tified that before the preliminary examina- | statement. Affirmatively and fully it aption was commenced the defendant volunta- pears that all that he said in the matter rily and without any suggestion insisted was said voluntarily, without any induceupon making a statement. Whereupon he, ment or influence of any kind being brought the magistrate, informed him that he was to bear upon him. Indeed, it is not claimed entitled to counsel, that he was under no by counsel that there was any improper inobligations and need not make any state- fluence, his contention being only that the ment, but that if he did it would be used provisions of the statute with respect to a against him on the trial, and also that if [229]he waited an opportunity *would be given desired, but he refused to say anything. statement pending an examination were not complied with in respect to these statements. The statements were properly admitted in evidence. These are the only matters called to our attention. No errors appear in them, nor do we perceive any plain error otherwise in the record. The proof of defendant's guilt is clear and satisfactory, and the judgment is affirmed. JOHN G. JENKINS and One Hundred and v. BARZILLAI G. NEFF, President, and John (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 230-238.) Trust companies-powers-error to state court-conclusiveness of findings of fact -state taxation of national banks-discrimination. the jail and ordered me to return to his 1. No power to loan, discount, or purchase commercial paper was given trust companies by N. Y. Laws 1893, chap. 696, authorizing trust companies to exercise the powers conferred on individual banks and bankers by N. Y. Laws 1892, chap. 689, § 55, which provides that such banks and bankers may "take, receive, reserve, and charge on every loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other evidence of debt, Interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum; and such interest may be taken in advance." office for the purpose of securing some in- any statement. So the question is whether nies generally by the provision of N. Y. Laws 1892, chap. 689, § 163, that "every trust company incorporated by a special law shall possess the powers of trust companies incorporated under this chapter, and shall be subject to such provisions of this chapter as are not inconsistent with the special laws relating to such specially chartered company." mony. Of course, statements which are ob- 3. Findings of fact in state courts are conclu tained by coercion or threat or promise will be subject to objection. Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 42 L. ed. 568, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 183. But, so far from anything of that kind appearing, the defendant was cautioned that he was under no obligations to make a statement; that it would be used against him if he made one, and that there was a proper time for him to make one if [230]he so desired. *Without even a suggestion, he insisted on making, prior to the examination, a statement which was reduced to writing and by him signed and sworn to, and after the examination was over and he had been placed in jail, he had an interview with the magistrate and volunteered a further sive on a writ of error to such courts from the Supreme Court of the United States. 4. No discrimination against national banks in violation of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5219, providing that taxation on their shares of stock shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed on other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens, is made by the system of taxation prevailing in New York in respect to trust companies, since it must be presumed that if such companies are using their funds in a strictly banking business, under an assumption of powers not in fact conferred by law, the state will take proper steps to NOTE-On state taxation of national. banks -see notes to McHenry v. Downer (Cal.) 45 L. R. A. 737, and Providence Bank v. Billings, 7 L. ed. U. S. 939. keep them within the statutory limits, and a neglect for a limited time to do so cannot be considered as an assent by the state to such an improper assumption of power. vested in the form of shares of stock in national banks, would diminish their value as an investment and drive the capital so invested from this employment, if at the same time similar investments and similar employments under the authority of state laws were exempt from an equal burden. The main purpose, therefore, of Congress in fixArgued March 20, 1902. Decided June 2, ing limits to state taxation on investments I [No. 198.] 1902. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of New York to review an order of that court affirming an assessment of the shares of stock in a national bank, affirmed by the Appellate Division of that Court and by the Court of Appeals. Affirmed. See same case below in Court of Appeals, 163 N. Y. 320, 57 N. E. 408, in Appellate Division, 47 App. Div. 394, 62 N. Y. Supp. 321. Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: This case is before us on a writ of error to the supreme court of the state of New York, and is brought to review a final order of that court affirming an assessment of the shares of stock in the First National Bank of Brooklyn. Under the practice prevailing in that state a writ of certiorari [231] was issued out of the supreme court on August 13, 1897, on the petition of the stockholders of the First National Bank of the city of Brooklyn, now plaintiffs in error, directed to the board of assessors of the city of Brooklyn, requiring them to return all their proceedings relative to the assessment of the shares of stock of said bank. A return having been made the assessment was on October 6, 1899, confirmed, with some modifications not material to the present controversy. This order was affirmed by the appellate division of that court on January 9, 1900. 47 App. Div. 394, 62 Ν. Y. Supp. 321. On appeal to the court of appeals the order was by that court also affirmed (163 N. Y. 320, 57 N. E. 408), and the record remitted to the supreme court. Messrs. Seymour D. Thompson and Frank Harvey Field argued the cause and filed a brief for plaintiffs in error. Mr. James McKeen argued the cause, and, with Mr. George L. Rives filed a brief for defendants in error. Contentions of counsel sufficiently appear in the opinion. Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court: The right of the state to tax these shares of stock is not denied, but the contention of plaintiffs in error rests on the applicability of that part of $ 5219, Rev. Stat. which reads "that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state." The purpose of this legislation was thus stated in Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 155, 30 L. ed. 895, 901, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826, 835: "A tax upon the money of individuals, in in the shares of national banks, was to render it impossible for the state, in levying such a tax, to create and foster an unequal and unfriendly competition by favoring institutions or individuals carrying on a simi-[232] lar business and operations and investments of a like character. The language of the act of Congress is to be read in the light of this policy." The laws of New York in reference to taxation of the shares of stock in national banks are like those in respect to the taxa tion of shares of stock in state banks, and there are many of the latter in the state. So it is not suggested that the state makes any discrimination between state banks and national banks, but it is contended that the statutes of New York, in reference to the taxation of trust companies, are essentially different; that these trust companies are practically carrying on a banking business; that an enormous amount of moneyed capital is invested in them, and that as a result not merely a theoretical, but a practical and burdensome, discrimination is made against the moneyed capital invested in national banks. Commenting upon this it was said by Mr. Justice Woodward, delivering the opinion of the appellate division of the supreme court in the case at bar: "It is conceded on the part of the relators that the stock of the First National Bank was assessed upon the same principle applied in the assessment of the stock of the state banks doing business in their immediate vicinity, and that this was done under the provisions of § 24 of the tax law of 1896. In order to pronounce this provision of the law invalid we must, therefore, convict the legislature, not alone of hostility to the national banks, but of hostility toward its own creations; we must reach the conclusion that the state of New York is seeking, by an exercise of its taxing power, to advance one class of moneyed corporations at the expense of another, both of which have been created by the legislature, and both of which are engaged, presumptively, in promoting the interests of the people. There are no presumptions in favor of this idea, and there is no evidence in the case to show that any of the state institutions have ever complained of an inequality in taxation." Further, in Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 30 L. ed. 895, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826, decided in 1887, the New York statutes in reference to the taxation of shares of stock of national banks were challenged on the ground of discrimination in favor of moneyed capital otherwise invested, *and several instances of such investment [233] were called to the attention of the court, among them that of trust companies, and it received, as stated in the opinion, "separate Counsel for plaintiffs in error insist that Section 55, referred to, provides: "Every bank and individual banker of interest and usury, that it is inadmissible to hold that thereby an additional power, either of loan or discount or purchase, was given to trust companies. The other change in the legislation re ferred to is found in § 163 of chapter 689 of the Laws of 1892, which provides that "every trust company incorporated by a special law shall possess the powers of trust companies incorporated under this chapter, and shall be subject to such provisions of this chapter as are not inconsistent with the special laws relating to such specially chartered company." But this gives no new powers to trust companies generally, but simply grants to such companies, incorporated under special laws, the powers of trust companies incorporated under the general statute, and subjects them to the same restrictions, unless inconsistent with their special charters. Clearly, there has been no change in the legislation of New York in respect to the powers of trust companies which calls for any limitation of the decision in Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York. Again, it is insisted that that case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts which neglected to disclose fully the manner in which trust companies carried on their business, and also that whatever might have been the facts at that time the testimony here presented shows that almost the entire do-volume of the business of the trust compa-[235] This legislation simply places trust companies on an equality with banks, whether corporate or individual, in respect to the matter of interest, and does not give to trust companies power to loan, discount, or purchase paper. Whatever powers trust companies had in respect to these matters were given by statutes which were in exist[234]ence before the decision in Mercantile *Nat. Bank v. New York. That which was in the mind of the legislature was evidently equality in respect to interest and usury. The doctrine that legislative recognition is equivalent to legislative grant is not pertinent. In order to come within the scope of that doctrine there should be in the language a clear recognition of a corporate en tity or corporate power actually existing or claimed to exist. A grant of corporate life or corporate power is not made by implication, and the same rule obtains in respect to the matter of recognition. If the language of the legislature is satisfied, has full scope and effect, without reading into it either a grant or a recognition of corporate life or power, neither will be implied. And here so clear is it that the legislature was not contemplating the grant or recognition of any hitherto unauthorized power to loan, discount, or purchase paper, but had simply the thought of giving equality in the matter Further, although there is in the record quite an amount of testimony as to the assets and business of trust companies in Brooklyn, yet the case was determined by the supreme and appellate courts of New York upon findings of fact, which findings do not sustain the contention of plaintiffa in error in this respect, and it is well settled that the findings of fact in the state courts are on a writ of error conclusive with us. Hedrick v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 167 U. S. 673, 677, 42 L. ed. 320, 321, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 922, and cases cited therein; B. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co. 186 U. S. 70, ante, 1058, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747. In other words, we apply the law to the facts settled in the state courts, and we do not search the record to see if there be not disclosed by the testimony some other matters not embraced in the findings which may affect the conclusion. Still, again, even if we were to pass beyond the findings of fact, and, searching the record, should be of the opinion that the testimony justified the contention of the plaintiffs in error that trust companies are mainly using their funds in the carrying on of a purely banking business, and this under an assumption of powers not in fact bestowed by the legislation of the state, what effect would such conclusion have upon the question before us? It is to be presumed that if trust or other companies are exercising powers not conferred by law the state will take the proper steps to keep them within their statutory limits, and a neglect for a limited time to do so cannot be considered as an assent by the state to such an improper assumption of power. It is not to be assumed that the state is acting in bad faith; that it has so legislated that upon the face of the statutes a uniform rate of taxation upon all moneyed capital is provided, while at the same time it has designedly placed the grants of some corporate franchises in such form as to permit the use of moneyed capital in certain ways with peculiar and less stringent rates of taxation. Certainly there is nothing in this case to [236] *indicate any want of good faith on the part of the state of New York. Whatever may have been the practices of trust companies, to find in the record any evidence of such a discrimination against the national banks as would justify us in holding that the law under which the trust companies operate, and the statutes under which they are taxed, [237] can have the effect of invalidating an otherwise valid statute. The fact that in a given instance, by reason of an exercise of a discretion as to the particular kind of securities purchased, a trust company may have a real or imaginary advantage over invest ors in the shares of a national bank is not a sufficient foundation for declaring an assessment invalid. It is essential, if the law of the state is to be declared invalid under the limitations expressed in the United States statute, that the enactment of the legislature shall evidence a disposition to evade or override the spirit of the limiting statute; and this is clearly not the case where it provides for equal taxation upon its own state banks, and where it does not require its trust companies, which, it may there is no suspicion of a purpose on the be conceded, come into a limited competi part of the state to discriminate against national banks by permitting trust companies to do a banking business without being subject to the same rate of taxation that is enforced against moneyed capital invested in such banks. Counsel for plaintiffs in error notice several reports of the commissioners of taxes and assessments of the city of New York for years following the commencement of this suit in respect to the rel. ative taxation of banks and trust companies, and it was stated on the argument that, as a consequence, perhaps, of these reports, legislation has been had with a view of correcting any supposed discrimination. In reference to some other suggested differences between banks and trust companies in respect to the matter of taxation we make a further extract from the opinion of Mr. Justice Woodward, which in general we approve: "It may not, in view of the importance of this question, be out of place to suggest that the statute under which the trust companies are organized does not compel the capital to be invested in United States bonds; it may be invested in 'bonds and mortgages on unencumbered real property in this state worth at least double the amount loaned thereon, or in the stocks or bonds of this state, or of the United States, or of any county or incorporated city of this state duly authorized by law to be issued.' The Banking Law, Laws of 1892, chap. 689,$ 159. If the capital of the trust companies should be invested in bonds and mortgages, or other securities not exempt from taxation, there would be no inequality in the premises; and as they are not allowed the privilege of issuing notes to be circulated as money upon the security of their United States bonds, which is the real justification for the taxation which is assessed upon the shareholders of the national banks, we fail tion with the investors in the shares of national banks, to invest their capital in such a way as to necessarily exempt them from taxation upon a portion of their capital stock. If the state refused to allow its trust companies to invest in United States securities there might be a far greater cause for grievance. Trust companies are not organized primarily for banking purposes; they are designed for other purposes, as pointed out in the Mercantile Bank Case, and it was never the purpose of the Federal government to interfere with the policy of the state in reference to the formation and development of such corporations as it should judge expedient, even though it should be found necessary to invest them with some of the powers of banking associations as an inducement to perform the other duties and obligations imposed by the state. As was said in the Mercantile Bank Case in reference to savings banks, however large, therefore, may be the amount of moneyed capital in the hands of individuals, in the shape of deposits in savings banks as now organized, which the policy of the state exempts from taxation for its own purposes, that exemption cannot affect the rule for the taxation of shares in national banks, provided they are taxed at a rate not greater than other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens otherwise subject to taxation." " While we have not discussed all the questions raised by counsel in their elaborate brief and argument, we have sufficiently *in-[238] dicated our views upon the general questions involved in the case, and, finding no error, the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York is affirmed. Mr. Justice Gray did not hear the argument, and took no part in the decision of this case. i) CHESAPEAKE & POTOMAC TELE- priation act of June 30, 1898 (30 Stat. at L PHONE COMPANY, Appt., v. J. FORREST MANNING and Harry E. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 238-256.) Appeal final decree-statutes presump- 525, 538, chap. 540). 4. The prohibition against charging or receiving "more than $50 per annum for the use of a telephone on a separate wire," which is made by the District appropriation act of June 30, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 525, 538, chap. 540), does not require a telephone company to furnish at that rate such additional equipment as wall cabinet and desk, auxiliary bells, etc., for which separate charges had theretofore been made. [No. 363.] 1. A decree of the court of appeals of the Dis- Argued March 10, 11, 12, 1902. Decided trict of Columbia reversing a decree of the injunction in the language of the preliminary a proviso that it should ope Congress will be presumed to have acted advisedly and with full knowledge of the situation, in enacting the provision of the Disfrict appropriation act of June 30, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 525, 538, chap. 540), regulating the rates which a telephone company may charge in the District of Columbia, although the committees appointed by each House to investigate charges for telephone service in the District never completed their work and made no report. Rentals received by a telephone company from private telephone systems installed by It must, together with the expenses thereof, be excluded from consideration in inquiring Into the reasonableness of the rates which telephone companies doing business in the District of Columbia are prohibited from exceeding by a provision in the District appro NOTE--As to what judgments or decrees are Legislative power to regulate telephone rates. In Nebraska Teleph. Co v. State ex rel. The power of the legislature to regulate telephone rates and to authorize cities to regulate A June 2, 1902. PPEAL from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to review a decree which reversed a decree of the Supreme Court of the District dissolving a preliminary injunction and dismissing a complaint in a suit to restrain a telephone company from discontinuing its telephone service, and remanded the case with instructions to enter a decree granting a permanent injunction. Reversed. See same case below, 18 App. D. C. 191. Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: On July 14, 1898, the appellees commenced this suit in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, to restrain the defendant from discontinuing its telephone service to them. Their bill alleged that the defendant was a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York, and for a long time past engaged in the business of furnishing telephone exchange service in the District [239] of Columbia; that with the assent and under the direction of the Congress of the United States and the commissioners of the District of Columbia it was occupying the them is not decided in St. Louis v. Bell Teleph. Co. 96 Mo. 623, 2 L. R. A. 278, 10 S. W. 197, but it is there held that, even if the legislature had such power, it had not conferred it upon the city, and an ordinance limiting the annual charge for use of a telephone was therefore in valid. So, in State es rel. Wisconsin Teleph. Co. v. Sheboygan, 111 Wis. 23, 86 N. W. 657, the fail ure of the legislature to confer the power upon the municipality was fatal to its contention that it might fix maximum telephone charges as a lawful police regulation to prevent extortion. A telephone company duly incorporated and organized under a statute giving it the right to occupy a city's streets and conduct its business therein cannot be affected by the subsequent adoption by the city of Wis. Rev. Stat. 1898, §§ 940c-940i, prescribing the manner in which franchises shall be granted, pursuant to which it established regulations for the maintenance and operation of a proposed extension of the company's plant and the conduct by it of its business, and prescribed the rates which it might not exceed. State ex rel. Wisconsin Teleph. Co. v. Sheboygan (Wis.) 90 N. W. 441. For an extended discussion of the power of the legislature to fix tolls, rates, and prices, see note to Winchester & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Croxton (Ky.) 33 L. R. A. 188. 186 U. S. |