none. It appeared to him, therefore, an advantage given to France without the least sign of an equivalent. We were admitting French wines into our ports to the exclusion of those of Portugal, reducing our duties on both, and forfeiting all those advantages which we formerly enjoyed by the Methuen treaty. Such was the policy and principle of the leading feature of this treaty!

The right honourable gentleman had used arguments not less extraordinary in favour of establishing peace between this country and France. He had asked in his zeal and sanguinary wishes for the event, were not the two countries nearly situated, were they not nearly connected in their mutual intercourse, were they not pursuing the same means of encreasing their prosperity, and was not this the only means of uniting a people in the bonds of peace, amity, and prosperity? Such arguments might be used with regard to Spain and Portugal. Portugal might say, Am I not nearly adjoining to Spain? Do we not speak almost the same language? Are we not of the same religion? Are we not similar in manners? And should I not rather seek alliance and protection from a neighbour so near me, and so competent to afford protection from insulting and invading neighbours? These questions were certainly as applicable to Spain and Portugal, as they were to France and England. And yet the answer which would naturally be given to Portugal as well as to Great Britain, was, that vicinity of situation, instead of being the means to connect, was what should excite our fear and jealousy. Portugal being so near to such a superior power as Spain, was certainly in danger from her ambition. It was, therefore, that she rather sought foreign connections and alliances, than union with a country to which she might be sacrificed, had she not such a friend as Great Britain to call to her assistance. This was the reason why Portugal could not enter into any treaty with Spain with safety, any more than Great Britain could possibly enter into a commercial treaty with France. Both transactions were equally dangerous to us and Portugal; for our relative situations were such, as to render this policy extremely hazardous, not only to the prosperity, but to the existence of each country as a nation. As to the stipulation of reducing Portugal wines one third below the French wines, while the eleventh article

of the treaty subsisted, he could not conceive that this could have the least effect in preserving the Methuen treaty unbroken. For by the eleventh article it was agreed, that all commodities imported from either nation into the other should be on terms of the most favoured nations, Portugal excepted. Thus, if we reduced the Spanish wines, we should be obliged also, by the French treaty, to reduce to the same degree the French wines, unless they were already as low as the duties on Portugal wines. Thus should we be obliged to reduce the duties on both the French and Portugal wines, to the great diminution of our revenue, without the least probability of an equivalent. Mr. Fox maintained, that the treaty was a tempting bait, which none but gudgeons the most simple would have bitten at; and concluded a most able speech with moving, That the chairman do leave the chair, report progress, and ask leave to sit again.

Mr. Francis followed Mr. Fox, and concurred in opinion with him upon the mischievous political tendency of the measure under their consideration. He went even farther: he dreaded the effects of an intimate political connection with France upon the character of the British nation. The first step towards enslaving a free people was to endeavour to corrupt them; and he was convinced that a freer intercourse with France would produce that effect. There were other reflections, he said, which belonged to the subject, too obvious to require explanation, and too delicate to be expressed. There might be too strict an union between the two crowns through the medium of an union between the two nations; and that union might be fatal to the liberty of Great Britain. He reminded Mr. Pitt of the opposite opinions of the late Lord Chatham, and lamented that the pomp of modern eloquence should be employed to derogate from the merits of his administration. The polemical laurels of the father must yield, he said, to the pacific myrtles which shadow the forehead of the son. The first and most prominent feature in the political character of Lord Chatham was antigallican. His glory was founded on the resistance he made to the united power of the house of Bourbon. The present minister had taken the opposite road to fame; and France, the object of every hostile principle in the policy of Lord Chatham, was the amicissima of the son.- Mr. Powys was of opinion that the treaty was not safe in its policy, and that it put the commercial interests of this country unnecessarily to hazard.-Mr. Baring, the member for Exeter, and himself a person of great commercial dealings, thought the treaty, as far as his consideration of it had gone, had both its advantages and disadvantages; but upon the whole, commercially considered, his opinion went in its favour.- The treaty was defended by Mr. W. Grenville upon the ground occupied by Mr. Pitt; and the question being at length called for, Mr. Fox's amendment was negatived; and the resolution moved agreed to by á majority of 248 to 118.

gens

February 15.

The House having again resolved itself into a committee, Mr. Pitt read, without any preface, his second resolution: "That it appears to this committee, that wines, of the produce of the European dominions of the French king, imported directly into this kingdom, shall in no case pay higher duties than the wines of Portugal now pay." Mr. Flood in a long and eloquent speech condemned the terms of the peace. Mr. Wilberforce rose in answer to Mr. Flood. He said, that the right honourable member's speech abounded with false reasoning, and unwarrantable conclusions. He had asserted that the manufacturers disliked the treaty: of his own knowledge he could take upon him to assert the reverse was the fact. He had seen a great number of the manufacturers of different descriptions, he had conversed with them upon the subject, and they all highly approved of the treaty. He next addressed himself to Mr. Fox, and said, he heartily wished he would come down to that House coolly and dispassionately: that he would sometimes forget that he was a politician, and consider matters under discussion with a greater degree of attention to their particular merits. He asked, to what end it was to tell a poor cottager, groaning under a load of taxes, and sitting with scarcely a snuff of candle to light him, while he was poring over a newspaper, containing a violent speech of the right honourable gentleman, so put together that the sense of it could scarcely be made out, that he was a balancer of the power of Europe, and a protector of its liberties? Was that a proper language to be told to such a man? Was it likely to stimulate him to better exertions or industry? He declared he had been run away with frequently by the oratory of the right honourable gentleman, and obliged to appeal to his reason and his principles to prevent being declaimed out of his understanding.

Mr. Fox rose to condemn the low and desponding arguments made use of by Mr. Wilberforce. That honourable gentleman had stated, in the meekness of his nature, that he dreamt not of power, nor did he wish to tread the paths of ambition; but immediately afterwards, he had a vision, which told him, that the navy of Great Britain must be kept up; and then he drew a most affecting picture of the distresses of poor cottagers groaning under the accumulated weight of taxes! This was, no doubt, a very ingenious mode of captivating the vulgar; but he would ask the honourable gentleman how the navy was to be supported without taxing the subject? Or how the visions of the honourable gentleman could be realized without a great expence to the nation? But the honourable gentleman had the admirable talent of making attacks under the shield of modesty. Was this country, then, not in a situation to take a part in preserving the