has, but of that which he has not? The great Subject of human Calamities, is Money. Take all the reft together, as Death, Sickness, Fear, Defire, Pain, Labour; and those which proceed from Money exceed them all. 'Tis a wonderful Folly, that of Tumblers, Rope-dancers, Divers; what Pains they take, and what Hazard they run, for an inconfiderable Gain! And yet we have not Patience for the thousandth Part of that Trouble, though it would put us into the Poffeffion of an everlasting Quiet. Epicurus, for Experiment fake, confined himself to a narrower Allowance, than that of the feverest Prisons to the moft capital Offenders: and found himself at Eafe too in a ftricter Diet, than a Man in the worst Condition needs to fear. This was to prevent Fortune, and to frustrate the worst which the can do. We fhould never know any thing to be fuperfluous, but by the want of it. How many things do we provide, only because others have them for Fafhion fake? Caligula offered Demetrius five thoufand Crowns, who rejected them with a Smile, as who should fay, It was fo little, it did him no Honour the refufing of it. Nothing lefs, fays he, than the Offer of his whole Empire would have been a Temptation to have tried the Firmness of my Virtue. By this Contempt of Riches, is intended only the fearless Poffeffion of them. And the way to attain that, is to perfwade ourselves, that we may live happily without them. How many of thofe things, which Reason formerly told us were fuper fluous, and mimical, do we now find to be fo by Experience? But we are mif-led by the Counterfeit of Good on the one Hand, and the Sufpicion of Evil on the other. Not that Riches are an efficient Cause of Mischief; but they are a precedent Cause, by way of Irritation, and Attraction. For they have fo near a Refemblance of Good, that most People take them to be good. Nay, Virtue itself is also a precedent Caufe of Evil; as many are envied for their Wisdom, or for their Juftice. Which does not arife from the Thing itself, but from the irreprovable Power of Virtue, that forces all Men to admire, and to love it. That is not good, that is more advanta geous to us, but that which is only fo.

EPISTLE VI.

The Bleffings of a virtuous Retirement, How we come to the Knowledge of Virtue. A Distinction betwixt Good and A wife Man contents himfelf

Honeft.
with his Lot.

TH

HERE is no Opportunity 'fcapes me, of enquiring where you are, what you do and what Company you keep: And I am well enough pleafed that I can hear nothing concerning you; for it fhews that you live retir ed. Not but that I durft trust you with the wide World too: But, however, it is not eafy, fuch a general Converfation: Nor is it abfolutely fafe neither; for, though it should not corrupt you, it would yet hinder you. Now wherefoever you are, know, that I am with you; and you are fo to live, as if I both heard and faw you. Your Letters are really Bleflings to me, and the Sense of your Improvements relieves me, even under the Consideration of my own Decay. Remember, that as I am old, fo are you mortal. Be true to yourself, and examine yourself, whether you be of the fame Mind to day, that you were yefterday; for that's a Sign of perfect Wisdom. And yet give me leave to tell you, that though change of Mind be a Token of Imperfection; it is the Business of my Age to unwill one Day, that which I willed another. And let me recommend it to your Practice too, in many Cafes; for the Abatement of our Appetites, and of our Errors, is the best Entertainment of Mankind. It is for young Men to gather Knowledge, and for old Men to use it: And affure yourself, that no Man gives a fairer Account of his Time, than he that makes it his daily Study, to make himself better. If you be in Health, and think it worth your while to become the Master of yourself; it is my Defire, and my Advice, that you apply yourself to

Wisdom with your whole Heart: And judge of your Improvement, not by what you fpeak, or by what you write; but by, the Firmnefs of your Mind, and the Government of your Paffions. What Extremities have fome Men endared in Sieges; even for the Ambition and Intereft of other People! And, fhall not a Man venture the croffing of an intemperate Luft, for the Conqueft of himfelf? You do very well to betake yourself to a private Life; and better yet, in keeping of that Privacy private. For, otherwife, your Retreat would look like Oftentation: The greatest Actions of our Lives are thofe that we do in a Recefs from Business: Besides, that there are fome Governments, and Employments, that a Man would not have any thing to do withal. And then it is to be confidered; that public Offices and Commiffions are commonly bought with our Money; whereas the great Bleffings of Leifure, and Privacy, coft us nothing. Contemplati on is undoubtedly the best Entertainment of Peace; and only a fhorter Cut to heaven itfelf: Over and above that, Bulinefs makes us troublesome to others, and unquiet to ourfelves; for, the End of one Appetite, or Defign, is the Beginning of another. To fay nothing of the Expence of Time in vexatious Attendances, and the Danger of Competitors. Such a Man, perhaps, has more Friends at Court than I have; a larger Train, a fairer Estate, more profitable Offices, and more illuftrious Titles. But, what do I care to be overcome by Men, in fome Cafes, fo long as Fortune is overcome by me in all? Thefe Confiderations fhould have been earlier; for 'tis too late in the Article of Death, to project the Happiness of Life. And yet there is no Age better adapted to Virtue, than that which comes by many Experiments, and long Sufferings, to the Knowledge of it: For our Lufts are then weak, and our Judgment strong; and Wisdom is the Effect of Time.

SOME are of Opinion, that we come to the Knowledge of Virtue by Chance; (which were an Indignity.) Others by Obfervation, and comparing Matters of Fact one with another; the Understanding, by a kind of Analogy approving this, or that, for good and honeft. These are two Points, which others make wholly different; but the Stoicks only divide them. Some will have every thing to be good, that is beneficial to us : As Money, Wine; and

1

fo lower, to the meaneft things we ufe. And they rec kon that to be honest, where there is a reasonable Difcharge of a common Duty: As reverence to a Parent; Tenderness to a Friend; the expofing of ourselves for our Country, and the regulating of our lives according to Moderation and Prudence. The Stoicks reckon them to be two; but so as to make these two, yet, out of one. They will have nothing to be good, but what is honeft; nor any thing to be honeft, but that which is good: So that in fome fort they are mixed, and infeparable. There are fome things that are neither good, nor bad; as War, Embaffy, Jurifdiction: But thefe, in the laudable Adminiftration of them, do, of doubtful, become good; which Good is only a Confequent upon Honesty: But Honesty is good in itself, and the other flows from it. There are fome Actions that feem to us Matter of Benignity, Humanity, Generofity, Refolution; which we are apt to admire, as perfect: And yet, upon farther Examination, we find that great Vices were concealed under the Refemblances of eminent Virtues. Glorious Actions are the Images of Virtue: But yet many things feem to be good, that are evil, and evil, that are good; and the Skill is to diftinguish betwixt things that are fo much alike in Shew, and fo difagreeing in Effect. We are led to the Understanding of Virtue by the Congruity we find in fuch. and fuch Actions to Nature, and right Reafon, by the Order, Grace, and Conftancy of them, and by a certain Majefty and Greatnefs, that furpaffes all other things. From hence proceeds a happy life; to which nothing comes amifs; but, on the contrary, every thing fucceeds to our very with. There is no wrangling with Fortune; no being out of Humour for Accidents. Whatfoever befals me in my fot, and whether in Appearance it be good or bad, it is God's pleasure; and it is my Duty to bear it. When a Man has once gotten a Habit of Virtue, all his Actions are equal: He is conftantly one and the fame Man; and he does well, not only upon Counfel, but out of Custom too. Shall I tell you now, in a word, the Sum of human Duty? Patience where we are to fuffer; and Prudence, in things we do. It is a frequent complaint in the World, that the things we enjoy are but few, tranfitory, and uncertain; fo ungrateful a

EPISTLE VII.

Of impertinent Studies, and impertinent Men. Philofophers the best Companions.

HE

E that duly confiders the Business of Life and Death, will find that he has little Time to fpare from that Study: And yet how we trifle away our Hours upon im. pertinent Niceties and Cavils! Will Plato's imaginary Ideas make me an honest Man? There's neither Certain ty in them, nor Substance. A Moufe is a Syllable; but a Syllable does not eat Cheefe: therefore a Mouse does not eat Cheese. Oh! thefe childifh Follies! Is it for this that we spend our Blood, and our good Humour, and grow grey in our Clofets? We are jefting, when we fhould be helping the miferable; as well ourselves as others. There's no fporting with Men in Diftrefs. The Felicity of Mankind depends upon the Counsel of Philo. fophers. Let us rather confider what Nature has made fuperfluous, and what neceffary: How eafy our Conditi ons are, and how delicious that Life, which is governed by Reason rather than Opinion. There are impertinent Studies, as well as impertinent Men. Didymus the Grammarian wrote 4000 Books; wherein he is much concerned to difcover where Homer was born; who was Encas's true Mother; and whether Anacreon was the greater Whoremaster or Drunkard: With other Fopperies, that a Man would labour to forget, if he knew them. Is it not an important Queftion, which of the two was first, illet or the Tongs? Some People are extremely inquifitive to know how many Oars Uyes had: Which was firft written, the Iliads or the Odyffes; or if they were both done by the fame Hand? A Man is never a Jot the more learned for this Curiosity, but much the more troublesome. Am I ever the more juft, the more moderate, valiant, or liberal, for knowing, that Curius Dentatas was the first that carried Ele