« ForrigeFortsett »
Opinion of the Court. 317 U. S.
SHARPE v. BUCHANAN, WARDEN.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
No. 525. Decided December 14, 1942.
Where a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the District Court's refusal of habeas corpus was upon the sole ground that the applicant, who was confined in a state penitentiary, had not applied for habeas corpus to the state courts, this Court vacated the judgment because, after the filing of the petition for certiorari here, habeas corpus had been expressly refused by the State's highest court. P. 238.
121 F. 2d 448, vacated.
Petition for writ of certiorari to review the affirmance of a judgment denying habeas corpus, 36 F. Supp. 386.
Howard M. Sharpe, pro se.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and the petition for certiorari is also granted. It appears from the record that, after hearing, the District Court denied an application for habeas corpus filed by petitioner, who is confined in a state penitentiary pursuant to a judgment of conviction of a state court. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order, 121 F. 2d 448, on the sole ground that petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies by applying to the state courts for habeas corpus, although an application for a writ of error coram nobis had previously been denied by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 88, 143 S. W. 2d 857. The Circuit Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing, when it appeared that an application for habeas corpus, filed in a state court after the Circuit Court of Appeals had rendered its judgment, was still pending on appeal in the
Kentucky Court of Appeals. After the petition for certiorari was filed here, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the state court's order denying habeas corpus. Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 86, 165 S. W. 2d 993. It thus appears that this obstacle to a consideration of the merits of petitioner's application, which the Circuit Court of Appeals encountered, has now been removed. The judgment is therefore vacated, without costs, and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for such further proceedings as it may deem appropriate.
, So ordered.
GARRETT v. MOORE-McCORMACK CO., INC. Et Al.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. No. 67. Argued November 12,1942.—Decided December 14,1942.
1. In a suit by a seaman in a state court for damages under § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act and for maintenance and cure, the rights of the parties are measured by the federal statute and admiralty principles. P. 243.
2. The question whether a state court, in an action for damages under § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act and for maintenance and cure, protected all the substantial rights of the parties under controlling federal law is a federal question reviewable under § 237 (b) of the Judicial Code. P. 245.
3. A shipowner, who, in defense of an action by a seaman for personal injuries, sets up the seaman's release, is under the burden of proving that it was executed freely, without deception or coercion, and that it was made by the seaman with full understanding of his rights. The adequacy of the consideration and the nature of the medical and legal advice available to the seaman at the time of signing the release are relevant to an appraisal of this understanding. P. 246.
4. This general admiralty rule applies not only to actions for maintenance and cure but also to actions for damages under § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act. P. 248.
5. Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act is to be liberally construed for the seaman's protection; it is an integral part of the maritime law, and rights fashioned by it are to be implemented by admiralty rules not inconsistent with the Act. P. 248.
Opinion of the Court. 317U.S.
6. The right of a seaman suing in a Pennsylvania court under § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act to be free from the burden of proof imposed by Pennsylvania law upon one attacking the validity of a written release, is a substantive right inherent in his cause of action. P. 249.
344 Pa. 69, 23 A. 2d 503, reversed.
Certiorari, 316 U. S. 656, to review the affirmance of a judgment non obstante veredicto rendered against the present petitioner in a suit for damages and for maintenance and cure.
Mr. Abraham E. Freedman, with whom Mr. Milton M. Borowsky was on the brief, for petitioner.
Mr. Rowland C. Evans, Jr. for respondents.
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was injured while working as a seaman for respondent on a vessel traveling between the United States and European ports, and spent a number of months in hospitals in Gdynia, Poland, and in the United States. He brought this suit in a Pennsylvania state court for damages pursuant to § 33 of the Merchant Marine (Jones) Act,1 and for maintenance and cure.2 The Pennsylvania courts, as this litigation evidences, are apparently quite willing to make themselves available for the enforcement of these rights.
Petitioner attributed his condition to a blow by a hatch cover which allegedly fell on him through respondent's
1 46 U. S. C. 688.
2 The right of a seaman to recover damages for negligent injury arises under the Jones Act, and the right to maintenance and cure, irrespective of negligence, arises under the law of admiralty. These rights are independent and cumulative. Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U. S. 130, 138. For a general discussion of maintenance and cure, see The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158; Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 2S7 U. S. 367, 371; Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U. S. 525, 527.
239 Opinion of the Court.
negligence. Respondent joined issue generally, contested the extent of any injuries received, and further contended that if serious injuries did exist they were caused by a fight in Copenhagen or by accidents prior to the voyage. As an additional defense the respondent also alleged that for a consideration of $100 petitioner had executed a full release. Denying that he had any knowledge of having signed such an instrument, the petitioner asserted that, if his name appeared on it, his signature was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, and without "legal, binding and valid consideration."
The petitioner did execute a release for $100 several days after his return to this country. His testimony was that his discussion with respondent's claim agent took place while he was under the influence of drugs taken to allay the pain of his injury, that he was threatened with imprisonment if he did not sign as directed, and that he considered the $100 a payment of wages.3 The respondent's evidence was that the $100 was paid not for wages but to settle all claims growing out of the petitioner's injuries, that the petitioner had not appeared to be under the influence of drugs, and that no threats of any kind were made.
Upon this and much other evidence relating to the cause and extent of the injuries, the jury rendered a verdict for the petitioner for $3000 under the Jones Act, and $1000 for maintenance and cure.
Respondent made a motion for a new trial and judgment non obstante veredicto which under the Pennsylvania Opinion of the Court. 317 U. S.
3 There were two elements of the wage dispute: (a) whether wages should be computed at $50.00 or $72.50 a month; (b) whether, since petitioner was left in a hospital in Poland and could not return with his ship, he should have been paid wages until he actually arrived in his home port. He was paid only up to the time he left the vessel. There is clear authority to support a claim for wages to the end of the voyage for which petitioner had been signed. The Osceola, supra, 175.
practice was submitted to the trial court en banc* That court gave judgment to the defendant non obstante veredicto, not upon an appraisal of disputed questions of fact concerning the accident, but because of a conclusion that petitioner had failed to sustain the burden of proof required under Pennsylvania law to invalidate the release. It conceded that, "in admiralty cases, the responsibility is on the defendant to sustain a release rather than on a plaintiff to overcome it," but concluded that since petitioner had chosen to bring his action in a state, rather than in an admiralty, court, his case must be governed by local, rather than admiralty principles. Under the Pennsylvania rule, one who attacks the validity of a written release has the burden of sustaining his allegation by "clear, precise, and indubitable" evidence, meaning evidence "that is not only found to be credible but of such weight and directness as to make out the facts alleged beyond a reasonable doubt." Witnesses who testify against the release must not only be credible, but "distinctly remember the facts to which they testify and narrate the details exactly." The court held that, since the petitioner had not sustained this burden of proof, the trial judge should have withdrawn the case from the jury.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took a somewhat different view. It held that in an action of this sort the Pennsylvania court was obligated "to apply the federal law creating the right of action in the same sense in which it would have been applied in the federal courts." However, it affirmed the judgment in the belief that the rule as to burden of proof on releases does not affect the substantive rights of the parties, but is merely procedural, and is therefore controlled by state law.
* In Pennsylvania the trial judge does not pass upon such motions alone; instead, they are heard and decided by three judges of the court sitting en banc. Purdon, Perm. Stat. Ann., Vol. 12, Par. 680.