by England; which Demands and Answers | this separate negotiation was brought to matowere made the secret preliminary articles be- rity; but avoided to become parties when the twixt Great Britain and France, and were treaty was to be signed and executed, signed as such, Sept. 27th, 1711, by M. Mes- This great care and caution for their own nager on the part of France, and the accepta-persons, and little regard for the honour and tion of them by lord Dartmouth, and Mr. St. interest of their queen and country, appears John, on the part of Great Britain. No. 4. through this whole separate negotiation; It being very remarkable that there is not one paper of powers or instructions throughout the whole affair countersigned by any one minister, but the queen's name exposed to cover all; which looks as if they flattered themselves, that this omission of their duty would be suffi cient to skreen them from the justice of the nation, if these matters should ever come to be enquired into. · Mr. St. John, in this Letter, represents it to the queen, as the unanimous opinion of her servants, then present, that a warrant and full powers should be prepared that night and transmitted to her majesty to be signed, in order to pass the great seal the next day, whereby the earl of Oxford, the Duke of Buckinghamshire, the bishop of Bristol, the duke of Shrewsbury, earl Powlet, earl of Dartmouth, Henry St. John and Matthew Prior, esqrs; were to be constituted plenipotentiaries, to meet and treat with M. Mesnager, which warrant, and a translation of the full powers, were sent to the queen. No. 5. This Warrant under the signet appears signby the queen, directing the lord keeper to affix the great seal to an instrument thereunto annexed, containing her commission to himself, and others, therein named, to meet and treat with the Sieur Mesnager; but it does not appear that any such instrument did pass the great seal, the warrant remains not countersigned, and is endorsed Not used.' This Warrant is dated the 17th of Sept. although it is manifest, by Mr. St. John's letter, it was not prepared, nor thought of, till the 20th. This antedating seems designed to justify the ministers, in their meeting and conferring with the queen's enemies, previous to the warrant; which never passing into a legal authority, it appears that these secret negotiations betwixt France and the queen's ministers here, were begun and carried on from the 11th of April to the 25th Sept. 1711, when the warrant to lord Dartmouth and Mr. St. John was signed, with out any powers or written authority from the queen; and it is very observable, that the queen was brought into these measures, by its being represented to her by the secretary of state as the unanimous opinion of all her ministers, to which alone the assent of the queen is to be ascribed. But what is more strange, is, that after Mr. St. John had represented it to the queen, as the unanimous opinion of her ministers, that full powers must immediately pass the great seal to authorize them to meet and treat with the said M. Mesnager, these powers should be laid aside; and the acceptation of the preliminaries signed by lord Dartmouth and Mr. St. John, by virtue of a warrant directed to them two only, signed by the queen at top and bottom, and countersigned by nobody. No. 6. Where the obstruction arose to the passing these powers, does not appear to the committee; but those ministers seem conscious to themselves of what was doing, who so readily concurred in privately meeting, conferring, and treating, with the ministers of France, till After such a sacrifice made of the general interest of Europe, such a direct violation of the grand alliance, and such unwarrantable and illegal steps taken in transacting and concul ing these special preliminar es between England and France, it had been but reasonable to expect in them some very particular advantages and concessions made to Great Britain, to atone for such unprecedented transactions; but it is astonishing to find bow insignificant all the demands are, that were made on the part of Great Britain; and, inconsiderable as they were, how ineffectual they have since been rendered. Nothing possibly could be said less with regard to the succession, than what is here demanded in the first article. The queen, not yet acknowledged by France, nor designed to be so, till the conclusion of the peace, as France afterwards explained this article at the general congress; not a word of removing the Pretender, nor any engagement not to support him in any attempt he might make upon the nation. The second Article offers a Treaty of Commerce, in such doubtful words, as France only could make advantage of. In the Article of Dunkirk, the equivalent is expressed in so strong a manner, and the demolition so very loosely; as could not but bring certain and great prejudice to our allies, with very little prospect of advantage to ourselves; and fatal experience has convinced us, what security is procured for our navigation by this third article. But the history of this will be further explained in its proper place. The fifth and seventh Articles chiefly regard the Assiento contract; what a national advantage that is like to be, is now too well understood to want much explanation: But with what views the ministers were so fond of this, as to make it their chief care and concern, will no longer be a doubt, when it shall appear that this part of the treaty was calculated only for private advantage. What the ministry themselves thought most valuable in these articles, was that part of the seventh which grants us an advantage of 15 per cent. upon our manufactures sent to Spain: But this great advantage soon vanished into nothing; and was given up by our ministry here. The bishop of Bristol says indeed of it, It is declared, that to settle the interests of in his letter of the 17th August, 1712, That Great Britain in the first place is a principle it was granted by the French with a design from which the queen can never depart; this either to inflame things between us and the plea was made use of, to defer the interests of Dutch, or to give the French a pretence to sti- | all the allies, to be discussed at general confe:pulate for themselves such particular advanta- rences; but the turn given to it here was to ages in the Spanish trade as may be the ruin of amuse the people, by persuading them that the English ministry was contending for great and particular advantages and concessions to be inade to Great Britain, that might make us some amends for that great and unequal burthen which we had lain under through the whole course of the war. - ours. But what is most remarkable in the seventh Article is the introduction to it, in which the ministry confess themselves to have been im. posed upon by France; for they declare that from the first propoals of M. de Torcy to that time, they always understood, that by the real #securities promised in those proposals, were meant places; which now was absolutely refused; and they consent to take for real securities what they confess is none, but what a love of peace may induce them to accept as an equivalent. What was really of most importance to England was the eighth article, which relates to Hudson's-bay and Newfoundland; but the ministry suffered themselves to be so grossly | imposed upon in this article, that they directly give to France all they wanted, which was a li=berty of taking and drying their fish: whilst France gives nothing at all to us, but refers our most valuable interests to the general conferences: Which was but another manner of denying then, as the event has sufficiently shewn. But the English ministry having thought fit every where to extol and magnify the vast advantages that were granted to Great Britain, France resolved to make a proper use of it, and declared these articles were an eventual or conditional treaty only; and that the king of France would not be obliged to make them good, but in case of the signing of a general peace; in this sense M. Mesnager signed them, and with this condition they are accepted on our part. Hard terms! That such concessions as these were not to be purchased at a less price than forcing upon our allies such conditions of peace as France should be pleased to impose upon them and this the ministry were fully apprized of some time before they were accepted; for in pressing to settle and adjust singly and separately the interests of Great Britain, they enforce it by saying France can run no risk in such engagements, since the special preliminaries will have no effect till a general peace shall be signed. We demand in the sixth Article, that we shall have all the privileges that have been or shall be granted by Spain to the subjects of France or any other nation. Whereas the mi- By these means the Committee observe to nisters ought to have insisted that France how fatal a dilemma the queen was brought by should not upon any pretence whatsoever be her ministry; she must either now go on through permitted to trade to the Spanish West Indies, all adventures in the measures of France, or which they would not have omitted, if they had they had it in their power, by divulging the had the least regard to the trade of Great Bri- secret, and exposing such a notorious breach of tain, or had not entirely forgot the eighth arti-national faith, to make what advantage they cle of the grand alliance; wherein it is expressly stipulated, as a condition without which no peace shall be made, neque ipsis ibidem' (that is, the French in the Spanish West-Indies) O Navigatio Mercature exercendæ causà sub 'quocunque prætextu, directé vel indirecté permittatur. One thing further is to be observed of these articles, that such of them as any way relate to Spain are expresly granted in the name and by virtue of powers given by king Philip, and yet after this, all intentions of leaving any part of the Spanish monarchy to king Philip is publicly disavowed; as will afterwards appear. . This short view of these special preliminaries sufficiently demonstrates, that the interest of Britain was not the inducement to our ministers to proceed in this extraordinary_manner. Yet trivial as these advantages are, France is pressed that they may be first adjusted; to what use and purpose is fully explained in the draught of answers upon the conferences with M. Mesnager, "That our ministers may be enabled to engage the queen to make the conclusion of the general peace easy to France." thought fit of it among the allies, who must from this time think themselves disengaged from the queen, if they could find their own. account by looking after themselves. And that the French were neither so ignorant, nor wanting to themselves, as to miss such an opportunity, appears above three months before these articles were signed. When lord Raby in his letter of the 20th of June, 1711, N. Š. to Mr. St. John, acquaints him that both the Pensionary and M. Vander Dussen had seen a letter from M. de Torcy, giving an account that they had begun a negotiation in England. By this management the English ministry had, under colour of the queen's authority, and the pretence of treating a peace, put it in the power of France to divest the queen of all her allies, and given them greater advantages then they could any other ways have hoped for. On the same day that the Special Preliminaries, betwixt Great Britain and France were signed, which it was a fundamental condition should be concealed with the utmost secrecy, another set of General Preliminaries on the part of France, No. 7, were signed by M. | being a sufficient foundation upon which a neMesnager only; which Mr. St. John, in his gotiation might be hazarded; they dreaded the letter to the queen, says, were to be sent into fatal consequences of opening the general conHolland, as the foundation of a general peace, ferences, before the articles offered by France in which my lord treasurer had made some al- were explained, and made specific; and espeterations to make the whole more palatable cially before they knew at all what they were to abroad. And on the same day, a separate Ar- trust to, for their own barrier, and for their ticle was signed in favour of the duke of Savoy, commerce. which is here annexed. No. 7. These considerations made them for some From this time a perfect confidence was es- time decline granting the passports; and in tablished between the two ministries of Eng- order to prevail with the queen to have some land and France; and in the letters written in regard to her faithful allies, and particularly the month of October, a mutual sincerity is in the two great articles of their barrier and recommended and engaged for, and that a per-commerce, they sent over Monsieur Buys to fect unanimity be maintained for accomplishing the work in hand. Lord Strafford's Instructions in order to his immediate return into Holland were now preparing, and dated Oct. 1, O. S. 1711. And as an early proof of the confidence which Mr. St. John reposed in the French minister, he acquaints Monsieur de Torcy by his letter of Oct. 2, O. S. that the earl of Strafford was going for Holland; and says, Your minister, (meaning M. Mesnager, who was then going back to France and carried this letter,) is fully informed in what the earl of Strafford is to propose to the States. Such intelligence of the queen's counsels, which Mr. St. John confesses he had given to the ministers of the queen's enemies, seems very extraordinary; especially if it be considered, that lord Strafford was sent over to press the opening the general conferences, with assurances of the greatest friendship and concern for the interest of the States, on the part of the queen, and by her authority to procure from France just satisfaction for all her allies; and in his instructions is likewise directed to propose to the States a new scheme for carrying on the war, and to acquaint them with such resolutions as the queen had taken concerning it. Lord Strafford's Instructions are hereunto annexed, No. 8, wherein almost every article is a specimen of the sincerity with which our ministers intended to treat the allies. He is instructed that it must be the most careful endea vour and fixed principle of all the confederates to hold fast together; and this immediately after a separate treaty had been signed by us; and if the ministers of Holland should express any uneasiness at their apprehensions of any such private agreement, he is ordered by evasive answers to avoid giving them satisfaction concerning it. But his chief business was to deliver to the States the Propositions signed by M. Mesnager, as the foundation of a general peace, and as the whole of what had been transacted; and to acquaint them that France had proposed Utrecht, Nimeghen, Aix la Chappellé or Liege, to be the place for opening the conferences; to press the States to fix upon one of these places, and immediately to grant passports to the French plenipotentiaries to come thither and open the general conferences. These Propositions, so very general and uncertain, did extremely alarm the states, as not intercede with her majesty to alter her resolutions; they make the same representations to the earl of Strafford, but all to no purpose. For as Mr. St. John declared in his letter to my lord Strafford of Oct. 9, "Certain it is that her majesty has so far determined upon her measures, that those will deceive themselves who may imagine by delay or other artifices to break them." And again Nov. 2, to lord Strafford, The queen will not finally concert a plan for the prosecution of the war with the States, until they join with her in agreeing to open the conferences of peace. And lord Strafford acquaints Mr. St. John, Nov. 15, that he bad now told them her majesty's order to him was to declare, That she should look upon any delay as a refusal to comply with her propositions. In these circumstances the Dutch at last comply to grant the passports, and agree to open the general conferences at the time fixed by the queen, Jan. 1, 1711-12. The resolution of the States General upon this occasion is hereunto annexed, No. 9, às a paper that must have moved any set of men, not already determined to hear no reason but what came from France; for although the representations made by the States, on both sides the water, had made some impressions, as is evident by a memorial delivered by Mr. St. John to the abbot Gaultier, Oct. 29, 1711. No. 10, and by Mr. St. John's letter to M. de Torcy of the same date, No. 7, that accompanied it; yet 'tis in the Memorial declared, that the queen remains firm in her first resolution of causing the conferences to be opened upon the articles signed by M. Mesnager. The same memorial declares, it was absolutely necessary that the most Christian King should give to her Majesty the queen, such explications of his intentions in respect to the particular interests of the allies, which he shall think proper to engage them to come more easily into the general negotiation. So that hitherto it is plain, our ministers were entirely ignorant even of the King of France's intentions with regard to the allies. And again it is said, if her majesty wishes the most Christian King would give an explication to the aforesaid demands, &c. his most Christian Majesty may assure himself, the queen will make no other use of the trust the king shall repose in her, but to advance the negotiation, in seeking the shortest means, and the most effectual, to obtain a peace so much | exceptions, if they consent to this scheme; if coveted. not, they are to be punished with the loss of their trade, aud to be reduced to the Tariff of 1699. It is therein again acknowledged, that the Dutch have nothing in view but their barrier and commerce; and provided the queen can, without fear of being disavowed, specify somewhat near the barrier that France will consent to yield to them, and to assure them of the Tarif of 1664, there is no room left to doubt that the States General would come without any further hesitation into the negotiation, in the same manner as it had been concerted. But lest all these arguments should have no effect, Mr. St. John in his letter to M. de Torcy, says, These Explications will dissipate all clouds, and you inay believe we will make use thereof with great reserve, when I assure you, "that if the king would offer a plan of specific preliminaries, the queen will never communicate it to her allies;" he concludes, "If the Sieur Gaultier returns with these marks of confidence, you will see our parliament as much inclinable to peace, as ever it was to war." But, extravagant as this scheme was, it is received by the English ministers without any surprise or resentment; and Mr. St. John, in his letter of the 25th Nov. 1711, thanks M. de Torcy for the communication of it; promises to make a discreet use of it, and to keep the contents with an inviolable secrecy, and that the utmost efforts shall be used by England to fix the pretensions of the allies; he represents it as necessary, that all those who wish for peace may mutually help one another, and endeavour to finish the treaty so soon, as not to be exposed to another campaign. It is indeed no wonder, that this plan was never communicated to the allies, which must at once have broke off all the conferences, and determined them rather to run all hazards, than treat upon so ruinous a foundation; but it is a wonder that the English ministry were not startled when they saw such a scene opened; but this shews with what justice the ministry complained, that the allies would not enter into the queen's measures, when they never were informed what the queen's measures were. Pursuant to the resolution of the States general upon the pressing instances of the queen, passports for the French plenipotentiaries were sent to Monsieur Buys, and delivered to Mr. St John. Utrecht is agreed upon here to be the place for the general conferences. The bishop of Bristol, then lord privy seal, and the earl of Strafford, are appointed her majesty's plenipotentiaries. Dec. 23, 1711, her majesty's Instructions to her said plenipotentiaries are settled and signed, and are hereunto annexed. No. 12. Here the Committee cannot but observe the English ministry begging of France, after they had been seven months treating with them, that they may have some intimations at least of what was designed for the allies; expressing their fear of being disavowed by France, after they had gone these lengths with them; declaring the Dutch would come into the queen's measures if they could but know any thing near the barrier that was designed them, and have security about their commerce; persisting still, without any such satisfaction in the measures prescribed by France, resolved to force the allies into general conferences upon loose and uncertain articles, and promising if they could but have so much credit with France as to be trusted at all, they would use it with the greatest reserve, and never communicate it to any of the allies; for whose satisfaction only it is pre-servation upon these general Instructions, tended all this submission was made. wherein the plenipotentiaries are ordered, The return made by France is to be seen in a" That if it shall be thought proper to begin paper called "Answer to the Memorial brought by M. Gaultier, Nov. 18, 1711." No. 11. This memorial is accompanied with a letter from M. de Torcy to Mr. St. John, of the same date, wherein he tells him "his majesty wholly depends upon the secrecy and good use you will make of the entire confidence he testifies to the queen of Great Britain; and the king of France extols the firmness of the queen, and sees with great pleasure the new marks of resolution she shews. The Committee think it needless to enter into a particular disquisition of this Memorial; but observe in general, that nothing had at this time been demanded of France concerning the disposal of the Netherlands; and that the king of France, not satisfied with having secured Spain and the West Indies to his grandson, proposes to strip the Emperor of all his dominions in Italy, and to impose upon him much worse terms than he afterwards procured for himself, when left to carry on the war alone. The Dutch may have the Tariff of 1664, with some The Committee think fit to make one oh by the disposition of the Spanish monarchy, you are to insist that the security and reasonable satisfaction which the allies expect, and which his most Christian Majesty has promised, cannot be obtained, if Spain and the West Indies be allotted to any branch of the House of Bourbon;" so that hitherto the queen thought fit to declare in all public acts, that Spain and the West Indies ought by no means to be left in the possession of the House of Bourbon; although in the special preliminaries, signed by the earl of Dartmouth, and Mr. St. John, on the 27 Sept. preceding, the king of France did expressly promise to make good the sixth Article for himself, and for the king of Spain, pursuant to the powers which were then in his majesty's hands." On the 15th Jan., 1711-12, the British plenipotentiaries arrive at Utrecht; who by their general instructions being ordered to concert measures with the ministers of the allies, and at the beginning pursuing these directions; M. de Torcy, on the 31st Jan., writes to Mr St. John, and tells him, "he perceives there was not so perfect a confidence established between the plenipotentiaries of France and Great Britain, as was to be desired: He believes therefore he will think it proper to send to the bishop of Bristol and the earl of Strafford more precise instructions, concerning the manner in which they were to concert their proceedings with the king's plenipotentiaries." And in the auswer to the memorial sent by M. Gaultier, March 28, 1712, it is declared "the principal order that the king had given to his plenipotentiaries, when they set out for Utrecht, was to establish a strict intimacy between them and the ministers of the queen of Great Britain." But Mr. St. John soon sends them words of comfort, that Mr. Harley wit set out in a few days, who is fully instructed in all the queen's views and desires; "That it were to be wished this gentleman could have been sooner sent, but the hurry which we have been for some time in is inexpressible; and be was too useful to be spared, 'till the House of Commons was perfectly secured to the queen's interest, and to the measures of peace. I think I may say they are absolutely so now. He confesseth the French plan to be too scanty. That they must let the French ministers know, that the whole turns upon their manner of proceeding, her majesty having gone further than could have been expected from her in promoting the peace." The Committee cannot but take notice of the reflection that is cast here upon that House of Commons; as if they were secured to the queen's interest, and the measures of peace, by the management of a secretary to the treasury, a near relation and a trusty agent of the lord On the 29th Jan. at the first general conference, lord Strafford took occasion to declare, That the queen had received the general pro positions as a foundation for a negotiation of peace: but that they were binding to France only, and not to the allies; to which the French ministers readily assented. But it is to be observed through the whole proceeding, that this is meant of the propositions signed by M. Mes-high treasurer. nager only, the congress not having the least notice or cognizance of what was signed, both ou the part of France and England too; which had been hitherto concealed, and upon all occasions publicly disowned. On the 11th Feb. 1711-12, the French delivered a specific Explanation of the General Preliminaries, signed by M. Mesnager. No. 13. It must be observed, that the King of France here makes, as well as in the special preliminaries, his first offers, in the name and by virtue of powers from his grandson as king of Spain; how the British plenipotentiaries could reconcile this to their instructions, and how their behaviour upon it is to be justified, is not very clear. This explication was received by all the allies with the greatest indignation, and deepest concern; which had such an effect, that lord Strafford, in his letter of the 16th Feb. 1711-12, says, the French ministers are mortified at the general discontent these offers gave; and seem to wish they had put in Tournay for the Dutch, and St. Venant to be demolished, to have softened the matter at its first coming out. For whose use and service Mr. Harley had been so well employed at home, and was now to be sent abroad, cannot be a doubt, since Mr. St. John thought it necessary to give M. de Torcy an immediate account of his successful endeavours here, and the business he was sent abroad to manage. In his letter of March 4, to M. de Torcy, be tells him, "He had deferred writing of late, till he might write with certainty; till the necessary dispositions were made among our people at horue; and till the queen had taken the only resolution, which could bring us in a short time to a good and solid peace. I have now the satisfaction to tell you that this resolution is taken, and that Mr. Harley will carry with him this night, or to-morrow morning, the final instructions of the queen to her plenipotentiaries. I refer myself to M. Gaultier, to explain to you more at large the subject of this gentleman's commission; and what the queen hopes his most Cbristian majesty will do to co-operate with her." Those Instructions of Mr. Harley do not appear; but it seems the subject of them was not Nor were our plenipotentiaries without their proper to be committed to writing; for which uneasinesses: They had done all they could, reason, as in almost all matters relating to the lord Strafford says, to persuade the French to Pretender, it is referred to M. Gaultier to exbe as ample in the explication as they could, plain them; but what is meant by the neces "being that is what will have a great effect, sary dispositions made among our people and strike the minds of unthinking people, and here at home, is pretty well explained by M. make some work for reflection for the faction." de Torcy, in a memorial dated the 28th March The plenipotentiaries complain, they are under 1712, in answer to what was brought by M. great difficulties on all hands, for both Buys and Gaultier; wherein he commends the prudent Mesnager think they come short of what had conduct of the court of Britain, in managing the been told them in England; and the allies then House of Commons, and in particular their forming their respective demands in concert wise conduct in making known to the House of with each other, they want further orders: The Commons, that the nation was abused by its plenipotentiaries are at a great loss how to be- allies; and says, the king of France assures have about Spain, both in regard to the parti- himself that those who now manage with so cular advantages that were to be asked on the much capacity the affairs of the queen of Great behalf of Great Britain, and the general dispo-Britain, know how to curb the passion of the sition of it. turbulent party in the other House. |