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territory of IIawaii, as well as on April 12, 1901, when this petition for a writ of mandamus was filed, this court had made no order assigning the territory of Hawaii to any judicial circuit. The order made by this court on April 15, 1901, assigning the territory of Hawaii to the ninth judicial circuit, was not, as this petitioner requested, made as of a former day, but took effect only from its date. And no order of this court. assigning the territory of Hawaii to a judicial circuit under the act of 1891, can give a right of appeal inconsistent with the provision of § 86 of the later act of 1900 restricting such appeals to cases in which by the laws of the United States they are allowable to the courts of the United States from the courts of the several states.

Petition dismissed.

*CHARLES H. NUTTING, Plff. in Err.,[553] MASSACHU.

ror, removals of causes, and other matters and proceedings between the courts of the United States and the courts of the territory of Hawaii provides that they shall be governed, not by the laws applicable to other territories, but by the laws of the United States as to such matters and proceedings "as between the courts of the United States and the courts of the several states." Congress may have considered that, owing to the great distance of the territory of Hawaii from the continent, the appellate jurisdiction over that territory should be more restricted than over other territories, and should extend only, as in the case of the several states, to judgments against a right claimed under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. But whatever may have been the reasons which influenced Congress, its language is too plain to be misunderstood. Cases in admiralty, brought after the act of 1900 took effect, must, of course, be brought in the district court of the United States, and subject to the right of appeal therein provided to the circuit court of appeals for the ninth cir- COMMONWEALTH cuit. But as to cases in admiralty pending in the courts of Hawaii when the act took effect, there is no special provision, and they therefore remain, like other civil cases, to be finally determined in the courts of the territory of Hawaii, under the general provision of § 10. In cases in admiralty, as in all other cases pending in the courts of Hawaii at that time, it was within the discretionary power of Congress to provide that they should remain within the jurisdiction and determination of the courts of the territory; and it has clearly so provided as to pending suits of all classes. The fact that in a state cases in admiralty cannot be brought in its courts, but only in the courts of the United States, affords no reason for implying that Congress, without any lan[552]guage expressing *such an intention, meant to vest in any court of the United States either original or appellate jurisdiction in cases in admiralty pending in the courts of Hawaii when this act of Congress took effect.

v.

OF
SETTS.

(See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 553–558.)

Constitutional law—right of insurance brokto contract insurance without the state.

er

U. S. Const. 14th Amend. is not violated by the prohibition of Mass. Stat. 1894, chap. 522, § 98, against negotiating and transacting unlawful insurance with a foreign insurance company not admitted to do business in Massachusetts, under which a licensed insurance broker who, as local agent of New York insurance brokers, secured authority from a Boston shipbuilder to place insurance upon a vessel in process of construction in a Boston shipyard, may be convicted of a violation of this section, where he delivered to such builder a policy of insurance on such vessel, issued by an insurance company not admitted to do business in Massachusetts, which he had received by mail from the New York brokers.

[No. 32.]

Reliance is placed by the petitioner on § 15 of the act of March 3, 1891, chap. 517 (long before the annexation of Hawaii), Argued November 20, 21, 1901. Decided establishing circuit courts of appeals, which provides that "the circuit court of appeal, in cases in which the judgments of the cir

cuit courts of appeal are made final by this I's

act" (which include cases in admiralty), "shall have the same appellate jurisdiction, by writ of error or appeal, to review the judgments, orders, and decrees of the supreme courts of the several territories as by this act they may have to review the judgments, orders, and decrees of the district court and circuit courts; and for that purpose the several territories shall, by orders of the supreme court, to be made from time to time, be assigned to particular circuits." 20 Stat. at L. 830. But on November 9, 1900, when this appeal to the cir cuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit was claimed from the supreme court of the

January 13, 1902.

N ERROR to the Superior Court of the State of Massachusetts to review a conviction of negotiating unlawful insurance with a foreign insurance company not admitted to do business in that state. Affirmed.

Statement by Mr. Justice Gray:

This was an indictment on the statute of Massachusetts of 1894, chap. 522, § 98, for negotiating and transacting unlawful insurance with a foreign insurance company not admitted to do business in Massachusetts.

Section 98 of that act is as follows: "Any
NOTE.-A8 to constitutionality of statutes re-

stricting contracts and business-see note to
State v. Loomis (Mo.) 21 L. R. A. 789.

person who shall assume to act as an insur-| 1898, for a year from November 16, 1898, ance agent or insurance broker without li- on the aforesaid vessel, for the sum of cense therefor as herein provided, or who shall act in any manner in the negotiation or transaction of unlawful insurance with a foreign insurance company not admitted to do business in this commonwealth, or who as principal or agent shall violate any provision of this act in regard to the negotiation or effecting of contracts of insurance, shall be punished by fine of not less than $100 nor more than $500 dollars for each offense."

The act, in § 3, provides that "it shall be unlawful for any company to make any con

£4,124, the policy running in favor of Johnson & Higgins, "on account of whom it may concern, as well in their own name as for and in the name and names of all and every other person or persons to whom the same doth, may, or shall appertain." Tyson & Company, at the time of receiving the policy, paid the premiums thereon for account of Johnson & Higgins, and received a commission upon the insurance from Lloyds for themselves and for Johnson & Higgins. Tyson & Company sent the policy to Johnson & Higgins in New York; they, after indors

[554]tract of insurance upon or concerning *anying it, forwarded it by mail to the defend

property or interests or lives in this com- ant in Boston; and he, on November 18, monwealth, or with any resident thereof, 1898, sent it by mail to McKie. The policy or for any person as insurance agent or in- was procured from the London Lloyds in the surance broker to make, negotiate, solicit, usual course of the business of the defendor in any manner aid in the transaction of ant, of Johnson & Higgins, and of Tyson & such insurance, unless and except as au Company. None of them were agents of thorized under the provisions of this act;" the London Lloyds, except in so far as the and that "all contracts of insurance on facts agreed constituted them agents. The property, lives, or interests in this common- London Lloyds were individual insurers, wealth shall be deemed to be made therein." citizens of England, associated as principals And in §§ 77-82 it prescribes the conditions in the business of insurance under and by with which foreign insurance companies authority of the government of the United must comply before they can do business in Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and Massachusetts, requiring each company, carrying on the business in England on the among other things, to appoint the insur- Lloyds' plan, by which each associate unance commissioner its attorney, upon whom derwriter becomes liable for a proportionate process in any suit against it may be part of the whole amount insured by a poliserved; to appoint some resident of Massa-cy. The London Lloyds had not complied chusetts as its agent; to obtain from the in- with any of the requirements imposed by surance commissioner a certificate that it the laws of Massachusetts upon foreign inhas complied with the laws of Massachu-surance companies, and had not been admitsetts, and is authorized to make contracts ted to do insurance business in the commonof insurance; and, if incorporated or asso- wealth, according to law. ciated under the laws of any government The defendant requested the court to inother than the United States or one of the struct the jury that so much of the Massastates, to deposit with the treasurer of Mas-chusetts statute as purported to make illesachusetts or the financial officer of some gal such acts as were done by the defendant other state a sum equal to the capital re- was contrary to the 14th Amendment of the quired of like companies, to be held in trust Constitution of the United States, and as for the benefit of all the company's policy- such was unconstitutional and void. The holders and creditors in the United States. request was refused; and the court instructAt the trial in the superior court, the par-ed the jury that upon the facts above stated ties agreed upon the following facts: The defendant was a citizen of Massachusetts and a licensed insurance broker in Boston, and, at some time prior to November 18, 1898, solicited from one William McKie, a shipbuilder in Boston, and likewise a citizen of Massachusetts, the business of procuring insurance upon a vessel then in process of construction in his Boston shipyard; and, as agent for Johnson & Higgins, average adjusters and insurance brokers having an office in Boston in charge of the defendant, and their principal place of business in New York, secured the authority of McKie to the placing of a contract of insurance for £4,124 upon the vessel. Thereupon the defendant transmitted an order for the insurance to Johnson & Higgins in New York, and they at once wrote to their Liverpool agents, John D. Tyson & Company, to procure the aforesaid insurance. Accordingly, Tyson & Company procured a policy from the Lon- Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 [555]don Lloyds, to be delivered to Tyson & Com-L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427. pany. in Liverpool, dated November 18, The contract which is the basis of this

they would be warranted in finding the de-
fendant guilty. To all of this the defend-
ant duly excepted, and being found guilty,
his exceptions were overruled by the su-
preme judicial court of Massachusetts. 175
Mass. 154, 55 N. E. 895. He *was thereupon[556]
sentenced in the superior court, and sued
out this writ of error.

Mr. J. Hubley Ashton argued the cause and filed a brief for plaintiff in error:

It is the absolute constitutional right of a citizen or resident of a state to enter into contracts made outside of the state with foreign underwriters not admitted to do business in the state, for the insurance of his property in the territory of the state, and to effectuate such contracts by acts done within the limits of the state, any prohibition of a state statute to the contrary notwithstanding.

criminal prosecution was an English, and of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give not a Massachusetts, contract, and the whole effect to the Constitution. business of insurance involved was transacted by the British underwriters within British jurisdiction, and not within the state of Massachusetts.

Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374; Commonwealth Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. William Knabe & Co. Mfg. Co. 171 Mass. 265, 50 N. E. 516; Western Massachusetts Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Girard Point Storage Co. 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 288.

The object of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States is to protect the citizens of the United States and the people of the states against all such arbitrary state legislation, under the guise of the police power, as that enforced against the plaintiff in error in this case.

Wharton, American Law, §§ 365, 594, 595. The statute, as construed and applied in this case, is a plain violation of the principle of right and justice embodied in the Amendment, that "the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255.

Mr. McKie having the constitutional right to effect this insurance with the underwriters at Lloyd's, there can be no punishment inflicted by the state upon the plaintiff in error for doing what he did as the agent or servant of McKie in respect to the insurance. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 49, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757.

Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 625, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273.

It cannot be otherwise than unlawful for the legislature to use any means whatever to accomplish an unlawful purpose.

Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L ed. 678; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 431, 20 L. ed. 453; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 130, 19 L. ed. 384; Hinson v. Lott, Wall. 152, 19 L. ed. 388; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 279, 23 L. ed. 349; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 573, 24 L. ed. 1017.

Every constitutional right of liberty and property should be liberally construed and enforced.

Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 318, 11 L. ed. 145; Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co. 13 Wall. 166, 20 L. ed. 557.

Whatever one may claim as of right under the Constitution and laws of the United States by virtue of his citizenship is a privilege of a citizen of the United States. Whatever the Constitution and laws of the United States entitle him to exemption from, he may claim an immunity in respect to.

Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L

ed. 394.

And such a right or privilege is abridged whenever the state law interferes with any legitimate operation of the Federal authority which concerns his interest, whether it be an authority actively exerted, or resung only in the express or implied command or assurance of the Federal Constitution or laws.

Cooley, Const. Law, 246; Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. p. 489.

There can be no valid legislation by a state under its police power, or otherwise, which encroaches upon individual rights The power of Congress to regulate intergranted, secured, or protected by the Fed-national and interstate commerce embraces eral Constitution.

New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 654, 29 L. ed. 518, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L.

ed. 527.

Any person is at liberty to pursue any lawful calling, and to do so in his own way, not encroaching upon the rights of others. It is not competent, therefore, to forbid any person or class of persons, whether citizens or aliens, to offer their services in lawful business, or to subject others to penalties for employing them.

Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 745; Baker v. Portland, 5 Sawy. 566, Fed. Cas. No. 777.

The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.

Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 385, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499.

If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty

within its control all the instrumentalities by which that commerce may be carried on.

Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 29 L. ed. 158, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826; Cooley, Const.

Lim. 732.

The contract of marine insurance is a maritime contract within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States.

De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398, Fed. Cas. No. 3,776; New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1, 20 L. ed. 90.

Mr. Hosea M. Knowlton argued the cause and, with Mr. Arthur W. De Goosh, filed a brief for defendant in error:

The form of the indictment, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the material allegations of it, have been determined by the state court, and are not Federal questions.

Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673, 40 L. ed. 301, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 179; Baldwin v. Kansas, 129 U. S. 52, 32 L. ed. 640, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193.

There is no doubt of the power of the state to prohibit foreign insurance companies from doing business within its limits. The state can impose such conditions as it pleases upon the doing of any business by those companies within its borders, and un

less the conditions are complied with the prohibition may be absolute."

Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427. See also, to the same effect, Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389, 44 L. ed. 1116, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep.

962.

The state of Massachusetts has the right to prohibit foreign companies from doing business in this state without a license. As a means of giving effect to such prohibition, it must have the right to prevent those who are not licensed to act as insurance brokers from soliciting such business; otherwise the law would be of no value, and the state would be powerless to prevent the very thing it has the right to prohibit.

Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 39 L. ed. 297, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 610, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207.

York, having an office in Boston, secured
the authority of McKie to the placing of a
contract of insurance for a certain sum in
pounds sterling upon the vessel, and trans-
mitted an order for that insurance to John-
son & Higgins in New York; whereupon
they, acting according to the usual cours
of business of the defendant, of themselves,
and of their agents in Liverpool, obtained
from the London Lloyds, who had not been
admitted to do business in Massachusetts, a
policy of insurance for that amount on the
vessel; and the defendant afterwards, in
Massachusetts, received from Johnson & Hig-
gins that policy, and sent it by mail to Mc-
Kie, which tends to show that the policy ob-
tained from the foreign insurance company
was the insurance which he had originally
solicited. These facts clearly convict the
defendant of negotiating and transacting in
Massachusetts unlawful insurance with a
foreign insurance company, in violation of
the statute, if that statute is constitutional.

York, obtained from them a policy of ma-
rine insurance of a Massachusetts insurance
company on a vessel in California owned by
a citizen of California, to whom he deliv-
ered the policy in California. It was held
that a statute of California by which Hoop-
er was guilty of procuring insurance for a
resident of California from a foreign insur-
ance company which had not given bond as
required by the laws of California was con-
stitutional.

[556] *Mr. Justice Gray, after stating the case In Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 39
as above, delivered the opinion of the court: L. ed. 297, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 610, 15 Sup.
A state has the undoubted power to pro- Ct. Rep. 207, Hooper, the agent in Califor-
hibit foreign insurance companies from mak-nia of the same Johnson & Higgins of New
ing contracts of insurance, marine or other,
within its limits, except upon such condi-
tions as the state may prescribe, not inter-
fering with interstate commerce. A con-
tract of marine insurance is not an instru-
mentality of commerce, but a mere incident
of commercial intercourse. The state, hav-
ing the power to impose conditions on the
transaction of business by foreign insurance
companies within its limits, has the equal
right to prohibit the transaction of such
business by agents of such companies, or by
insurance brokers, who are to some extent
the representatives of both parties. Hooper
v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 39 L. ed. 297,
5 Inters. Com. Rep. 610, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep.
207; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578,
41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427.

In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427, the insurance was not obtained through an agent or broker, but by the assured himself; and the point decided was that a statute of a state punishing the owner of property for obtaining insurance thereon in another state The statute of Massachusetts of 1894, was unconstitutional. In that case the dechap. 522, on which this indictment is cision in Hooper's Case was expressly recog founded, besides requiring foreign insurance nized and distinguished; and Mr. Justice companies, as conditions precedent to doing Peckham, speaking for the court, and rebusiness in the state, to appoint agents with- peating the words of Mr. Justice White in in the state, and to deposit a certain sum Hooper's Case, observed: "It is said that in trust for their policy holders and credit- the right of a citizen to contract for *insur [558] ors, provides in § 3 that "it shall be unlaw-ance for himself is guaranteed by the 14th ful" "for any person as insurance agent or Amendment, and that therefore he cannot insurance broker to make, negotiate, solicit, be deprived by the state of the capacity to so or in any manner aid in the transaction of" contract through an agent. The 14th insurance on or concerning any property, in- Amendment, however, does not guarantee terest, or lives in Massachusetts, except as the citizen the right to make within his authorized by the act; and in § 98 that any state, either directly or indirectly, a conperson "who shall act in any manner in the negotiation or transaction of unlawful in tract the making whereof is constitutionalsurance" (evidently intending insurance de-ly forbidden by the state. The proposition clared unlawful by § 3) "with a foreign insurance company not admitted to do business in this commonwealth" shall be punished by fine.

The acts of negotiation or transaction by the defendant in Massachusetts, admitted in [557]the facts agreed by the parties, are *that he solicited from McKie the business of procuring insurance upon his vessel in Boston, and, as agent of Johnson & Higgins of New

that because a citizen might make such a
contract for himself beyond the confines of
his state, therefore he might authorize an
agent to violate in his behalf the laws of his
state, within her own limits, involves a clear
non sequitur, and ignores the vital distinc-
tion between acts done within and acts done
beyond a state's jurisdiction." 155 U. S.
659, 659, 39 L. ed. 302, 5 Inters. Com. Rep.
620, 621, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211, 212; 16 †

[559]

8. 587, 588, 41 L. ed. 835, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep.
430, 431.

the state, or because the taking or using of depositions of witnesses so situated in criminal cases on behalf of defendant is not provided for and may not be recognized in that [No. 417.]

state.

ary 6, 1902.

As was well said by the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts: "While the legis lature cannot impair the freedom of McKie to elect with whom he will contract, it can prevent the foreign insurers from sheltering Argued December 3, 1901. Decided Januthemselves under his freedom in order to solicit contracts which otherwise he would not have thought of making. It may prohibit, not only agents of the insurers, but al-IN ERROR to the Superior Court of Bibb County, State of Georgia, to review a so brokers, from soliciting or intermeddling conviction for murder affirmed by the Suin such insurance, and for the same rea-preme Court. Affirmed. sons." 175 Mass. 156, 55 N. E. 895.

We are of opinion that the case at bar comes within Hooper v. California, and not within Allgeyer v. Louisiana; and that § 98 of the statute of Massachusetts under which the plaintiff in error has been convicted is not contrary to the Constitution of the United States.

The effect of the other provision of the Massachusetts statute declaring that "all contracts of insurance on property, lives, or interests in this Commonwealth shall be deemed to be made therein" need not be considered; because the defendant has been convicted, not of the making of the contract, but of negotiating and transacting that contract in Massachusetts.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting:

In my opinion this case does not differ in principle from Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; and so thinking I cannot concur in the opinion and judgment in this case.

*ISADORE MINDER, Piff. in Err.,

บ.

STATE OF GEORGIA.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 559-562.)

[ocr errors]

See same case below, 113 Ga. 772, 39 S. E.

284.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. John R. Cooper argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Herman Brasch and Marion W. Harris, filed a brief for plaintiff in error:

No state in this Union shall deprive a citizen of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws. Due process of law is process of law according to the law of the land.

French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 181 U. S. 330, 45 L. ed. 884, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625; Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 45 L ed. 1165, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 836; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 369, 30 L. ed. 226, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 102, 24 L. ed. 618; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 Ú. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Cooley, Const. Lim. 351; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 599, 45 L. ed. 1020, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730.

It is within the power of each state of this Union to try and punish her own citizens according to her laws, as long as the authority does not infringe upon the limited power of the Constitution of the United States.

Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 29 L. ed. 250, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1148.

A person accused of crime has a right to process to compel the attendance of wit

Constitutional law due process of law-nesses in his behalf.
equal protection of laws-refusal to con-

Ex parte Marmaduke, 91 Mo. 228, 60 Am.

tinue criminal case for absence of non-Rep. 250, 4 S. W. 91.

resident witnesses.

The constitutional guaranty that persons accused of crime shall have compulsory proc

cludes, as an essential to the enjoyment of the right, reasonable time for making such process effectual; and a statute whose effect is to bring the defendant to trial before he has had a proper opportunity to obtain his witnesses is unconstitutional and void.

The refusal of a state court to continue a crim-ess for obtaining witnesses in their favor in-
inal case on account of the absence of mate-
rial witnesses residing in another state is not
a denial of due process of law or the equal
protection of the laws secured by U. S. Const.
14th Amend. because it is not within the
power of the state courts to compel the at-
tendance of witnesses beyond the limits of
NOTE.-As to what constitutes due process of
law-see Kuntz v. Sumption (Ind.) 2 L. R. A.
655, and note; Re Gannon (R. I.) 5 L. R. A.
359, and note; Ulman v. Baltimore (Md.) 11
L. R. A. 224, and note; Gilman v. Tucker (N.
Y.) 13 L. R. A. 304, and note. And see notes
to People v. O'Brien (N. Y.) 2 L. R. A. 258;
Pearson v. Yewdall, 24 L. ed. U. S. 436, and
Wilson v. North Carolina ex rel. Caldwell, 42 L.

ed. U. S. 865.

As to constitutional equality of privileges, immunities, and protection-see Louisville Safety Vault & T. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 14 L. R. A. 579, and note.

Graham v. State, 50 Ark. 161, 6 S. W. 721; State v. Berkley, 92 Mo. 41, 4 S. W.

24.

The right of an accused, under U. S. Const. 6th Amend., to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor was by the 14th Amendment extended to every citizen of every state charged with a crime in the state courts.

Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131, sub nom. Ex parte Spies, 31 L. ed. 80, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 282, 45 L. ed. 1104; 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770.

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