the acceptor, his refusal to pay, the protest for nonpayment, and the notice of the dishonor of the bill sent to the drawer by the first mail after the dishonor of the bill.

court was correct, and that therefore the judg ment ought to be affirmed.

Mr. Justice Nelson delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States held by the district judge in and for the Southern District of Mississippi.

When the notary so testified in open court, at the trial, of what importance was the notarial certificate made by him ex parte? That the notary made three or three dozen notarial certificates of protest is immaterial. In what The suit was brought on an inland bill of exrespect did the first, second, and third certifi- change by the indorsee against the drawers, cates of the notary differ one from another? and resulted, in the court below, in a verdict It is not pretended that they were contradic- | for the defendant on an objection taken to the tory the one to another, nor that either was validity of the protest. contradictory to the evidence given by the notary to the court and jury when on his oath. In such case, the credibility and weight of the evidence would have been a question of fact proper for the jury to try, and not a question of law to the court.

Supposed omissions were the subjects of the several notarial certificates, not falsehoods.

The evidence, as given at the trial, was sufficient to maintain the action so brought against the drawer of the bill of exchange; and the instruction of the court to the jury was erroneous Mr. Crittenden, for the defendant in error, said that the only question in the case related to the sufficiency of the evidence of protest offered by the plaintiff.

By the laws of the State of Mississippi, a protest was necessary and indispensable to the plaintiff's right of recovery. Statute Laws of Mississippi, page 372, 8th section, and page 375, section 17, etc.; Offet v. Vick, Walker's Reports, Mississippi, 100.

The instrument offered in evidence as such was no legal or valid protest, because the justice of the peace (David H. Dickson) who made it had no authority so to do, it not appearing that there was no notary public in Jackson at the time ready to act, and his authority, by law, being only to make protest for want or in default of a notary public. Statute Laws of Mississippi, section 8, page 373.

If Dickson, as a justice of the peace, was under the circumstances, authorized to protest, the instrument offered in evidence as a protest, made out near a year after the transaction, cannot be taken or regarded as an authentic or legal instrument, admissible as evidence, especially as it appears that it was neither the first nor second protest made in reference to the same occasion.

28*] *It would be subversive of the security and certainty of commercial interests and dealings in such transactions, if such an instrument as that offered in evidence in this case should be received and allowed the effect of a legal protest. The first protest, made at the time of the alleged demand and refusal of payment, is suppressed. A second edition of it, made out some time after, is also suppressed. And the -one now offered in evidence is the third edition, fabricated about one year after the transaction. The proof is, also, that each of these differed from the other. It is impossible as it seems to me, that such an instrument can be regarded as a protest, or admitted in evidence as such.

On both grounds-1st. That Dickson had no authority to protest; and 2d. That if he had, the instrument offered in evidence was no protest-it seems clear that the instruction of the

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The statute of Mississippi provides for protesting inland bills in case of non-acceptance, or of nonpayment by the drawee, after due presentment, in like manner as in case of foreign bills of exchange; and allows five per cent. damages on the amount for which the bill is drawn. Howard & Hutchinson, Statutes of Miss. pp. 372, sec. 8; 375, sec. 17; and 376, sec. 20.

On the trial, the notary was called as a witness by the plaintiff, and proved the presentment of the bill at maturity, demand of payment, and refusal, and notice to the drawers. And further, that he drew up the protest in form at the time and delivered it to the holders, but that, on account of some alleged defect, which is not stated in the bill of exceptions, it was returned to him, and a second one made out, and delivered, which was also subsequently returned, and a third drawn up, which was the protest offered in evidence. It was made out nearly a year after the presentment.

The court below decided, that the protest was invalid, and instructed the jury that the plaintiff could not recover, unless the bill had been duly protested according to the requirement of the statute. Whereupon a verdict was rendered for the defendant.

*The bill was presented and the pro- [*29 test made out by a justice of the peace, as a notary ex officio; and on the argument the ruling of the court was sought to be sustained, on the ground that the power of this officer to protest bills extended only to cases where the notary was absent or could not be procured. But, on looking into the laws of Mississippi, it was found that a subsequent statute had given the power to this officer in all cases, without any qualification, and the point was given up. How. & Hutch. p. 430, sec. 24.

The ground of objection, therefore, is narrowed down to the time when, and the circumstances under which, the notarial protest was drawn up, in form. And on looking into the cases and books of authority on the subject, it will be found, that, if the bill has been duly presented for acceptance, or payment, and dishonored, and a minute made, at the time, of the steps taken which is called noting the bill, the protest may be drawn up in form afterwards, at the convenience of the notary. And it has been held, if drawn up at any time before the trial, it will be sufficient. Chitty on Bills, 334, 436, and cases, ed. 1842.

The minute contains a brief record of the facts which transpired on presenting the bill, and the protest, as subsequently made out, is but an extension of them in the customary form. The time of the extension, therefore, would seem to be of no great importance.

For the same reason, if a mistake should occur, no great danger need be apprehended if the notary is permitted to correct it, provided the regular steps have been taken, and noted, to charge the parties. The amendment would not be made from memory, or recollection, but from a written memorandum of the facts. But, without pursuing this view of the case further, a decisive ground against the ruling of the court below is, that a protest of the bill was not essential to enable the plaintiff to recover. The statute of Mississippi is taken, substantially, from the 9 and 10 Wm. III., ch. 17, amended by the 3 and 4 Anne, ch. 9, under which it has always been held by the courts in England that the action at common law was not thereby taken away; but that an additional remedy was given, by which the holder could recover interest and damages on an inland bill in cases where he was not entitled to them at common law. And that if he chose to waive the benefit of the statute, he might | still recover the amount due on the bill, by giving the customary proof of default and notice. 2 Ld. Raym. 992; S. C. 1 Salk. 131; S. C. 6 Mod. 80; 2 Barn. & Ald. 696; Chitty on Bills, 466.

30*] *The act of Mississippi is not more explicit and positive in its terms, in respect to | the duty of protesting, than that of the 9 and 10 Wm. III. as will be seen on a comparison of the two acts, and should receive a similar interpretation. It follows, therefore, from this view, as the plaintiff did not claim the five per cent. damages given by the act, he should have been allowed to recover the amount of the bill, principal and interest, on the testimony of the notary alone, independently of the written protest.

It appears from the record that the defendant put in two pleas to the jurisdiction in the court below, for the want of proper parties; and also the plea of non assumpsit. To the latter, the similiter was added, upon which issue the cause went down to trial. No notice was taken of the pleas to the jurisdiction.

It is suggested that this affords ground of error on the record.

The plea of non assumpsit in bar of the action operated as a waiver of the pleas to the jurisdiction, which doubtless furnishes the reason why no notice was afterwards taken of these pleas by either party. 3 Johns. 105; 6 Bac. Abr. tit. Pl. & Pr. let. a, pp. 186, 187; Gould, Pl. ch. 5, sec. 13.

They were virtually abandoned by the


that Fatheree, at the time the bill was drawn, and also at the time of its transfer to the plainiff, was an alien, and resident of Texas.

The suit was discontinued as to Fatheree before the trial, which left it between the plaintiff and the defendant alone.

The plaintiff being a citizen of Virginia, and deriving title through a person competent to maintain a suit in the Circuit Court against the defendant, that court properly took jurisdiction of the case.

In every view taken of the case, we think the court below erred, and that the judgment should be reversed.

Judgment reversed, with venire de novo by the court below.

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This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi, and was argued by counsel; consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed, with costs; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said Circuit Court, with directions to award a venire facias de novo.

STATES, Plaintiffs in Error.


HENRY K. MOSS, William H. Shelton, Robert
A. Patrick, and Chas. Lynch, Defendants.

Jurisdiction-action on notes by indorsee in U. S. court-citizenship of payee not alleged— money counts-presumptions-circuit court, after adjournment sine die, cannot set aside its own judgment on motion.

Where a declaration contained special counts

upon promissory notes, and also the common money counts, although the jurisdiction of the court was not apparent upon the special counts, yet the money counts, sustained by evidence, might have been sufficient to sustain it; and this court

will presume such evidence to have been given if the record is silent upon the subject, and if no ob

de-jection was made to the jurisdiction in the pro

gress of the trial.

Judgment having been rendered for the plaintiffs, it was not competent for the court below to strike out the judgment at the next term, on the ground of supposed want of jurisdiction.

It was also suggested, that it appeared from the declaration that Fatheree, the payee of the bill, was a citizen of Mississippi, and that the plaintiff deriving title from him, though a citi-ments examined and stated. zen of Virginia, could not maintain the action, for

The power of a court over its records and judg

for want of jurisdiction within the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act.

The answer to the suggestion is, that the fact upon which it is founded is not sustained by the record. The suit was brought, originally, against Dozier and Fatheree, the drawer and payee, indorsers jointly, who are described in the commencement of the declaration as citizens of the State of Mississippi. But in a subsequent part of the declaration it is averred,

THIS case was brought up by writ of error

from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi.

In 1838 the two following notes were executed, viz,:

$10,715-53 Brandon, March 17th, 1838.

Nine months after 1st April. 1838, we, or either of us, promise to pay to Briggs, Lacoste & Co., or order, for value received. ten thousand seven hundred and fifteen 53 dollars.

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Indorsed, "Briggs, Lacoste & Co." In March, 1840, the Bank of the United States brought suit, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi, against Henry K. Moss, William H. Shelton, Robert A. Patrick, Charles Lynch, and Charles A. Lacoste. On the same day, a declaration was filed, consisting of five counts, in which all the defendants were averred to be citizens of Mississippi. The first two counts were upon the notes, each count being upon one note. In the first count, the indorsement is thus averred: "And the said Charles A. Lacoste, together with Charles Briggs and Louis Hermann, who are not sued in this action, not being citizens of this State, by the name and style of Briggs, Lacoste & Co., being partners in trade, using the name and style of Briggs, Lacoste & Co., to whom or to whose order the payment of the sum of money in the said note," etc., and in the second count, upon the other note, it is thus stated: "And then and there delivered the same to said Briggs, Lacoste & Co., and the said Briggs, Lacoste & Co., of which firm the said defendant, Charles A. Lacoste, is a partner, the rest not being citizens of this State, to whom or to whose order the pay- | ment of the sum of money in the said note specified was by the same to be made, after the making of the said note, and before the payment of the said sum of money therein specified, to wit, on the day and year last aforesaid, and at the district aforesaid, indorsed the same note in writing, by the name of Briggs, Lacoste & Co.," etc.

The other three counts in the declaration were the common money counts.

The defendants all appeared, and pleaded the general issue.

At November Term, 1841, on motion of the plaintiffs' attorney, the suit was discontinued as to Lacoste, and a jury, being impaneled, found a verdict for the plaintiffs, assessing the damages at $26,485.66, for which sum judgment was entered up.

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above case came into court and moved the court
to set aside the verdict and judgment in this
case rendered at the last term of this court,
and to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction
of the court; which motion is in the words and
figures following: "The defendants by their
attorney move the court to set aside the verdict
and judgment rendered in this cause, and to
dismiss the suit, because the court had not ju-
And thereupon came
risdiction of the cause.
the plaintiffs and objected to said motion, but
the court, without any evidence other than the
record in said cause, sustained the said defend-
ants' motion, and ordered said verdict and judg-
ment rendered in this case at the last term of
this court to be set aside, and the suit dis-
missed; to which opinion of the court in sus-
taining said motion, and setting aside said ver-
dict and judgment, and dismissing said suit,
the plaintiffs by their counsel except, and pray
that this their bill of exceptions be signed,
sealed, enrolled, and made a part of the record
in this cause, which is done accordingly.
"J. McKinley. [SEAL.]"

Upon which exception, the cause came up to this court.

The cause was argued by Mr. G. M. Wharton and Mr. Sergeant for the plaintiffs in error, no counsel appearing for the defendants in error.

The error assigned is, that the court below erred in setting aside, at May Term, 1842, the judgment rendered at November Term, 1841, in favor of the plaintiff.

The judgment was set aside at a term subsequent to that, at which it was rendered; and this was done for alleged want of jurisdiction in the court below over the cause of action. The defect of jurisdiction was alleged to arise form the first count of the narration not averring that one of the payees and indorsers of the note, Lacoste, was a citizen of some other State than Mississippi.

That the discontinuance of the suit as to Lacoste was not erroneous, and was a local practice sanctioned by this court, they cited McAfee V. Doremus, 5 How. 53. See How. & Hutch. Miss. Dig. 596, for the law of that State. The remaining three counts in the narration were the common money counts, and in them there was no pretense of error.

The first question arising upon the record was as to the power of the Circuit Court to set aside its former judgment. They contended that it was a general rule, that the same court which enters up a judgment cannot set it aside, at a subsequent *term, for errors of law. [*34 This would be tantamount to the power of reversing its own judgment.

The power of setting aside or opening judg ments for fraud, irregularity, or misprision of the clerk, they asserted to be a different power.

As authority for their view of the first question, they cited and relied upon the following cases:

At May Term, 1841, the defendants, by their In the courts of the United States, Assessors counsel, moved the court to set aside the verdict and judgment rendered in the cause, be- of Medford v. Dorsey, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 433; cause the court had not jurisdiction; which The Avery, 2 Gall. 386; Cameron v. McRoberts, motion was sustained. The verdict and judg-3 Wheat. 591; Jackson v. Ashton 10 Peters, ment were set aside, and the case dismissed for want of jurisdiction; to which decision the plaintiffs filed the following bill of exceptions: 33*] "Be it remembered, that at the present term of this court the defendants in the

480. Ex-parte Crenshaw, 15 Peters, 119, they said, was not a decision the other way, because there the Supreme Court merely revoked its mandate, and declared its former judgment a♦ nullity, as the cause had never been before it.

Washington Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. | 19, 1828, 4 Statutes at Large, 218, provides 413; Jenkins v. Eldridge, 1 Wood. & M. 61, that the forms and modes of proceeding then were also cited. used in the highest courts of original and genIn the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Cat-eral jurisdiction in the States admitted into lin v. Robinson, 2 Watts, 373; Stephens v. Cowan, 6 Ib. 511; Gallup v. Reynolds, 8 Ib. 424. In New York, Barheydt v. Adams, 1 Wend. 101; Soulden v. Cook, 4 Ib. 217.

In North Carolina, Anon. 2 Haywood, 73; S. C. Taylor, 146; Ib. 239; Bender v. Asken, 2 Dever. 149; Skinner v. Moore, 2 Dev. & Bat. 138.

The like general rule is settled in England. During the same term, judgments are amendable at common law-being then in paper, in fieri, in the breast of the court. Afterwards, they are only amendable under the Statutes of Amendments or Jeofails. 2 Tidd's Pr. 975; 2 Archb. Pr. 243; Ib. 202, 203, as to setting aside judgments for irregularity.

If courts were not held strictly to the rule contended for, what would become of acts imposing limitations on writs of error, or of those protecting purchasers at sheriffs' sales?

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The second question was this: Was the judgment entered at November Term, 1841, void or irregular, because the foreign citizenship of Lacoste was not alleged in the first count? They contended that this was not the case; it was merely matter assignable as error, upon a writ of error.


the Union since 1789 shall be the rules of the United States courts held in those States, subject to alterations and additions by said United States courts, or by the Supreme Court of the United States. The statute of Mississippi was passed eight years before this act of Congress. That State was admitted into the Union in 1817.

But, further than this, the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi adopted the practice and proceeding of the State courts by their printed Rules of 1839. See section 30 of those Rules.

This provision of the Act of 1820 binds the United States courts in Mississippi, as one of the "forms and modes of proceeding" in that State. In support of this, they cited United States v. Boyd, 15 Peters, 187; McNutt v. Bland, 2 How. 9; Gwin v. Breedlove, Ib. 29.

For the distinction between final and mesne process, as bearing upon this head, they cited Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 Ib. 608.

They admitted that the statute law of Mississippi (sec. 33, Act of 13 May, 1837; How. & Hutch. Dig. 595), which compelled plaintiffs *to sue in one action, the drawers and in- [*36 dorsers of promissory notes who live in Mississippi, does not confer upon the courts of the United States jurisdiction of a case where otherwise they would not have it; nor is such a joint suit maintainable in the federal courts, as has been decided in Dromgoole v. F. & M. Bank,

They cited, on this point, McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192; Voorhees v. Bank of United States, 10 Peters, 449; Kemp v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch, 185; Skillen v. May, 6 Ib. 267. The courts of the United States are courts of limited, but not of inferior jurisdiction. Their judgments, until reversed on error, are conclu-2 How. 241; Keary v. Same, 16 Peters, 89, sive between parties and privies.

Under this head, they further contended that there was not necessarily a defect of jurisdic35*] tion in the Circuit Court over the *first two counts, because it did not appear but that Lacoste was a citizen of another State when the note was indorsed. If he were so then, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court would not be taken away, although, at the time of the bringing of the present, suit, he had become a citizen of Mississippi. The 11th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 would be fully satisfied by this construction. The right of the assignee of a chose in action to sue in the federal court could not be taken away by his assignor subsequently becoming a citizen of the same State with the defendant.

In the third place, they argued, that, under the statute law of Mississippi governing the case, the judgment of November Term, 1841, was not erroneous, and that consequently, on a writ of error, this court would not have reversed the judgment. Although by the common law, where, in a civil suit, one count is good and the others bad, and there is a general finding, judgment will be arrested, yet, by the statute law of Mississippi, a different rule prevails. They referred to the 12th section of the Act of 1820. How. & Hutch. Dig. 591. The defendant must apply to the court to instruct the jury to disregard the faulty count.

They contended that this statute was binding upon the Circuit Court of the United States for Mississippi. The Act of Congress of May

and Gibson v. Chew, Ib. 315. But inasmuch as the suit had been, before verdict, properly discontinued as to Lacoste, this difficulty was removed, and the action stood as if originally brought against the present defendants alone.

In further proof of the error of setting aside the judgment in the Circuit Court, the three last counts showing jurisdiction, they cited and relied upon Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537.

Mr. Justice Woodbury delivered the opinion of the court.

In this case, at the November Term of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, A. D. 1841, a verdict was found for the plaintiffs against the defendants for $26,485.66. Final judgment was then rendered for that sum.

At the ensuing May term, on motion of the defendants, the court set aside both the judgment and verdict, and dismissed the case for what it considered to be a want of jurisdiction.

To this the plaintiff excepted, and a writ of error is now before us to reverse that decision. The first question is, whether any want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

No evidence is reported, nor any defect apparent, which seems to raise any doubt concerning the jurisdiction, unless it be in the pleadings.

The declaration contained the usual money counts, beside special ones on two notes, made to Briggs, Lacoste & Co., or their order, and by them indorsed to the plaintiffs.

The defendants pleaded that they did not promise as alleged, and a verdict was found against them, without any statement being given of the evidence laid before the jury or the court, though copies of the two notes named in the declaration are printed in the case.

The various questions which this state of the record presents, and which bear upon the jurisdiction, can, when analyzed and separately considered, be disposed of chiefly by adjudged cases, without any labored examination of the principles involved. The special counts on the notes standing alone might not be sufficient. under the 11th section of the Judiciary Act, to give jurisdiction to a circuit court of the United States, without an allegation that the promisees resided in a different State from the promisors. Turner v. Bank of North America, 37*] *4 Dall. 8, and 9 Wheat. 539; Dromgoole et al. v. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank, 2 How. 243; and Keary et al. v. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank of Memphis, 16 Peters, 95. But it is very clear, that the money counts aver enough to give jurisdiction to the court below over them, as they state an indebtedness and a promise to pay, made directly by the defendants to the plaintiffs. Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 539; Bingham v. Cabbot, 3 Dall. 41.

It is well settled, likewise, that the notes would at the trial be evidence of money had even of an indorsee. 4 Esp. Ca. 201; 7 Halsted, 141; 6 Greenl. 220; 12 Johns, 90; 8 Cowen, 83; Wild v. Fisher, 4 Pick. 421; Webster v. Randall, 19 Pick. 13; Ramsdell v. Soule, 12 Pick. 126; Ellsworth v. Brewer, 11 Pick. 316; 16 Pick. 395; State Bank v. Hurd, 12 Mass. 172; 15 Mass. 69, 433; Page's Administrators v. Bank of Alexandria, 7 Wheat. 35; 2 Wm. Bl. 1269.

2 Howard, 263; 2

it was in truth found.
Saund. 171, b; Tidd's Pr. 901.

And if, in this case, it was found on the two special counts alone, the judgment on the verdict might then have been arrested *for [*38 want of proper averments in them conferring jurisdiction.

So it might have been arrested for a misjoinder of bad counts with good, if the verdict had not been applied to the latter, but remained general. Hopkins v. Beedle, 1 Caines' Rep. 347; 5 Johns. 476; 1 Chit. Pl. 236, 448; 1 Taunt. 212; 2 Bos. & Pull. 424; Cowp. 276; 3 Wils. 185; 2 Saund. 171, b; 3 Maule & Selw. 110; Doug. 722.

But here jurisdiction did appear on three of the counts, and also final judgment had been rendered in November previous.

The action was not regularly on the docket at the new term in May following, when the court undertook to set the judgment aside. The power of the court over the original action itself, or its merits, under the proceedings then existing, had been exhausted-ended. Jackson v. Ashton, 10 Peters, 480; Catlin v. Robinson, 2 Watts, 379; 12 Peters, 492; 3 Bac. Abr. Error, T. 6; Co. Lit. 260 a; 7 Ves. 293; 12 Ves. 456; 1 Stor. P. 310; 1 Hoff. Pr. 559; 2 Smith, Ch. 14; 9 Peters, 771; 3 Johns. 140; 9 Johns. 78; Kelly v. Kezir, 3 Marsh. R. 268.

This means the power to decide on it, or to change opinions once given, or to make new decisions and alterations on material points. A mere error in law, of any kind, supposed to have been rendered in a judgment of a court at a previous term, is never a sufficient justification for revising and annulling it, at a subsequent term, in this summary way, on motion. Šee cases ante; 2 Gall. 386; Cameron v. MçRoberts, 3 Wheat. 591; 2 Haywood, 237; Skinner v. Moor, 2 Dev. & Bat. 138; Wash. Bridge Comp v. Stewart, 3 How. 413; and Jackson et al. v. Ashton, 10 Peters, 480; Lessee of Hickey et al. v. Stewart, 3 How. 762; Henderson v. Poindexter, 12 Wheat. 543; Elliott et al. ▼ Peirsol et al. 1 Peters, 340; Wilcox v. Jackson, No decision, however, is made on this point, 13 Peters, 511; Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, 241. as from this record we cannot learn but that We would not be understood by this to desuch additional evidence was given, or that prive a court, at a subsequent term, of power other evidence than the notes was not intro-to set right mere forms in its judgments. 3 duced in support of the money counts.

But they probably would not alone be sufficient, by the 11th section of the Judiciary Act, to give jurisdiction over them to a circuit court of the United States, under these money counts any more than the others, without additional evidence that the original promisees resided in a different State from the promisors. Wheat. 35, semb.


It is not competent for this court now to presume that neither of these kinds of evidence was offered beside the notes. The inference, on the contrary, is the other way, or the defendants would probably have objected to the jurisdiction at the trial, and the jury not found a verdict for the plaintiffs, or the court not have rendered judgment upon it.

In the next place, if such a state of things did happen as there having been no additional or other evidence, it is clear from the record, that no advantage was taken of it till after final judgment, and at the following term of the court, and then by motion only.

But it was then too late, after final judgment, and at the next term, and by motion only, to set aside the judgment and verdict on account of a supposed want of jurisdiction. At the next term, if no final judgment had yet been rendered, the court might, from its minutes, have had the verdict applied to the counts on which

Wheat. 591; 3 Peters, 431; 12 Wheat. 10; Law-
rence v. Cornell, 4 Johns. Ch. 542. Or power to
correct misprisions of its clerks. The Palmyra,
12 Wheat. 10; Hawes v. McConnel, 2 Ohio, 32;
1 Greenl. 375; Com. Dig. Amendment, T. 1.
The right to correct any mere clerical errors,
so as to conform the record to the truth, al-
ways remains.
Sibbald v. United States, 12
Peters, 492; Newford v. Dorsey, 2 Wash. C. C.
433; 6 Watts. 513; 8 Watts. 424; 1 Wendell,
101; 4 Wendell, 217; 1 Bibb, 324 2 Bibb, 88;
Weston's case, 11 Mass. 417; The Bank v. Wis-
tar, 3 Peters, 431. Irregularities, also, in no-
tices, mandates, and similar proceedings can
still, in some cases, be amended.
Crenshaw, 15 Peters, 123.

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*Indeed, any amendments permissible [*39 under the Statutes of Jeofails may be proper at subsequent terms. 2 Tidd's Pr. 917; 2 Arch. Pr. 202, 243; and at times even after a writ of error is brought. 2 How. 243; 3 Johns

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