Goodnefs, having already the Foundation and the Seeds of Virtue within themfelves: So that it is but awakening the Confideration of it, where all Men are agreed beforehand upon the Main, Who is fo fordid, as not to be roused at such a Speech as this? The poor Man wants many things, but the covetous Man wants all. Can any Flesh forbear being delighted with this Saying, though. a Satire against his own Vice? As to forced Metaphors, and wild Hyperboles, I would leave them to the Poets.. And I am utterly against fooling with tinkling Conceits and Sounds: Not that I would wholly forbid the Ufe of Hyperboles; which, although they exceed the Truth, may yet be a Means, by things incredible, to bring us unto things credible. And there may be great Ufe, made alfo of Parables: For the Way of Application does ufually more affect the Mind, than the downright Meaning. That Speech which gains upon the Paffions, is much more profitable than that which only works upon the Judgment. Chryfippus was a great Man, and of an acute Wit; but the Edge of it was fo fine, that every thing turned it: and he might be faid, in Truth, rather to prick the Subject that he handled, than to pierce it through.

As it is not for the Honour of a Philofopher to be folicitous about Words, I would not have him negligent neither: But let him speak with Affurance, and without Affectation. If we can, let our Difcourfes be powerful: but however, let them be clear. I like a Compofition that is nervous and ftrong; but yet I would have it fweet and gracious withal. There are many things, I know, that please well enough in the Delivery, and yet will hardly abide the Teft of an Examination. But that Eloquence is mifchievous, that diverts a Man from Things to Words, and little better than a Prostitution of Letters. For what fignifies the Pomp of Words or the Jumbling of Syllables, to the making up of a wife Man! Tully's Compofitions indeed is equal, his Numbers are harmonious, free, and gentle and yet he takes a Care, not to make any Forfeiture of his Gravity. Fabian is a great Man, in being fecond to Cicero. Pollio is a great Man too, tho' a Step below him; and fo is Livy likewife, tho' he comes after the other three,

But feveral Subjects require feveral Excellencies. An Orator fhould be fharp; the Tragedian great, and the Comedian pleafant. When a Man declaims against Vice, let him be bitter; against Danger, bold; against Fortune, proud; against Ambition, reproachful: Let him chide Luxury, defame Luft: An Impotency of Mind must be broker. In thefe Cafes, Words are the leaft part of an honeft Man's Business.

In the Matter of Compofition, I would write as F fpeak; with Eafe and Freedom; for it is more friendly as well as more natural: And fo much my Inclination, that if I could make my Mind vifible to you, I would neither speak nor write it. If I put my Thoughts in good Senfe, the Matter of Ornament I fhall leave to the Orators. There are fome things that a Man may write even as he travels: Others that require Privacy and Leifure: But, however, it is good in Writing, as in other Cafes, to leave the best Bit for the laft. A Philofopher has no more to do, than to speak properly, and in Words that exprefs his Meaning. And this may be done without Tofling of the Hands, Stamping, or any violent Agitation of the Body; without either the Va nity of the Theatre, on the one Hand, or an infipid Hea vinefs on the other. I would have his Speech as plain and fimple as his Life; for he is then as good as his Word, when both hearing him, and feeing him, we find him to be the fame Perfon. And yet if a Man can be eloquent, without more Pains than the thing's worth, let him ufe his Faculty: provided that he value himself upon the Matter, more than upon the Words; and apply himfelf rather to the Understanding, than to the Fancy: for this is a Bufinefs of Virtue, not a trial of Wit. Who is there that would not rather have a healing, than a rhe torical Phylician? But for efteeming any Man purely upon the Score of his Rhetoric, I would as foon chufe a Pilot for his good Head of Hair.

In the Matter of Reading; I would fix upon fome particular Authors, and make them my own. He that is every where, is no where; but like a Man that spends his Life in Travel, he has many Hofts, but few Friends. Which is the very Condition of him that skips from one Book to another: The Variety does but distract his

Head, and for want of Digefting, it turns to Corruption, inftead of Nourishment. 'Tis a good Argument of a well compofed Mind, when a Man loves, home, and to keep Company with himfelf: Whereas a rambling Head, is a certain Sign of a fickly Humour. Many Books, and many Acquaintances, bring a Man to a Levity of Difpofition, and a Liking of Change. What is the Body the better for Meat, that will not stay with it? Nor is there any thing more hurtful in the Cafe of Diseases, or Wounds, than the frequent fhifting of Phyfic, or Plailters. Of Authors, be fare to make Choice of the beft; and (as I faid before) to stick close to them; and though you take up others by the bye, referve fome felect ones however for your Study and Retreat. In your Reading, you will every Day meet with Confolation and Support against Poverty, Death, and other Calamities, incident to human Life: Extract what you like; and then fingle out fome Particular from the reft, for that Day's Meditation. Reading does not only feed, and entertain the Understanding; but when a Man is dofed with one Study, he relieves himself with another, but ftill Reading and Writing are to be taken up by Turns. So long as the Meat lies whole upon the Stomach, it is a Burden to us; but upon the Concoction, it paffes into Strength and Blood. And fo it fares with our Studies; fo long as they lie whole, they pafs into the Memory without affecting the Understanding. But, upon Meditation they become our own, and fupply us with Strength and Virtue: The Bee that wanders and fips from every Flower, difpofes what fhe has gathered

into her Cells.

EPISTLE HIL

Against all Sorts of Affectation in Difcourfe, fantasticl Studies; impertinent and unprofitable Subtilties. Man's Bufinefs is Virtue, not Words.

T

HERE are many Men (and fome of great Senfe too) that lose both the Profit, and the Reputation of good Thoughts, by the uncouth Manner of expreffing them. They love to talk in Mystery, and take it for a Mark of Wisdom, not to be understood. They are fo fond of making themselves public, that they will rather be ridiculous, than not taken notice of. When the Mind grows fqueamish, and comes to a Loathing of things that are common, as if they were fordid that Sickness betrays itfelf in our way of Speaking too for we must have new Words, new Compositions; and it paffes for an Ornament to borrow from other Tongues, where we may be better furnished in our own. One Man prizes himself up. on being concife, and talking in Parables: Another runs himfelf out in Words; and that which he takes only for copious, renders him to others both ridiculous and tedious: Others there are, that like the Error well enough, but cannot come up to it. But take this for a Rule: Wherefoever the Speech is corrupted, fo is the Mind. Some are only for Words antiquated, and long fince out of Date; others only for that which is popular and coarfe; and they are both in the Wrong; for the one takes too little Care, and the other too much. are for a rough, broken Stile, as if it were a thing unmanly to please the Ear; others are too nice upon the Matter of Number, and make it rather Singing than Speak ing. Some affect not to be understood 'till the end of the Period, and hardly then neither. 'Tis not good, a Stile that is either too bold, or too florid; the one wants

Some

Modesty, and the other Effect. Some are too ftarcht, and formal; others take a Pride in being rugged; and if they chance to let fall any thing that is fmoothe, they will tranfpofe and mangle it on purpose, only to maim the Period, and difappoint a Body's Expectation. These Errors are commonly introduced by fome Perfon that is famous for his Eloquence; others follow him, and fo it paffes into Fashion. And we are as much out in the Choice of the Matter, as in that of our Words.

THERE are fome Studies which are only Matter of Curiofity, and Trial of Skill; others of Pleasure, and of Ufe: But ftill there are many things worth the knowing, perhaps, that were not worth the Learning. It is a huge deal of Time that is fpent in Cavilling about Words, and captious Disputations, that works us up to an Edge, and then nothing comes on it. There are some Tricks of Wit, like Slight of Hand, which amount to no more than the Tying of Knots only to loofen them again; and it is the very Fallacy that pleafes es; for so foon as ever we know how they are done, the Satisfaction is at an end. He that does not understand thefe Sophifms, is never the worse; and he that does, is never the better. If a Man tells me that I have Horns, I can tell him again, that I have none, without feeling on my Forehead. Bion's Dilemma makes all Men to be facrilegious, and yet at the fame time maintains, that there is no fuch thing as Sacrilege. He that takes to himself (fays he) what belongs to God, commits Sacrilege; but all things belong to God, therefore he that applies any Thing to his own Ufe is facrilegious. On the other fide, the very Rifling of a Temple he makes to be no Sacrilege For 'tis (fays he) but the taking of fomething out of one Place that belongs to God and removing it to an other that belongs to him too. The Fallacy lies in this, that though all things belong to him, all things are not yet dedicated to him. There is no greater Enemy of Truth, than over much Subtilty of Speculation. Protagoras will have every thing difputable, and as much to be faid for the one fide, as for the other. Nay, he makes it another Queftion, Whether every thing be difputable or no? There are others that make it a Science, to prove, that Man knows nothing: But the former is

Bb