at an approaching election, debauched the people with the public money; to that pitch of corruption we are now arrived. It is otherwise impossible to give an account how so many gentlemen are chosen to serve in parliament, in counties and places where they have no visible estates or interest; nay, some perhaps whose names were never heard of in the county a month before the election. lute necessity for the bill which is now before | by sending their agents through the kingdom, you, and that those who oppose it, are no better than friends to a Popish Pretender. But as I wish as well to his present majesty's person and government, as the most zealous for his service, I shall never resign my opinion to words only, and betray my trust to serve the purposes of a ministry.-I cannot but think this bill, if it pass into a law, will highly infringe the liberties of the people; and as I can by no means assent to the reasons that are offered to prove it necessary, so I shall heartily give my negative to it. I do not wonder to hear a neces sity urged for altering the constitution of our parliaments, by those who have given up their own. [This last expression, which was supposed to be owing to Mr. Haddon's, a Scots member, having declared for the bill, was resented by Mr. Thomas Smith, who said, That Mr. Snell would not be so bold as to speak those words any where else. He was seconded by lord Coningsby; and the dispute being like to grow warm, Mr. Speaker interposed, and said, That all the members having the privilege of explaining themselves, Mr. Sneli ought to have the liberty of so doing. Hereupon Mr. Snell said, That he meant no personal reflection on that worthy member, for that he spoke only of the Scots nation in general. To which sir David Dalrymple replied, That Mr. Snell's explanation increased the offence, instead of lessening it, and that he demanded satisfaction.-Some other members also calling out To the Bar, To the Bar,' Mr. Snell excused himself, by begging pardon for any unguarded expression that might have escaped him: Upon which the affair dropped, and he went on as follows :] Sir;-The chief arguments made use of for the bill, as it repeals the Triennial act, and continues the present parliament, are, To appease the groundless animosities of the people: To avoid expences, which frequent elections occasion, to the impoverishing of many gentlemen's families; To obviate tumultuous riots and assemblies, which might give a handle to a second rebellion: and, lastly, To further our alliances abroad.-How we can possibly expect to quiet the groundless animosities of the people by this bill, I must own, I am at a loss to imagine, unless stripping them of their most valuable privileges, which they and their ancestors have for many ages past exercised and enjoyed, may be thought a proper expedient to reconcile their affections, and endear the present administration to them. The expences at elections are merely voluntary, and if any one suffers by them he has none to blame but himself; and I scarce believe gentlemen to be serious in this particular; for let us look but a little backward, and trace this mischievous evil, this growing corruption, that needs such an extraordinary remedy, to its original, and we shall find it has its rise from the same place whence the remedy proposed had its beginning; and that former ill ministries, the better to forward their sinister views, have, The Rebellion is happily now at an end, and the government so much better secured against riots and tumultuous assemblies, by the wholesome laws provided by the wisdom of this parliament, that little or no danger can be reasonably apprehended from thence; especially, if we consider the number of forces prudently quartered throughout the kingdom, sufficient to suppress the most daring commotions that shall be attempted. The last reason made use of to prove the necessity of this bill, is, that it will enable the government the better to treat and negociate foreign alliances. But surely those who make use of this as an argument, are strangers to the constitution of England; for by the known and standing law of the land, the right of making peace and war, treaties and alliances, are undeniably the king's prerogative; and the king may exercise that right, as to him seems best, and most for the good and benefit of his people, without application to parliament, either to approve or confirm. But admitting that of late years parliaments have thought themselves intitled to interpose their advice in treaties and alliances, though I deny it to be their right, this is an argument singly sufficient with me to support the Triennia! Bill. For supposing a ministry shall at any time negociate an alliance prejudicial to the interest of England, and by their artifice impose upon a parliament to approve and confirm it; is it not a peculiar happiness, that such a parliament will quickly have an end; and that the people have it in their own power, by another, which must soon be called, to correct the misdeeds of such a ministry, and prevent the farther ill consequences of such a treaty to the nation. But allowing the arguments that are made use of sufficient to prove the necessity of repealing the Triennial Bill at present, I would beg leave to consider, whether it be in our power or no, to continue the present parliament beyond the time for which the people chose us? And as for my own part, I freely declare it as my opinion, though I shall always acquiesce in the judgment of the majority, that the purport of this bill, so far as it relates to the continuance of this present parliament, is not within the compass of the trust reposed in us by the people. And to satisfy gentlemen that I am not singular in this opinion, I would beg their patience to read to them a passage or two from Mr. Locke's Treatise of Government. • The power of the legislative, says he, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant ' and institution, can be no other than what that 'positive grant conveyed; which being only to ⚫inake laws and not legislators, the legislative can have no power of transferring their authority of ⚫ making laws, and placing it in other hands. Again, he lays it down as a rule, That when the ⚫ society has placed the legislative in any assembly of men, to continue in them and their 'successors, the legislative can never revert to the people whilst that government lasts; because, having provided a legislature with 'power to continue for ever, they have given • up their political power to the legislative and 'cannot resume it; but if they have set limits to the duration of their legislative, and make 'this supreme power in any person or assembly only temporary; at the determination of the 'time set, it reverts to the society, and the 'people have a right to place it in new hands.' I beg pardon for the length of the quotation; but as the author, in his life time, was always esteemed a man of great learning and candour, and no ways suspected as disaffected to the succession in the house of Hanover, I could not omit taking notice of the sentiments of so great a man, so conducive to a right understanding of the point now in question. And if these positions are true, the inferences are very obvious; the people of England have a fundamental indisputable right to appoint their representatives in parliament; and by a law still in being, for three years and no longer, sabject to the king's power of dissolution, have chosen us their representatives, in pursuance of that law; and therefore, whenever that Triennial term shall expire, have a right to chuse new ones. It may be objected, That when the people have once constituted the legislative, that the legislature is thereby vested with the whole power of their electors: and it cannot be denied, but, generally speaking, it will hold true. And the people of England, having chosen us to represent them, we are thereby impowered not only to make laws, but to alter or repeal any law in being, as we shall think fit, for their benefit and security; and they will undoubt edly be bound thereby. But then this is to be understood, where the subject-matter of the laws we make is within compass of the trust which the people have or may at least be supposed to delegate to us; and it is in an ill way of reasoning to assert, that we have a power to do what we cannot do without prejudice to those we represent. | beyond our Triennial term, it will unavoidably follow, we have it in our power to make ourselves perpetual; and whatever necessity we may be reduced to hereafter, matters are not yet in that apparent bad condition, to convince the people that there is a present occasion for this dangerous innovation in their constitution. To say that the passing this Bill is not to grasp to ourselves the right of election, but only to enlarge the time for calling new pariaments, is a manifest fallacy; for wheneveal our three years are expired, we can no longer be said to subsist by the choice of the people but by our own appointment; and it is a jest to tell me, I have a right to that which another has a right to take from me. Whoever will consider well the frame and nature of our constitution, will find it calculated for every circumstance needful for the security of a free people. We are guarded by our representatives in parliament, against any arbitrary encroachments of the supreme executive power; and by frequent and new parliaments, against the weakness, folly, and corruption of our representatives: and though many instances may be given of long intermissions of parliaments, yet that does by no means prove frequent and new parliaments not to be part of our constitution; and it is obvious to every impartial person, that without them our constitution is defective. For these reasons I cannot approve of this bill: I think it an open violation of the people's liberties, or, to speak most mildly of it, a breach of our trust in that part which will most sensibly affect them; and of that ill tendency in its consequence, that as nothing but the security of the ministry can make it at this time needful, so nothing but a standing force can make it lasting. Mr. Bromley spoke next against the Bill: Mr. Speaker; I may venture to affirm, that the Bill now before you is of higher concern to the Commons of Great Britain, than any that ever yet was before you: it takes away the people's right of appointing their representatives, it deprives them of their share in the legislature, and, in my opinion, wounds the constitution of parliaments very deep. No gentleman is ignorant, that the frame of our government is made up of the King, the Lords, and the Commons. These, with respect to each other, have ever been esteemed separate, although, when put together, they make but one entire government. The duration of this form of government in England, longer than in our neighbouring countries, is manifestly owing to the care taken by those that went before us, in keeping these three con The right of electing representatives in parliament, is inseparably inherent in the people of Great Britain, and can never be thought to be delegated to the representatives, unless you will make the elected to be the elector; and, at the same time, suppose it the will of the peo-stituent parts of the political body up to the ple, that their representatives should have it in their power to destroy those that made them, whenever a ministry shall think it necessary to screen themselves from their just resentments: this would be to destroy the fence to all their freedom; for if we have a right to continue ourselves one year, one month, or day, rules of their first institution, by restraining each to its proper bounds, and in not suffering one to be over-born,or swallowed up by the other two: however these three great parts For a short account of him, See vol. 6, p. 923. 1 may in other respects be considered, yet with regard to the legislative they must act in conjunction. The assent of each to the making of laws is essentially necessary, but the manner of giving this assent is different in the people, from what it is in the king, and in the lords. The people, by reason of their number, cannot be personally present at the passing of laws, their assent can no otherwise be signified, than | by their representatives. The disadvantage the Commons are, in this respect under, is in some sort made up to them by the care taken in the framing of our government, that they should be truly and fairly represented. That elections shall be free, is often declared in our written laws. It is in effect saying, that neither the power of the crown, nor the power of the lords should interpose in them. The resolution of this House, renewed every session, viz.' That for a lord to concern himself in the election of members to serve for the Commons in parliament, is a high infringement of the liberties and privileges of the Commons of Great Britain,' sufficiently shews the jealousy the Commons ever had of the Lords intermeddling in the elections of their representatives. vernment to preserve this right, did not stop here; it was not sufficient to that purpose, that elections should be free; it was likewise necessary that they should be frequent. The people's right to frequent elections was founded on substantial reasons: for since they, who could act no otherwise than by representatives, were ca pable of being mistaken in their choice, and the person chosen liable to be tempted over to a dependence on the crown, or on the Lords, and thereby receive an undue influence, it became necessary that frequent opportunities should be given to the Commons to correct their choice, and thereby prevent the danger which the unfaithfulness of their representatives might otherwise bring upon them. That the people had a right to frequent elections, is made unquestionable by the best of evidence, perpetual usage. From the first footsteps of parliaments, down to the time of Henry 8, not only from records, but from the printed statutes, the frequency of elections does appear. The most repeated instances, within that period of time, are of parliaments determining within the compass of a year; no instance where they continued longer than three. King Charles 1, that unfortunate prince, was put upon governing without parliaments; but the necessity of affairs forcing him to change his purpose, a parliament was called in the 16th year of his reign, in which a law of an extraordinary nature was passed, viz. That in case 'the king did not call a parliament within three years after the determination of the preceding 'parliament, then the lord chancellor, &c. should issue writs for that purpose;' with many other extraordinary provisions. That parliament soon after perpetuated themselves, so far as it was capable of being done, and by an act made the same year, they were not to be dissolved but by act of parliament."' To the long continuance of which parliament were all the calamities of the civil war to be imputed. The attempts made on the king's part, towards influencing elections, have been principally by officers under the nomination of the crown. As this mischief from time to time appeared, laws were introduced providing against it. The statute 7 Hen. 4, c. 15, recites that law to be made At the grievous complaint of 'the Commons of the undue elections for par. liament,' and directs, among other things, 'that sheriffs should proceed to elections freely and indifferently, notwithstanding any command to the contrary.' Many subsequent laws were made for preserving to the people this privilege, on which all other depend, of being faithfully represented in parliament. No less than seven acts were made in king William's time for that purpose: so greatly did the endeavours of officers to influence elections at that time abound. The statute of 3 Will, and Mar. c. 1, takes notice, That the officers of the excise, by reason of the greatness of the duty, and the extraordinary powers given to 'them, had frequently, by threats or promises, so far prevailed on electors, that they had 'been absolutely debarred of the freedom of giving their votes; which, according to the known constitution of this kingdom, every person ought to have and enjoy.' It then enacts, that any such officer who persuades or dis'suades any elector from giving his vote, shall ⚫ forfeit 1007. and be incapable of executing any office relating to the excise.' Another law of the like nature was lately made in relation to the officers concerned in collecting the post-office duty. These laws are now all to be laid asleep. Provisions made for protecting the people's right of election must become insignificant, if elections themselves are no longer to be allowed. The care taken by the founders of our go-assurance of which being privately given to This statute of the 16th of Charles 1 was repealed by the statute of the 16th of Charles 2, c. 1. But notwithstanding the fond humour the nation was then in, even by the same Act it was declared, That by the laws of this realm, parliaments are to be held very often,' and to the end there might be a frequent calling, assembling, and holding parliaments once in three years at least, it was declared and enacted, 'that parliaments should not be intermitted ' above three years at the most.' In king Charles 2d's time another turn of policy was taken, which was to bring the House of Commons to the bent of the ministry, by the secret application of pensions to the members. Such was the modesty even of that age, as not openly and avowedly to bias with offices, those who ought at least to be the faithful representatives of the people. For the effecting of this pernicious purpose of corrupting the Commons, it was necessary that the parliament should be prolonged; which it was for eighteen years: many of the members, and there being time sufficient to gain upon others, not so far intrusted with the secret, the design was effected. And such was the behaviour of that parliament, that it acquired the infamous name of the Pen. sioner-Parliament. appear in the form of a writ for summoning the parliament. And in the indentures annexed to the return, the writ recites, Whereas we have thought fit to call a parliament, touching divers urgent affairs, concerning us, the state, and ' defence of our kingdom of Great Britain,' it then requires, That the sheriff do cause two 'to be elected knights, &c. to act in, and consent to what shall be ordained by the common council of Great Britain, 'super negotiis ' antedictis.' The indenture annexed to the return, answers the writ, viz. That they have 'elected such and such to attend according to the tenor of the writ, and given them full power to act in, and consent to, all things in 'the said parliament, which shall be by common council and consent ordained, touching 'the state and defence of his majesty's king The attack thus made on the constitution of parliaments, by depriving the people of their right of frequent elections, gave birth to the jealousy the nation entertained, of the inten tion that prince had of assuming to himself a despotic power. How uneasy the later part of his reign became on that account, is well known; and this nation has felt the effects of the fervent and divisions which then arose; and by the artifice of ill-designing ministers, have been ever since continued. The people being warned by the narrow escape their liberties met with from that parliament, did, after much struggle, ob-dom of Great Britain.' The question then tain this law of Triennial Parliaments, the only remedy left for preserving their ancient constitution. And now, after above an hundred millions given by the people, in order to preserve their old form of government, here is a bill sent us by the Lords, which if it passes, must expose us again to the greatest of dangers, which is that of a long parliament. : In the time of that Pensioner-Parliament, which began in 1662, the means of temptation in the minister's hands, were not so great as they now are the Civil List is well nigh double to what it then was: the dependence on the crown is greatly enlarged, by reason of the increase of officers for managing the public revenue and funds. What influence these may have upon an exhausted nation, under the terror which 40,000 regular troops carry with them, is easily foreseen. No wonder the Lords, who are ever fond of power, have sent us a bill which admits of their having a share in the nomination of the House of Commons: but I cannot guess what should induce them to expect our concurrence. Surely they cannot think so meanly of us, that for the sake of continuing our seats here, we should give into what so greatly affects the rights of those that sent us. Can we be thought so ungrateful, as to join in the destruction of the power that raised us? Can they think us so unfaithful, as to betray our trust in this gross manner, by renouncing our relation to the people, and accepting from the crown, and from themselves a renewal of our right to sit here?' should they imagine us no longer to be influenced by the rules of justice and morality; yet methinks they should allow us to have some sense of shame remaining, which must give us pain when we return into our countries, and look those in the face whom we have so greatly injured. I would take notice of a matter that was mentioned in the debate, viz. That supposing this bill should undergo the forms used in the 'passing of bills, whether it would carry with it 'the obligation of a law? Of this I own myself much in doubt. The powers we are intrusted with, as representatives of the people, is, Whether the authority thus given us to act, touching the defence of the government, does enable us to lay aside one of the three great estates, the people, by denying them their right of acting by their representatives in parliament and consequently their share in the legislature? does the power put into our hands by the people,justify our turning the dagger into the bowels of the constitution? This doubt is increased, by the notion that prevailed touching the in validity of the statute of the 16th Car. 1, c. 7, whereby that parliament was not to be dissolved but by an act of parliament. No act of parliament was ever made for that purpose; which would certainly have been done, had the subsequent parliament thought that a law made in diminution of the people's interest in the legislature had been valid, (it is to be observed, that by an Act of the Convention that met in April 1660, the Long Parliament that met in 1640 was declared to be dissolved: but that act was not confirmed by parliament, as most of the other acts of that Convention were by the statute of the 13th Car. 2, c. 7.) "I should be very willing to hear answered what a worthy member who just now spoke for committing the bill, and owned his sentirents altered touching the Triennial Act, has told the world in an excellent Treatise of this. [Meaning Mr. Molesworth, in his Preface to his Account of Denmark] That no people can give away the freedom of themselves and their posterity that such a donation ought to be esteemed of no greater validity than the gift of a child, or of a madman: that people can no more part with their legal liberties, than kings can alienate their crowns.' Every body is sensible that the public occasions will require large supplies; and should so much as a doubt arise in men's minds touching the legality of the taxes, it will tend to increase the general dissatisfaction, so often mentioned in this debate, and subject us to hazard there is no occasion to run, did we content ourselves with proceeding in the common methods, which the usage of many ages does justify. For these reasons I am against committing the bill. Sir Robert Raymond* spoke likewise against the bill as follows: Mr. Speaker; I am very sensible under what disadvantage I must speak after so long a debate: I will therefore endeavour to contract what occurs to me on this subject, and to avoid repeating what has been said before by other gentlemen. And in what I have to offer I shall observe this method; I will first consider the arguments that have been used for this bill, and then give my reasons why I am against it. The arguments for the bill are, I think, chiefly these: the expences in elections. The animosities and divisions made and continued by triennial elections; the advantages our enemies may take of these animosities and divisions; and the encouragement, I think no gentlemen has spoke plainer, that this bill will give to our allies to treat with us, and to enter into proper alliances, for our mutual benefit and advantage. As to the expences in elections, it must be acknowledged that they are grown very scandalous as well as grievous and burthensome to the gentlemen of England. They have increased upon them, not from the contests of neighbouring gentlemen with one another, but from strangers, by what influence or direction I cannot tell, coming to their boroughs, who have no natural interest to recommend them, nothing but bribery and corruption, which has put gentlemen under the necessity of great expences to preserve their interests, and serve their country. And you must give me leave to add, that another cause has been, the impunity that bribery and corruption have met with in this House, when they have been very notorious, and very fully detected. But, I fear, this bill can be no cure to that evil, it will rather increase it; for as the term of the continuance of a parliament is prolonged, so the expences will increase with it. An annuity for seven years deserves a better consideration, than for three; and those that will give money to get into parliament, will give more for seven than for three years. Nothing will so effectually prevent expences, as annual parliaments: That was our ancient constitution, and every depart ing from it, is usually attended with great inconveniences. As for our animosities and divisions, I am sorry there are any, but cannot believe this bill will be a remedy for them. The animosities and divisions raised by elections are of a private nature, and little affect the public; those that do, are otherwise to be accounted for, which might have been extinguished; but the opportunities have been neglected, and I wish some "One of those many eminent men who have risen to the peerage from the profession of the law. He was Solicitor General to queen Anne, Attorney General to George the 1st, by whom he was appointed one of the Commissioners of the Great Seal and Chief Justice of the King's Bench; in which station he died in 1732." Lord Orford's Noble Authors. persons have not studied rather to continue and increase them, than to extinguish them. I will speak plainly on this occasion, I think the greatest animosities and divisions, the greatest discontents and uneasinesses now among us, have been owing to the unreasonable resentments, avarice, and ambition of some, and to the unaccountable folly and madness of others. That our enemies will take advantage of our divisions, is not to be doubted, if it is in their power; but I must observe, that since the Triennial act passed, there have been ten several parliaments called, most of them when you were actually in war, your animosities and divisions great, and your enemies vigilant; yet no inconveniencies followed, nor were any, as I have heard of, so much as attempted at the times of those elections. The last of the arguments I have recited, is the encouragement this will give to your allies to enter into treaties with you. No one says they want this encouragement; no one says they ask it; so that I may conclude this is only a pretence. I should be sorry we had such allies as would not treat with his majesty without our giving up our constitution. Should the like be asked of them, they would certainly entertain such a proposition with the contempt and indignation it deserved. But what you are now going to do, instead of strengthening the king's hands, will, I am persuaded, lessen him in the opinion of his allies: for this is proclaiming to the world, that he dares not call a new parliament: that he dares not trust the people in a new choice. Besides, not daring to call a new parliament, carries along with it a supposition to the dishonour of this House: for it supposes that another House of Commons would act differently from the present: which is to confess that this House does not truly represent the people; that they and their representatives are of different minds; and that if they were to chuse again, they would chuse men of other principles, of other sentiments. I will not trouble you farther with answers to the arguments for this bill; those against it, that weigh most with me, are these: That frequent new parliaments are our constitution; that a long parliament is plainly destructive of the subjects just right, and many ways inconsistent with the good of the nation. Is it reasonable any particular men should for a long time engross so great a trust, exclusive of others; can it be of advantage to the public, that the counties, cities, boroughs, should be long confined to those they have once chosen, their interests admitting of great variation in length of time? Frequent new parliaments are our constitution, and the calling and holding of them was for many ages the practice. Before the conquest, parliaments were held three times every year, at Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide. In Edward the 3d's time it was enacted, "That parliaments should be holden every year |