lish patent, as there was no other, and the he would necessarily have been compelled to describe it as "Rahtjen's Composition," right to use those words depended upon the existence of the patent, although up to 1878 [9]the article sent to the *United States was manufactured in Germany. As the right to use the word depended upon the English censees could manufacture the article, yet patent, the right to so designate the compo- the description would still have been "Rahtsition fell with the expiration of that pat- jen's Composition;" but when the patent exent, and from that time (1880) until 1883, when the trademark was obtained by Suter, Hartmann, & Co., there can be no claim made of an exclusive right to designate the composition as Rahtjen's composition, be cause from 1880 that right became public the name of the manufacturer. During its whole existence the name had been given to the article, and that was the only name by which it was possible to describe it. as a description of the article, and not of pired the exclusive right to manufacture and in order to obtain it a person would have to describe it by the words "Rahtjen's Composition." The words thus became public property descriptive of the article, and the right to manufacture it was open to all by the expiration of the English patent. Co. from the outset of their career as sole After Suter, Hartmann; & Co. obtained the consignees contained the description "Raht- trademark of an open hand, originally jen's Patent Composition, None genuine painted red, together with the name "Rahtwithout signature, Suter, Hartmann, & Co." jen's Patent Composition," which was some These labels were affixed to the packages, time in 1883, the paint was sent to the The labels used by Suter, Hartmann, & and were sent to Rahtjen in Germany when United States under that designation; but the trademark was not obtained without the positive disclaimer by the plaintiffs of the he manufactured for them, to be placed on own scribed? When the right to make it became public, how else could it be sold than by the name used to describe it? And when a person having the right to make it de scribed the composition by its name, and said it was manufactured by him, and said it so plainly that no one seeing the label sequent to the expiration of the English and had could fail to see that the package on which The United States registered trademark[11] it was placed was Rahtjen's composition could not, therefore, interfere with the prior manufactured by Holzapfel & Co., or Holz- (but not exclusive) right of the defendant apfel's Composition Company (Limited), to the use of those words. how can it be held that there was any in- The respondent company advertised and This rule held good when at the expiration of the patent, in November, 1880, 380, Suter, Hartmann, & Co. continued to send the paint to the United States as "Rahtjen's [10] Patent Composition, *Hartmann's Manufacture," because it is plain that the name of Rahtjen had, as we have said, become descriptive of the article itself, and was not a designation of the manufacturer. It had been manufactured both in Germany and in England at the same time, and that which was manufactured in England by Hartmann Brothers or Suter, Hartmann, & Co. had been distinguished from the German article by the statement that it was "Rahtjen's Genuine Composition, Hartmann's Manufacture." If anyone had desired to use this under the name of "Rahtjen's Composition, The trademarks which have been spoken paint, and had called for it in the market, Composition," was obtained only by the dis : claimer on the part of the applicants of to 1873, and by the expiration of the Engthe right to the exclusive use of those words, lish patent, in 1880, the right to that use except as part of the combination constitut- had become public. These various assigning the trademark. Prior to the English ors, therefore, did not convey by their aspatent, the respondent's predecessors or assignment a right to the exclusive use of signs had no valid trademark in England the words in the United States. The domesfor the same reason the Rahtjens had ac- tic trademark, which the respondent also quired none in the United States, viz., they had no right to designate the composition as a patented article when in fact there was no patent. From 1873 to 1880, while the patent was in life, they were entirely justified in calling it a patented article, and when that patent expired it seems clear they had no right to retain the exclusive use of the only name which described the composition, and that no such right could be claimed by virtue of a valid trademark antedating the patent, for there was none, assuming even that such fact, if it had existed, would have justified the claim to the exclusive use of the descriptive words after the patent had expired. claims gives it that right, was not used until after the sale of the composition by [13] the petitioner in the United States under the name of "Rahtjen's Composition, Holzapfel's Manufacture." We think the principle which prohibits the right to the exclusive use of a name descriptive of the article after the expiration of a patent covering its manufacture applies here. In the manufacture and sale of the article, of course, no deceit would be tolerated, and the article described as "Rahtjen's Composition" would, when manufactured by defendant, have to be plainly described as its manufacture. The proof shows this has been done, and that the article has been sold under a totally different trademark from any used by respondent, and it has been plainly and fully described as manufactured The judgments in the Antwerp and Ham[12]burg courts simply showed that in those countries the use of the words "Rahtjen's Composition" or "Rahtjen's Patent Compo- by defendant or its assignors, the Holzapsition" had become descriptive of the article fels. itself, and did not in any way designate We are of opinion that no right to the ex the persons who manufactured it; but even without those judgments the record shows beyond question that when the English patent expired the use of the words became open to the world as descriptive of the article itself, and to manufacture an article under that name was a right open to the world. There was no trademark in that name in the United States. The principles involved in Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co. 163 U. S. 169, 41 L. ed. 118, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1002, apply here. It is said there is a distinction between the case at bar and the one cited, because in the latter the patent and the trademark were both domestic, while here the trademark is domestic and the patent foreign. The respondent claims the right to use these words by virtue of assignments from the Messrs. Rahtjen and also Suter, Hartmann, & Co. in England, and also by virtue of a domestic trademark which it or its predecessors had acquired from user and registration in the United States. The rights of Suter, Hartmann, & Co. to the exclusive use of these words had been disclaimed by thein in 1883, long before any assignment of their rights to the respondent, and we do not see why that disclaimer should be confined to England. It was a general disclaimer of any right whatever to the exclusive these words, and it was only upon the filing of that disclaimer that they obtained the trademark which they did in England. The disclaimer, however, was as broad as it could be made. When they assigned their rights the assignment did not include a use of clusive use in the United States of the words "Rahtjen's Composition" has been shown by respondent, and that the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit should be reversed, and that of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed. And it is so ordered. KNOXVILLE IRON COMPANY, Plff. in Err., υ. SAMUEL HARBISON. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 13-22.) Constitutionality of statute-redemption of store orders in money-interference with right of contract. The provision for the redemption of store or ders, scrip, etc., in money, which is made by Tenn. act March 17, 1899, requiring all persons who issue such orders to employees in payment of wages to redeem them in money on any regular pay day or at any time within thirty days after they are issued, if presented and payment in money demanded by such employees or by bona fide holders, is not unconstitutional as an arbitrary interference with the right of contract, but is a legitimate exercise of the general legislative power as well as of the police power. [No. 22.] right to an exclusive use which, in order to Argued and Submitted March 7, 1901. De obtain the trademark registration, they had already disclaimed. The assignment of the Rahtjen firm could not convey the exclusive right to the use of such words, because they had no valid trademark in those words prior cided October 21, 1901. NOTE. On the validity and effect of statutes requiring wages to be paid in lawful moneysee Avent-Beattyville Coal Co. v. Com. (Ky.) 28 L. R. A. 273, and note. Statement by Mr. Justice Shiras: [13] *In the chancery court of Knox county, Tennessee, Samuel Harbison, a citizen of said state, on June 2, 1899, filed a bill of complaint against the Knoxville Iron Company, a corporation organized under the [14 laws of the state of Tennessee, alleging that he was the bona fide holder by purchase in due course of trade of certain specified accepted orders for coal that had been issued by the defendant company in payment of wages due to its employees; that he had made due demand for their redemption in cash according to law, which demand had been refused; and that he was entitled to ■ decree for the amount of said orders, with interest. The company filed an answer derying that the complainant was a bona fide bolder of the orders in question, and allegAng an agreement between the company and its employees that the latter would accept coal in payment of said orders, etc. Proof was taken and the case heard by the chancellor, who rendered a decree in favor of the complainant for $1,702.66 as principal and interest of said orders, with costs. An appeal was taken by the defendant company to the court of chancery appeals of Tennessee, an intermediate court of reference in equity causes, where the decree of the chancery court of Knox county was affirmed. The facts as found by the court of chancery appeals are as follows: "The defendant is a corporation chartered under chapter 57, Acts of 1867-68. The following powers are given by § 4: To purchase, hold, and dispose of such real estate, not to exceed 70,000 acres, leases, main erals, iron, coal, oil, salt, and personal prop erty as they may desire, or as they may deem necessary for the legitimate transaction of their business; to mine, bore, forge, smelt, work, and manufacture, transport, re fine, and vend the same. The company to have and enjoy and exercise all the rights, privileges, and powers belonging to or inci. dental to corporations, which may be convenient to carry out any business they are in this act authorized to engage in.' "The defendant has its principal office at Knoxville, where it is engaged in the manufacture of iron. As an incident to this business it also mines and sells coal. Its mines are located in Anderson county. It works about 200 employees. It has now and has had for many years a regular pay day, being that Saturday in every month which is nearest the 20th day of the month. Upon [15] this pay day each employee is paid *in cash the amount then due him, excepting what may be due him from the first of the month, up to said pay day; that is, the company keeps in arrears with its employees all the time to the extent of their wages for about twenty days' time, so far as concerns the matter of cash payments, but they may collect this sum and all sums that may be due them in coal orders, as stated below. It does not and will not pay cash to its employees for wages at any other time than upon said regular pay days. Defendant, however, nearly always has on hand in its Knoxville yard a large amount of coal which it sells to all persons who are willing to purchase, whether such persons are its laborers or the public generally. For some time prior to the filing of the bill and at the time the bill was filed the defendant was and had been accustomed to accept from its laborers, after work had been performed, orders for coal in the following form: "Let bearer have and charge to my account. bushels of coal "The defendant's employees are accustomed to sign orders, and in this form they are accepted by a stamp in these words: ""Accepted 1899. "Knoxville Iron Company.' "Many of the defendant's employees have never drawn an order on the defendant, and many others have used them only in the purchase of coal for themselves; but the defendant in this way pays off about 75 per cent of the wages earned by its employees. Many of the employees who draw these orders get small wages, 90 cents to $1.20 per day, and sell these orders to get money to live on, but those who get the largest wages, $65 to $175 per month, draw more of such coal orders in proportion than do those who get small wages. Defendant has never insisted upon any of its laborers giving any such orders, but has been willing to accept such orders when any employee would draw them and ask their acceptance. Defendant, however, sets apart every Saturday afternoon, from 1 o'clock to 5 o'clock, for the acceptance of such orders. It makes some profit in accepting said orders in that, instead of paying the wages of its employees in cash, it *pays them in coal at 12 cents[16] per bushel, and also, to some extent, its coal business is increased thereby. On the other hand, such orders are a convenience to the defendant's employees in the way of enabling them to realize on their wages before the regular monthly pay day and up to that pay day. When these orders are drawn by defendant's employees and accepted, defendant credits itself with said orders on its accounts with the persons so drawing them at the rate of 12 cents per bushel for the amount of coal called for by said orders. There is no proof of an express agreement between the defendant and its employees that the orders should be paid only in coal, unless the face of the order shall be construed as setting forth such an agreement. The only proof of any implied agreement to that effect is 28 L. ed. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 391, 42 L. ed. 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Re Tiburcio Parrott, 6 Sawy. 349, 1 Fed. 506; Stockton Laundry Case, 11 Sawy. 472, 26 Fed. 614; Re Grice, 79 Fed. 627; Re Ja cobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People v. Mara, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 2 N. E. 29. to be found in such inferences as may be drawn from the face of the orders and from the custom of the company to issue themand the employees to receive them on other than the regular cash pay days and the fact that no employee has ever presented one of such orders for redemption in anything else than coal. There is no proof of any compulsion on the part of the defendant upon its operatives, except in so far as compulsion may be implied from the fact that unless defendant's operatives take their wages in coal orders they must always on each monthly pay day suffer the defendant to be in arrears about twenty days; that is, that on the regular pay day on that Saturday which is the nearest the 20th of the month, the defendant will not pay wages except up to the last day of the preceding month, but will pay in coal orders the whole wages due at the end of each week, and that such is the course of business between the defendant and its employees. The complainant purchased 614 of said accepted orders from defendant's employees, and within thirty days from the issuance of each of said orders 650, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 24, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. he presented each of them to the Knoxville Iron Company, defendant hereto, and demanded that it redeem them in cash, which was refused by defendant. Complainant is ▲ licensed dealer in securities, and sent his agents among the employees of the defendant to buy these coal orders. They had previously been selling at 75 cents on the dol. lar, that is, before the passage of chapter [17] 11, act of 1899, but he instructed *his agents to give 85 cents on the dollar, and the orders now in suit were purchased at that price. They amount in dollars and cents to $1,678. There is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the complainant in the purchase of said orders." The orders sued on in this case were issued after the passage of the act of March 17, 1899. From the decree of the chancery court of appeals an appeal was taken by the company to the supreme court of Tennessee, by which court the decrees of the courts below were affirmed. The case was then brought to this court by a writ of error albwed by the chief justice of the supreme court of Tennessee. Every interference by the state with the rights of liberty and property, not coming within the legitimate exercise of the police power, is a deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law, and is unconstitutional and void. Ibid. Corporations are "persons" within the meaning of the 14th Amendment, and their property and liberties are protected by its provisions. Santa Clara County v. Southern P. R. Co. 118 U. S. 394, 30 L. ed. 118, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1132; Pembina Consol. Silver Min. & Mill. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 31 L. ed. 737; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. ed. 585, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165. Whenever the police power of the state is sought to be exercised in matters affecting the public interest, outside of those primary police duties of safety, health, and morals, in which the public interest is intimately and inseparably connected with that of every individ individual, the impairment of individual rights of property and liberty can only be justified when it is shown to be demanded by the public welfare and the interest and well being of the community at large, as distinguished from the well-being of a particular class only. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 385, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 32, 24 L. ed. 992. The rights of property and liberty of one class of the community can never be taken away by the legislature, in the exercise of its police power, merely to secure financial advantage to another class of the community, however large and deserving such other class may be. The right of contract and other rights of liberty and property may be more freely infringed when necessary to protect the public safety, health, or morals than they can for the indefinite purpose of promoting the public welfare in general. This arises from the paramount duty of the state to protect the health, morals of its citizens, their preservation constituting an overruling necessity which often justifies interference with individual rights that would be exempt from infringement upon general and indefinite considerations of public benefit. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 397, 42 L. ed. 792, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. U. S. Const. 14th Amend. § 1; SlaughterHouse Cases, 16 Wall. 127, 21 L. ed. 425; The legislative justification for depriving any citizen of his life and property must be based upon a public benefit that is reasona Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Cres-bly certain, and not merely upon conjectures cent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, and possibilities. Re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 47 L. R. A. 52, 58 Pac. 1071; People v. Jackson & M. Pl. Road Co. 9 Mich. 295. While there is a presumption in favor of the validity of state legislation, yet the legislative determination is subject to revision by the courts, and the attempted exercise of police powers will not be upheld if it bears no substantial relation to the welfare of the public at large, and arbitrarily interferes with the rights of individuals under the guise of protecting the public interest. The police power cannot be put forward as an excuse for oppression and unjust legislation. Yick Wov. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064: Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 45 Ν. Ε. 313; Guthrie, 14th Amend. p. 76. This legislation cannot be sustained, even though many contracts are embraced within it which are legitimately the subject of legislation, since, if it interferes with a single class of contracts which are proper in themselves and are protected by the Constitution, the act must fall as a whole.. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Third Nat. Bank v. Divine Grocery Co. 97 Tenn. 603, 34 L. R. A. 445. 37 S. W. 390. Public policy requires the utmost liberty of contracting. Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq. 462. Under the overwhelming weight of authority, statutes which attempt to enforce the payment of wages in money, and take away from the employer and laborer the right of contracting otherwise, are invalid and unconstitutional. Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 6 Atl. 354; Showalter v. Ehlan, 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 242; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621, 10 S. E. 285; State v. Peel Splint Coal Co. 36 W. Va. 802, 17 L. R. A. 385, 15 S. E. 1000; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 21 L. R. A. 789, 22 S. W. 350; Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366, 6 L. R. A. 576, 23 N. E. 253; State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146, 47 L. R. A. 369, 59 Pас. 340. Similar attempts of state legislatures to arbitrarily interfere with the relationship of employer and employee in other matters, and to deprive them of the right of mutual contract, have also been held unconstitutional by a well-nigh unbroken line of authority. Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 57 Am. Rep. 869, 7 Ν. Ε. 631; Frorer v. People use of School Fund, 141 111. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395; Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380, 17 L. R. A. 853, 32 N. E. 364; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 111. 66, 22 L. R. A. 340, 35 Ν. Ε. 62; Harding v. People, 160 Ill. 459, 32 L. R. A. 455, 43 N. E. 624; Bauer v. Reynolds, 3 Pa. Dist. R. 502; Com. v. Brown, 6 Pa. Dist. R. 773; State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co. 33 W. Va. 188, 6 L. R. A. 359, 10 S. E. 288: State v. Julow, 129 Μο. 163, 29 L. R. A. 257, 31 S. W. 781; Leep v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 58 Ark. 407, 23 L. R. A. 264, 25 S. W. 75; State ex rel. Curtis v. Brown & S. Mfg. Co. 18 R. I. 16, 17 L. R. A. 856. 25 Atl. 246; Shaffer v. Union Min. Co. 55 Md. 74; Opinion of the Justices, 163 Mass. 587, sub nom. Rc House Bill, No. 1230, 28 L. R. Α. 344, 40 N. E. 713; Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 14 L. R. A. 325, 28 Ν. Ε. 1126; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 29 L. R. A. 79, 40 N. E. 454; Re Kuback, 85 Cal. 274, 9 L. R. A. 482, 24 Pac. 737; Low v. Rees Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 24 L. R. A. 702, 59 N. W. 362; Com. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co. 120 Mass. 383; State v. Wilson, 61 Kan. 32, 47 L. R. A. 71, 58 Pac. 981; Re Eight Hour Bill, 21 Colo. 29, 39 Pac. 328; Re House Bill, No. 203, 21 Colo. 27, 39 Pac. 431; State v. Holden, 14 Utah, 71, 37 L. R. A. 103, 46 Рас. 756, 14 Utah, 96, 37 L. R. A. 108, 46 Рас. 1105; Short v. Bullion-Beck & C. Min. Co. 20 Utah, 20, 45 L. R. A. 603, 57 Pac. 720; Re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 47 L. R. Α. 52, 58 Pac. 1071; Re Considine, 83 Fed. 157; Cox v. Pittsburgh. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 1 Ohio N. P. 213; Skinner v. Garnett Gold-Min. Co. 96 Fed. 735; Johnson v. Goodyear Min. Co. 127 Cal. 4, 47 L. R. A. 338, 59 Pac. 304; Whitebreast Fuel Co. v. People, 175 III. 51, 51 N. E. 853; Com. v. Brown, 43 W. N. C. 69. See also Tiedeman, Pol. Power, § 178. The attempts of the legislature in other analogous cases to deprive individuals of liberty and property under the guise of the police power have likewise been uniformly held unconstitutional by the courts. Rc Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People v. Mara, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 2 Ν. Ε. 29; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 Ν. Ε. 343; Third Nat. Bank v. Divine Grocery Co. 97 Tenn. 603, 34 L. R. A. 445, 37 S. W. 390; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; People ex rel. Tyroler v. Warden of City Prison, 157 N. Y. 116, 43 L. R. A. 264, 51 Ν. Ε. 1006. If the statute itself transcends the legitimate authority of the state, and attempts to interfere with the property or liberties of individuals beyond the proper police power of the state, it is, for this reason, not due process of law, and is repugnant to the 14th Amendment. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 367, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. Insurance cases are distinguishable from the case at bar because of the peculiar nature of insurance contracts, and they are more nearly analogous to the Granger Cases, 94 U. S. 155, 24 L. ed. 94, and other cases in which it has been held that the state, in the exercise of its police power, may not only regulate the charges of common carriers, but may regulate the charge for storing grain in bulk in warehouses as a business "affected with a public interest." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 1, 5 L. R. A. 559, 22 Ν. Ε. 670. Statutes regulating the contract rate of interest for the use of money furnish no real exception to the rule contended for, but are to be supported as a traditional policy of the race, rooted in abhorrence of usury from the earliest times. |