State v. Peel Splint Coal Co. 36 W. Va. 802, 17 L. R. A. 385, 15 S. E. 1000. An act of the state of Indiana requiring biweekly payments of wages was upheld as proper by the supreme court of that state. Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366, 6 L. R. A. 576, 23 Ν. Ε. 253. The supreme courts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Kentucky, and many other states have sustained similar, and even more drastic, laws for the regulation of business and contracts growing out of same. State ex rel. Curtis v. Brown & S. Mfg. Co. 18 R. I. 16, 17 L. R. A. 856, 25 Atl. 246; Shaffer v. Union Min. Co. 55 Md. 74; Opinion of the Justices, 163 Mass. 589, sub nom. Re House Bill, No. 1230, 28 L. R. A. 344, 40 All contracts and property rights are subject to the police power of the state. Dugger v. Mechanics' & T. Ins. Co. 95 Tenn. 245, 28 L. R. A. 796, 32 S. W. 5; Marr v. Bank of West Tennessee, 4 Lea, 585; Knoxville v. Bird, 12 Lea, 121, 47 Am. Rep. 326: New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 139, 9 L. ed. 662; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 457, 12 L. ed. 775; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 700, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 823, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689, 1062; Lawton v. Steele. 152 U. S. 136, 38 L. ed. 388, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Reelfoot Lake Levee Dist. v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 172, 34 L. R. A. 725, 36 S. W. 1041; Smith v. State, 100 Tenn. 494, 41 L. R. A. 432, 46 S. W. 566; Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 567, 50 L. R. A. 478, 48 S. W. 305; Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. 706; Black, Stat. Constr. & Interpretation of Laws, § 154. islature of the state of Tennessee prescrib ing that corporations and other persons is suing store orders in payment for labor shall redeem them in cash, and providing a legal remedy for bona fide holders of such orders. In the case of Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, in error to the supreme court of Tennessee, decided at the present term, 183 U. S. 13, ante, 55, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, we affirmed the judgment of that court sustaining the constitutional validity of the state legislation in question, and the cause now before us is sufficiently disposed of by a reference to that case. mestic The only difference in the cases is that in the former the plaintiff in error was a docorporation of the state of Tennessee, while in the present the plaintiff in error is a foreign corporation. If that fact can be considered as a ground for a difierent conclusion, it would not help the present plaintiff in error, whose right, as a foreign corporation, to carry on business in the state of Tennessee, might be deemed subject to the condition of obeying the regulations prescribed in the legislation of the state. As was said in Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281, that "which a state may do with corporations of its own creation it may do with foreign corporations admitted into the state. The power of a state to impose conditions upon foreign corporations is certainly as extensive as the power over domestic corporations, and is fully explained in Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 39 L. ed. 297, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 610, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207." . We do not care, however, to put our present decision upon the fact that the plaintiff in error is a foreign corporation, nor to be[25] understood to intimate that state legistation, invalid as contrary to the Constitution of the United States, can be imposed as a condition upon the right of such a corporation to do business within the state. Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 22 L. ed. 365; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 254, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is affirmed. Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice Peckham dissent. FRED. A. MCMASTER, Administrator of the Estate of F. E. McMaster, Deceased, Petitioner, The very language of $ 1, 14th Amend. U. S. Const. implies that by "due process of law, or the law of the land," property rights NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COM may be regulated, and even taken. Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co. 103 Tenn. 421, 53 S. W. 955. [24] *Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion of the court: v. PANY. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 25-42.) Life insurance - forfeiture unauthorized insertion changing time for premiumfailure of insured to read policy. The only question presented for our consideration in this record is the validity, un- 1. Evidence of the unauthorized insertion In der the 14th Amendment of the Constitution NOTE.-As to the effect of agent's filling in of the United States, of the act of the leg-answers in application for insurance without : an insurance policy, on request of the Insur-cuted and delivered December 12, 1893, and ance agent, of a provision contrary to that which had been agreed upon between him and the insured, and evidence of the agent's as surance, in response to an inquiry by the insured at the time when the policy was deliv. ered, to the effect that the policy conformed te their agreement, is admissible on the question whether the insured was or was not bound by the inserted provision, either on the ground that he had requested it or that he was negligent in not reading the policy. 2. The omission of the insured to read a life insurance policy when delivered to him and payment of premiums made, and when in answer to his Inquiry the insurance agent told him that the policy conformed to their agreement, does not constitute such negligence as to estop the insured from denying that by accepting the policy he agreed to a provision therein contained, but of which he was ig norant and to which he had not agreed, to the effect that the annual premium should be paid in subsequent years on a date earlier than that on which the policy was issued. 8. On the question of forfeiture of an insurance policy which contains provisions that are inconsistent, or which is so framed as to be fairly open to construction, the view should be adopted, if possible, which will sustain rather than forfeit the contract. [No. 29.] Argued March 18, 1901. Decided October 28, 1901. 0 N WRIT of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to review a decision affirming a judgment in favor of defendant in an action on policies of life insurance. Reversed, and remanded with direction of judgment for plaintiff. See same case below, 40 C. C. A. 119, 99 Fed. 856. Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller: [26] *This was an action brought by Fred. A. McMaster, administrator of the estate of Frank E. McMaster, deceased, against the New York Life Insurance Company on five policies of insurance of $1,000 each upon the life of Frank E. McMaster. The applications were dated December 12, ard the policies December 18, 1893. The premiums for a year in advance were paid and the policies delivered December 26, 1893. McMaster died January 18, 1895, and the defense was that the insurance had been forfeited by failure in payment of the second annual premiums on or before January 12, 1895, that is to say, within thirty days after December 12, 1894, when the company contended they became due. set forth: "2. This defendant, for further answer, says that said application is dated the 12th day of December, 1893, and asked the issuing of five policies of $1,000 each upon the life of the said *Frank E. McMaster, de- [27] ceased. Said application also contained a request that said five policies each should be issued, dated, and take effect the same date as the application, namely, the 12th day of December, 1893, and said request was complied with, and the policies were so issued. "This defendant grants to the insured in said defendant company a grace of one month on the payment of premiums, which extended the day of payment of premiums from December 12th, 1894, as in the policies issued to said Frank E. McMaster, deceased, late as the 12th day of January, 1895, but not later. "3. This defendant, for further answer, says that payment of the premiums due upon said policies were not paid within the time prescribed as aforesaid, and that said Frank E. McMaster died on the 18th day of January, 1895, six days after said policies had lapsed and were forfeited for nonpayment of premiums as required. "6. This defendant, further answering said petition, says that said application is a part of said policies, in each case, that said assured received and accepted said policies during his lifetime, and had them all in his possession for a long time, and was aware and knew, or could have known, the contents in each policy. "That said assured had paid the premiums when said policies were delivered to him; that by reason of said assured's acceptance of said policies, his representative, the plaintiff herein, is estopped from denying the date of said policies or claiming that said policies should have a different date from the application, and is estopped for the reasons above stated from claiming that said words, to wit, 'Please date policy same as application,' were not in said application when insured signed same, for by accepting said poncics the assured waived said right to object, if said words were inserted, as alleged in petition, after the signing of the application, which this defendant denies." The case was tried by the circuit court without a jury; special findings of fact made; and judgment rendered in favor of defendant. 90 Fed. 40. Plaintiff prosecuted a writ of error from the circuit court of appeals, and the judg-[28] ment was affirmed. 40 C. C. A. 119, 99 Fed. 856. The writ of certiorari was then al The company alleged in a substituted and amended answer that the policies were exe-lowed. knowledge of assured-see note to Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 20 L. ed. U. S. 617. On the effect of knowledge by insurer's agent of the falsity of statements in applicationsee Clemans v. Supreme Assembly R. S. of G. F. (Ν. Υ.) 16 L. R. A. 33, and note. As to the effect of riders or slips attached to insurance policies-see Jackson v. British America Assur. Co. (Mich.) 30 L. R. A. 636, and note. 183 U. S. U. S., BOOK 46. part of this finding of facts. Pending the trial below, plaintiff filed a | December 12, 1893, of the form which is bill in equity for the reformation of the poli- made part of the policies sued on and atcies, and the circuit court granted the relief tached to the petition, the same being made prayed. 78 Fed. 33. On appeal this decree was reversed (30 C. C. A. 532, 57 U. S. App. 638, 87 Fed. 63), and an application to this court for certiorari was denied. 171 U. S. 687, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 944. The circuit court of appeals expressed the opinion in that case that no recovery could be had at law or in equity, and accordingly the circuit court in this case, although of opinion that plaintiff was entitled to recover, gave judgment for defendant. Separate opinions were given by the judges of the court of appeals, Sanborn and Thayer, JJ., concurring in affirming, and Caldwell, J., dissenting. The findings of fact by the circuit court were as follows: "1st. The plaintiff, Fred A. McMaster, was when the suit was brought and is now the lawfully appointed administrator of the estate of Frank E. McMaster, deceased, having been appointed administrator of the named estate by the probate court of Woodbury county, lowa; and furthermore said plaintiff was when this suit was brought and is now a citizen of the state of Iowa, and a resident of Woodbury county, Iowa. "2d. That the defendant, the New York Life Insurance Company, was when this suit was brought and is now a corporation created under the laws of the state of New York, having its principal office and place of business in the city of New York, in the state of New York, but being also engaged in carrying on its business of life insurance in the state of Iowa and other states. "3d. That in December, 1893, F. W. Smith, an agent for the New York Life Insurance Company, residing at Sioux City, Iowa, solicited Frank E. McMaster to insure his life in that company, and, as an inducement to taking the insurance, pressed upon McMaster the provision adopted by the company, and set forth in the circular issued by the company, and printed on the back of the policies issued by the company, under the heading, 'Benefits and Provisions referred to in this Policy,' in the following words: 'After this policy shall have been in force three [29]*months, a grace of one month will be allowed in payment of subsequent premiums, subject to an interest charge of 5 per cent per annum for the number of days during which the premium remains due and unpaid. During said month of grace the unpaid premium, with interest as above, remains an indebtedness due the company, and in the event of death during said month, this indebtedness will be deducted from the amount of the insurance.' "5th. In the application when signed by Frank E. McMaster it was provided that the amount of insurance applied for was the sum of $5,000, to be evidenced by five policies for $1,000 each, on the ordinary life table, the premium to be payable annually. "6th. There now appears on the face of the application, interlined in ink, the words, 'Please date policy same as application.' These words were not in the application when it was signed by McMaster, but after the signing thereof they were written into the application by F. W. Smith, the agent of the New York Life Insurance Company, without the knowledge or assent of Frank E. McMaster, and were so written in by the agent in order to secure to the agent a bonus which the company allowed to agents for business secured during the month of December, 1893; and it does not appear that Frank E. McMaster ever knew that these words had been written into the application, and it affirmatively appears that he had no knowledge thereof when the application was forwarded to the home office of the company and was acted on by the company. "7th. By the express understanding had between F. W. Smith, "the agent of the New [30] York Life Insurance Company, and Frank E. McMaster, when the application for insurance was signed, it was agreed that the first year's premium was to be paid by MeMaster upon the delivery to him of the policies, and that the contract of insurance was not to take effect until the policies were delivered. "Sth. The defendant company, at its home office in New York City, upon receipt of the application, determined to grant the insurance applied for, and issued five policies each for the sum of $1,000 dated December 18th, 1893, and reciting on the face thereof that the annual premium on each policy was $21.00, and forwarded the same to its agent F. W. Smith, at Sioux City, Iowa, for de livery to Frank E. McMaster. These five policies are in the form of the one attached to the petition in this case, which is hereby made a part of this finding of fact, and each policy contains the recital: 'This contract is made in consideration of the written application for this policy, and of the agreements, statements, and warranties thereof, which are hereby made a part of this contract, and in further consideration of the sum of twenty-one dollars and cents, to be paid in advance, and of the payment of a like sum on the twelfth day of December in every year thereafter during the continu. "4th. Relying on the benefits of this pro-ance of this policy." vision and in the belief that if he accepted a policy of insurance upon his life from the New York Life Insurance Company, paying the premiums thereon annually, the company could not assert the right of forfeiture until thirteen months had elapsed since the last payment of the annual premium, the said Frank E. McMaster signed an application for insurance in said company, dated "9th. The five policies inclosed in envelopes on or about December 26th, 1893, were taken by F. W. Smith, the agent of the defendant company, to the office of Frank E. McMaster, who asked the agent if the policies were as represented, and if they would insure him for the period of thirteen months, to which the agent replied that they did so insure him, and thereupon McMaster paid the agent the full first annual premium, or the sum of $21 on each policy, and, without reading the policies, he received them and placed them away. The agent did not in any way attempt to prevent McMaster from reading the policies, and he had the full opportunity for reading them, but in fact did not read them, and accepted them on the statement of the agent of the company, as hereinabove set forth. "10th. That not later than November 17th, 1894, notice was sent to Frank E. McMaster [31] of the coming due of the premiums *on the policies issued to him by the defendant company, in accordance with the requirements of the statutes of the state of New York. "11th. The renewal receipts for the second annual premium on the five policies held by Frank E. McMaster in the defendant company were sent for collection to Mary A. Ball, at Sioux City, Iowa, who on the 11th or 12th day of December, 1894, called on said McMaster for payment of the premiums in question. At that time McMaster declined making payment thereon, saying that he had seen other policies which promised better results, and that he did not think he would renew the insurance in the defendant company. Miss Ball told him the New York contracts had some nice provisions, like thirty days of grace and loans, and, in reply to an inquiry from McMaster, stated that his policies entitled him to the month's grace in the payment of the premiums, and that, as she understood it, the grace on the second premiums would expire January 11, and McMaster said if he concluded to keep any of the insurance he would call and pay for it before the grace expired. "15th. That Frank E. McMaster died at Sioux City on the morning of January 18th, 1895. "16th. That up to the time of his death the said Frank E. McMaster had not paid the second year's premiums on the policies issued to him by the defendant company, nor have the same been paid since his death, nor had the said McMaster received or paid for the policies issued by the Union Central Company, and the same had not been delivered or become effectual. re "17th. That due and sufficient notices and proofs of the death of said Frank E. MeMaster were immediately sent to and ceived by the defendant company, and due demand for the payment of the five policies sued on was made by the plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Frank E. McMaster, and refused by the defendant company on the ground that the policies in question had lapsed and were not in force at the time of the death of said Frank E. McMaster, by reason of the failure to pay the second year's premiums coming due on said policies. "18th. That the defendant company has not paid said policies or any part thereof, and, assuming the same to be valid, there is due thereon November 1, 1898, the sum of ($5,965) five thousand nine hundred and sixty-five dollars, after deducting from the face of the policies the amount of the second premiums, with interest thereon to March 14, 1895." The policies were dated December 18, 1893, and provided: This contract is made in consideration of the written application for this policy, and of the agreements, statements, and warranties thereof, which are hereby made a part of this contract, and ty-one dollars and "12th. That in November or December, 1894, Frank E. McMaster was examined for Annual the purpose of obtaining life insurance by Premium the agents of the Union Central Insurance $21.00. Company, it being understood between the parties that the policies were not to issue until in January, 1895, and it being the purpose of McMaster to take $1,000 or $2,000 insurance in the Union Central Company, at the expiration of his insurance in the de fendant company, but also to continue part of the policies held in the defendant company. "13th. That on or about January 15th, 1895, the agent of the Union Central Company, meeting McMaster on the street in Sioux City, told him the policies issued by the Union Central Company had been received, and in reply McMaster said: 'All right. Just hold them. There is no hurry about them.' And in the same conversation The benefits and provisions placed by the he stated that he had other insurance, referring to the policies in the defendant company. Incontesta- *After this policy shall have{&3] been in force one full year, if company on the next page are a part of this Benefits at "14th. That the action of Frank E. McMaster shows, and the court so finds the fact to be, that the said McMaster believed that the policies issued to him by the defendant [32] company would *continue in force for the end of Acperiod of thirteen months from the date of cumulation the policies, and his action with respect to period. the policies in the defendant company and the proposed insurance in the Union Central Company was based upon and governed by this belief on his part. If the insured is living on the 12th day of December in the year nineteen hundred and thirteen, on which date the accumulation period of this pol icy ends, and if the premiums have been paid in full to said date, the insured shall be entitled to one of the six benefits following: [cash value; annuity; i [34] paid-up policy, etc., etc.] If the insured statements and representations referred to, made no selection dividends were to be apportioned as provided. (Any indebtedness to the company, including any balance of the current year's premium remaining unpaid, will be deducted in any settlement of this policy or of any benefits thereunder.) Powers not Delegated. no statements, representations, promises or information made or given by or to the person soliciting or taking this application for a policy, or by or to any other person, shall be binding on said company, or in any manner affect its rights, unless such statements, representations, promises, or information No agent has power in be- be reduced to writing and presented to the half of the company to make officers of said company, at the home office or modify this or any contract in this application. 4. That any time for paying a premium, to waive any plication shall not be in force until the actforfeiture, or to bind the company by mak-ual payment to and acceptance of the ing any promise or making or receiving any premium by said company or an authorized representation or information. These pow-agent, during my lifetime and good health. ers can be exercised only by the president, vice president, second vice president, actuary, or secretary of the company, and will not be delegated. of insurance, to extend the policy which may be *issued under this ap-[35] Payment of All premiums are due and payable at the home office of the company, unless otherwise agreed in writing, but may be paid to agents producing receipts signed by the president, vice president, second vice president, actuary or secretary, and countersigned by such agent. If any premium is not thus paid on or before the day when due, then (except as hereinafter otherwise provided) this policy shall become void, and all payments previously made shall remain the property of the company. Grace. *After this policy shall have been in force three months, a grace of one month will be allowed in payment of subsequent premiums, subject to an interest charge of 5 per cent per annum Mr. Henry J. Taylor argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Frank E. Gill and Eric A. Burgess, filed a brief for petitioner: The statements of the agent in reference to existing terms of the policies were known to him to be false, and were relied on by the assured to his damage. That the guilty party may not render his fraud effectual, the parolevidence rule must yield to the rule of equitable estoppel. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222, 20 L. ed. 556; Equitable Safety Ins. Co. v. Hearne, 20 Wall. 494, 22 L. ed. 398. The party responsible for the fraud or other vice inherent in a contract estops himself from setting it up, and parol evidence is admissible to establish and furnish the basis for the estoppel. Under the rule of estoppel the statement. "Please date policy same as appucation, application," is not the direction of the ascompany itself, and the company must bear all the consequences naturally, reasonably, or actually flowing sured, but of the for the number of days during which the premium remains due and unpaid. During the said month of grace the unpaid premium, with interest as above, remains an indebtedness due the company, and in the event of death during the said month this indebtedness will be deducted from the amount of the insurance. The applications were dated December 12, 1893, and contained, among other things, the following: Sum to be insured, $5,000. Please date policy same as application. [It was averred in the complaint and found by the circuit court that these words in italics were inserted by the agent after the applications were signed and without applicant's knowledge.] (Annually. Premium payable Semilly. (Quarterly. Note: Strike out the rates not desired. I do hereby agree as follows: That inasmuch as only the officers at the home office of said company, in the city of New York, have authority to determine whether or not a policy shall issue on any application, and as they act on the written from its conduct. Continental L. Ins. Co. v. Chamberlain, 132 U. S. 304, 33 L. ed. 341, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 87: American L. Ins. Co. v. Mahone, 21 Wall. 152, 22 L. ed. 593; Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222, 20 L. ed. 617; New Jersey Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 94 U. S. 610, 24 L. ed. 268; North American F. Ins. Co. v. Throop, 22 Mich. 146, 7 Am. Rep. 638; Platten v. Merchants' & F. Mut. F. Ins. Co. 40 N. H. 375; McMaster v. New York L. Ins. Co. 78 Fed. 36; Marston v. Ken nebec Mut. L. Ins. Co. 89 Me. 266, 36 Atl. 389. Above the rule of parol evidence against varying or contradicting the terms of the written contract is the doctrine that one cannot use provisions procured through mistake, fraud, or deceit to perpetuate the same. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222, 20 L. ed. 617; Continental L. Ins. Co. v. Chamberlain, 132 U. S. 304, 33 L. ed. 341, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 87; American L. Ins. Co. v. Mahone, 21 Wall. 152, 22 L. ed. 593; Etna Live Stock, Fire, & Tornado Ins. Co. v. Olmstead, 21 Mich. 251, 4 Am. Rep. 483; Kausal v. Minnesota Farmers' Mut. F. Ins. Asso. 31 Minn. 21, 47 Am. Rep. 776, 16 Ν. W. 430: New Jersey Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Bakcr, 94 U. S. 610, 24 L. ed. 268; North American F. Ins. Co. v. Throop, 22 Mich. 146, 7 Am. Rep. 638. |