The following rules for construing statutes applied to the case, viz. : First. That in a grant, designed by the sovereign power making it to be a general benefit and accommodation to the public, if the meaning of the words be doubtful, they shall be taken most strong ly against the grantee and for the government; and therefore should not be extended by implication in favor of the grantee beyond the natural and obvious meaning of the words employed; and if these do not support the right claimed, it must fall. Second. If the grant admits of two interpretations, one of which is more extended, and the other more restricted, so that a choice is fairly open, and either may be adopted without any apparent violation of the apparent objects of the grant, if in such case one interpretation would render the grant inoperative, and the other would give it force and effect, the latter, if within a reasonable construction of the terms employed, should be adopted.

The jurisdiction of this court, under the twentyfifth section of the Judiciary Act, extends to a review of the judgment of a State court, where the point involved was the alleged violation of a contract granting a ferry right by a State to an individual, but it does not extend to a case where the alleged violation of a contract is, that a State has taken more land than was necessary for the easement which it wanted, and thus violated the contract under which the owner held his land by a patent. It rests with State Legislatures and State courts exclusively to protect their citizens from injustice and oppression of this description.

THE

HIS case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, by a writ of error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act.

Mills and others filed their bill in chancery in the State court of Illinois, seeking to obtain 570*] an injunction against the defendants *in error. The bill states the case of the complainants as follows:

The people of the western part of Illinois had, from the earliest settlement of that country, maintained a constant commercial intercourse with the town of St. Louis, and long felt the necessity for increased facilities in crossing the Mississippi River. For the purpose of securing these facilities, the State made a contract with Samuel Wiggins for the establishment of a ferry across that stream, with boats to be propelled by steam or horse power. An act of the General Assembly was passed, which was approved on the 2d of March, 1819, which was as follows:

"An Act to authorize Samuel Wiggins to establish a Ferry upon the Waters of the Mississippi. Approved March 2d, 1819.

of the description aforesaid, he, she, or they shall forfeit every such boat, with its furniture and apparel, to the said Samuel Wiggins, his heirs and assigns, which may be attached and recovered before any court in this State having competent jurisdiction.

"Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, that it shall and may be lawful for the said Samuel Wiggins, his heirs or assigns, to demand and receive the same rates of ferriage as are now of right demandable at the ferry established nearest to the ferry authorized to be established by this act. Provided, that no more shall be charged for a wagon, cart, or other carriage, if loaded, than could be charged if empty.

"Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, that the ferry hereby established shall be subject to the same taxes as are now, or hereafter *may be, imposed on other ferries with- [*571 in this State, and under the same regulations and forfeitures. And that if the provisions of the second section of this act shall be made to appear to the General Assembly to be injurious to the public good, that then, and in such case, the said second section may be repealed.'

At the date of this act, Wiggins did not own any land near the town of Illinois; but within the time allowed by the act for the establishment of the ferry, he purchased a tract of land of one hundred acres, and established the ferry, with boats propelled by horses, according to the terms of the act.

He increased the means of transportation as the public wants required, and changed the boats employed from boats propelled by horses to boats propelled by steam, so as to comply with the letter and spirit of his contract with the State of Illinois, and meet all the demands of the increasing population and commerce.

The bill claims, that under this act of the 2₫ of March, 1819, Samuel Wiggins, his heirs and assigns, were entitled to the perpetual franchise of maintaining a ferry across the Mississippi from any point near the town of Illinois, upon any land that might at any time belong to him or them.

The bill states that the bank of the Mississippi, opposite the town of St. Louis, is an alluvial formation, which is continually falling into the stream, and that the character of the stream is such that, by reason of the frequent changes in the channel, the sudden formation of sand bars, and the falling of the banks, it became necessary for Wiggins, in order to fulfill his contract with the State of Illinois, to acquire title to a large space of land on the bank of the river, in order to change the place of landing as the changes in the river and in its banks might require.

"Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the people of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, that Samuel Wiggins, his heirs and assigns, be, and they are hereby authorized to establish a ferry on the waters of the Mississippi, near the town of Illinois in this State, and to run the same from lands at the said place that may belong to him. Provided, that he shall not use any boat or water craft, except The Legislature of Illinois, appreciating this such as shall be propelled or urged to the water necessity, and recognizing the franchise as perby steam, horses, oxen, or other four-footed petual, passed an act on the 6th day of Februanimals. Provided, that the said Samuel Wig-ary, 1821, the essential parts of which were as gins, his heirs and assigns, shall have the said follows: ferry in actual operation within eighteen months from and after the passage of this act.

"Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, that no person or persons, except those who have ferries now established at this place, shall establish any ferry of the description aforesaid within one mile of the ferry established under this act. And if any person or persons shall, contrary to the provisions of this act, run any boat or boats

"An Act to authorize Samuel Wiggins to make a Turnpike Road, and for other Purposes. Approved February 6, 1821.

"Sec. 1. Be it enacted, by the people of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, that Samuel Wiggins, his heirs or assigns, be, and hereby are authorized to make and construct a turnpike road, of one hundred feet wide, to commence on the Mississippi

572*] River, opposite to St. Louis, *on lands that may belong to him, to run thence across the American Bottom to the bluffs within two miles of George Swaggart's, and to construct and erect all necessary bridges on said road; and that he or they be, and are hereby authorized to build and make said turnpike road through the lands of any person or persons whomsoever, except yards, gardens, orchards, or dwelling houses; that, when the aforesaid road is about to be carried through any improved land, the maker of the said road shall first obtain the consent of the proprietor or proprietors of said grounds, and should the parties not agree on the amount of said damages, then a jury of six reputable freeholders should be summoned, and being duly sworn before any justice of the peace of the county faithfully and impartially to assess the damages, which damages shall be paid before the said road shall be permitted to pass through such grounds.

be condemned, and pay the owners of the land the damages; and after such payment the said court should have power to enter upon the land so condemned, and establish a ferry across the Mississippi River, and might either carry on the ferry for the county itself, or lease it for any term not exceeding five years, to any lessees.

The commissioners thus appointed located the road and ferry landing, three hundred feet wide, upon the land which Wiggins acquired in July, 1822, and which was conveyed by him with the franchise.

The land was condemned, and its value estimated at six hundred dollars, being less than the annual ground rent which it would produce without any connection with any ferry privilege.

In estimating the damages to be paid, the jury were expressly directed to confine their estimate of the damages to the value of the land itself, and not to consider any interference with the ferry franchise of the complainants as

"And whereas the said Samuel Wiggins, his heirs and assigns, were authorized to establish a ferry upon the waters of the Mississippi | a subject of compensation. River, near the town of Illinois, in this State, and a sand bar having been formed since that time opposite said ferry, therefore:

The bill states that the County of St. Clair, through its agents, entered upon and took in possession the said lands so condemned, and "Sec. 5. Be it further enacted, that the said has leased the same, together with the ferry auSamuel Wiggins, his heirs and assigns, be, and thorized by the said act of 1839, to James Harthey are hereby authorized to remove said rison, at a yearly rent of $800; and that a ferry ferry on any land that may belong to him or has been established from said land to the city them on the said Mississippi River, under the of St. Louis. The rates of ferriage charged by same privileges as were prescribed by the Act said Harrison are fixed in his lease, exhibited entitled, 'An Act to authorize Samuel Wig-with the bill, as exhibit S., No. 18. gins to establish a ferry upon the waters of the Mississippi,' approved March 2d, 1819."

On the 13th of July, 1822, Wiggins acquired title to a tract of four hundred acres of land, adjoining the tract from which he first ran his ferry. The tract so acquired is situated on the bank of the river below his first tract, and was necessary to the owners of the ferry franchise in order to secure a convenient landing of the boats, as changes occurred in the channel or in the bank of the river.

The complainants aver that the land so taken from them is a part of their ferry landing, as authorized by the two acts of the Legislature under which they claim, and that the land so taken is indispensable to the exercise of the franchise with which they are invested. From time to time they have been compelled to change their place of landing, as the changes in the river, and its banks and sand bars, required, so that the whole *front on the river has [*574 been necessary to the enjoyment of their franThe bill states sundry conveyances and de-chise and the performance of their duty, and scents, by which the complainants have be- that the said land so taken from them is not come invested with the title to all the land only the most convenient point on their land held by said Wiggins, and with the franchise for their ferry landing, but is the only point granted by the State of Illinois. where boats can securely be landed without running far up the stream, so as to make their trip about twelve hundred yards longer than if they still owned and could use the land so taken from them.

It is also averred that Wiggins, while the owner of the franchise, fulfilled all the duties and obligations which he had assumed under his contract with the State of Illinois, and that his assignees, owners of said franchise, have ever since his transfer of the franchise in like manner fully discharged those duties; that speedy, secure, and comfortable passage has 573*] been *at all times afforded for all persons and property offered to be crossed over the river, in such vessels only as are required by the act granting the franchise.

The bill then states an act of the Legislature of the State of Illinois, approved on the 2d of March, 1839, by which commissioners were appointed to locate a road and ferry landing between Cahokia Creek and the Mississippi River, opposite St. Louis; the road and ferry landing to be three hundred feet wide, upon the most eligible ground for the purpose. This act authorized the County Commissioners' Court of St. Clair County to cause the land on which the road and ferry landing should be located to

The complainants allege that the Act of the Legislature of Illinois of March 2, 1839, authorizing the taking of a part of their ferry landing, is a violation of the first clause of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits the States from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

The bill prays for an injunction to restrain the defendants from maintaining a ferry from the land so taken from the complainants.

To this bill there was a demurrer, which was sustained by the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, and the bill dismissed. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, and the decree of the Circuit Court affirmed.

From this decree of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, a writ of error brought the case up to this court.

It was argued by Mr. Gamble and Mr. Web-|point, as their views of expediency might sugster for the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Breeze for the defendants.

Mr. Gamble made the following points, which he sustained orally. [Mr. Breeze and Mr. Webster both presented written arguments, of which the Reporter can only give extracts]:

1. The franchise which the complainants hold by purchase from Wiggins, extended to the land which has been taken from them under the Act of the Legislature of Illinois of 2d March, 1839.

2. The land so taken is necessary to the enjoyment of the franchise.

3. No compensation has been made to the complainants, nor is any authorized to be made, for the violation of the franchise.

4. The act of the Illinois Legislature complained of is a violation of the Constitution of the United States, under the earlier decisions of this court. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Peters, 514; New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164; Dartmouth College case, 4 Wheat. 518.

5. The act complained of is not constitutional, within the scope of the later decisions in the Charles River Bridge case, 11 Peters, 549, and West River Bridge case, 6 Howard, 507. 575*] *Mr. Breeze first contended, that this case did not fall within the jurisdiction of the court, because the Supreme Court of Illinois rested its decision upon the construction of the act of the Legislature, and the extent of the ferry franchise acquired under it; limiting it to the land owned by Wiggins when the Act of 1821 was passed, with the exercise of which franchise the law complained of did not interfere. 2. That the grant to Wiggins was of no validity, because the Legislature had no power to make grants of privileges to be exercised beyond its territorial limits and over a navigable stream, declared by law to be a public highway.

gest.

The appellees contend that the appellants have not, as the assigns of Wiggins, any exclusive right to a ferry franchise by the Act of 1819, and that their ferry is not of that ambulatory character they insist it has been made by the Act of 1821.

The court understands, that, when the Act of 1819 was passed, Wiggins owned no land on the river near the town of Illinois; that it was not until a year or more thereafter that he obtained title to an undivided two sevenths of a tract of one hundred acres, of the heirs of one Piggot, and known as claim 624. Upon this tract he located his ferry, at a certain known and fixed point. It will be further understood by the plat of survey *before the court, [*576 that the town of Illinois is not on the river, but on the east bank of Cahokia Creek, and some hundred yards from the river, and from it to the river there never was a public road until after the passage of the Act of 1839, under which appellees claim. The grantor of appellants, owning the land between the creek and the river, and the whole of the river bank, could, and did up to that time, prevent all competition with him and his assigns and keep off all rivals; and for a similar purpose he enlarged his possessions on the bank of the river by the purchase of land from Jarrot and others, in 1822, known as claim 579, on which the appellees established their ferry, at the termination of a public road, regularly laid out, three hundred feet wide, from the bridge over· Cahokia Creek to the river, and through the land of the appellants, after the same was regularly condemned in pursuance of the laws of the State of Illinois, and compensation tendered. To this last named tract, appellants' ferry was removed under the authority supposed to be granted by the Act of 1821, although Wiggins did not, at the passage of that act, own it. To whatever point, then, on this tract, it was removed, the appellees insist, that point became the ferry landing, and there appellants' privileges were to be exercised, and not elsewhere. It could not therefore be removed to the first location without the consent of the Legislature, nor to any other point on the tract. A ferry must, from the nature of such establishments, 5. Admitting, however, for the sake of the be kept stationary at one point, until legislative argument only, that these laws are contracts, sanction can be had to remove it to another; then the appellees insist that the Legislature of and so Wiggins thought when he applied to Illinois has in no degree impaired their obli- the Legislature to remove it from claim 624 to gation, by any other act in favor of other claim 579. And this from motives of public parties subsequently passed, and certainly not convenience. It would be a great injury to the by the Act of March 2, 1839, about which this public to permit the owner of such a franchise, controversy has arisen. The appellants, to sus- at his discretion, and to suit his whim or tain their complaint, assume the ground, that, caprice, to move it from point to point. When by the Act of 1819, the authority to Wiggins to a point was selected, that became the "ferry," establish a ferry was perpetual and exclusive, and there and there only, and from it, could the privilege be exercised. The right of way and that having become the proprietor of other lands at a great distance from the tract he pre-construction, extend over every particle of over the water could not, by any reasonable tended to own in 1819, the Legislature author- space covered by miles of distance. ́ A reasonized him, by the Act of 6th February, 1821, to able space for landings and ferryways is all remove his ferry to them, and thereby, as his that could be claimed. The excuse put forth assigns, the appellants, contend, have neces- by appellants, for shifting their landing-the sarily excluded all other ferries between them, character of the current and the texture of the making theirs a movable one, covering a dis- banks-is all idle, as everyone knows who has tance of a mile or more up and down the river, ever seen the bank of the Mississippi opposite and authorizing them to shift it from point to St. Louis. A landing can be made at one point

3. That the laws in question were not contracts, within the meaning of the prohibition of the Constitution of the United States. That private contracts alone were contemplated in this provision of the Constitution.

4. That these laws in themselves had none of the features of contracts, for the want of mutuality, etc.

was intended for the public benefit had become an oppressive monopoly, and they performed a most popular act by repealing them, thus taking away all pretext of exclusiveness, and opening the whole subject to further legislation. This was "nominated in the bond," and the appellants cannot with any propriety or justice complain, if it is injurious to them.

as well as at another, if proper means are used | tion was injurious to the public good, as well for grading the banks, and proper platforms as the fifth section of the Act of 1821. Fourteen provided. The object and design for shifting years' experience had satisfied them that what the landing was undoubtedly to keep off rivals -to prevent competition, and thus enable, for all time to come, the appellants to divide their fifty thousand dollars a year. 577*] *The ferry being established, by the Act of 1819, on the Piggot tract (claim 624), within eighteen months after its passage, Wiggins had the right, so far as the Legislature could confer it, to all the advantages which might result from it, and to all the provisions of the act, and nothing more. Did, then, the Legislature by that act, intend | Act of 1819, and of the fifth section of the Act that his privilege should be exclusive forever, and is that intention manifest from the terms used in the act?

The first section contains the grant, if it be one, and is, in substance, as follows: That Samuel Wiggins, his heirs or assigns, are authorized to establish a ferry on the waters of the Mississippi, near the town of Illinois, in this State, and to run the same from lands at the said place that may belong to him, with a provision that he shall use steam or the power of four-footed animals, and provided, that the same shall be in operation within eighteen months, etc.

The second section provides, that no person or persons, except those who had ferries then established at that place, should establish any ferry of that description within one mile of it, and if it is done, a forfeiture to Wiggins of the boats, furniture, and apparel shall be the consequence.

The third section authorizes Wiggins to receive the accustomed rates of ferriage, and the fourth and last section subjects it to taxes, and then declares, “If the provisions of the second section shall be made to appear to the General Assembly to be injurious to the public good, that then, and in such case, the said section may be repealed."

The appellants contend that the grant would be perfect without the second section. So it would; but when arraigning an act of the Legislature of a sovereign State as repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, because it repealed a former act of that body, we must examine and see what the first act is-we must take the whole of it together, to ascertain the intention of the law maker; and we see in this act of 1819 a right reserved to the State to repeal that part of it which bestows the character of exclusiveness upon the appellants' privilege. The Legislature of 1819 acted upon circumstances as they then were, and foreseeing that, from the great advantages the State possessed, in soil, climate, and power of production, and its great capacity for settlement and cultivation, people from distant lands would seek it for a home, reserved the right to take away a privilege, which, when granted, might be of great public benefit, but likely to become in time oppressive.

The Legislature, then, having, by the Act of 1833 (Rev. Laws of 1833, p. 310), repealed the restrictive clause of the second section of the

of 1821, proceeded, in 1839, in obedience to public clamor, excited to a high tone by the continued and oppressive exactions of this monopoly, and its repeated failures, and manifest inability or want of desire to satisfy the public demands for proper facilities for crossing the river, to put measures in train to satisfy the public want. The preamble to the Act of 2d March, 1839, assigns the reason for its passage-the facts upon which the Legislature acted-and they must be taken to be true. It is a legislative decision, that the exigency had arisen, which, on the repeal of the second section of the Act of 1819, required increased facilities of approach to a place then grown to be a great commercial city, and the great market of the State.

By examining the provisions of that act, it will be seen that in no part of it is an expression used of a design to take from the appellants their franchise; theirs still exists in all its vigor, precisely as it did before the passage of the act. No interference with their ferry ways is contemplated or attempted; no part or portion of their right, as secured by the Act of 1819 or 1821, is taken from them or abridged. Although the receipt of tolls may be lessened by this rival ferry, yet the right itself is as perfect as ever. It is still lawful for them to receive all the tolls that may come to their ferry. Should the rival ferry so successfully compete with them, as finally to take from them all the travel, still their rights, conferred by the Act of 1819 and 1821, yet inure to them. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters, 420.

The appellees perceive no distinction between the rights of pontage and of ferriage, and if it was lawful, as it was, unquestionably, to establish the Warren Bridge, by which all the tolls were taken from the Charles River Bridge, previously established by an act of the Legislature of Massachusetts, it is not perceived *why the same results should not right- [*579 fully flow in this case, the more especially as the Legislature had reserved the right, in the very act which gave the authority, to destroy the character of exclusiveness for which the appellants contend. Legislation affects every day the value of property, and it must be so in the nature of things. Providence Bank v. BilWith commendable forecast, the fourth sec-lings, 4 Peters, 514. tion was inserted, and became an important If the Act of 1839 designed to seize the ferrypart of the so-called contract, and the Act of ways of the appellants, there would be ground 578*] *1821 was passed, with the same power of complaint; but it does not. It designs only to repeal included. The acts were accepted, to establish a healthy and necessary competiwith that power reserved. In 1833 (Rev. Laws, tion, at a very important point, by which the 310, 311), the Legislature determined that sec-public good is vastly promoted, and the land

taken for such a beneficial public purpose, for a road and landing, has been condemned in the usual mode, the damages assessed, and a tender of the amount made to appellants.

Whether the road is too wide or not is not for this court to determine; it is only to determine whether, in the adjudication of the rights of these parties by a State court, validity has been given to a law of the State impairing the obligation of any contract entered into between the State and the appellants, and doing, by such decision, injustice to them. The appellees can see no ground for such a pretense, and without taking up more time, they submit the case on their part to the court, confident that this most just and enlightened tribunal will not condemn a law of a sovereign State, unless that law is manifestly repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. Webster replied to each one of these points, and particularly the last, citing and commenting upon many parts of the bill, which were all admitted by the demurrer, in order to show that the Act of 1839 had destroyed the value of the ferry privilege.

Mr. Justice Catron delivered the opinion of the court:

second section of this act shall be made to appear to the General Assembly to be injurious to the public good, that then, and in such case, the second section may be repealed." Wiggins had no land of his own on the river near the town of Illinois when the above act was passed; but within less than eighteen months, he acquired an interest in a tract of land of one hundred acres, part of which lay between Illinois town and the river, and extended to a considerable distance above it; and on this tract he established his ferry.

On the 6th of February, 1821, Samuel Wiggins had another act passed in his favor by the Legislature of Illinois, authorizing him to make a turnpike road, to commence on the Mississippi River opposite St. Louis, on lands that "may belong to him," and to run across the American bottom to the bluffs. The act further provides: "And whereas the said Samuel Wiggins, his heirs and assigns, were authorized to establish a ferry upon the waters of the Mississippi River, near the town of Illinois, in this State, and a sand bar having been formed since that time opposite said ferry, therefore—

"Sec. 5. Be it further enacted, that the said Samuel Wiggins, his heirs and assigns, be, and they are hereby authorized to remove said ferry on any land that may belong to him or them on the said Mississippi River, under the same privileges as were prescribed by the Act entitled, 'An Act to authorize Samuel *Wiggins [*581 to establish a ferry upon the waters of the Mississippi," approved March 2d, 1819.”

By an Act of March 2d, 1839, the Legislature of Illinois appointed five commissioners to locate a road and ferry landing, three hundred feet wide, on the east bank of the River Mississippi, opposite to the city of St. Louis; the road to extend back to Cahokia Creek. The road and landing were accordingly located; the dis- By an act approved January 19th, 1833, so tance from the river to the creek being about much of the acts of 1819 and 1821 as prohibsixty poles. The ferry having gone into opera-ited another ferry from being established withtion under the Act of 1839, this bill was filed, in one mile of Wiggins's ferry landing, was reseeking to obtain a perpetual injunction against pealed. This restriction is therefore out of an exercise of a ferry privilege, on the ground, the case. among others, that Samuel Wiggins and his assignees were entitled to the exclusive ferry right at that place, by contract with the State of Illinois; and that said contract was violated 580*] by *the Act of 1839, and the establishment of a road and ferry under and by force of its provisions. The Supreme Court of Illinois having decided that the State law, and the acts done pursuant thereto, did not violate the contract made with Wiggins, and that it was not opposed to the Constitution of the United States, that court proceeded, by a final decree, to dissolve an injunction granted nisi, and to dismiss the bill. To reverse this decree, on the grounds stated, a writ of error has been prosecuted to the Supreme Court of Illinois, from this court, under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789.

The contract relied on by the defendants was made with Wiggins, by two acts of the Legislature of Illinois. The first act, approved March 2d, 1819, authorizes Samuel Wiggins, his heirs and assigns, to establish a ferry on the east bank of the River Mississippi, near the town of Illinois, and to run the same from lands "that may belong to him;" provided that said ferry should be put into actual operation within eighteen months from and after the passage of that act. And it was also provided by the second section, that no other person should thereafter establish any ferry within one mile of that established by Wiggins, with this reservation: "That if the provisions of the

On the 13th of July, 1822, Wiggins obtained, by purchase from Julia Jarrot, a tract of one hundred acres, lying below the tract first acquired, adjoining thereto on the south, and fronting on the river; and it is upon this tract that the new ferry and road were located under the Act of 1839. The parties respectively assume, and so the court below held, that the establishment and regulation of ferries across navigable streams is a subject within the control of the government, and not matter of private right; and that the government may exercise its powers by contracting with individuals. We deem this general principle not open to controversy; and in regard to so much of the controversy as involves the contract itself, no material difficulty exists as to what principles of law shall govern: only two general principles need be invoked in construing the acts of 1819 and 1821, which are, First, that in a grant, like this, designed by the sovereign power making it to be a general benefit and accommodation to the public, the rule is, that, if the meaning of the words be doubtful, they shall be taken most strongly against the grantee, and for the government; and therefore should not be extended by implication in favor of the grantee, beyond the natural and obvious meaning of the words employed; and if these do not support the right claimed, it must fall. Such is the established doctrine of this court, as was held in the case of The Charles River Bridge v. The Warren Bridge, 11 Peters, 544-547. Second, if the