State laws, notwithstanding subsequent adverse State decisions; Wilson v. Ward Lumber Co., 67 Fed. 681, 683, disregarding recent State decisions conflicting with prior decisions construing State laws affecting land titles; Forsyth v. Hammond, 71 Fed. 454, 34 U. S. App. 552, declining to follow State court decision rendered pending decree, inconsistent with previous decisions on the subject; Jones v. Great, etc., Hotel Co., 86 Fed. 372, holding State decisions not binding on Federal courts when contract executed before statute construed affected thereby; Opinion of the Court, 58 N. H. 625, holding contract, valid upon well-settled construction of Constitution when made, not invalidated by adverse judicial construction. Cited also in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 603, 15 L. 783, dissenting opinion, majority following State decisions upon effect of taking slave to State where slavery prohibited and returning him. Good discussion in note to 98 Am. Dec. 682. See 14 Am. Rep. 288, note.

Distinguished in Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. 818, 12 L. 928, strictly following State decisions construing State Constitution and statutes; Fairfield v. Gallatin Co., 100 U. S. 53, 54, 25 L. 546, overruling decision made in ignorance of prior construction of State Constitution by State court; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Poe, 64 Fed. 13, where Federal court reversed former ruling construing State law in deference to State court decision, rendered pending entry of final decree; Sanford v. Poe, 69 Fed. 548, 37 U. S. App. 378, following State decisions where no rights involved, acquired upon faith of earlier conflicting decisions; Hibbits v. Jack, 97 Ind. 577, holding a certain overruled decision was never a general rule of property. Denied in McClure v. Owen, 26 Iowa, 256, 257, reviewing cases, holding Federal courts would follow latest settled State adjudications upon construction of State statute. Distinguished in Jessup v. Carnegie, 80 N. Y. 448, 36 Am. Rep. 648, reviewing cases, adopting construction placed by courts of another State on their own statutes; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 214, 17 L. 528, dissenting opinion, majority following long-settled construction rather than recent decisions; Ex parte Holman, 28 Iowa, 141, 142, dissenting opinion, majority holding State court could not interfere with process of Federal court; Brighton, etc., Bank v. Merick, 11 Mich. 424, holding Federal courts bound by State decisions upon construction of State laws.

Miscellaneous.— Cited in McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 66, dissenting opinion, majority holding purchase of slaves during war, after emancipation proclamation, sufficient consideration for promissory note; Moore v. Clopton, 22 Ark. 128, following Mississippi courts in construing her laws regulating slave importations. Erroneously cited in Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 486, as instance of Supreme Court following State court's latest construction out of deference to latter court.


5 How. 141–143

Notes on U. S. Reports.

5 How. 141-143, 12 L. 88, TRULY v. WANZER.


Slaves.- Note given for purchase of negroes imported for sale into Mississippi, was not void by virtue of prohibitive provision in State Constitution in absence of supplementary legislation thereon, p. 142.

Cited and principle applied in State v. Buckley, 54 Ala. 616, reviewing cases, distinguishing between certain self-executing and non-self-executing constitutional provisions.

Equity will enjoin a judgment at law where it would be against conscience to execute it, because of facts of which party could not have, or was prevented by fraud or accident from availing himself at law, without his fault or negligence, p. 142.

Cited and principle followed in Humphreys v. Leggett, 9 How. 313, 13 L. 152, enjoining execution where defense good in equity was not cognizable in law; Crim v. Handley, 94 U. S. 658, 24 L. 218, applying rule and denying injunction in absence of necessary circumstances; Dutil v. Pacheco, 21 Cal. 442, 82 Am. Dec. 750, collecting cases, refusing to interfere to set aside judgment on ground cognizable as defense at law; Litchfield's Appeal, 28 Conn. 137, 73 Am. Dec. 665, refusing to interfere; Pollock v. Gilbert, 16 Ga. 403, 405, 60 Am. Dec. 735, 737, overruling demurrer to bill to enjoin execution of judgment; White v. Herndon, 40 Ga. 498, sustaining constitutionality of act permitting reopening of judgments to let in equitable defenses; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Wall, 1 Or. 296, refusing to interfere to relieve against execution, because party had legal remedy; Shricker v. Field, 9 Iowa, 372, denying injunction where plaintiff had neglected available legal defense; Celina v. Eastport Sav. Bank, 68 Fed. 403, 37 U. S. App. 164, sustaining dismissal of bill for relief against judgment suffered through party's negligence. Cited also, arguendo, in The Elmira, 16 Fed. 138, denying appeal from order denying motion to quash execution and stay proceedings thereon; arguendo, in State v. Matley, 17 Neb. 567, 24 N. W. 201, collecting cases, setting aside mandamus improperly issued. valuable note on this subject, in 19 Am. Dec. 603.


Equity will not enjoin judgment because party had neglected to urge an unconscionable defense, or because he had heard a claim might possibly in the future be urged against the property for purchase price of which the judgment was obtained; accordingly injunction refused as against a judgment for purchase price of slaves, under the allegation that vendor might not be able to make good title, p. 142.

Cited in Rogers v. Parker, 1 Hughes, 155, F. C. 12,018, denying injunction prayed for against execution of judgment on account of a defense good at law if anywhere; King v. Buskirk, 78 Fed. 235, 42 U. S. App. 249, holding preliminary injunction properly dissolved.

Injunction should be issued only where right is clear, the injury impending and threatened so as to be averted only by injunction, and never where it may be used to delay, vex or harass suitors in the prosecution of their just demands, p. 143.

Cited and applied in Massachusetts Benefit, etc., Assn. v. Lohmiller, 74 Fed. 26, 28, 46 U. S. App. 103, refusing to enjoin enforcement of default judgment; Dutil v. Pacheco, 21 Cal. 442, 82 Am. Dec. 750, collecting cases, refusing to interfere to set aside judgment on ground cognizable as defense at law.

Miscellaneous.- Referred to incidentally in Wanzer v. Truly, 17 How. 585, 15 L. 216, and in Moore v. Clopton, 22 Ark. 130. Cited in Moore v. Clopton, 22 Ark. 128, as instance of disagreement between Federal and State courts upon construction of State Constitution.

5 How. 143-168, 12 L. 89, FORD v. DOUGLAS.

Fraudulent sale. In Louisiana, judgment creditor of deceased's estate cannot treat a conveyance from the executors, made in pursuance of a judicial sale of the succession by a probate judge, as fraudulent and void, and subject the property to his judgment, without a previous successful direct proceeding to set sale aside, and attempt so to do will be enjoined, p. 166.

Cited and rule applied in Lawler v. Cosgrove, 39 La. Ann. 490, 2 So. 35, collecting cases, holding ostensibly valid, recorded sale passes title, and cannot be collaterally attacked by vendor's creditor. See also Howard v. Cannon, 11 Rich. Eq. 26, 75 Am. Dec. 730, restraining subjection of property assigned for benefit of creditors, to subsequent judgment against assignor; Tufts v. Tufts, 3 Wood. & M. 495, F. C. 14,233, holding, arguendo, an executed sale valid until avoided in proper proceedings. See good discussion of this doctrine in note to 17 Am. Dec. 186.

Distinguished in La Mothe v. Fink, 8 Biss. 498, F. C. 8,032, denying injunction to restrain sale under execution against mortgagor, of mortgaged chattels in mortgagee's possession.

Federal courts.- Louisiana rule that a fraudulent judicial sale is binding until set aside by suit for that purpose, is not a rule of practice, but of property, binding on the Federal court, p. 166–167.

Equity pleading.— Bill in equity on cross-bill is the appropriate remedy in the Federal court to set aside fraudulent conveyance made in pursuance of judicial sale in Louisiana, and question cannot be raised by answer to bill to enjoin subjection of property conveyed to defendant's judgment, p. 167.

Cited in White v. Bower, 48 Fed. 187, reviewing cases, sustaining exception to "answer in the nature of a cross-bill," drawn in accordance with State practice; Wood v. Collins, 60 Fed. 142, 23 U. S. App. 224, collecting cases, and Owens v. Heidbreder, 78 Fed. 838, 41 U. S. App. 736, both holding cross-bill necessary to entitle defend ant in equity to affirmative relief.

5 How. 168–192

Notes on U. S. Reports.


Injunction to prevent subjecting property, claimed to have been fraudulently conveyed, to judgment against vendor of the property, should leave creditor free to pursue other property, and to file a cross-bill to set aside the sale, p. 168.

5 How. 168-176, 12 L. 100, GEAR v. PARISH.

Injunction. Where mortgage was executed for an unascertained balance of accounts which it was supposed to be, but was not actually, sufficient to cover, and the creditor obtained judgment for the residue, payment of the sum named in the mortgage was no ground for injunction to stay proceedings on the judgment, p. 175.

Erroneously cited in Bass v. Comstock, 38 N. Y. 22, to point that demurrer lies to complaint for not separately stating two causes of action.

5 How. 176–192, 12 L. 104, IN RE METZGER.

French treaty of 1843 provides for and authorizes the mutual surrender of fugitives from justice in specified cases, p. 188.

Constitutional law. A treaty is the supreme law of the land, and in regard to rights and responsibilities growing out of it, may become the subject of judicial cognizance; thus the question whether a crime charged is sufficiently proved, and within the provisions of an extradition treaty, are matters for judicial decision, pp. 188–189. Cited and principle applied in In re Kaine, 14 Fed. Cas. 89, holding extradition treaty a law directed to judicial officers furnishing adequate authority for its own execution.

Extradition. The surrender of fugitives from justice is matter of conventional arrangement between States as no such obligation is imposed by the law of nations, p. 188.

Cited in Ex parte McCabe, 46 Fed. 371, 12 L. R. A. 594, discharging prisoner on habeas corpus where treaty did not authorize her extradition.

Supreme Court may, in the exercise of its appellate power in civil or criminal cases, examine, by writ of habeas corpus, into the legality of a commitment, but cannot review judgment to revise errors of lower court where it had jurisdiction, p. 191.

Cited and rule applied in Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 166, 21 L. 875, collecting cases, holding habeas corpus lies to ascertain whether Circuit Court exceeded its authority in restraining prisoner; State v. Towle, 42 N. H. 542, reviewing cases, holding, on habeas corpus, only jurisdiction of court to commit prisoner could be investigated; James v. Smith, 2 S. C. 188, reviewing cases, discharging prisoner on habeas corpus for want of jurisdiction in court to commit. See also Seavey v. Seymour, 3 Cliff. 443, F. C. 12,596, as to general doctrine of habeas corpus under judiciary act of 1789.

Supreme Court can exercise no power in an appellate form over decisions made at chambers by a District Court judge, his authority in such cases being a special one and the law not having provided any appeal, pp. 191, 192.

Cited and principle applied in In re Kaine, 14 How. 119, 124, 14 L. 352, 353, collecting cases, holding commissioner's judgment committing prisoner pending president's order, not being reviewable, habeas corpus did not lie; Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 253, 17 L. 593, denying habeas corpus, holding military commission exercised special authority and judgment not reviewable; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 714, 37 L. 913, 13 S. Ct. 1022, holding proceedings under Chinese exclusion act not subject to review on habeas corpus. Cited also in In re McDonald, 16 Fed. Cas. 23, holding, arguendo, Supreme Court could not issue habeas corpus where it had no appellate jurisdiction; Wyeth v. Richardson, 10 Gray, 242, holding exceptions do not lie to discharge of a prisoner on habeas corpus by single judge.

Distinguished in In re Kaine, 14 How. 133, 14 L. 357, dissenting opinion, majority holding prisoner held under commissioner's process and, therefore, denying jurisdiction to issue writ. Modified in Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 99, 19 L. 337, and Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 341, 25 L. 677, holding, arguendo, appellate jurisdiction by habeas corpus extends to all commitments under Federal judicial authority.

Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus, p. 192.

Cited in In re Kaine, 14 How. 130, 14 L. 356, collecting cases, dissenting opinion, majority holding Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus; Hyatt v. Allen, 54 Cal. 364, dissenting opinion, arguendo, majority holding State. Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to issue various writs.

Miscellaneous.- Cited, arguendo, in In re Kaine, 14 How. 126, 14 L. 354, concurring opinion, upon question of applicability to case at bar of decision in Ex parte Burford, 3 Cr. 448, 2 L. 495; In re Kaine, 14 Fed. Cas. 83, collecting cases, holding questions involved of such importance as to justify submission to Supreme Court; United States v. Haun, 26 Fed. Cas. 230, as showing instance of Congress providing for removal of persons illegally coming to the country.

5 How. 192-208, 12 L. 111, CREATH'S ADMINISTRATOR v. SIMS. Equity. One seeking equity must come with clean hands; equity never interferes in opposition to conscience or good faith, and, therefore, it will not enjoin a judgment at law upon a contract prohibited by statute, both parties being in pari delicto, p. 204.

Cited and principle followed in Sample v. Barnes, 14 How. 74, 14 L. 332, dismissing bill to relieve against judgment where considera

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