Ct. Rep. p. 24, after a quotation of the 23d section of the act of March 3, 1871, is this declaration:

"The Southern Pacific Railroad Company constructed the road thus contemplated, and claims that the lands here in dispute passed to it under the above act of 1871."

So also on page 46, L. ed. p. 376, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 26:

"The lands now in controversy are situated opposite to and are conterminous with the first, second, and fourth sections of the Southern Pacific Railroad, as constructed between 1873 and 1877, inclusive, and within the primary and indemnity limits of the grant to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company made by the 23d section of the Tex & Pacific act of March 3, 1871."

And on page 61, L. ed. p. 381, Sup. Ct. Rep p. 32, the conclusion was summed up in these words:

For the reasons stated, we are of opinin that it must be taken in this case to have been conclusively adjudicated in the former Cases, as between the United States and the Southern Pacific Railroad Company[584] *1. That the maps filed by the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company in 1872 were sufficient, as maps of definite location, to identify the lands granted to that company by the act of 1866;

cases were tried. That fact, having been de-
termined, must be taken in the present suit
as not open to dispute. The Atlantic &
Pacific did file a sufficient map of definite
location of its line from the Colorado river
to the Pacific ocean, and such map was ap-
proved by the Secretary of the Interior. Its
title, therefore, to the land within the lim-
its of the grant in California, took effect as
of date July 27, 1866. No claim ofright *or [533]
title arising only in 1871, and created by
an act of that date, could affect its title.

But it was not adjudged in those cases
either that the Southern Pacific had no title
to any real estate by virtue of the act of
1866, or that if there was any real estate to
which it had any claim or right by virtue of
that act, such claim was not of equal force
with that of the Atlantic & Pacific. The
general statement at the close of the quota-
tion from 146 U. S. 607, 36 L. ed. 1101, 13
Sup. Ct. Rep. 160, "that the latter company
has no title of any kind to these lands," and
the similar statement in ¶ 3 of the quotation
from 168 U. S. 61, 42 L. ed. 381, 18 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 32, are to be taken as applicable
only to the facts presented, and cannot be
construed as announcing any determination
as to matters and questions not appearing
in the records. Of course the decrees that
were rendered in those cases are conclusive
of the title to the property involved in them,
no matter what claims or rights either par
ty may have had and failed to produce; but
as to property which was not involved in
those suits they are conclusive only as to
"3. That in view of the conditions at- the matters which were actually litigated
tached to the grant, and of the reservations and determined. "On principle, a point not
of power in Congress contained in the act in litigation in one action cannot be re-
of 1866, such lands became, upon the pass-ceived as conclusively settled in any subse-
age of the forfeiture act of 1886, the prop-quent action upon a different cause, because
erty of the United States, and by force of it might have been determined in the first
that act were restored to the public domain | action." Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S.
without the Southern Pacific Railroad Com-351-356, 24 L. ed. 195-199. "The particu-
pany's having acquired any interest there- lar matter in controversy in the adverse
in that affected the power of the United
States to forfeit and restore them to the
public domain.

"2. That upon the acceptance of those maps by the Land Department the rights of that company in the lands so granted attached, by relation as of the date of the act of 1866; and

suit was the triangular piece of ground, which is not the matter of dispute in this action. The judgment in that case is therefore not conclusive in this as to matters which might have been decided, but only as to matters which were in fact decided." Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler Min. Co. 157 U. S. 683-687, 39 L. ed. 859-861, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 733-735. The question here presented was not determined in the prior cases, and is whether the Southern Pacific acquireá

"These grounds being accepted as the basis of our decision, the law in the present case is clearly for the United States; for, as all the lands here in controversy are embraced by the maps of 1872, and therefore appertain to the line located by such maps, it must be, for the reasons stated in the former decision, that the United States is entitled, as between it and the Southern Pacific Rail-any title to lands other than those involved road Company, to the relief given by the decree below."

in those suits by virtue of the act of 1866; and that question, as we have seen, must be Obviously the fact settled by the decisions answered in the affirmative. Nor is this a in those cases was the filing by the Atlantic mere technical difference between those & Pacific of an approved map of definite cases and this. Counsel for the railroad location. Upon that the controversy hinged. company call the line from Mojave southSuch a map having been filed, the title of ward via Los Angeles, to connect with the the Atlantic & Pacific vested as of the date Texas & Pacific, a "branch line," and that of the act of July 27, 1866; and inasmuch eastward from Mojave to Needles, to conas the Southern Pacific claimed only by a nect with the Atlantic & Pacific, a "main grant of date March 3, 1871, it took no title. line;" *but by whatever name these two lines [5 This which is apparent from the foregoing are called, they were built under the authorquotations is emphasized by the full discus-ity of two different statutes, the line from sions in the opinions, as well as by the alle- Mojave southward via Los Angeles under gations in the pleadings upon which the the authority of the act of Congress of

March 3, 1871,--an act which in terms au- | limits conflict with the like limits of the thorized the building of a road from a point Southern Pacific, excepting therefrom those at or near Tehachapa pass, which is in the lands in respect to which there has been vicinity of Mojave, southward by way of some prior adjudication, and to dismiss the Los Angeles, to connect with the Texas & bill as to all other lands without prejudice Pacific, and gave no authority to build a to any future suit or action. line eastward from Mojave to connect with the Atlantic and Pacific,-the line from Mojave eastward, under the act of 1866, which authorized the Southern Pacific to connect UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF with the Atlantic & Pacific at or near the boundary of the state. The route which was selected by the company for this line was approved by Congress as authorized by

NEW YORK et al., Appts.,

v.

TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO.

v.

the act of 1866. Hence the one line was TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO, Appt., built under the authority of the act of 1871, and the other under the authority of the act of 1866.

Our conclusions therefore are that the United States, having become by the forfeiture act of July 6, 1886, repossessed of all the rights and interests of the Atlantic & Pacific in this grant within the limits of California, hold an equal, undivided moiety in all the odd-numbered sections which lie within the conflicting place limits of the grant to the Atlantic & Pacific and of that made to the Southern Pacific by the act of July 27, 1866; and that the Southern Pacific holds the other equal, undivided moiety therein. The United States and the Southern Pacific being, therefore, tenants in common of a large body of lands, a partition is necessary. It was suggested by Secretary Lamar, in the letter heretofore referred to, that the Southern Pacific take only every other alternate odd-numbered section. We see no impropriety in such mode of partition, though, under the case as it stands, we can make no order to that effect. In whatever way partition may be made, equity requires that the lands which the Southern Pacific has assumed to sell, and which were excepted by the circuit court from the decree in favor of the United States, and in respect to which they took their cross appeal, must be among those set off to the Southern Pacific, and thus the title of the purchasers be perfected. It is needless, therefore, to consider the merits of the cross appeal of the United States.

[535] *It is also unnecessary to determine the

UNITED

STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK et al.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 535-545.) Appeal-effect of reversal of decree of dismissal-agreed statement of facts--sale under foreclosure-liability for delinquent taxes when claim filed in timefinding of fact-penalty not enforced when not claimed in pleading-interest. ·

1.

The reversal by the Supreme Court of the United States of an order which dismissed a petition claiming a lien for taxes, on the ground that it presented no claim against the property or the parties, is an adjudication that upon the face of the petition a valid claim was presented, and is conclusive of such prima facie validity, not only as against objections which were in fact made, but also as against those which might have been made. 2. An agreed statement of facts certified by a territorial supreme court as a statement of facts under the act of April 7, 1874, brings nothing before the Supreme Court of the United States for consideration, where, instead of stating the ultimate facts, it contains a narrative of facts, transcripts of records, and the testimony which certain witnesses would have given if they had been produced and sworn.

3.

A claim of a lien for, and payment by the receiver of railroad property of, delinquent taxes on such property sold under decree of foreclosure, is in time, where the intervening petition making such claim was filed and the final adjudication establishing such lien made within the time expressly named in the derights of the Southern Pacific to lands outcree of foreclosure for the presentment of any side the limits of conflict. It having been claims for allowance, although such petition adjudged that the Southern Pacific, by the was filed after the confirmation of the sale, construction of its road eastward from Mo- but while the property was still in the posjave to Needles, became entitled to the bene- session of the receiver, and the latter had fit of the grant made by the 18th section of NOTE. On conclusiveness of judgments genthe act of 1866, the adjustment of the grant erally-see notes to Sharon v. Terry (C. C. N. is properly to be had in the Land Depart-D. Cal.) 1 L. R. A. 572; Bollong v. Schuyler ment, subject, of course, if necessary, to further contests in the courts.

Nat. Bank (Neb.) 3 L. R. A. 142; Wiese v. San Francisco Musical Fund Soc. (Cal.) 7 L. R. A. Bank of United States v. Beverly, 11 L. ed. U. 577; Morrill v. Morrill (Or.) 11 L. R. A. 155; S. 76; Johnson Steel Street Rail Co. v. Wharton, 38 L. ed. U. S. 429, and Southern P. R. Co. v. United States, 42 L. ed. U. S. 355.

As to review by United States Supreme Court

The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, affirming the decree of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of California, will be reversed, and the case remanded to the Circuit Court, with instructions to enter a decree quieting of judgment on agreed statement-see note to the title of the United States to an equal Stimpson v. Baltimore & S. R. Co. 13 L. ed. 442. As to review by the United States Supreme undivided moiety in all alternate sections Court of territorial decisions-see note to Minwithin the place or granted limits of the At-ers' Bank v. State ex rel. District Prosecuting lantic & Pacific in California, so far as those Attorney, 13 L. ed. U. S. 867.

4.

been discharged before such final adjudica

tion.

"any indebtedness and obligations or liabil-
ities which shall have been legally contracted
or incurred by the receiver before delivery
or possession of the property sold, including
the receiver's notes or certificates hereinbe-

The grantees of the purchasers of property at a sale under foreclosure cannot claim that they were misled in any way as to their liability for unpaid taxes where, by the terms of the decree, the sale was to be made sub-fore mentioned, and also any indebtedness ject to any indebtedness that might subsequently be charged against the property prior in lien to that of the mortgages foreclosed, and on the confirmation of the sale, and before they took title from the purchasers at such sale, the order specifically included within the obligations which must be assumed any taxes which might "finally be adjudged to be a lien on the property." 5. A proceeding to establish a tax lien is reinstated in the trial court as of the date of an order therein dismissing the petition on the ground that it presented no claim against the property or the parties, by the reversal of such order by the Supreme Court of the United States.

such fact.

and liabilities contracted or incurred by said defendant railroad company in the operation of its railroad prior to the appointment of receivers, which are prior in lien to said first mortgage, and which shall not be paid or satisfied out of the income of the property in the hands of the receiver, upon the court adjudging the same to be prior in lien to said mortgage, and directing payment thereof, provided that suit be brought for the enforcement of such indebtedness, obligation, or liability within the period allowed by any statute of limitations applicable thereto.

6. A finding by the trial court in a proceeding
to establish a tax lien upon railroad property,
as to the number of miles of railroad subject
to taxation, when approved by the supreme
court of the territory, is conclusive upon the
Supreme Court of the United States as to
The penalty of 25 per cent imposed by N.
M. Comp. Laws 1897, § 4035, upon any per-
son who fails to render a true list of his prop-
erty for taxation, will not be enforced in aance.
proceeding to establish a lien for unpaid
taxes, where no such penalty is claimed in
the petition.

7.

Interest on unpaid taxes prior to a decree establishing liability therefor, in an action to collect such taxes, is properly refused where the assessment was made in gross upon 60.7 miles of railroad, only 55 miles of which were subject to taxation, since under such circumstances the owners were justified in contesting their liability to such assessment and taxation in gross, and until there was an identification of the property subject to taxation, and a determination of the amount of taxes due, it would have been in equitable to charge penalties for nonpayment.

[Nos. 181, 182.]

Argued October 30, 31, 1901. Decided uary 6, 1902.

CROSS

"Any such claim for indebtedness, obligalions, or liabilities which shall not have been presented in writing to the receiver *or filed [537] with the clerk of this court prior to the time of delivery of possession of such property shall be presented for allowance, and filed within six months after the first publication by the receiver of a notice to the holders of such claims to present the same for allowThe receiver shall publish such notice at least once a week for the period of six weeks, in one or more newspapers published in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Prescott, Arizona, and Los Angeles, California, upon the request of any purchaser or purchasers after delivery of the possession of the property to them; and any such claims which shall not be so presented or filed within the period of six months after the first publication of such notice shall not be enforceable against said receiver nor against the property sold, nor against the purchaser or purchasers, his or their successors or assigns."

On May 3, 1897, a sale was made under the decree to A. F. Walker, R. Somers Hayes, and Victor Morawetz. On May 4 the sale was confirmed. The order of confirmation conJan-tained substantially the same provisions respecting payment of obligations as the decree, and added, "including also any taxes which may finally be adjudged to be a lien upon the property sold under the decree aforesaid."

APPEALS from the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico to review a decision modifying a decree of the District Court of the Second Judicial District establishing a tax lien. Affirmed. See same case below, 62 Pac. 987.

According to an affidavit filed in the case this clause was entered at the suggestion of counsel for the territory, and upon notice in open court of his intention to present a claim for the taxes hereinafter referred to. Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: [536] *On July 16, 1895, the United States Trust On June 22, 1897, the purchasers conveyed Company of New York filed its bill in the the property to the Santa Fe Pacific Railoffice of the clerk of the district court of road Company, and on July 1, 1897, the rethe second judicial district of the territory ceiver delivered possession of the property. of New Mexico, praying foreclosure of a On October 4, 1898, he was by order of the mortgage given by the Atlantic & Pacific court discharged as receiver. He failed to Railroad Company. On January 10, 1896, give the notice required by the decree for the Charles W. Smith was appointed receiver. purpose of cutting off claims against the On April 10, 1896, a decree of foreclosure was property, and on application of the Santa Fe entered. The decree provided that the pur- Pacific Railroad Company, the grantee of the chaser or purchasers, and his or their succes- purchasers, on December 19, 1898, an order sors or assigns, should, as part consideration was entered directing the clerk of the court and purchase price of the property pur- to publish the notice, and a notice was pubchased, and in addition to the sum bid, pay-'lished that on or before October 23, 1899, all

claims against the receiver must be presented or they would be barred. On June 10, 1897, after the confirmation of the sale, but while [538]the property was in possession of the receiver, the territory of New Mexico, by leave, filed an intervening petition claiming a lien for and payment by the receiver of certain taxes upon part of the railroad property in the county of Valencia. To this petition the trust company and receiver, on June 23, 1897, filed joint and several pleas. On the same day, without passing upon the sufficiency of the pleas, the court ordered the intervening petition dismissed on the ground that the "matters and things therein set up" were "not sufficient to entitle the said intervening petitioner to the relief sought by its petition." On appeal to the supreme court of the territory this order of dismissal was affirmed. From such decision the territory appealed to this court, which upon the first hearing affirmed the rulings below (172 U. S. 171, 186, 43 L. ed. 407, 412, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128), but on a petition for rehearing reversed the order and remanded the case for further pro- | ceedings. 174 U. S. 545, 43 L. ed. 1079, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 784.

proper, the court hereby certifies for use upon the appeal of the said The United States Trust Company of New York and C. W. Smith, receiver, that this case was tried in the court below upon an agreed statement of facts, which agreed statement of facts was made part of the record in the district court and part of the record upon appeal to this court, and is to be a part of the record on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States; that the said agreed statement sets out the facts of this case which were heard or considered by this court upon said appeal, and the same is hereby adopted by this court as its statement of such facts for use upon the appeal aforesaid, without here repeating the same.

"And the court further certifies for use upon the appeal of the said territory of New Mexico, in accordance with the prayer of the said appellant, the following statement of facts."

Following this was a special statement of facts, certified to under the hand of the Chief Justice.

Mr. C. N. Sterry argued the cause, and, with Messrs. E. D. Kenna and Robert Dunlap, filed a brief for the trust company:

The mandate having been returned and presented to the trial court on August 4, 1899, proceedings were there had which culminated, on October 5, 1899, in a finding that be formal, but may be brief, yet it should While a petition in intervention need not the territory was entitled to a tax lien upon exhibit all the material facts which are rea portion of the railroad property for $74,- lied upon for the specific relief invoked, em168.70, and a decree establishing such lien. bodying, either by a recital or by reference, From this decree both parties appealed to the so much of the record in the original suit supreme court of the territory, which, on in which the petition is filed as is essential August 23, 1900, modified the decree by re- to show a right to the particular relief deducing the amount to $61,922.73, and award-manded by the petition. ing interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from October 5, 1899, the date of the decree in the district court. 62 Pac. 987. From this decision both parties have appealed to this court.

A statement of facts agreed to by the parties was filed in the district court, and upon this statement the decree was founded.

A. 415, 46 U. S. App. 578, 77 Fed. 703;
Empire Distillng Co. v. McNulta, 23 C. C.
Beach, Modern Eq. Pr. 1 579.

When this case was reinstated upon the date of the supreme court of the territory), docket of the district court (upon the manthe district court, having parted with the taxes were claimed to have been levied, havpossession of the property upon which the ing disposed of all the funds that it ever had possession of in the foreclosure suit, and having finally discharged its receiver, should, of its own motion, have dismissed the intervening petition.

This agreed statement contains a narrative of facts, transcripts of records and the testimony which certain witnesses would have given if they had been produced and sworn. This statement of facts was incorporated in the record transmitted to the supreme court of the territory, and is the only portion of Bond v. State, 68 Miss. 648, 9 So. 353; the record showing the facts presented on the Brown v. Gay, 76 Tex. 444, 13 S. W. 472; hearing in the district court. After the de- Fordyce v. Du Bose, 87 Tex. 78, 26 S. W. cision by the supreme court of the territory, 1050; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Watson (Tex. both parties having signified an intention Civ. App.) 24 S. W. 952; New York & W. to appeal to this court, the territory applied U. Teleg. Co. v. Jewett, 115 N. Y. 166, 21 1539] for a statement of facts in accordance with N. E. 1036. See also McNulta v. Lockridge, the act of Congress of date April 7, 1874, in 137 Ill. 281, 27 N. E. 452; Farmers' Loan reference to practice in territorial courts and& T. Co. v. Central R. Co. 7 Fed. 539; High, appeals therefrom (18 Stat. at L. 27, chap. Receivers, 2d ed. § 398b. 80), which application was resisted by the Ordinarily an intervening petition cannot counsel for the trust company and the rebe filed after final judgment or decree, since ceiver on the ground that the case had been the court then loses jurisdiction, except to tried in the court below upon an agreed state-enforce such judgment or decree. ment of facts, whereupon the supreme court made this entry of record:

Meadows v. Goff, 90 Ky. 540, 14 S. W. 535; 11 Enc. Pl. & Pr. p. 503, note 5. "Being willing and desirous that the re- The purchase of the property upon its spective parties be allowed to get their ap-sale under the decree of foreclosure, the conpeals before the Supreme Court of the United firmation of such purchase, and the convey. States in such shape as their counsel deem 'ance of the property to the purchasers,

created a contract between the purchasers | Rep. 282. See also, to the same effect, and the court as to the method and manner Apache County v. Barth, 177 U. S. 540, 44 in which the unknown liabilities assumed by L. ed. 879, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 718. the purchasers as part of the purchase price were to be enforced, and the court was powerless to change the terms of such contract without the consent of the purchasers.

Any admission in the pleas originally filed to the intervening petition could not be used for any purpose by either party except upon the hearing of the pleas either upon argument or upon issue joined.

United States v. California & 0. Land Co. 148 U. S. 40, 37 L. ed. 359, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458; Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 303, 30 L. ed. 684, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534.

Kneeland v. American Loan & T. Co. 136 UJ. S. 89, 34 L. ed. 379, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 950; Davis v. Mercantile Trust Co. 152 U. S. 594, 38 L. ed. 565, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693; Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 30 Fed. 332; Fidelity Ins. Trust & S. D. Co. v. The territory was not entitled to recover Norfolk & W. R. Co. 88 Fed. 820; Chicago any interest upon the taxes alleged to have & O. R. Co. v. McCammon, 10 C. C. A. 50, been levied. The interest fixed by the stat18 U. S. App. 628, 709, 61 Fed. 774; Hous-ute quoted was and is in the nature of a ton & T. C. R. Co. v. Crawford, 88 Tex. 277, 28 L. R. A. 761, 31 S. W. 176. See also Central Trust Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. 59 Fed. 385; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Central R. Co. 7 Fed. 540.

There is no lien on real estate for taxes, except by force of statute, and a statute creating such lien must be strictly construed. Such statutory lien cannot be enlarged by construction.

Heine v. Levee Comrs. 19 Wall. 655, 22 L. ed. 223; Lyon v. Alley, 130 U. S. 177, 32 L. ed. 899, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 480; Cooley, Taxn. 305; Miller v. Anderson, 1 S. D. 539, 11 R. A. 317, 47 N. W. 957. See also Creighton v. Manson, 27 Cal. 614; State, Macknet, Prosecutor, v. Newark, 42 N. J. L. 38; Howell v. Essex County Road Board, 32 N. J. Eq. 672; Garrettson v. Scofield, 44 Iowa, 37; Otoe County v. Mathews, 18 Neb. 466, 25 N. W. 618; Meyer v. Burritt, 60 Conn. 122, 22 Atl. 501; New England Loan & T. Co. v. Young, 81 Iowa, 738, 10 L. R. A. 478, 39 N. W. 116, 46 N. W. 1103; Philadelphia v. Greble, 38 Pa. 339; Cabin Creek Bd. of Edu. v. Old Dominion Iron, Min. & Mfg. Co. 18 W. Va. 441; Kentucky C. R. Co. v. Com. 92 Ky. 64, 17 S. W. 196; Tousey v. Post, 91 Mich. 631, 52 N. W. 57; Anderson v. State, 23 Miss. 459.

penalty.

Litchfield v. Webster County, 101 U. S. 779, 25 L. ed. 927; Cooley, Taxn. 2d ed. pp. 456, 457.

It could not possibly attach in any event until the taxes themselves were levied. While the property was being administered in the hands of the court as an insolvent property, interest could not be allowed or collected on account of the failure to pay any taxes.

Thomas v. Western Car Co. 149 U. S. 95, 37 L. ed. 663, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 824; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Central Vermont R. Co. 90 Fed. 163; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Central Vermont R. Co. 91 Fed. 570.

Until the amount of legal taxes was definitely ascertained, the owners of this property had no opportunity of paying such taxes, and were therefore not in default in not paying; hence the claim for back interest is not a valid one.

Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. People, 46 Mich. 193, 9 N. W. 249; Redwood County v. Winona & St. P. Land Co. 40 Minn. 513, 41 N. W. 465.

Mr. F. W. Clancy argued the cause and filed a brief for the Territory:

An assessment of property is void, when the valid portion, if any, of the tax cannot There was no statute in New Mexico re-be separated, but not so where it is separquiring or making these taxes, when levied, able.

relate back to any previous time or date, California v. Central P. R. Co. 127 U. S. and, whether rightfully levied by the collec-1, 32 L. ed. 150, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 153, 8 tor, or not, they could only become due on Sup. Ct. Rep. 1073; Santa Clara County v. the 1st of January, 1898. Southern P. R. Co. 118 U. S. 394, 30 L. ed. 118, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1132.

Winona & St. P. Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 534, 40 L. ed. 250, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83.

Courts of equity regard substance, and not form; and even at law a case will not be reversed where "the result is right, although the manner of reaching it may have been wrong."

An agreed statement of facts made part of the record in a case tried by a court with out a jury is the equivalent of a special verdict, and constitutes a sufficient compliance First Nat. Bank. v. Home Sav. Bank, 21 with U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 649 and 700, which, Wall. 301, 22 L. ed. 560; Allis v. Northwestin their requirements, are substantiallyern Mut. L. Ins. Co. 97 U. S. 145, 24 L. ed. equivalent to the act of April 7, 1874.

Wayne County v. Kennicott, 103 U. S. 554, 26 L. ed. 486; Lehnen v. Dickson, 148 U. S. 73. 37 L. ed. 373, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 481. The adoption by the supreme court of the territory of findings made by the district court would be a sufficient statement of the facts of the case, within the meaning of the act of Congress approved April 7, 1874.

1008; Gregg v. Moss, 14 Wall. 569, 20 L. ed. 742; Cannon v. Pratt, 99 U. S. 623. 25 L. ed. 448: Hornbuckle v. Stafford, 111 U. S. 394, 28 L. ed. 470, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 515.

The taxes are liens on the property from the dates of the levies in the several years, respectively.

Peters v. Myers, 22 Wis. 602.

The admission in the pleas filed to the inStringfellow v. Cain, 99 U. S. 610, 25 L.tervening petition, that 58 miles of right of

ed. 421; Haws v. Victoria Copper Min. Co. 160 U. S. 303, 40 L ed. 436, 16 Sup. Ct.

way was not through government land, but land which belonged to private parties, and