which De la Croix says Mr. Clark made to him, have always been received to establish the legitimacy of a child, with or without proof of inarriage; and when there is in a case the positive testimony of one witness to a marriage, they are conclusive proof of legitimacy. What is urged against such a conclusion in this case? The conduct of the parties in not promulgating their marriage, and not occupying the same house upon their return to New Orleans. In connection with that conduct, the testimony of De la Croix, that Colonel and Mrs. Davis, who reared Mrs. Gaines at the request of her father, knew nothing of this marriage; that the witnesses, Mr. Coxe and Mr. Hulings, who were for a long time the intimates of Mr. Clarkthe former his partner in business-swear, to 592*] the best of their belief, *that he never married. And the subsequent connection with Gardette, without a dissolution of the marriage with Mr. Clark. The first is a good objection, until it has been reasonably accounted for. We do not mean so accounted for as to make it proper, but enough so to separate such conduct from the suspicion of an illicit connection. Madame Despau declares, when the marriage was contracted in Philadelphia, and afterwards upon their arrival in New Orleans, that Clark said the marriage could not be disclosed on account of Zuline's previous marriage with De Grange; that legal proof must be obtained of the previous marriage of De Grange, and that an action would have to be brought by Zuline "against his name." This is substantially confirmed by Madame Caillaret, in her statement of the proposals for a marriage by Mr. Clark, and it having been deferred for the reason given by Madame Despau for its concealment. It is confirmed by what other witnesses say. as well as Madame Despau, of the arrest and imprisonment of De Grange for bigamy, to which they all swear as within their own knowledge, and by the subsequent proceedings in the City Court against De Grange. Record, 206. Connect the preceding with the mode of proceeding in Louisiana to impeach a marriage with one unable to contract marriage, its exist ing application to De Grange, and what might then have been its application to Mrs. Clark if her marriage in Philadelphia had been disclosed before a sentence of the nullity of her marriage with De Grange had been obtained, and we shall have facts from which motives for concealment of it may be inferred diverse from and stronger than the usual suspicion of its having been caused by an illicit intercourse. It was not necessary to the validity of the marriage in Philadelphia, that a sentence of dissolution should have been first pronounced in Louisiana against De Grange. By the law of the latter, as well as by the law of Pennsylvania, the marriage with De Grange was void from the beginning. A void marriage imposes no legal restraint upon the party imposed upon from contracting another, though prudence and delicacy do, until the fact is so generally known as not to be a matter of doubt, or until it has been impeached in a judicial proceeding, whereever that may be done. Mr. Clark probably knew what we have just stated concerning the validity of his marriage; but from his pride and | temper as his character has been disclosed in this record, was it not probable, not to say natural, that such a man, anticipating his return to Louisiana, would resort to the course which was pursued to keep his feelings from being wounded, until a judicial sentence had restored *his wife to the unequivocal condition [*593 enjoyed by her before the imposition of De Grange? We speak of the fact, and not of its propriety. The latter has not our approbation, but we recognize what all of us know to be true, that concealment is as frequently the refuge of error as it is of crime, and that men of the world shun more than anything else the exposure of their follies, more especially such as the world may think to be so, and bearing upon the honor of the most delicate relation which a man can form in life. It is not a fiction, that men have been situated as Mr. Clark was, who have died without disclosing, as he did, even in behalf of their unoffending children, such a relation, and that women have been found to bear it. Such reflections would have no weight with us, unconnected with the proof that there is in this case of the marriage. But we think, with such proof, that they are appropriate to repel any presumption of illegitimacy in this instance, arising from the concealment of the marriage, or from the parties to it not having occupied the same house. The events which followed embittered the rest of this father's life, and, until now, have deprived his child of that legitimate standing which he was most anxious to give her, and which seems to have pressed most heavily upon him at the hour of his death. Bois Fontaine says, in reply to the third cross-interrogatory: "He spoke of her mother with great respect, and frequently told me, after her marriage with Gardette, that he would have made his marriage with her public if that barrier had not been made, and frequently lamented to me that it had been made; but that she was blameless. He said he would never give Myra a stepmother. When, in 1813, he communicated to me that he was making his last will, he showed great sensibility as to her being declared legitimate in it. While I was with him in his death-sickness, and even at the moment he expired, he was in perfect possession of his senses, and no parent could have manifested greater affection than he did for her. Nearly his last words were about her," etc. Time with him was near its end, and the truth was told. De la Croix's testimony, in the particular in which it is relied upon, differs from that of all the other witnesses, who have deposed to what Mr. Clark said to them, repeatedly, of the legitimacy of his child. We regard it the less, for notwithstanding his intimacy with Mr. Clark, and the confidence which he had in De la Croix's suitableness to be the guardian of Myra, he says Mr. Clark never spoke to him about her, except on the occasion when he was asked to become his executor and her tutor. Record, 233, 234. This declaration to De la Croix, supposing it to have *been made in connection with the oc- [*594 casion when he says it was made by Mr. Clark, it is the testimony in the record most relied upon to disprove the legitimacy of Mrs. Gaines. But it cannot be allowed to exceed in weight the testimony of several other witnesses who were more intimate with Mr. Clark than De la Croix was, who-from from facts in the cause independently of any declarations of theirs-seems to have had more of his confidence, and to whom Mr. Clark spoke very differently of the same fact. A single declaration, directly the reverse of many to the same fact, may be made in such a manner, by the same person, as to disable us from coming to a conclusion coincident with that which the many assert. But if the latter are associated with other proofs bearing upon the point derived from other persons, stronger than any proofs which can be connected with the contradiction of them, we have a rule to guide us in our estimate of both, making the many prevail over the one, though it might, independently of all other proof connected with either, bring us to an opposite conclusion. The testimony of De la Croix cannot stand the test of this rule. Setting aside all that the other witnesses say contrary to it, there is the oath of one witness who swears to the marriage, which raises an intendment of legitimacy in the offspring conclusive until it has been disproved. Against such a rule, suspicions or doubts not resting upon proofs as strong as the proofs of the marriage must not be indulged. But for a brief illustration of the rule, let us take the case. De la Croix says Mr. Clark told him, upon the only occasion he ever spoke to him of Myra, that she was his natural child. Madame Despau says she was present at the marriage of Mr. Clark to the mother of Myra. Bois Fontaine says Mr. Clark said to him, speaking of the mother of Mrs. Gaines, that he would have made his marriage with her public, but for her subsequent connection with Gardette. Now, where is the weight of proof? Does De la Croix's testimony exceed that of the witness who swears to the marriage, and also Clark's declaration to Bois Fontaine admitting it? The contrary declarations may neutralize each other, in this aspect of the case, without lessening the positive. In such a case, we have not a choice of conclusions, but must take that which the positive proves. Hitherto, the testimony of De la Croix has been treated as if it was altogether unexceptionable. It is not so. There is in it that cold hardness of a man of the world, unmindful of the relations of former friendship whilst professing to regard them, but little in unison with kindness, and not at all so with the seriousness of exact truth. Such men will not swear to 595*] *what is false, but they may speak what is not true, by an indifference to exactness in what they do say. De la Croix's testimony is twice in the record taken at different times, and we have it both in French and English. No injustice is done him by translation. They are not so contradictory of each other as to justify of themselves any charge against intentional veracity; but they differ in particulars about Myra, as well as of other persons, so as to make it right that it should, as a whole, be received with great caution. Besides, for there must be no disguise of the facts which brings us to our conclusion concerning his testimony, there is upon the record a pecuniary relation between himself and the estate of Daniel Clark, which, unexplained, does not leave a favorable impression of his impartiality in this affair. Again, suppose the fact of legitimacy in this case had been placed altogether upon the evidence of Belle Chasse and De la Croix, that of the former would not have been proof of it. But if Belle Chasse's testimony is fortified by that of others, speaking as strongly as he does of Clark's declarations of his daughter's legitimacy, it would not be reasonable to discard it for the testimony of De la Croix, which is unsupported by any other witness. Is the conclusion one less of proof, because Colonel and Mrs. Davis, who reared the child at the request of her father, were ignorant of his marriage? because Mr. Coxe and Mr. Hulings, who knew him well, say that they knew nothing of Mr. Clark's marriage, the two last declaring so to the best of their belief? All of this is negative testimony, implying ignorance of the fact of which they speak, and not knowledge of it—a fact susceptible of positive proof, or of proof by facts from which marriage may be inferred. The rest of the testimony of Mr. Coxe, Mr. Hulings, and De la Croix, in respect to the marriage, is excluded from our consideration, from not being within the rules by which hearsay is admissible in cases of pedigree. Neither of them relate anything as coming from the parents of Myra, or the relations on either side of the marriage. The only point in which the testimony of Mr. Coxe differs from that of Madame Despau is in his narrative of the arrangement made by him, at the request of Mr. Clark, for the birth of Caroline, now Mrs. Barnes. Madame Despau says she was the child of De Grange; Mr. Coxe, that Clark told him that she was his child. These declarations are at variance with each other as to the fact, but not contradictory. The fact may be as one or the other witness has related it. The difference, therefore, does not at all discredit Madame Despau. But the ignorance of Colonel and Mrs. Davis of the marriage, in connection with the arrangements *which were made by [*596 them, at the request of its father, for the birth of the child, and the father's great confidence in them it is said, is extraordinary and unaccountable. But is it not equally so, that, under such circumstances, he should not have communicated to them the reverse? The latter is ordinarily the usual confidence between the parties upon such occasions, and when it is not made, an inquiry suggests itself at once why it was not done. Its not having been done though extraordinary, proves nothing either one way or the other; the mind is left to connect other facts with it, for the purpose of enabling us to conclude what inference can justly be made from such an incident, so much out of the way of the confidence between parties upon such occasions. There are no such facts in this case to aid such an objection. There are facts independent of it, which happened afterwards, which repel it. The witnesses speak of the extraordinary affection manifested by Mr. Clark for this child his daily visits, parental and endearing fondness-his costly presents and manifested pride in her, as time developed her mind and appearance- and that he always called her Myra Clark. All of this is not inconsistent with what men of generous temper will and should do to repair as much as they can, in such cases, their indiscretion as to the birth of a child. But when a parent does it, with subsequent dec- | larations, made over and over again, to several persons, of a child's legitimacy, they may well be united with the latter to remove the objection, that Mr. Clark had not mentioned his marriage to Colonel and Mrs. Davis. Besides, let it be remembered that the evidence shows, up to that time, he had mentioned his marriage to no one. Madame Despau, his wife, and himself only knew the secret, and his influence over them made it his own, until they could speak free from the apprehensions excited in them by the declaration, that the marriage was not to be disclosed until the marriage with De Grange had been judicially annulled. He was a man of no ordinary character or influence upon those who were about him. His natural fitness to control became habitual, as his wealth and standing increased, and it was exercised and involuntarily yielded to by all who associated or who were in business with him. He was a man of high qualities, but of no rigor or virtue or self-control; energetic, enterprising, courageous, affectionate and generous, but with a pride which had yielded to no mortification until his affection subdued it to a sense of justice in behalf of his child. As to Mrs. Clark's subsequent connection with Gardette whilst she was the wife of Mr. Clark, considering it alone 597*] or with those reasons which *have been urged against the fact of that marriage, our conclusion is, that, inexcusable as her conduct was, there is not enough to make the fact of the marriage with Mr. Clark doubtful. Discarding from our consideration altogether the irritation and impositions to which this female had been subjected from her girlhood, and her well founded fears of the fidelity of Mr. Clark, and admitting she was very deficient in her apprehension of the sacredness of marriage, however much it may expose her virtue and her affection for her lawful husband to conclusions against both, we do not deem it to be a fact | strong enough to set aside the testimony of one witness who swears positively to her marriage with Mr. Clark, all the corroborating proof of that fact in the case. It will raise a suspicion against the marriage, in this most curious and original chapter of domestic life, not easily removed from the minds of those who indulge it. But we cannot permit it to prevail over the legitimacy of her child, established, as we think ourselves obliged to say it has been, in conformity with those rules of evidence which long experience and the wisdom of those who have gone before us in courts of equity have deemed the best to ascertain, in cases of doubt, the affinity and blood relationship of social life. But it is still said, admitting the marriage with Clark to have taken place in Philadelphia, that Mrs. Gaines cannot inherit from her father, his marriage with her mother being void, on account of her previous marriage with De Grange. This will depend upon the marriage with De Grange having been a valid marriage. Or upon its being void for one of those causes which disable persons from contracting marriage. The burden of proof in such a case is not upon the party asserting the validity of the second marriage, but on the other, who asserts its invalidity on account of the validity of the first. Both are affirmative declarations. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. The argument is, the marriage with De Grange stands in the way of any right of Mrs. Gaines to inherit from her father, until the record of the conviction of De Grange for bigamy has been produced. We do not understand the law to be so. A bigamist may be proved so, in a civil suit, by any of those facts from which marriage may be inferred. Reputation of marriage is not enough, but facts from which it may be inferred are so. In a prosecution for the offense, there must be proof of an actual marriage. The confession of the bigamist will be sufficient in a civil suit, when made under circumstances which imply no objection to it as a confession. De Grange did make such a confession. Madame Benguerel says, in answer to the seventh interrogatory put to her: "My *husband and [*598 myself were very intimate with De Grange, and when we reproached him for his baseness in imposing upon Zuline, he endeavored to excuse himself by saying, that, at the time of his marrying her, he had abandoned his lawful wife, and never intended to see her again." Record, 212. And her answer to the cross-interrogatory is: "I am not related to nor connected with the defendants, nor with either of them, nor with the mother of the said Myra, nor am I interested at all in this suit. It was in New Orleans where I obtained my information. It will be seen by my answers how 1 knew the facts. I was well acquainted with De Grange and the said Zuline, and I knew the lawful wife of the said De Grange, whom he had married previous to his imposing himself in marriage upon Zuline." The credit of this witness is unassailed. Here, then, is proof enough of a subsisting marriage between De Grange and another female, when he married Mrs. Gaines's mother, to invalidate the latter. But suppose Madame Benguerel had not given such testimony, or that her credit had been successfully assailed; what would then be the state of the objection? Just this: as all the other witnesses who speak of the prosecution of De Grange for bigamy speak of his conviction only as hearsay or common report, the defendant cannot call upon the plaintiff for record proof of it, without placing himself in the inconsistent attitude of rejecting the hearsay to be proof of its existence, but giving to him the right to call for its production. The testimony of Madame Benguerel was introduced by the plaintiffs without any obligation upon them to have done so. It establises the fact of De Grange's previous marriage, for all the purposes of this controversy. The denial, in the answer of the defendant, that Mr. Clark was ever married, is the assertion of a fact, of which the defendant cannot, in the nature of things, have positive knowledge, and is therefore no more than a declaration of his belief. One witness, therefore, overrules the denial. But there is no force in this objection for another reason. When, in the progress of a suit in equity, a question of pedigree arises, and there is proof enough, in the opinion of the court, to establish the marriage of the ancestor, the presumption of law is, that a child of the marriage is legitimate, and it will be incumbent upon him who denies it to disprove it, though in doing so he may have to prove a negative. Further upon this point, the record of De Grange's conviction cannot be called for, as there is proof that it could not be found in the proper office in New Orleans, where it should be. The complainants do not rely upon such proof to establish the fact that De Grange was a married man when he married Zuline. 599*] *His declaration to Madame Benguerel associated with other facts, sufficiently proves it. Before leaving this point, however, we will make a single remark upon what was said in the argument, that, if the record of De Grange's conviction had been produced, it would not have been competent testimony, from its being res inter alios acta. The general rule certainly is, that a person cannot be affected, much less concluded, by any evidence, decree, or judgment, to which he was not actually, or in consideration of law, privy. But the general rule has been departed from so far as that wherever reputation would be admissible evidence, there a verdict between strangers, in a former action, is evidence also; such as in cases of manorial rights, public rights of way, immemorial custom, disputed boundary, and pedigrees. Duchess of Kingston's case, 11 Howell, State Trials, 261; Davies, Demandant, Lowndes, Tenant, 7 Scott, N. R. 141; Doe, d. Bacon, v. Brydges, 7 Scott, 333; Read v. Jackson, per Lawrence, J., 1 East, 355; Brisco v. Lomax, 8 Adol. & Ell. 198; Evans v. Rees, 10 Adol. & Ell. 151; Biddulph v. Ather, 2 Wel. 23; Tooker v. Duke of Beauford, 1 Burr. 146, as to manorial rights; Brisco v. Lomax, 8 Adol. & Ell. 198, as to disputed boundary; Laybourn v. Crisp, 4 Mees. & Wels. 320, as to questions of immemorial custom; Travers v. Challoner, Gwill, 1237, as to disputed modus and pedigree; Carr v. Heaton, Gwill. 1261. In Neal & Duke of Athol v. Wilding, Strange, 1157, the court rejected a special verdict in a former suit, the defendants not having been parties to that suit, which was offered to prove three of the descents which were necessary to make out the Duke's pedigree. Mr. Justice Wright differed from the majority of the judges on that occasion, and in Buller's N. P. 4th ed. p. 233, it is said that the opinion of that learned judge was generally approved, though the determination by the rest of the court was contrary. And the point has been since repeatedly ruled in conformity with the opinion of Mr. Justice Wright. But it may be said that the real fact was not what our conclusion is upon this point. Let it be remembered by those who may say so, that possibilities are the enemies of truth, indicating more frequently than otherwise the unpreparedness of a mind to receive it, rather than its uncertainty. They have no standing in the law against a violent presumption, which is plena probatio, or full proof. Having disposed of all the objections which were urged, or which can be raised upon this record, against the most interesting and essential fact in the case of the complainants, we 600*] *proceed to give our conclusions upon the legal points made for the reversal of the decree of the Circuit Court. It was said the decree was not final. That the statute of limitations barred a recovery. And last, that the decree directs the property for which the defendant is sued to be conveyed and surrendered to Mrs. Gaines, instead of making it liable as a portion of Daniel Clark's estate, out of which the forced heir's légitime is to be calculated. The first objection would prevail against the decree, if Mr. Patterson's was such a purchase. It is not so. The defendant is the alienee of the purchasers who bought the property at auction, in the year 1820, from the executors of Mr. Clark under the will of 1811. It is admitted that the property was a part of Mr. Clark's estate when he died. These sales were made without any authority, judicial or otherwise. ity, judicial or otherwise. They were made after the time when, by the law of Louisiana, the relation of the sellers as executors had expired. Nor can it be said they were legal on account of the power of attorney given to Mr. Relf and Mr. Chew by Mrs. Clark, the mother and universal legatee of the testator. She could give no power to the executors to dispense with the law prescribing the manner for making the sale of a succession. Her power of attorney was not of itself, nor was it treated by the executors, to make for her a legal acceptance of the succession. It was neither an express nor a tacit acceptance of the succession, casting upon her the responsibilities resulting to a donee of a succession by its acceptance. It might have been used as an act done by her from which her intention to accept the succession might have been inferred, which would have been a legal acceptance. But it was not so treated. Until the acceptance was made as the law required it to be, every act performed under it by the attorneys was void. It The power was also given when the possession of the estate was lawfully in the executors, for the purpose of enabling them to discharge their functions according to law. could not invest them with any power, either when their connection with the estate as executors existed, or afterwards, to sell any part of it in a way not permitted by the law. One of the executors, Mr. Relf, received letters testamentary on the 27th of August, 1813. The other, Mr. Chew, on the 21st January, 1814. Without delay, on the same day that he received letters, Mr. Relf applied for leave to sell the movable *and immovable [*601 property of his testator. It was granted. For reasons stated in a subsequent application, he applied for an extension of the order as to the time for making a sale. It was allowed, without any alteration of the times for advertising the property he wished to sell, as fixed in the first order. The movable effects were to be advertised ten days. The slaves and other immovable effects thirty days. The defendant depends upon these orders for the regularity of the sales and the validity of the purchase made by his alienor. Correjollas, the original purchaser. The sale of the property bought by Correjollas was made in 1820. The time for They were, that a suit at the instance of a forced heir cannot be maintained against a purchaser, until the donee's property has been dis-making the sales, according to the order of the cussed. court, had passed more than six years. The time within which the executors could act as such by the law of Louisiana had expired. They had neither legal nor delegated authority from the donee of the estate, recognized as such by the law of Louisiana, to make the sale. It was a sale without judicial order-a sale in disregard of, and in violation of, the law-one which the law of Louisiana makes absolutely void. If considered as having been made under the orders for sale given by the court, it is also absolutely void. It is necessary to show, in all cases of forced sales, meaning such as are done by judicial order-particularly of the property of a succession, or estate of a deceased person-that all the formalities of the law have been strictly complied with, or the sale will be annulled. Delogný v. Smith, 3 La. R. 421; Donaldson v. Hall, 7 N. S. 113; Marsfield v. Comeaux, 7 N. S. 185; 8 N. S. 246; 4 La. R. 204; 11 Martin, 610, 675; 2 La. R. 328. Under these decisions, and the view which we have taken of this point of the case, the fact of notice by the purchasers, and by the defendant from them, of the illegal and fraudulent sale, cannot be denied. The defendant knew, from the titles which he received from the purchaser, Correjollas, and from that bough, by him from the other alienee of Correjollas, that the sales had been made by Mr. Relf and Mr. Chew in a representative character, and it was his duty to inquire if they legally filled it. Not having done so he has bought in his own wrong, and the title by which he claims the property must be annulled. We have confined our remarks strictly to the objection, that these sales were made by the donee, or universal heir of the will, without adducing other causes found in the proceedings of the executors, of which this record is but too fruitful, to show that the objection has no foundation in fact. Of the statute of limitations, we will only say that the statute in force at the time the suit 602*] is brought determines the *right of the party to sue for a claim, and that the time under that in force when this suit was commenced had not expired. We ought, though, to say, to prevent future misapprehension, that it is not regularly in the pleading of this cause. legally dispose of, but is only reducible to that quantum. To determine the reduction to which the donation in the will of 1811 is liable, the 29th article of title 2d of donations mer viv mortis causa, ch. 3, sec. 2, of the code of 1808, gives the rule. The disposable quantum in this instance would be one fifth of the aggregate of the property of the decedent in Louisiana; the légitime four fifths. Code of 1808, 212, tit. 22. We shall direct the decree of the court below to be reversed, and adjudge that a decree shall be made in the said curt, in this suit deelang that a lawful marriage was contracted in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, between Daniel Clark and Zuline Carriere, and that Myra Clark, now Myra Gaines, is the lawful and only child of that marriage. That the said Myra is the forced heir of her father, and is entitled to four fifths of his estate, after the excessive donation in the will of 1811 is reduced to the disposable quantum which the father could legally give to others. That the property described in the answer of the defendant, Mr. Patterson, is a part of the estate of Daniel Clark at the time of his death, that it was legally sold by those who had no right or authority to make a sale of it, that the titles given by them to the purchaser and by the purchaser to the defendant, Mr. Patterson, including those given by the buyer *from [*603 the first purchaser to Mr. Patterson, are null and void, and that the same is liable, as a part of the estate of Daniel Clark, to the légitime of the forced heir, and that the defendant, Charles Patterson, shall surrender the same as shall be directed among other things to be done in the premises, as will appear in the decree and mandate of this court to the Circuit Court in Louisiana. Order. This appeal having been heard by this court, upon the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and upon the arguments of counsel, as well for the appellees, this court, upon consideration of the premises, doth now here adjudge, order and decree, that the decree of the said Circuit Court be, and the same is hereby reversed, with costs; and that such other decree in the premises be passed as is It is also said that the decree of the Circuit Court is not final, in the sense contemplated by the law, to give to this court appellate jurisdic-hereinafter ordered and decreed. tion. Indeed, we do not see how a decree And this court, thereupon proceeding to pass could be more so. Nothing is left open be- such decree in this cause as the said Circuit tween the parties; it embraces the pleadings as Court ought to have passed, doth now here adwell as the proofs in the cause, and directs the judge, order and decree, that it be adjudged property held by the defendant, as it is set and declared, and is hereby adjudged and deforth in the pleadings, to be conveyed and sur-clared, upon the evidence in this cause, that a rendered to Mrs Games. And it is only because the decree is subject to the objection, that the légitime of Mrs. Gaines in her father's estate is to be calculated out of the whole of it, so as to ascertain and preserve distinct from the controversy the disposable quantum to which the donee is entitled under the will of 1811, that we shall direct it to be reversed. Mrs. Gaines, as the forced heir of her father, is entitled to such a portion of his estate as he could not deprive her of, either by donations inter vivos or mortis causa. The will of 1811 is not null on account of its being a donation exceeding the quantum which the father could lawful marriage was contracted and solemnized at Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, between the same Daniel Clark, in the bill and proceedings mentioned, and the same Zuline or Zuliene Carriere, in the bill and proceedings mentioned; and that Myra Clark, now Myra Clark Gaines, and one of the complainants in this cause, is the lawful and only issue of the said marriage, and was at the death of her said father, Daniel Clark, his only legitimate child and heir at law, and as such was exclusively invested with the character of his forced heir, and entitled to all the rights of such forced heir. |