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administrative law, patents and copyrights, bankruptcy, finance, public utilities, monopoly and restraint of trade, labor relations, civil rights, and the law of the public domain. The solid stuff of his opinions is set forth to advantage by a simple, straightforward, lucid style, without rhetorical flourish. Noteworthy illustration of his judicial work may be found in his opinions on the economic and constitutional problems of public utility valuation, and in his opinions on the rights of free speech and other civil liberties, in peace and in war, which have won high place among the best of our Anglo-American legal literature. To borrow the words of Chief Justice Hughes, Mr. Justice Brandeis was 'the master of both microscope and telescope. Nothing of importance, however minute, escapes his microscopic examination of every problem, and, through his powerful telescopic lens, his mental vision embraces distant scenes ranging far beyond the familiar worlds of conventional thinking.' How the future will regard his judicial work it is not for us to say, but this much is certain: from our contemporary viewpoint, Mr. Justice Brandeis stands with the half dozen giants of our law, wise, strong, and good.
"In his own person, with the ready cooperation of his wife and children, Mr. Justice Brandeis practiced his austere preachment to others of 'simple living, high thinking, and hard work.' His marriage in 1891 to Alice Goldmark gave him warm intellectual comradeship and a happy home, which sustained and fortified him throughout a long and vigorous career. The serenity of spirit which he achieved, and retained to the last, was the due reward of his dedication of great gifts to great purposes. His personal influence on young people was remarkable; in an age of cynicism and materialism, they learned from him that life had not lost its spiritual meaning. Countless men and women, of all ages and walks of life, came to him as to a sage and counsellor and went away with lifted hearts and a new insight.
"Wherefore, it is
"Resolved, That we, the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, express our grievous sense of loss upon the death of Mr. Justice Brandeis, that we acknowledge our professional debt to him for his exemplification in word and deed of so lofty a conception of the lawyer's calling, and that we give grateful recognition to the enduring contributions made by him to the enrichment of our national life: It is further
"Resolved, That the Chairman of our Committee on Resolutions be directed to present these resolutions to the Court, with the prayer that they be embodied in its permanent records."
That, continued Judge Magruder, concludes the reading of the resolutions. As directed by the Bar, I now move that these resolutions be received by the Court and made a part of its permanent records.
Mr. Attorney General Biddle addressed the Court, as follows:
Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the Court: We are gathered today to honor the memory of a great American—Louis D. Brandeis. In paying our tribute to that memory, we speak for the Bar and the Bench. Yet we speak too not only as lawyers, gathered to record his extraordinary contribution to the profession in which we have spent our lives, but as Americans, joined now for a moment that we may try to express what he did for our country. It is timely that at this moment we should think of Mr. Justice Brandeis in this broader sense; for those inherent values that he held dear are being desperately defended throughout the world. As we fight today we are redefining among ourselves, and among those with whom we are allied, the meaning and the reality of those values. If this war touches us more deeply than any war, it is to the extent that we feel the essentials of our freedom beyond the sounds of words that we and others have spoken. To ourselves we must, day by bitter day, rediscover and reaffirm what constitutes our old American faith.
Brandeis spent his life in such a continued reaffirmation. I suggest, Mr. Chief Justice, that here is a very rare and very moving thing to remember; to remember again in the years that will come after this war, terrible years, or years of hope and growth, according as we shape them. Today, again, men are dying for the faith they cherish; Brandeis lived for that same faith, quietly dedicated his life to the service of his country. To be sure, he was too fundamentally simple to think of anything he did as a dedication. But, as much as anyone I have ever known, he was innately selfless. Nor was it the selflessness of a man who held off the world. Brandeis lived intensely in his world—a world where the economic struggle for power, the wretched inequalities between comfort and suffering, the failure of the accepted democratic processes to give scope to the needs of a new industrial era, enlisted his heart as well as his mind.
His preparation for his twenty-three years on this Court thus transcended his wide and varied experience in practice, which had brought him to the front of his profession. But in the practice the same qualities stood forth: there was the battle for cheap insurance, which led to the adoption of the savings banks insurance legislation in Massachusetts; the successful campaign for lower gas rates in Boston; the Ballinger-Pinchot investigation, which resulted in centering public attention on the vital need of immediate and effective conservation programs; his chairmanship of the board of arbitration in the needle trades; his representation of the interests of consumers and workmen in many fields.
Although he was frugal and ascetic, living a life of steady concentration and immense work on the problems before him, his singleness of purpose never limited the friendly sympathy of his nature, or the curiosity of his mind. He was without prejudices, as he was without cliches. The asceticism and his fundamentally moral outlook gave him, in the eyes of many of his friends, the quality of a saint. Mr. Justice Holmes felt this reverence for his younger associate. "Whenever he left my house," Holmes wrote of him in 1932, "I was likely to say to my wife, 'There goes a really good man . . .' In the moments of discouragement that we all pass through, he always has had the happy word that lifts up one's heart. It came from knowledge, experience, courage, and the high way in which he always has taken life."
Yet, Justice Brandeis had none of the mystic essence which we associate with sainthood. He was practical, realistic, patient, persistent. He brought the mind of a trained social scientist to the analysis of legal opinion and decision, a method which is beautifully illustrated in his brief in support of the Oregon law fixing a ten-hour day for women wage earners. Three pages argue the law; the other ninety-seven diagnose factory conditions and their effect on individual workers and the public health. This approach has had a profound influence on the method of presenting arguments in cases involving social legislation, and, I suggest, on the outlook of courts to social problems. That judges today are more realistic, less given to the assumption of accepted dogmas, more mature and more curious-minded, is largely due to the influences of Brandeis. "What we must do in America," he once said, a few years before he was made a judge, "is not to attack our judges but to educate them. All judges should be made to feel, as many judges already do, that the things needed to protect liberty are radically different from what they were fifty years back ... In the past the courts have reached their conclusions largely deductively from preconceived notions and precedents. The method I have tried to employ in arguing cases before them has been inductive, reasoning from the facts."
I hesitate to suggest that Brandeis had a philosophy of life, for I do not think of him primarily as a philosopher. Do not philosophers deal with generalities that take shapes of the universal and glitter above and below the realm of the restless particular? Unlike Mr. Justice Holmes, who, distrustful though he was of the essences, yet felt that the nature of man was to indulge in their formulation, Brandeis, clear in his first principles, was truly empirical in his preoccupations. While Holmes' doubts were philosophic, Brandeis' were scientific. "I have no general philosophy," he said. "All my life I have thought only in connection with the facts that came before me . . . We need, not so much reason, as to see and understand facts and conditions." He believed profoundly that behind every argument is someone's ignorance, and that disputes generally arise from misunderstanding. President Wilson knew this when, after the hearings on the Justice's appointment which had lasted for three months, he wrote Senator Culbertson, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee: "I cannot speak too highly of his impartial, impersonal, orderly, and constructive mind, his rare analytical powers, his deep human sympathy, his profound acquaintance with the historical roots of our institutions ... his knowledge of economic conditions and the way they bear upon the masses of the people."
Mr. Justice Brandeis' fundamental thought, running through the whole frame and direction of his efforts, was always of man—"Man (to quote Alfred Lief) struggling with oppressive forces in society. Man's right to full development. The infinite possibilities in human creativeness. Man's limitations, too. But especially the breadth of national achievement which can come when energies are released." He voiced this approach many times, never more profoundly than in his testimony before the Commission on Industrial Relations, in 1914, more remarkable for having been delivered extemporaneously. "We must," he told the Committee, "bear in mind all the time that, however much we may desire material improvement and must desire it for the comfort of the individual, the United States is a democracy and that we must have, above all things, men. It is the development of man