42 L. ed. 407, 408, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, 2, "applications for the writ have been made, and appeals taken from refusals to grant it, quite destitute of meritorious grounds, and operating only to delay the administration of justice."

It is an attempt to substitute a writ of habeas corpus for a writ of error, and to review the proceedings in a criminal case in the state court by such collateral attack rather than by direct proceedings in error, --something which this court has repeatedly said ought seldom to be done. See, among other cases, Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284, 42 L. ed. 748, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 323; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 104, 43 L. ed. 91, 96, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 805, and cases cited in the opinion; Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U. S. 184, 44 L. ed. 124, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76; Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U. S. 499, 45 L. ed. 639, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 455.

Many of the allegations in the petition are general and obscure, and it is not easy to determine therefrom in what particular the petitioner considers the proceedings [142]against him to be *in conflict with the Federal Constitution or the treaty with Italy.

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Some of the matters presented involve only the construction of state statutes, and should be determined by the courts of the state, whose determination in respect thereto is binding upon this court. It must be borne in mind that under § 763 of the Revised Statutes the jurisdiction of the Federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus is limited to "the case of any person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any law or treaty of the United States," and to cases arising under the laws of nations.

With these considerations in mind we pass to notice more particularly the matters set forth in the petition. It is stated that the petitioner was sentenced to be put to death at a given time; that he was not then put to death on account of a respite granted by the governor, and that such respite was unlawfully granted. Wherein the unlawfulness consisted is not stated, and whether it were lawful or not is a matter dependent on the laws of the state, and to be determined by its courts. The Federal Constitution neither grants nor forbids to the governor of a state the right to stay the execution of a sentence. So, also, it is said that under the Massachusetts statutes the party convicted has a year in which to file a motion for a new trial, and, therefore, no sentence can be executed on him until that time. Whether that be so or not is also a question depending on the statutes of the state, and to be determined by its courts. The state may see fit to postpone the execution of a capital sentence for a year, or provide that it shall be carried into effect more speedily, and what the state has provided in the matter is for its courts to decide.

It is averred that the proceedings in the Massachusetts courts are in conflict with the rights secured by the treaty between

Italy and the United States, but the articles of the treaty referred to only require equality of treatment and that the same rights and privileges be accorded to a citizen of Italy that are given to a citizen of the United States under like circumstances, and there is nothing in the petition tending to show a lack of such equality of treat-[143] ment. The petition, therefore, is plainly without merit.

But the principal contention of counsel is that the petition was dismissed by the circuit court for want of jurisdiction and a certificate thereof given, and that under § 5 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. at L. 827, chap. 517), the only question that we can consider is one of jurisdiction, and the following cases are referred to: Horner v. United States, 143 U. S. 570, 36 L. ed. 266, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522; Chappell v. United States, 160 U. S. 499, 40 L. ed. 510, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397; Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 164 U. S. 105, 41 L. ed. 367, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40, and Huntington v. Laidley, 176 U. S. 668, 44 L. ed. 630, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526.

We do not question that rule as applied to ordinary suits and actions, but § 761, Rev. Stat., provides as to habeas corpus cases that "the court, or justice, or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case by hearing the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice require." That mandate is applicable to this court, whether it is exercising its original or appellate jurisdiction. Proceedings in habeas corpus are to be disposed of in a summary way. The interests of both the public and the petitioner require promptness; that if he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty it may be given to him as speedily as possible; that if not, all having anything to do with his restraint be advised thereof, and the mind of the public be put at rest, and also that if further action is to be taken in the matter it may be taken without delay. Especially is this true when the habeas corpus proceedings are had in the courts of a jurisdiction different from that in pursuance of whose mandate he is detained. This matter of promptness is not peculiar to these cases in Federal courts, but is the general rule which obtains whereever the common law is in force. It is one of those things which give to such proceedings their special value, and is enforced by statutory provisions, both state and Federal. The command of the section is "to dispose of the party as law and justice require." All the freedom of equity procedure is thus prescribed; and substantial justice, promptly administered, is ever the rule in habeas corpus.

As the petition presented no case entitling the petitioner to a discharge, as the grounds[144] stated therein are absolutely frivolous, and as the result reached in the Circuit Court was in accordance with law and justice, the judgment is affirmed, and it is further ordered that the mandate issue at once.

H. L. PINNEY, C. L. Pinney, W. C. Patter-
son, and Thomas Brooks, Plffs. in Err.,



(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 144-151.) Impairing obligation of contract-law enact ed after making of contract-personal liability of stockholder in foreign corpora


Findings of fact were also made, among which were the following:

*"2. That the Los Angeles Iron & Steel [145] Company was a corporation organized on the 8th day of March, 1893, and incorporated under the laws of the state of Colorado; that the seventh provision of its articles of incorporation is as follows, to wit: The said company is created for the purpose of carrying on part of its business beyond the limits of the state of Colorado, and the principal office of said company in the state 1. The obligation of the contract of the stock shall be kept at the city of Denver, Arapaholders in a foreign corporation cannot be hoe county, and the principal plant and deemed to be impaired by the provision of Cal. Civ. Code, § 322 (which was enacted prior principal operations of said company, beto the incorporation of such corporation), im-yond the limits of the state, shall be in Los posing the same personal liability upon stock- Angeles county, state of California, and holders of foreign corporations doing business such other places in the state of California within the state as upon stockholders in doas may be decided upon by the board of dimestic corporations. rectors. The principal business of said 2. California stockholders in a Colorado corpo- company in the state of Colorado shall be ration whose charter specified that one pur-carried on in Arapahoe county. pose of the incorporation was the transaction of business by the corporation in California must be deemed to have contracted with reference to the provisions of Cal. Civ. Code, 8 322, Imposing the same personal liability upon stockholders of foreign corporations doing business within the state as upon stockholders in domestic corporations, and are bound thereby, so far, at least, as such liability arises from the corporate business carried on in California.

[No. 65.]

"3. That the defendants are and were at all times herein mentioned residents and citizens of the state of California.

"4. That all the indebtedness of said Los Angeles Iron & Steel Company to plaintiff and to plaintiff's assignors was created by contracts made, executed, and to be performed in the state of California."

"6. That at the time the said indebtedness was created and incurred by the said company there were issued of the capital stock thereof the number of 1,311 shares, and that the defendants were at said times the own

Submitted April 26, 1901. Decided Decem-ers respectively of the number of said shares


ber 2, 1901.

N ERROR to the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, State of California, to review a judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action to enforce a personal liability of stockholders. Affirmed.

as set opposite their respective names, as
follows, to wit: H. L. Pinney, 50 shares; C.
L. Pinney, 42 shares; W. C. Patterson, 35
shares; C. W. Damerel, 91 shares; F. E.
Little, 22 shares; Thomas Brooks, 38

Upon the stipulation and findings a judg
ment was rendered in favor of the plaintiă.
A writ of error was subsequently sued out
from this to that court, it being the highest
court in the state to which the action could
be taken.

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Article 12, § 15, of the Constitution of
California, adopted in 1879, reads:

"No corporation organized outside the
limits of this state shall be allowed to trans-
act business within this state on more favor-
able conditions than are prescribed by law
to similar corporations organized under the
laws of this state."

Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: [144] *This was an action to enforce a personal liability of stockholders. It was commenced in a justice's court of Los Angeles city, Los Angeles county, California, on September 30, 1898, by the defendant in error against the plaintiffs in error. It was subsequently transferred to the superior court of the county, where a trial was had on January 17, 1900, before the court without a jury. A stipulation was signed as to the truth of various averments in the complaint and answer, which concluded as follows: *Section 322 of the Civil Code of Califor-[146] "And it is stipulated that the only ques-nia, as amended March 15, 1876, provides tion in this case is as to whether § 322 of as follows: the Civil Code of California is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States; and if it is in violation of such provisions defendants are entitled to judgment; but if said section is not in violation of said provisions, then plaintiff is entitled to judgment as prayed for in his complaint."


"Each stockholder of a corporation is individually and personally liable for such proportion of its debts and liabilities as the amount of stock or shares owned by him bears to the whole of the subscribed capital stock or shares of the corporation, and for a like proportion only of each debt or claim against the corporation. Any creditor of Purchasing Co. v. Boston & M. Consol. Copper & Silver Min. Co. 35 C. C. A. 12.

NOTE. As to what laws are void as impairing obligation of contracts-see notes to Franklin County Grammar School v. Bailey (Vt.) 10 L. R. A. 405; Fletcher v. Peck, 3 L. ed. U. S. 162: McCanna & F. Co. v. Citizens' Trust & Burety Co. 24 C. C. A. 20, and Montana Ore-Dana, 25 L. ed. U. S. 885.

On the individual liability of stockholders for corporate debts-see notes to United States v. Stanford, 40 L. ed. U. S. 751, and Hatch v.

the corporation may institute joint or several actions against any of its stockholders for the proportion of his claim payable by each, and in such action the court must ascertain the proportion of the claim or debt for which each defendant is liable, and a several judgment must be rendered against each, in conformity therewith.

"The liability of each stockholder of a corporation formed under the laws of any other state or territory of the United States, or of any foreign country, and doing business within this state, shall be the same as the liability of a stockholder of a corporation created under the Constitution and laws of this state."

By the stipulation above referred to, the truthfulness of the following averment in the answer was admitted:

"Defendants allege that there is no statute of the state of Colorado providing that stockholders shall be liable for any portion of the indebtedness of a corporation, and allege that under the laws of the state of Colorado a stockholder in a corporation is not liable for any portion of the indebtedness of said corporation."

Mr. M. L. Graff submitted the cause for plaintiffs in error. Mr. J. W. McKinley was with him on the brief.

The statutes of Colorado are a part of the contract of subscription, but the laws of California are not, and cannot be a portion of the contract between a Colorado corporation and its stockholders.


the state of California to transact business was not the act of the stockholders, nor can it in any way affect their relationship to the corporation or its creditors.

Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 587, 10 L. ed. 307; Brown v. Hitchcock, 36 Ohio St. 667.

The inhibition against statutes which impair the obligation of contracts has received a very broad and liberal construction in a long line of decisions upon the subject.

Re Gibson, 21 N. Y. 14; Morawetz, Priv. Corp. §§ 1044, 1045, 1047; Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, 24 L. ed. 558; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 647, 20 L. ed. 686; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 550, sub nom. United States ex rel. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 18 L. ed. 408; Robinson v. Magee, 9 Cal. 84, 70 Am. Dec. 638; People ex rel. McCauley v. Brooks, 16 Cal. 33; Rose v. Estudillo, 39 Cal. 274; Bates v. Gregory, 89 Cal. 393, 26 Pac. 891.

Stockholders in a corporation incorporated by the citizens of one state under the laws of another state for the purpose of doing business within the state of their residence will be treated in the same manner as if they were residents of the state of incorporation.

Second Nat. Bank v. Hall, 35 Ohio St. 166; Oakdale Mfg. Co. v. Garst, 18 R. I. 484, |23 L. R. A. 639, 28 Atl. 974; Demarest v. Flack, 128 N. Y. 219, sub nom. Demarest v. Grant, 13 L. R. A. 854, 28 N. E. 645; Lancaster v. Amsterdam Improv. Co. 140 N. Y. 582, 24 L. R. A. 322, 35 N. E. 964.

Mr. J. A. Anderson submitted the cause for defendant in error. Messrs. W. S. Taylor and Edward W. Forgy were with him on the brief.

Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 187, 47 L. R. A. 725, 56 N. E. 489; Ferguson v. Sherman, 116 Cal. 169, 37 L. R. A. 622, 47 Pac. 1023; Russell v. Pacific R. Co. 113 Cal. 258, 34 L. The objection that a statute impairs the R. A. 747, 45 Pac. 323; Fourth Nat. Bank v. obligations of their contract cannot be urged Francklyn, 120 U. S. 747, 30 L. ed. 825, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757.

by persons either contracting within the jurisdiction of the statute, or voluntarily entering within the jurisdiction of the statute in the performance of their contract, or in the enjoyment of benefits of their contract, many years after the enactment of the stat ute.

The individual liability of the stockholder under the national bank act is an essential element in the contract by which the stock holder became a member of the corporation. It is voluntarily entered into by subscribing for and accepting shares of stock; its obligation becomes a part of every contract, debt, and engagement of the bank itself,-as much so as if they were made directly by the stock-articles holders, instead of by the corporation.

Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 30 L. ed. 864, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 788; Stuart v. Hayden, 169 U. S. 1, 42 L. ed. 639, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 274; Flash v. Conn, 109 U. S. 371, 27 L. ed. 966, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221; Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205, 25 L. ed. S85: Matteson v. Dent, 176 U. S. 521, 44 L. ed. 571, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419; Bailey v. Hollister, 26 N. Y. 112.

The obligation of the stockholders under the California statute arises upon contract. Dennis v. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. 91 Cal. 548, 27 Pac. 1031; Kennedy v. Cali fornia Sav. Bank, 97 Cal. 96, 31 Pac. 846.

Liability depends upon, and is determined by, the charter and statutes of the state which created the corporation.

Morawetz, Priv. Corp. § 874; Merrick v. Van Santvoord, 34 N. Y. 208; Cook, Stock & Stockholders, § 223.

The act of the corporation in coming into

Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 391, 30 L. ed. 1059, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 916. When plaintiff's in error subscribed to the of incorporation they expressly agreed that this corporation could and should do business in California, and they must be held to have agreed to all the personal liabilities which the expressed law of the state then declared to be inseparable incidents to the making of the contract.

A foreign corporation can claim a right to do business in another state to any extent, only subject to the conditions imposed by its laws.

Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357; Cook, Stock & Stockholders, § 694; Morawetz, Priv. Corp. § 973; People v. Fire Asso. of Philadelphia, 92 N. Y. 311, 44 Am. Rep. 380; Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 656, 39 L. ed. 301, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 610, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207.

A state may forbid a foreign corporation from exercising corporate power within its limits, or may lay such restrictions upon its exercise as will prevent it, except on condi

tion that the stockholders become bound for the debts of the corporation.

Second Nat. Bank v. Hall, 35 Ohio St. 166.

[146] *Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

other law than that of the place, and when that is so that other law will control. That the parties have some other law in view and contract with reference to it is shown by an express declaration to that effect. In the absence of such declaration it may be dis

The plaintiffs in error rely upon the prop-closed by the terms of the contract and the osition that the liability of a stockholder is purpose with which it is entered into. In determined by the charter of the corporation Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124, 27 L. [147]*and the laws of the state in which the in- cd. 104, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 104, many cases corporation is had. "If the constitution to were cited by Mr. Justice Matthews, deliverwhich a corporator has agreed does not pro-ing the opinion of the court, in which these vide for individual liability to creditors, he propositions were illustrated and enforced, cannot be charged with individual liability and on page 136, L. ed. p. 108, Sup. Ct. Rep. anywhere." 2 Morawetz, Priv. Corp. 2d ed. p. 112, it was said: § 874. They invoke the lex loci contractus, and say that the stockholders' contract was made in Colorado, that being the state in which the Los Angeles Iron & Steel Company was incorporated; that by the laws of that state there is no personal liability of stockholders; that it is not within the power of California to change the terms of that contract, the Federal Constitution (art. 1, §10) forbidding a state to pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts; that while California, which prescribes an individual liability of stockholders, may if it sees fit exclude every corporation of another state whose stockholders do not assent to such liability, yet if it fails to do so, and such Colorado corporation actually comes into California to transact business, such coming into the state and the transaction of business therein do not change the terms of the stockholders' contracts, or impose a personal liability; and also that in such a case an attempt to enforce the statutory provisions of California so far as to change the personal liability of corporators in the foreign corporation is in conflict with the due process and equal protection clauses of the 1st section of the 14th Amendment.

With reference to the contention that the law of California impairs the obligation of the contract of the stockholders. it is enough to say that that law, both constitutional and statutory, was enacted long before the incorporation of the Los Angeles Iron & Steel Company, and that therefore § 10 of article 1 of the Federal Constitution has no application. "It is equally clear that the law of the state to which the Constitution refers in that clause must be one enacted after the making of the contract, the obligation of which is claimed to be impaired." Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388, 391, 30 L. ed. 1059, 1060, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 916, 918. See also Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 111, 40 L. ed. 91, 94, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80; McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102. 116, 43 L. ed. 382, 387, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134.

"The law we are in search of, which is to decide upon the nature, interpretation, and validity of the engagement in question, is that which the parties have, either expressly or presumptively, incorporated into their contract as constituting its obligation. It has never been better described than it was incidentally by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 48, 6 L. ed. 253, 264, where he defined it as a principle of universal law, the principle that in every forum a contract is governed by the law with a view to which it was made.' The same idea had been expressed by Lord Mansfield in Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, 1078: The law of the place,' he said, 'can never be the rule where the transaction is entered into with an express view to the law of another country as the rule by which it is to be governed.' And in Lloyd v. Gui bert, L. R. 1 Q. B. 115, 120, in the court of exchequer chamber, it was said that it is necessary to consider by what general law the parties intended that the transaction should be governed, or, rather, by what general law it is just to presume that they have submitted themselves in the matter.' Le Breton v. Miles, 8 Paige, 261."

The subject was also discussed at length by Mr. Justice Gray in Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 129 U. S. 397, 32 L. ed. 7SS, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469. In Coghlan v. South Carolina R. Co. 142 U. S. 101, 110, 35 L. ed. 951. 954. 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150, 152, Mr. Justice Harlan, referring to these two opinions, observed: "The elaborate and careful review *of the adjudged [149] cases, American and English, in the two cases last cited. leaves nothing to be said upon the general subject."

In Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 588, 10 L. ed. 274, 307, Chief Justice Taney said:

"It is very true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. But although it must live and have its being in that state only, yet it does not Passing to a consideration of the stock-by any means follow that its existence there holders' contract in the light of the other [148] contention, it may be said that ordinarily it is controlled by the law of the state in which the incorporation is had. That is the place of contract, and, generally, the law of the place where a contract is made governs its nature, interpretation, and obligation. While this is so, it is also true that parties in making a contract may have in view some

will not be recognized in other places; and its residence in one state creates no insuperable objection to its power of contracting in another. It is indeed a mere artificial being, invisible and intangible, yet it is a person for certain purposes in contemplation of law, and has been recognized as such by the decisions of this court. It was so held in the case of United States v. Amedy, 11

Wheat. 412, 6 L. ed. 507, and in Beaston v. those laws do not enter into the contract Farmers' Bank, 12 Pet. 135, 9 L. ed. 1030. and control as to all business done in purNow, natural persons, through the interven- suance of that contract within the limits of tion of agents, are continually making con- California? Suppose these same stockholdtracts in countries in which they do not re- ers in Colorado had formed a partnership side and where they are not personally pres-with the expressed intent of carrying on ent when the contract is made, and nobody business in California, would not that exhas ever doubted the validity of these agree-pressed intent be a clear reference to the ments. And what greater objection can laws of California and an incorporation of there be to the capacity of an artificial per- those laws into the liabilities created by the son, by its agents, to make a contract with- partnership business in California? And if in the scope of its limited powers, in a sov- this rule obtains as to contracts of partners ereignty in which it does not reside, provided between themselves, why not also as to consuch contracts are permitted to be made by tracts of stockholders between themselves in them by the laws of the place?" forming a corporation?

And then, after discussing the question of comity, added (p. 589, L. ed. p. 308):

"Adopting, as we do, the principle here stated, we proceed to inquire whether, by the comity of nations, foreign corporations are permitted to make contracts within their jurisdiction, and we can perceive no sufficient reason for excluding them when they are not contrary to the known policy of the state, or injurious to its interests.

"It is nothing more than the admission of the existence of an artificial person created by the law of another state, and clothed with the power of making certain contracts. It is but the usual comity of recognizing the

law of another state."

*In this case it appears that the business[151] transactions out of which these liabilities arose were carried on in California. They resulted from business done in California by virtue of an express contract made by the stockholders with reference to such business. It is unnecessary to express an opinion upon the question whether any personal liability would be assumed by the stockholders in reference to business transacted in Colorado. Parties may contract with special reference to carrying on business in separate states, and when they make an express contract therefor the business transacted in each of the states will be affected by the laws of those states, and may result in a difference of liability. Neither is it necessary to express any opinion upon the question whether the defendants could have been held liable under the California statutes, independently of the provisions of the Colorado charter. All that we here hold is that when a corporation is formed in one state, and by the express terms of its charter it is created for doing business in another state, and business is done in that state, it must be assumed that the charter contract was made with reference to its laws; and the liabilities which those laws impose will attend the transaction of such business.

The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.


[150] As, then, a corporation can have no legal
existence outside of the state in which it is
incorporated, the contract of the stockhold-
ers with one another, by which the corpora
tion is created, is presumed to have been
made with reference to the laws of that
state, nothing being said in the charter to
the contrary. But as comity permits a cor-
poration to enter another state and do busi-
ness therein, it is competent for the stock
holders in making their charter to contract
with reference to the laws of a state in which
they propose the corporation shall do busi-
ness. And in this case the stockholders in
their charter specified that the purpose of
the incorporation was partly business be-
yond the limits of Colorado, and that the
principal part of such outside business
should be carried on in California. Not
content to rely upon the general authori- HENRY W. DOOLEY et al., Plffs. in Err.,
ty which by the rules of comity the Colora-
do corporation would have to enter Califor-
nia and transact business therein, they in
terms set forth that a part of the purpose
of the incorporation was the transaction of
business by the corporation in California.
Now, when they in terms specified that they
were framing a corporation for the purpose
of having that corporation do business in
California, is it not clear that they were
contracting with reference to the laws of
that state? Contracting with reference to
the laws of that state they must be assumed
to know the provisions of those laws; that
by them a personal liability was cast upon
the stockholders in corporations formed un-
der the laws of the state, and that that same
liability was also imposed upon the stock-
holders of corporations formed under the
laws of other states and doing business with-
in California. How can it be said that


(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 151-176.)

Constitutional law-Foraker act-duty on
exports-imports into Porto Rico.



The tax imposed upon goods imported into Porto Rico from New York under the provisions of the Foraker act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 77, chap. 191), is not a tax or duty on articles exported from the United States within the meaning of U. S. Const. art. 1. 9. declaring that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state, since the goods are not exported to a foreign country.

A duty on imports to Porto Rico, within the power of Congress under U. S Const. art. 1. § 8. "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises," is imposed by the Foraker act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 77. chap.

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