Per Justices 191), as temporary legislation for the island, since the tax is for the benefit of Porto Rico, and can be abolished by the legislative assembly of Porto Rico at will. Brown, Gray, Shiras, and McKenna. 3. The constitutional provision that "all duties, Imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States" (U. S. Const. art. 1, §8) does not apply to the tax imposed by the Foraker act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 77, chap. 191), upon goods imported into Porto Rico from New York. Per Justice White. [No. 207.] Argued January 8, 9, 10, 11, 1901. Decided IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York to review a dismissal of a petition on demurrer in an action against the United States to recover duties paid under protest upon imports into Porto Rico from New York. Affirmed. Statement by Mr. Justice Brown: [152] *This was an action begun in the circuit court as a court of claims by the firm of Dooley, Smith, & Co., to recover duties exacted of them and paid under protest to the collector of the port of San Juan, Porto Rico, upon merchandise imported into that port from the port of New York after May 1, 1900, and since the Foraker act. This act requires all merchandise "coming into Porto Rico from the United States" to be "entered at the several ports of entry upon payment of fifteen per centum of the duties which are required to be levied, collected, and paid upon like articles of merchandise imported from foreign countries." [31 Stat. at L. 77, chap. 191, § 3.] | late interstate and foreign commerce, which is exclusively a subject of national legisla tion, by imposing duties thereon, it is plainly an attempted exercise of the powers conferred on Congress as a national government, viz., the power to regulate commerce, conferred by cl. 3, § 8, art. 1, of the Constitution, and the power to levy duties, imposts, and excises conferred by clause 1 of the same section; and as such its tariff regula tions are unconstitutional and void because the duties levied and collected under them are not uniform throughout the United States. The uniformity required by the Constitution is a geographical uniformity. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 44 L. ed. 969, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747. The tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found. Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, sub nom. Edye v. Robertson, 28 L. ed. 798, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247. The geographical uniformity required is not confined to the states, but extends to the whole "American empire." Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, L. ed. 98. 5 The act, so far as its tariff regulations on commerce between Porto Rico and the states are concerned, cannot be sustained as an exercise of the power of Congress to govern the territories. The tax is not a local tax for local purposes, but a tax laid under the 8th section of the 1st article of the Constitution. The duties collected under the act of April 12, 1900, from the plaintiffs, at the island of Porto Rico, on articles exported by them from the state of New York, were illegally exacted, and the collection of them was in violation of that provision of the Constitution which says that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.” A demurrer was interposed by the district attorney upon the ground that the This clause, so far as we are aware, has court had no jurisdiction of the subject of never received judicial interpretation. We the action, and also that the complaint did believe, however, that the language is explicnot state facts sufficient to constitute a cause it, and is susceptible of but one meaning, of action. The demurrer to the complaint which is that Congress has, under no condifor insufficiency was sustained, and the petition and in no place where it has jurisdic tion dismissed. tion to levy a tax, the right to exercise the taxing power with respect to articles which Hr. Henry M. Ward argued the cause, have been, are being, or are to be, exported and, with Messrs. John G. Carlisle and Wil from any state, whether to a foreign coun liam Edmond Curtis, filed a brief for plain-try or to another part of the United States. tiffs in error. For their contentions, see their brief as reported in Dooley v. United States, 45 ed. U. S. 1075. L. Mr. John G. Carlisle also argued the cause for plaintiffs in error. For his contentions, see his argument as reported in Dooley v. United States, 45 L. ed. U. S. 1077. Mr. Henry M. Ward also filed a separate brief for plaintiffs in error. For his contentions, see his brief as reported in Dooley v. United States, 45 L. ed. U. S. 1077. Messrs. William G. Choate and Joseph Larocque, Jr., also filed a brief for plaintiffs in error: As the act in question purports to regu Viewed from this standpoint, it is immate rial whether the taxing power is exercised in the port of New York or in the port of San Juan with respect to articles exported from New York to Porto Rico. Solicitor General Richards argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant in er ported in De Lima v. Bidwell, 45 L. ed. U. lay duties on imports from abroad and the S. 1046. Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court: This case raises the question of the consti[153]tutionality of the *Foraker act, so far as it fixes the duties to be paid upon merchandise imported into Porto Rico from the port of New York. The validity of this requirement is attacked upon the ground of its violation of that clause of the Constitution (art. 1, § 9) declaring that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." While the words "import" and "export" are sometimes used to denote goods passing from one state to another, the word "import, in connection with the provision of the Constitution that "no state shall levy any imposts or duties on imports or. exports," was held in Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 19 L. ed. 382, to apply only to articles imported from foreign countries into the United States. That was an action to recover a tax imposed by the city of Mobile for municipal purposes, upon sales at auction. Defendants, who were auctioneers, received in the course of their business for themselves, or as consignees or agents for others, large aniounts of goods and merchandise the products of other states than Alabama, and sold the same in Mobile to purchasers in unbroken and original packages. The supreme court of Alabama decided the case in favor of the tax, and the case came here for review. The question, as stated by Mr. Justice Miller, was "whether merchandise brought from other states and sold, under the circumstances stated, comes within the prohibition of the Federal Constitution that no state shall, without the consent of Congress, levy any imposts or duties on imports or exports." Defendants relied largely upon a dictum in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678, to the effect that the principles laid down in that case as to the nontaxability of imports from foreign countries might perhaps apply equally to importations from a sister state. In discussing this question, and particularly of the power of Congress to levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, Mr. Justice Miller observed: "Is the word 'impost,' here used, intended to confer upon Congress a distinct power to levy a tax upon all goods or merchandise carried from one state into another? Or is the power limited to duties on foreign imports? If the [154]*former be intended, then the power conferred is curiously rendered nugatory by the subsequent clause of the 9th section, which declares that no tax shall be laid on articles exported from any state, for no article can be imported from one state into another which is not at the same time exported from the former. But if we give to the word 'imposts' as used in the first-mentioned clause the definition of Chief Justice Marshall, and to the word 'export' the corresponding idea of something carried out of the United States, we have, in the power to prohibition to lay such duties on exports to other countries, the power and its limitations concerning imposts." "It is not too much to say that, so far as our research has extended, neither the word 'export,' 'import,' or 'impost' is to be found in the discussion on this subject, as they have come down to us from that time, in reference to any other than foreign commerce, without some special form of words to show that foreign commerce is not meant. Whether we look, then, to the terms of the clause of the Constitution in question, or to its relation to the other parts of that instrument, or to the history of its formation and adoption, or to the comments of the eminent men who took part in those transactions, we are forced to the conclusion that no intention existed to prohibit by this clause" (that no state shall, without the consent of Congress, levy any impost or duty upon any export or import) "the right of one state to tax articles brought into it from another." This definition of the word "impost" was afterwards approved in Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 623, 29 L. ed. 257, 5 Sup Ct. Rep. 1091. See also Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, 45 L. ed. 862, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648. It follows, and is the logical sequence of the case of Woodruff v. Parham, that the word "export" should be given a correlative meaning, and applied only to goods exported to a foreign country. Muller v. Baldwin, L. R. 9 Q. B. 457. If, then, Porto Rico be no longer a foreign country under the Dingley act, as was held by a majority of this court in De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 45 L. ed. 1041, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 743, and Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, 45 L. ed. 1074, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 762, we find it impossible to say that goods carried from New York to Porto Rico can be considered as "exported" from New York within the[155] meaning of that clause of the Constitution. If they are neither exports nor imports, they are still liable to be taxed by Congress under the ample and comprehensive authority conferred by the Constitution "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." Art. 1, § 8. In another view, however, the case presented by the record is whether a duty laid by Congress upon goods arriving at Porto Rico from New York is a duty upon an export from New York, or upon an import to Porto Rico. The fact that the duty is exacted upon the arrival of the goods at San Juan certainly creates a presumption in favor of the latter theory. At the same time it is possible that it may also be a duty upon an export. The mere fact that the duty is not laid at the port of departure is by no means decisive against its being such. It is too clear for argument that, if vessels bound for a foreign country were compelled to stop at an intermediate port and pay into the Treasury of the United States a duty upon their cargoes, such duty would be a tax upon an export, and the place of its exaction would be of little significance. The manner in which and the place at which the tax is 4 levied are of minor consequence. Thus, in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678, it was held that an act of a state legislature requiring importers of foreign goods to take out a license was a violation of the Constitution declaring that no state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any impost or duty on imports or exports; and in the recent case of Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, 45 L. ed. 862, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648, we held that a discriminating stamp tax upon bills of lading covering goods to be carried to a foreign country was a tax upon exports within the same provision of the Constitution. posed, would be a duty upon imports to The action is really correlative to that of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 45 L. ed. 1088, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770, in which we held that Congress could lawfully impose a duty upon imports from Porto Rico, notwithstanding the provision of the Constitution that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. It is true that this conclusion was reached by a majority of the court by different processes of reasoning, but it is none the less true that in the conclusion that certain provi sions of the Constitution did apply to Porto Rico, and that certain others did not, there was no difference of opinion. One thing, however, is entirely clear. The tax in question was imposed upon goods imported into Porto Rico, since it was exacted by the collector of the port of San Juan after the arrival of the goods within the limits of that port. From this moment the duties became payable as upon imported merchandise. United States v. Vowell, 5 Cranch, 368, 3 L. ed. 128; Arnold v. United States, 9 Cranch, 104, 3 L. ed. 671; Meredith v. United States, 13 Pet. 486, 10 L. ed. 258. Now, while an import into one port almost necessarily involves a prior export from another, still, in determining the char[156]acter *of the tax imposed, it is important to consider whether the duty be laid for the purpose of adding to the revenues of the country from which the export takes place, or for the benefit of the territory into which they are imported. By the 3d section of the Foraker act, imposing duties upon merchandise coming into Porto Rico from the United States, it is declared that "whenever the legislative assembly of Porto Rico shall have enacted and put into operation a system of local taxation to meet the necessities of the government of Porto Rico, by this act established, and shall by resolution duly passed so notify the President, he shall make proclamation thereof, and thereupon all tariff duties on merchandise and articles going into Porto Rico from the United States or coming into the United States from Porto Rico shall cease, and from and after such date all such merchandise and articles shall be entered at the several ports of entry free of duty." And by § 4, "the duties and taxes collected in Porto Rico in pursuance of this act, less the cost of collecting the same and the gross amount of all collections of duties and taxes in the United States upon articles of merchandise coming from Porto Rico, shall not be covered into the general fund of the Treasury, but shall be held as a separate fund, and shall be placed at the disposal of the President to be While agreeing to the judgment of affirmused for the government and benefit of Porto ance and in substance concurring in the Rico until the government of Porto Rico, opinion of the court just announced, by herein provided for, shall have been organ- *which the affirmance is sustained, I propose [158] izel, when all moneys theretofore collected to summarize in my own language the reaunder the provisions hereof, then unexpend-soning which the opinion embodies as it is ed, shall be transferred to the local treas- by me understood. ury of Porto Rico." Now, there can be no doubt whatever that if the legislative assembly of Porto Rico should, with the consent of Congress, lay a tax upon goods arriving from ports of the United States, such tax, if legally im It is not intended by this opinion to intimate that Congress may lay an export tax upon merchandise carried from one state to another. While this does not seem to be forbidden by the express words of the Constitution, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to lay such a tax without a violation of the 1st paragraph of art. 1, § 8, that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." There is a wide difference between the full and paramount power of Congress in legislating for a territory in the condi tion of Porto Rico and its power with respect to the states, which is merely incidental to its right to regulate interstate commerce. The question, however, is not involved in this case, and we do not desire to express an opinion upon it. These duties were properly collected, and the action of the Circuit Court in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint was correct, and it is therefore affirmed. Mr. Justice White concurring: In my judgment the opinion of the court in the cases of De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 45 L. ed. 1041, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 743, and Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, 45 L. ed. 1074, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 762, decided in the last term, and that just announced in from the former. But if we give to the word 'imposts,' as used in the first-mentioned clause, the definition of Chief Justice Marshall, and to the word 'export' the corre sponding idea of something carried out of the United States, we have, in the power to lay duties on imports from abroad, and the prohibition to lay such duties on exports to other countries, the power and its limitations concerning imposts." the case of The Diamond Rings, 183 U. S. 176, post, 138, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 59, as well as the opinions of the majority of the members of the court in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 45 L. ed. 1088, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770, also decided at the last term, when considered in connection with the previous adjudications of this court, are conclusive in favor of the affirmance of the judgment in this cause. The question is whether a tax imposed by authority of the act of April 12, The opinion then proceeded to elaborately 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 77, chap. 191), in Porto consider the meaning of the words "imRico, on merchandise coming into that is- ports," "exports," and "imposts" in the Conland from the United States, is repugnant to stitution, with reference to the powers of clause 5, § 9, of article 1 of the Constitution Congress, and concluded that they related of the United States, which provides that only to the bringing in of goods from a "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles ex-country foreign to the United States, or the ported from any state." Is the tax here as- taking out of goods from the United States sailed an export tax within the meaning of to such a country. From this conclusion the Constitution? If it is, the judgment the deduction was drawn that the words sustaining it should be reversed; if it is not, "imports" and "exports," when used in the affirmance is required. Constitution with reference to the power of In Woodruff v. Parham (1868) 8 Wall. the several states, had a similar meaning, 123, 19 L. ed. 382, the validity of a tax on and hence the tax levied by the city of Moauction sales levied by the city of Mobile bile was decided not to be repugnant to the pursuant to authority conferred by the laws clause of the Constitution heretofore reof the state of Alabama was called in ques-ferred to, prohibiting a state "from laying tion. One of the contentions was that, as the tax was on sales at auction of goods in the original packages brought into the state of Alabama from other states, it was repugnant to that clause of § 9 of article 1 of the Constitution, which forbids any state, with out the consent of Congress, from laying imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws. In approaching the consideration of the question thus presented, the court, in its opinion, which was announced by Mr. Justice Miller, said (p. 131, L. ed. 384): imposts or duties on imports or exports." In the course of the opinion an intimation of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland, that the words "imports" and "exports" *might relate to the movement of [160] goods between the states, was referred to, and it was expressly said that this was a mere suggestion on the part of the Chief Justice, not involved in the cause, and not therefore decided. So, also, the attention of the court was directed to the case of Almy v. California (1860) 24 How. 169, 16 L. ed. 644. That case involved the validity of a stamp tax imposed in California on all "The words 'imposts,' 'imports,' and 'ex- bills of lading for the shipment of gold ports' are frequently used in the Constitu- from California to a point without the tion. They have a necessary co-relation, state. The particular bill of lading which and when we have a clear idea of what was in question was for the shipment of either word means in any particular connec-gold from California to New York. It was tion in which it may be found, we have one of the most satisfactory tests of its defini[159]tion in other parts of the same *instrument. Leaving, then, for a moment, the clause of the Constitution under consideration" (forbidding a state to lay an import or an export tax), "we find the first use of these co-relative terms in that clause of the Sth section of the 1st article, which begins the enumeration of the powers confided to Congress. The Congress shall have power to levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts, But all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.' Is the word 'impost,' here used, intended to confer Congress a distinct power to levy a tax upon all goods or merchandise carried from one state into another? or is the power limited to duties on foreign imports? If the former be intended, then the power conferred is curiously rendered nugatory by the subsequent clause of the 9th section, which declares that no tax shall be laid on articles exported from any state, for no article can be imported from one state into another, which is not, at the same time, exported and excises. upon held that this stamp tax was at least an indirect burden on exports, and hence was void, because an export tax within the meaning of the Constitution. In the opinion in Woodruff v. Parham it was expressly decided that although the conclusion in Almy v. California, that the tax was void, was sustained by the commerce clause of the Constitution, which had been referred to in the argument of that case, it had been erroneously held that "import" or "export," within the constitutional sense of the words, related to the movement of goods between the states, and not exclusively to foreign commerce. To the extent, therefore, that Almy v. California held or intimated that an export or import tax within the meaning of the Constitution embraced anything but foreign commerce, it was expressly overruled. In Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 29 L. ed. 257, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1091, decided in 1884, fourteen years after the decision in Woodruff v. Parham, the question which arose in the latter case was again presented. A tax levied by the state of Louisiana on certain coal which had come down the Ohio "It was decided by this court, in the case countries into the United States." [161] *The opinion, after stating the facts which were presented in Woodruff v. Parham, and the contention which was in that case based upon them, said (pp. 628, 629, L. ed. 259): "This court, however, after an elaborate examination of the question, held that the terms 'imports' and 'exports' in the clause under consideration had reference to goods brought from or carried to foreign countries alone, and not to goods transported from one state to another. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider further the question raised by the plaintiffs in error under their third assignment of error, so far forth as it is based on the assumption that the tax complained of was an impost or duty on imports." Thus treating the meaning of the words "imports" and "exports" as having been conclusively determined by Woodruff v. Parham, the court passed to the consideration of the contention that the tax levied in the state of Louisiana was an export tax within the meaning of the Constitution, because some of the coal was intended for export to a foreign country, or had been, as it was claimed, in part actually exported to such country. Again, in Fairbank v. United States (1900) 181 U. S. 283, 45 L. ed. 862, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 648, the court was called upon to determine whether the requirement in an act of Congress that a revenue stamp be affixed to every bill of lading for goods shipped to a foreign country was a tax on exports. In the course of the opinion, in considering the question, the court referred to Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, 16 L. ed. 644, as authority for the proposition that a tax on the bill of lading was a tax on the movement of the goods which the bill of lading evidenced. But in referring to the Almy Case the court was careful to say (p. 294, L. ed. p. 867. Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 650): A consideration of the opinions in Woodruff v. Parham and *Brown v. Houston, so[162] recently in effect approved by this court in the case of Fairbank v. United States, will make it clear that an adherence to the interpretation of the words "export" and "import," which was expounded in those cases, is essential to the preservation of the necessary powers of taxation of the several states, as well as of those of the government of the United States. And, by implication, in a number of cases decided by this court since the decision in Woodruff V. Parham, the doctrine of export and import there defined has been, if not expressly, at least tacitly, approved in many ways. Indeed, it may be safely assumed that many state statutes levying taxes and much legislation of Congress has been enacted upon the express or implied recogni tion of the settled construction of the Constitution hitherto affixed to the import and export clauses by this court in the cases referred to. And this will be made obvious when it is considered that if the words "export" and "import" as used in the Constitution be applied to the movement of goods between the states, then it amounts to not only an express prohibition on the states to impose any direct, but also any indirect, burden, and therefore, under the doctrine of Brown v. Maryland, any state tax law which would indirectly burden the coming of goods from one state to the other would be wholly void. So also as to the government of the United States, if the provision as to the laying and collection of imposts be not construed as a "distinct" provision relating to foreign commerce and co-related with the clause as to exports, it would follow, as was clearly pointed out in Woodruff V. Parham, that the Constitution had granted on the one hand a power and immediately denied it. Besides, it would follow that all the general powers of taxation conferred upon Congress would be limited by the export clause. and thus any domestic tax, although fulfilling the requirements of uniformity and not violating the prohibition against preferences which indirectly burdened the ultimate export, would be void, -a doctrine, which would manifestly cause to be invalid methods of taxation exercised by Congress from the beginning without question. It being, then, beyond doubt that this court has, in a line of well-considered cases, determined that the words "export" and "import" *when employed in the Constitution re-[163] late to the bringing in of goods from a country foreign to the United States and to the "It is true that thereafter, in Woodruff carrying out of goods from the United v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 19 L. ed. 382, it was States to such a country, the only question held that the words 'imports' and 'exports' remaining is, Is Porto Rico a country foras used in the Constitution were used to de-eign to the United States? In answering fine the shipment of articles between this and a foreign country, and not that between the states, and while, therefore, that case is no longer an authority as to what is or what is not an export, the proposition that a stamp duty on a bill of lading is in effect a duty on the article transported remains unaffect this question it is manifest, from the entire reasoning of the court, in the cases in which it was decided that the terms "export" and "import" relate to a foreign country alone, that the words "foreign country," as used in those opinions, signified a country outside of the sovereignty of the United States and beyond its legislative authority, and that |