for yarding and feeding live stock at its stock yards in Kansas City, Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri, which it may have enacted in violation of §§ 4 and 5 of the Kansas statute relative to stock yards, ap. proved March 3, 1897, since an injunction was first awarded herein, to wit, on April-, 1897; and that it will in like manner pay such overcharges, if any, as it may continue to exact in violation of said statute during the pendency of the appeal; said obligation to become void if the statute in question shall be pronounced invalid by the Supreme Court." 82 Fed. 857.

On November 4, 1897, an appeal was duly taken and allowed to this court.

Subsequently, Louis C. Boyle's term of office as attorney general having expired, his successor, A. A. Godard, was substituted as a party defendant.

The act of the legislature of the state of Kansas is in the following terms:

"Sec. 1. Any stock yards within this state, into which live stock is received for the purpose of exposing or having the same exposed for sale or feeding, and doing business for a compensation, and which for the preceding

than 70 pounds of corn in the car fors bushel, or less than 56 pounds of shelled corn for a bushel, or to charge for or to sell the same at more than 100 per cent above the average market price or value of such ear corn or shelled corn on the markets of the towns or cities wherein said stock yards are located, on the day next preceding such sale and delivery. All feed not above named shall be sold for no greater per cent of profit than hereinbefore provided.

*"Sec. 6. It shall be unlawful for the own-[83] ers or proprietors of any stock yards to prohibit the owner or owners, or the representatives of any owner or owners, of any dead stock in such yard or yards from selling such dead stock to any person or persons.

"Sec. 7. That any person or persons violating any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined for the first offense not more than $100; for the second offense not less than $100 nor more than $200; and for the third offense not less than $200 nor more than $500 and by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding

twelve months shall have had an average six months for each offense; and for each [82] daily receipt of not less than 100 head of subsequent offense he or they shall be fined cattle, or 300 head of hogs, or 300 head of in any sum not less than $1,000 and by imsheep, are hereby declared to be public stock-yards.

"Sec. 2. Any person, company, or corporation owning or operating any public stockyard or stock-yards in this state is hereby declared to be a public stock-yards operator, whether living or being within this state or

not.

"Sec. 3. Every such public stock-yards operator or operators shall annually, on the 31st day of December of each year, file with the secretary of state an itemized statement certified and sworn to, setting forth the number of head of cattle, calves, calves, sheep, hogs, horses, and mules received in his or their public stock-yards during the year next preceding.

prisonment in the county jail not less than six months.

"Sec. 8. It is hereby made the duty of the attorney general to prosecute all violations of the provisions of this act.

"Sec. 9. All acts or parts of acts in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.

"Sec. 10. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its publication in the official state paper." Laws of Kansas 1897, chap. 240, p. 448.

Mr. Albert H. Horton argued the cause, and, with Mr. B. P. Waggener, er, filed a brief for appellants:

If we concede the power of the legislature under some circumstances to classify stock

"Sec. 4. It shall be unlawful for the own-yard companies, and prescribe one rate for

ers, proprietors, or the employees of the owners or proprietors of any such public stock-yards within this state to charge for driving, yarding, watering, and weighing of stock greater prices than the following: For driving, yarding, watering, and weighing of cattle, 15 cents per head; calves, 8 cents per head; hogs, 6 cents per head; sheep, 4 cents per head; and there shall be but one yardage charged.

"Sec. 5. It shall be unlawful for the owner, owners, or proprietors, or their employees, of any such stock yards within this state, to sell and deliver at the rate of less than 2,000 pounds for a ton of hay, or any part thereof, the same to be of good quality, or to charge for or to sell the same at more than 100 per cent above the average market price or value of such hay upon the markets of the towns or cities wherein such stock yards are located, upon the day preceding such sale and delivery; and it shall also be unlawful for any such owners or proprietors or employees to sell and deliver less

one class and other rates for other classes, the classification cannot be arbitrarily made. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666. 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255.

The evasion of the constitutional provisions forbidding unlawful discriminations by the framing of the act so that it was not likely, and hardly possible, that any other stock yards than those of Kansas City would come within its provisions, should not be connived at by the courts.

Central Trust Co. v. Citizens' Street R.

Co. 80 Fed. 218.

Even though a division of cities of the state into certain classes, based exclusively on population, has been sustained by the Kansas supreme court, that court has held that when an act of the legislature is so special in its provisions that it can only apply to three certain cities it is unconstitutional and void.

Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431, 4 Pac. 800; see also State ex rel. Helfer v. Simon, 53 N. J. L. 550, 22 Atl. 120; State ex rel. Richards v. Hammer, 42 N. J. L. 435; State ex rel.

Reemelin v. Smith, 48 Ohio St. 211, 26 N. E. 1069; Harding v. People, 160 Ill. 459, 32 L. R. A. 445, 43 N. E. 624; Adams v. Nemeyer, 54 Ohio St. 614, 46 N. E. 1154.

as a dead structure, not as a unit or sy tem, or as a living and going concern.

San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 43 L. ed. 1154, 19 Sup.

So, the supreme court of Ohio has rebuked Ct. Rep. 804; Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio State

the favorite evasion of the legislature of that state, of seeming to adopt a general law, and yet making it local or special in its character.

Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Martin, 53 Ohio St. 386, 41 Ν. Ε. 690.

A statute is not constitutional which selects particular individuals from a class or locality and subjects them to peculiar rules, or imposes upon them special obligations or burdens, from which others in the same locality or class are exempt.

Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431, 4 Pac. 800; Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. 479, 482, 483, and notes. See also State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 21 L. R. A. 789, 22 S. W. 350; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621, 10 S. E. 285; Low v. Rees Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 24 L. R. A. 702, 59 N. W. 362; Re Eight Hour Lavw, 21 Colo. 29, 39 Pac. 328; Millett v. People, 117 111. 294, 57 Am. Rep. 869, 7 N. E. 631; State ex rel. McCue v. Ramsey County Sheriff, 48 Minn. 236, 51 N. W. 112; Darcy v. San José, 104 Cal. 642, 38 Pac. 500; Cincinnati v. Steinkamp, 54 Ohio St. 284, 43 Ν. Ε. 490; Shreveport v. Levy, 26 La. Ann. 671, 21 Am. Rep. 553.

As the statute was clearly intended for a particular case, and practically looks to no broader application, it is vicious class legislation, and therefore unconstitutional. When an act is found to fit a special case only, it is deemed to have been intended solely for it.

Sutherland, Stat. Constr. § 129.

It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our Constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that anyone should be subjected to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others, under like circumstances, are exempted.

Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 6 Am. Rep.

174.

or

Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 41 L. ed. 683, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 305, 166 U. S. 185, 41 L. ed. 965, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 604; National Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City, 27 L. R. A. 827, 10 C. C. A. 653, 27 U. S. App. 165, 62 Fed. 853; Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. McGehee, 41 Ark. 202; Mississippi & R. River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 25 L. ed. 206; King v. Minneapolis Union R. Co. 32 Minn. 224, 20 N. W. 135; Sanford v. Poе, 16 С. C. A. 305, 37 U. S. App. 378, 59 Fed. 546; State ex rel. Poe v. Jones, 51 Ohio St. 492, 37 Ν. Ε. 945.

If it would be unreasonable to reduce the total net income of the stock-yards company 75 per cent, prima facie it is unreasonable to reduce any part of such net income 75 per cent.

Ames v. Union P. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com, Rep. 835, 64 Fed. 165..

Considering the current rate of interest in Kansas and the character of the investment of the stockholders, the act of March 3d, 1897, would, by its necessary operation, deprive the Kansas City Stock-Yards Company of the right to obtain just compensation for the services rendered by it, and would also deny to such company and its stockholders the equal protection of the laws.

Ibid.; Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. v. Milwaukee, 87 Fed. 577; Southern P. Co. v. Railroad Comrs. 78 Fed. 236; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418.

Mr. William D. Guthrie also argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Albert H. Horton and B. P. Waggener, filed a brief for appellants:

So far as the question of the jurisdiction of a Federal court to enjoin the state officers from enforcing an unconstitutional statute when such enforcement would obviously interfere with and destroy the property rights of the citizen is involved, this case is within the settled doctrine of this court.

Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Reagan v. Farm

No state shall touch the life, the liberty, the property of any person, however humble his lot or exalted his station, without due process of law; and no state, even with due process of law, shall deny to anyone within its jurisdiction the equal protection and adversary contest upon

ers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047.

tion of the laws.

Santa Clara Railroad Tax Case, 9 Sawy. 165, 18 Fed. 385, 118 U. S. 394, 30 L. ed. 118, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1132.

The Kansas City Stock-Yards Company, although a corporation, is a person within the 14th Amendment.

Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418.

The finding of the master and the court below, of the value of the property of the Kansas City Stock-Yards Company, owned and operated by it for stock-yards purposes, was founded upon incompetent and insufficient testimony. The property was valued

The attorney general by a full investigathe merits, conducted by him below, has waived the question of jurisdiction under the 11th Amendment.

Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 27 L. ed. 780, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 878.

In equity it is always the practice to plead jurisdiction at the proper time and before a defendant enters into his defense at large. Good faith and early assertion of rights are as essential on the part of the defendant as of the complainant.

Brown, B. & Co. v. Lake Superior Iron Co. 134 U. S. 530, 33 L. ed. 1021, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 604.

There is a broad difference in the matter

of state regulation, between the public or | Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City, 27 L. R. Α.

quasi-public use of highways, waters, etc., and the use of private property by the publie for its convenience and profit.

The true rule is not so stringent as to deny a citizen relief unless the legislation is confiscation; but upon this question of reasonableness the court should "apply justice as it is understood of men, and, in its clear light," determine the controversy.

Southern P. Co. v. Railroad Comrs. 78

Fed. 236.

In estimating the profits of operation an allowance must be made for depreciation, and improvements may be properly charged against income.

Reagan v. Fermers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 74 Fed. 83, 174 U. S. 739, 43 L. ed. 1154, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 804; Little Miami & C. & X. R. Co. v. United States, 108 U. S. 277, 27 L. ed. 724, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 627; Union P. R. Co. v. United States, 99 U. S. 402, 25 L. ed. 274; United States 7. Central P. R. Co. 138 U. S. $4, 34 L. ed. 895, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 285; Southern P. Co. v. Railroad Comrs. 78 Fed. 236; Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Houston & T. C. R. Co. 90 Fed. 683; Whittaker v. Amwell Nat. Bank, 52 N. J. Eq. 400, 29 Atl. 203: Glasier v. Rolls, L. R. 42 Ch. Div. 436; Dent v. London Tramways Co. L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 344; Davison v. Gillies, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 347, note; Queen v. Grand Junction R. Co. 4 Q. B. 18; Queen v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co. 15 Q. B. 313; Reg. v. Great Western R. Co. 15 Q. B. 1085; Corry v. Londonderry & E. R. Co. 29 Beav. 263.

The provision of the Kansas statute that the rate of interest shall be 6 per cent in the absence of an agreement fixing a different rate, and that the maximum shall be 10 per cent, is the expression of the thought and estimate of the state itself as to the value of money, and as to what justice requires for the use of it.

Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047.

It is the legal measure of the value of the use, not only of money, but of property generally, and is a fair and just basis in almost all cases.

Loudon v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 104

592.

U. S. 771, 26 L. ed. 923; Spalding v. Mason, 161 U. S. 375, 40 L. ed. 738, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. As the legislative rates do not afford, in any reasonable aspect of the proof contained in the record, anything like 6 per cent, the statute violates the property rights of the owner of these stock yards.

Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047.

The property of the company should be valued in its present condition as a stock yard, to which special purpose the company's lands, by reason of their location and surroundings, were especially adapted.

Mississippi & R. River Boom Co. v. Patter son, 98 U. S. 403, 25 L. ed. 206; National

827, 10 С. С. A. 653, 27 U. S. App. 165, 62 Fed. 853. See also Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 37 L. ed. 463, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622; Grant v. East & West R. Co. 4 C. C. A. 511, 13 U. S. App. 1, 54 Fed. 569; Dupuis v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 115 111. 97, 3 N. E. 720; Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co. v. Eaton, 136 III. 9, 26 Ν. Ε. 575; Snouffer v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 105 Iowa, 681, 75 N. W. 501; Drury v. Midland R. Co. 127 Mass. 571; Columbia Delaware Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 38 N. J. L. 39; Miller v. Windsor Water Co. 148 Pa. 429, 23 Atl. 1132; Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365, 13 L. R. A. 431, 22 Atl. 896; Montgomery County v. Schuylkill Bridge Co. 110 Pa. 54, 20 Atl. 407; Rippe v. Chicago, D. & M. R. Co. 23 Minn. 18.

The fair value in themselves of the services rendered to the public must be taken into consideration in determining judicially the reasonableness of the charges made.

San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 43 L. ed. 1154, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 804; Covington & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 198; Parkersburg & 0. River Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. C91, 27 L. ed. 584, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732; Canada Southern R. Co. v. International Bridge Co. L. R. 8 App. Cas. 723.

The proof that the charge exacted by a private carrier, or warehouseman, or innkeeper, or stock yards is the customary rate during many years for similar services under like conditions should establish the reasonableness of such charge, as matter of law, in the absence of all evidence to the contrary.

Kock v. Emmerling, 22 How. 69, 16 L. ed: 292; Erben v. Lorillard, 2 Keyes, 567; Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wilson, 119 Ind. 352. 4 L. R. A. 244, 21 N. E. 341; Hopper v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 91 Iowa, 639, 60 N. W. 487; Johnson v. Pensacola & P. R. Co. 16 Fla. 623, 26 Am. Rep. 731; Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251, 32 Am. Dec. 470.

Although legislative rates are to be treated as prima facie reasonable, they have no more force; enactment does not change or shift the burden of proof.

Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 83 L. ed. 970, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 209, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 462, 702.

Messrs. A. A. Godard and B. H. Tracy argued the cause, and filed a brief for appellees:

There is no ambiguity apparent in the law and consequently no reason or excuse for the introduction of legislative journals as aids to its construction. Such journals are only secondary modes of ascertaining legislative intention, and they may be resorted to only when the meaning of the language of an act is itself doubtful.

23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 336; South

the jurisdiction, and cannot be permitted to | 622; People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32, 34 Ν.

play fast and loose with the situation, and E. 759.
proceed with the reservation that, if he is
defeated on the merits, he may still insist
upon want of jurisdiction.

Hartog v. Memory, 116 U. S. 588, 29 L.
ed. 725, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 521; Fitts v. Mc-
Ghce, 172 U. S. 516, 43 L. ed. 535, 19 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 269.

On its face this act exempts, and was intended to exempt, small yards and small dealers in feed. And "it is a pure, bald, and unmixed power of discrimination in favor of" those persons who are engaged in a similar business of yarding and feeding cattle to a smaller extent than at the Kansas City yards.

Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684, 43 L. ed. 858, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep.

565.

The statute is obnoxious to the constitutional guaranties of liberty, property, and equal rights.

Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. ed. 232, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, 292; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684, 43 L. ed. 858, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 565; Lawton v. Steelc, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 385, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499.

The value of services or property is always established in court by proof of customary

charges.

Kock v. Emmerling, 22 How. 69, 16 L. ed. 292; Erben v. Lorillard, 2 Keyes, 567; Gunning, Tolls, pp. 61, 62; Bedford v. Emmett, 3 Barn. & A. 366; Wright v. Bruister, 4 Barn. & Ad. 116; Heddy v. Wheelhouse, Part 2, Cro. Eliz. 559; Vinkensterne v. Ebden, 1 Ld. Raym. 384, 1 Salk. 248, 5 Mod. 356, Carthew, 357; Shephard v. Payne, 12 C. B. N. S. 414; Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wilson, 119 Ind. 352, 4 L. R. A. 244, 21 N. E. 341; Hopper v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 91 Iowa, 639, 60 N. W. 487; Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251, 32 Am. Dec. 470; 2 Kent, Com. 599.

The true test should be the value of the

service in itself.

Parkersburg & O. River Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691, 27 L. ed. 584, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732; Canada Southern R. Co. ✔. International Bridge Co. L. R. 8 App. Cas. 723.

Neither the owner of cattle nor the proprietor of a stockyard or cattle exchange or stable can be concluded, or his rights matecally affected or impaired, by a mere legis lative enactment.

Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 19 Fed. 679. See also Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, Fed. Cas. No. 16,857; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 37 L. ed. 463, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep.

In estimating the profits of operation an allowance must necessarily be made for wear and tear and depreciation and renewal. This view as to depreciation and that improvements may be properly charged against income is fully supported by the authorities.

Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 74 Fed. 79, 174 U. S. 739, 43 L. ed. 1154, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 804; Little Miami & C. & X. R. Co. v. United States, 108 U. S. 277, 27 L. ed. 724, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 627; Union P. R. Co. v. United States, 99 U. S. 402, 25 L. ed. 274; United States v. Central P. R. Co. 138 U. S. 84, 34 L. ed. 895, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 285; Southern P. Co. v. Railroad Comrs. 78 Fed. 236; Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Houston & T. C. R. Co. 90 Fed. 683; Whittaker v. Amwell Nat. Bank, 52 N. J. Eq. 400, 29 Atl. 203; Glasier v. Rolls, L. R. 42 Ch. Div. 436; Dent v. London Tramways Co. L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 344; Davison v. Gillies, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 347, note; Queen v. Grand Junction R. Co. 4 Q. B. 18; Queen v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co. 15 Q. B. 313; Reg. v. Great Western R. Co. 15 Q. B. 1085; Corry v. Londonderry & E. R. Co. 29 Beav. 263.

The market value of the capital stock would be a just basis of valuation for taxation.

Ryan v. Leavenworth County, 30 Kan. 185, 2 Pac. 156. See also Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185, 41 L. ed. 965, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 604; Porter v. Rockford, R. 1. & St. L. R. Co. 76 III. 561.

Mr. A. A. Godard argued the cause and

filed a brief for appellees on reargument:

Federal courts will not grant an injunetion against a state officer when it is conceded that he is proceeding under a valid

state statute.

Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148, 43 L ed. 399, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119.

This court will look at the nature of the case, as well as the nominal parties, to determine whether a suit is within the prohibition of the 11th Amendment.

Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 270, sub nom. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 29 L. ed. 185, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 903, 962.

This suit ought not to be maintained, because its sole purpose is to enjoin, in a court of equity, the prosecution of criminal ac

tions.

Ke Sawyer, 124 U. S. 210, 31 L. ed. 405,8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 482; Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 170, 43 L. ed. 406, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 43 L. ed. 535, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269.

*Mr. Justice Brewer, after making the [83] above statement, delivered the following opinion, and announced the conclusion and judgment of the court:

The learned circuit judge, in deciding the case, appreciated the importance of the questions involved, and, although denying the relief sought by the plaintiffs, exercised his power of continuing the restraining order