Dunham v. Gould, 16 Johns. 367, 8 Am. Dec. 323; Gray v. Bennett, 3 Met. 522. Mr. John W. Green submitted the cause for defendant in error. Mr. Samuel G. Shields was with him on the brief: The presumption is always in favor of the validity of a statute if the contrary is not clearly demonstrated, and a statute is not to be pronounced void upon the ground of repugnancy to the Constitution, unless such repugnancy is clear, and the conclusion that it exists inevitable. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14, 1 L. ed. 721; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 3 L. ed. 162; Pine Grove Twp. v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666, 22 I. ed. 227. The state may by statute lawfully limit the right of contract. Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281; Dugger v. Mechanics' & F. Ins. Co. 95 Tenn. 250, 28 L. R. A. 796, 32 S. W. 5; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404, 43 L. ed. 746, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419. The statute complies with the due-process of-law clause of the Constitution. Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 35 L. ed. 225, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 577; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 44 L. ed. 747, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 230. See also Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 127, 21 L. ed. 425; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 104, 24 L. ed. 619. The statute is a legitimate exercise of the police power. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231; Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 42 L. ed. 260, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 864; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 700, 40 L. ed. 859, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 714; Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 2 L. R. A. 81, 19 N. E. 390; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 385, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U. S. 43, 42 L. ed. 71, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 731; Douglass v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 488, 42 L. ed. 553, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 199; Sentell v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. 166 U. S. 698, 41 L. ed. 1169, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693; Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 140, 36 Am. Dec. 441. The foregoing citations apply solely to the rights of private citizens with respect to their private affairs. The principle is also illustrated by the large class of cases involv ing the police power of the state over quasipublic corporations, such as railroads, elevators, water companies, telegraph and telephone companies, etc. Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 36 L. ed. 247, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468; Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, 28 L. ed, 173, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska ex rel. Omaha, 170 U. S. 57, 42 L. ed. 948, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513; SlaughterHouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, 31 L. ed. 841, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 56, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1028; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77. Wages due to the laborer are often and in many ways made the subject of legislative protection, and such statutes, so far from being considered paternal and as financial measures, are upheld by the courts as just means for the protection of the weak against the strong. Seamen's wages are regulated by statutes of the United States. U. S. Rev. Stat. § 4520. Seamen are protected against new or unusual stipulations in the shipping articles, or against stipulations contravening the language and policy of the statute. The Two Fannys, 25 Fed. 285; The San Marcos, 27 Fed. 567. It is improper for plaintiff in error to assume that health, morals, and safety are alone concerned in the exercise of the police power. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 42 L. ed. 260, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 864: Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. Statutes like the one in question are founded upon reasons similar to those which justify the passage of usury laws, concerning which the supreme court of Illinois dethe lender and borrower of money do not occlares: They "proceed upon the theory that cupy towards each other the same relations of equality that parties do in contracting of other kinds of property, and that the borwith each other in regard to the loan or sale rower's necessities deprive him of freedom in contracting, and place him at the mercy of the lender." Frorer v. People use of School Fund, 141 II. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395. constitutional. Similar legislation in other states is held Opinion of the Justices, 163 Mass. 587, sub nom. Re House Bill, No. 1230, 28 L. R. A. 344, 40 N. E. 713; Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366, 6 L. R. A. 576, 23 N. F. 253; State v. Peel Splint Coal Co. 36 W. Va. 802, 17 L. R. A. 385, 15 S. E. 1000; Avent Beattyville Coal Co. v. Com. 96 Ky. 218, 28 L. R. A. 273, 28 S. W. 502; State ex rel. Curtis v. Brown & 8. Mfg. Co. 18 R. I. 16, 17 L. R. A. 856, 25 Atl. 246; Shaffer v. Union Min. Co. 55 Md. 74. *Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion[17] of the court: This is a suit in equity brought to this court by a writ of error to the supreme court of the state of Tennessee, involving the validity, under the Federal Constitution, of an act of the legislature of Tennessee passed March 17, 1899, requiring the redemption in cash of store orders or other evidences of indebtedness issued by employers in payment of wages due to employees. The caption and material portions of this act are as follows: "An Act Requiring All Persons, Firms, Corporations, and Companies Using Con pons, Scrip, Punchouts, Store Orders or Other Evidences of Indebtedness to Pay Laborers and Employees for Labor, or Otherwise to Redeem the Same in Good and Lawful Money of the United States in the Hands of Their Employees, Laborers, or a Bona Fide Holder, and to Provide a Legal Remedy for Collection of Same in Favor of Said Laborers, Employees, and Such Bona Fide Holder. [113 *Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of the state of Tennessee, That all persons, firms, corporations, and companies using coupons, scrip, punchouts, store orders, or other evidences of indebtedness to pay their or its laborers and employees, for labor or otherwise, shall, if demanded, redeem the same in the hands of such laborer, employee, or bona fide holder, in lawful money of the United States: Provided, The same is presented and redemption demanded of such person, firm, company, or corporation using same as aforesaid, at a regular pay day of such person, firm, company, or corporation to laborers or employees, or if presented and redemption demanded as aforesaid by such laborers, employees, or bona fide holders at any time not less than thirty days from the issuance or delivery of such coupon, scrip, punchout, store order, or other evidence of indebtedness to such employees, laborers, or bona fide holder. Such redemption to be at the face value of said scrip, punchout, coupon, store order, or other evidence of indebtedness: Provided, further, Said face value shall be in cash the same as its purchasing power in goods, wares, and merchandise at the commissary, company store, or other repository of such company, firm, person, or corporation afore said. qualify the right of contract, in that it requires that certain obligations payable in the first instance in merchandise shall in certain contingencies be paid in money; yet it is as certainly general in its terms, enbracing equally every employer and employee who is or may be in like situation and circumstances, and it is enforceable in the usual modes established in the administration of government with respect to kindred matters. The exact and precise requirement is that all employers, whether natural or artificial persons, paying their employees in 'coupons, scrip, punchouts, store orders, or other evidences of indebtedness,' shall redeem the same at face value in money, if demanded by the employee or a bona fide holder on a regular pay day or at any time not less than thirty days from issuance (§ 1), and that, if payment be not so made upon such demand, the owner may maintain a suit on such evidence of indebtedness, and have a money recovery for the face value thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction (§ 2). "There is no prohibition against the issuance of any of the obligations referred to, nor against payment in merchandise or otherwise according to their terms, but only a provision that they shall be paid in money at the election and upon a prescribed demand of the owner. In other words, the effect of the act is to convert into cash obligations such unpaid merchandise orders, etc., as may be presented for money payment on a regular pay day or as much as thirty days after issuance. "Under the act the present defendant may issue weekly orders for coal, as formerly, and may pay them in that commodity when desired by the holder, but instead of being able, as formerly, to compel the holder to accept payment of such orders in coal, the holder may, under the act, compel defendant to pay them in money. In this way and to this extent the defendant's right of contract is affected. "Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, That any employee, laborer, or bona fide holder referred to in § 1 of this act, upon presentation and demand for redemption of such scrip, coupon, punchout, store order, or other evidence of indebtedness aforesaid, and upon refusal of such person, firm, corpora"Under the act, as formerly, every emtion, or company to redeem the same in good ployee of the defendant *may receive the[20] and lawful money of the United States, may whole or a part of his wages in coal orders, maintain in his, her, or their own name an and may collect the orders in coal, or transaction before any court of competent juris-fer them to someone else for other merchandiction against such person, firm, corpora-dise or for money. His condition is bettered tion, or company, using same as aforesaid, for the recovery of the value of such coupon, scrip, punchout, store order, or other evidence of indebtedness, as defined in § 1 of this act." The views of the supreme court of Tennessee, sustaining the validity of the enactment in question, sufficiently appear in the following extracts from its opinion, a copy of which is found in the record: "Confessedly, the enactment now called in [19]question is in all respects a valid statute and free from objection as such, except that it is challenged as an arbitrary interference with the right of contract, on account of which it is said that it is unconstitutional, and not the law of the land' or 'due process of law.' "The act does, undoubtedly, abridge or by the act, in that it naturally enables him to get a better price for his coal orders than formerly, and thereby gives him more for his labor; and yet, although the defendant may not in that transaction realize the expected profit on the amount of coal called for in the orders, it in no event pays more in dollars and cents for the labor than the contract price. "The scope and purpose of the act are thus indicated. The legislature evidently deemed the laborer at some disadvantage under existing laws and customs, and by this act undertook to ameliorate his condition in some measure by enabling him or his bona fide transferee, at his election and at a proper time, to demand and receive his unpaid wages in money rather than in something less valuable. Its tendency, though of law. But it was held, after full review of the previous cases, that the act in question was a valid exercise of the police power of the state, and the judgment of the supreme court of Utah, sustaining the legis slight it may be, is to place the employer and employee upon equal ground in the matter of wages, and, so far as calculated to accomplish that end, it deserves commendation. Being general in its operation and enforceable by ordinary suit, and being unim-lation, was affirmed. peached and unimpeachable upon other constitutional grounds, the act is entitled to full recognition as the law of the land' and 'due process of law' as to the matters embraced, without reference to the state's police power, as was held of an act imposing far greater restrictions upon the right of contract, in the case of Dugger v. Mechan-insurance company should not be permitted ics' & T. Ins. Co. 95 Tenn. 245, 28 L. R. A. 796, 32 S. W. 5, and as had been previously decided in respect of other limiting statutes therein mentioned. 95 Tenn. 253, 254, 28 L. R. A. 799, 32 S. W. 6, 7. Where a contract of insurance provided that the insurance company should not be liable beyond the actual cash value of the property at the time of its loss, and where a statute of the state of Missouri provided that, in all suits brought upon policies of insurance against loss or damage by fire, the to deny that the property insured was worth Arkansas sustaining the validity of an act of the legislature of that state, which provided that whenever any corporation or person engaged in operating a railroad should discharge, with or without cause, any employee or servant, the unpaid wages of any such servant then earned should become due "Furthermore, the passage of this act was a legitimate exercise of police power, and upon that ground also the legislation is well sustained. The first right of a state, In St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Paul, 173 as of a man, is self-protection, and with the U. S. 404, 43 L. ed. 746, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. state that right involves the universally ac-419, a judgment of the supreme court of knowledged power and duty to enact and enforce all such laws not in plain conflict with some provision of the state or Federal Constitution as may rightly be deemed necessary or expedient for the safety, health, morals, comfort, and welfare of its people. [21] *“The act before us is, perhaps, less stringent than any one considered in any of the cases mentioned. It is neither prohibitory nor penal; not special, but general; tend ing towards equality between employer and employee in the matter of wages; intended and well calculated to promote peace and good order, and to prevent strife, violence, and bloodshed. Such being the character, purpose, and tendency of the act, we have no hesitation in holding that it is valid, both as general legislation, without reference to the state's reserved police power, and also as a wholesome regulation adopted in the proper exercise of that power." The supreme court of Tennessee justified its conclusions by so full and satisfactory a reference to the decisions of this court as to render it unnecessary for us to travel over the same ground. It will be sufficient to briefly notice two or three of the latest cases. In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383, the validity of an act of the state of Utah, regulating the employment of workingmen in underground mines, and fixing the period of employment at eight hours per day, was in question. There, as here, it was contended that the legislation deprived the employers and employees of the right to make contracts in a lawful way and for lawful purposes; that it was class legislation, and not equal or uniform in its provisions; that it deprived the parties of the equal protection of the laws, abridged the privileges and immunities of the defendant as a citizen of the United States, and deprived him of his property and liberty without due process and payable on the date of such discharge without abatement or deduction, was affirmed. It is true that stress was laid in the opinion in that case on the fact that, in the Constitution of the state, the power to amend corporation charters was reserved to the state, and it is asserted that no such power exists in the present case. But it is also true that, inasmuch as the right to contract is not absolute in respect to every matter, but may be subjected to the restraints demanded by the safety and welfare of the state and its inhabitants, the police power of the state may, within defined limitations, extend over corporations outside of and regardless of the power to amend charters. Atchison, T. & 8. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is affirmed. Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice Peckham dissent. *DAYTON COAL & IRON COMPANY (Lim [23] ited), Plff. in Err., v. T. A. BARTON. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 23-25.) Foreign corporations—subject to state laws -store orders redeemable in money. The fact that a corporation is foreign, and not requiring wages to be part in lawful money— NOTE.-On the validity and effect of statutes see Avent-Beattyville Coal Co. v. Com. (Ky.) 28 L. R. A. 273, and note. domestic, does not help it in contesting the constitutionality of the Tennessee act of March 17, 1899, requiring the redemption in money of store orders and scrip issued to em ployees in payment of wages, which act is held valid as to domestic corporations. [No. 26.] tracting, there is no condition existing upon which the legislature can interfere for the purpose of prohibiting the contract or controlling the terms thereof. State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 21 L. R. A. 789, 22 S. W. 350; San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Wilson (Tex. App.) 19 S. W. 910; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 22 L. R. A. 340, 35 N. E. 62; Frorer v. People Argued March 7, 1901. Decided October 21, use of School Fund, 141 Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. Statement by Mr. Justice Shiras: [23] *This was an action tried in the circuit court of Rhea county, Tennessee, wherein T. A. Barton, a citizen of Tennessee, sought to recover from the Dayton Coal & Iron Company (Limited), a corporation organized under the laws of Great Britain, and doing business as a manufacturer of pig iron and coke in said county. The company owns a store, where it sells goods to its employees and other persons. The company also has a monthly pay day, and settles in cash with its employees on said pay day. In the meantime, and to such of its enployees as see fit to request the same, it issues orders on its storekeeper for goods. On March 17, 1899, the legislature of Tennessee passed an act requiring "all persons, firms, corporations, and companies using coupons, scrip, punchouts, store orders, or other evidences of indebtedness to pay laborers and employees for labor or otherwise, to redeem the same in good and lawful money of the United States in the hands of their employees, laborers, or a bona fide holder, and to provide a legal remedy for collection of same in favor of said laborers, employees, and such bona fide hold ers." This was a suit brought by said Barton to recover as a bona fide holder of certain store orders that had been issued by the defendant company to some of its laborers in payment for labor. The defendant company denied the validity of the legislation, as well under the laws and Constitution of Tennessee as the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The plaintiff recovered a judgment against the company in the circuit court of Rhea county, and this judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of Tennessee, whereupon a writ of error from this court was allowed by the chief justice of the state supreme court. Mr. Frederick L. Mansfield argued the cause and filed a brief for plaintiff in error: When the subject of contract is purely and exclusively private, unaffected by any public interest or duty to persons or society or government, and the parties are capable of con 492, 31 N. E. 395; Leep v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 58 Ark. 407, 23 L. R. A. 264, 25 S. W. 75; Wally v. Kennedy, 2 Yerg. 554, 24 Am. Dec. 511; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 6 Atl. 354; Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 14 L. R. A. 325, 28 N. E. 1126; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 2 N. E. 29; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343; Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 57 Am. Rep. 869, 7 N. E. 631; Shaver v. Pennsylvania Co. 71 Fed. 931; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621, 10 S. E. 285. Laws depriving particular persons classes of persons of rights enjoyed by the community at large, to be valid, must be based upon some existing distinction or reason not applicable to others not included within their provisions. or Cooley, Const. Lim. 391; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621, 10 S. E. 285. The vocation of the employer, as well as that of his employee, is his property. Depriving the owner of property, or one of its attributes, is depriving him of his property under the provisions of the Constitution. People ex rel. Manhattan Sav. Inst. v. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48. Such legislation as the legislation in question partakes of the nature of despotism. Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 114, 50 Am. Rep. 636; State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co. 33 W. Va. 188, 6 L. R. A. 359, 10 S. E. 288; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 6 Atl. 354; Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 14 L. R. A. 325, 28 N. E. 1126; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343; Bauer v. Reynolds, 3 Pa. Dist. R. 502; Showalter v. Ehlan, 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 242. To take from property its chief element of value, and to deny to the citizen the right to use and transmit it in any proper and legitimate method, are as much depriving him of his property as if the property itself were taken. Third Nat. Bank v. Divine Grocery Co. 97 Tenn. 609, 34 L. R. A. 445, 37 S. W. 390; Stratton Claimants v. Morris Claimants, 89 Tenn. 497, sub nom. Dibrell v. Lanier, 12 L. R. A. 70, 15 S. W. 87; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652. The fact that appellant is an alien corporation does not alter the case, or make any different rule from what it would be if it were a domestic corporation. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L' ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064. A statute prohibiting the manufacture or sale, for food, of any substitute for butter or cheese produced from pure, unadulterated | allowed by the law to enjoy, it is clear that cream or milk, is unconstitutional. he is deprived of both liberty and property to the extent that he is thus denied the right to contract. People v. Marks, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 2 N. E. 29. The right to pursue in a lawful manner a lawful vocation or trade, unmolested by laws in any way restrictive of that right, is a privilege that is protected and secured to the citizen by the Constitution of the United States. Live Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Asso. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 1 Abb. (U. S.) 388, Fed. Cas. No. 8,408; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 430, 20 L. ed. 453; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 97, 21 L. ed. 415; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; 1 Smith, Wealth of Nations, chap. 10; Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274, 9 L. R. A. 482, 24 Pac. 737; Re Eight Hour Bill, 21 Colo. 29, 39 Pac. 328; Low v. Rees Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 24 L. R. A. 702, 59 N. W. 362; Re House Bill, No. 203, 21 Colo. 27, 39 Pac. 431; Frorer v. People use of School Fund, 141 Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395. Frorer v. People use of School Fund, 141 Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395; Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380, 17 L. R. A. 853, 32 N. E. 364; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 22 L. R. A. 340, 35 N. E. 62; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 21 L. R. A. 789, 22 S. W. 350; Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121. "The law of the land" does not mean the acts of legislatures which deprive the citizen of his rights, privileges, or property, but it means a valid act; and the spirit of the Constitution means that there must be some limitations on the part of the legislature. Magna Charta relieved the British subject from the tyranny of the King, and remitted him to the despotism of Parliament; the Constitution of the United States, under the 14th Amendment, relieves every person of the uncontrolled despotism of the legisla ture. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378. The right to labor is, of all others, after The right of personal security, the right of the right to live, the fundamental, inaliena-personal liberty, and the right to protect ble right of man, of which he cannot be deprived under the guise of law, or otherwise, except by usurpation or force. Re Tiburcio Parrott, 6 Sawy. 349, 1 Fed. 481. Everyone has the absolute right to the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution save only by the laws of the land. 1 Bl. Com. 138; Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co. 13 Wall. 166, 20 L. ed. 557; Wynchamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378. property are three fundamental rights of all persons in the United States. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 127, 21 L. ed. 425. There are some rights, in every free governiment, beyond the Constitution of the state. Citizens' Sav. & L. Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 661. 22 L. ed. 461. Mr. Benj. Gorden McKenzie argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant in error: "Due process of law" and "the law of the land" mean one and the same thing. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 101, 24 L. ed. 618. All laws, therefore, which impair or trammel these rights, which limit one in his choice of a trade or profession, or confine him to work or live in a specified locality, or exclude him from his own house, or restrain Then it necessarily follows, if this act is his otherwise lawful movements, are in- constitutional, that it is the law of the land, fringements upon the fundamental rights of and by it, within proper and reasonable limliberty, which are under constitutional pro-its, business and property rights can be regtection. People ex rel. Manhattan Sav. Inst. v. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509, 30 Am. Rep. 323; Low v. Rees Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 24 L. R. A. 702, 59 N. W. 362; Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn. 264, 33 N. W. 800; State ex rel. Randolph v. Wood, 49 N. J. L. 88, 7 Atl. 286; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 29 L. R. A. 79, 40 N. E. 454. The manner in which the law in question discriminates against one class of employers and employees and in favor of all others places it in opposition to the guaranties hereinbefore discussed, and renders it inval id. Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 29 L. R. A. 79, 40 N. E. 454; Frorer v. People use of School Fund, 141 Ill. 171, `16-L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395. ulated. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 392, 42 L. ed. 791, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. This court has held that the statute of Utah making eight hours' labor constitute a day's work is a proper exercise of the police power of the state. be Ibid. See also Com. v. Alger, ↑ Cush. 53, The act in question is general in its application, and hence no objection can brought on the ground of class legislation, as it applies to every person, natural or artificial. Such laws have been repeatedly upheld as a proper exercise of the police power of the state. In Tennessee an act regulating fire insurance contracts, and making the three-fourths value clause void, was upheld as proper and constitutional. Dugger v. Mechanics' & T. Ins. Co. 95 Tenn. 245, 28 L. R. A. 796, 32 S. W. 5. The privilege of contracting is both a lib- And the same court has held that an ordierty and a property right; and if A is denied nance prohibiting the erection of wooden the right to contract and acquire property in buildings within certain fire limits was not a manner which he has hitherto enjoyed un-in a constitutional sense, an impairment of no der the law, and which B, C, and D are still contract for erection of the same, although |