whom concurred in that opinion, and the ing point arose in this case, upon which the fourth did not dissent, but declined to partici-justices were opposed in opinion: pate in it, because he had not heard the argument.

In the case of Brooks et al., plaintiffs in error, v. Warren Hill, defendant in error, decided in March, 1848, and not yet reported, the Supreme Court unanimously re-affirmed the decision in the case of Green v. Graves, and decided further, that the associations under the laws in question had in no sense or form a valid and legal existence. The adjudications of the highest tribunal in the State are thus consistent and settled.

I do no propose to re-argue the questions involved in these decisions. The opinion of the Supreme Court discloses fully the grounds of the judgment.

"Whether the banking associations organized under the Act of the Legislature of the State of Michigan, entitled 'An Act to organize and regulate banking association,' approved March 15th, 1837, and the amended Act, entitled 'An Act to amend an act, entitled "An Act to regulate banking associations and for other purposes,' approved December 30th, 1837, were or were not corporations or bodies corporate, within the meaning of the constitution of the State of Michigan.'

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This question, it appears, depends on the construction of the constitution of Michigan, which declares that the Legislature shall pass no act of incorporation unless with the assent of at least two thirds of each house.

The Legislature chosen under this constitution, with the assent of two thirds of each house, passed an act authorizing any persons resident in any county in the State to form as

and conditions prescribed in the law; and declaring the stockholders in such associations to be a body politic and corporate, by such name as they should designate and assume, and conferring upon them the usual powers of banking corporations.

These decisions affect the construction of the organic law of the State in a most important particular, and they involve interests of vast extent. It is difficult to imagine a case in which a disagreement between the federal tri-sociations for banking business, upon the terms bunals and the State judicatories would be more alarming or mischievous. The bills of these associations are principally payable to bearer, and transferable by delivery. Any holder in another State would therefore have a right to sue in the Circuit Court. They are not affected by the statutes of limitations. Michigan Rev. Stat. of 1838, p. 576, sec. 4. It is plain that the consequences would be most disastrous of a decision by this court, by virtue of which a non-resident could, at any time, enforce the collection of the issues of these banks from parties who are prevented by the State decisions from collecting the assets of the bank, or availing themselves of its collateral securities, or compelling a contribution from others.

The obligation of this court to respect and follow the decisions of the State courts on the construction of their local laws will not be disputed: Brown v. VanBraam, 3 Dall. 344, note to same case in 1 Pet. Cond. 159; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 18, Groves et al. v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 497; Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 139. 817*] *The last case contains the only limitations of the general rule. These limitations do not touch this suit. In it there has been no decision by this court.

There was a decision by the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Michigan, in the case of Falconer and Higgins v. Campbell et al. reported in 2 McLean, 195. It was a suit against the defendants as directors, and it was followed by a bill in equity in the same court against the stockholders, to enforce the collection of the judgment. This case is still undisposed of the result, by stipulation, awaiting the decision of the suit now before this court. Surely a single decision in a single circuit, and that virtually appealed from and pending in this court, will not lead to a disregard of the settled and deliberate adjudications of the highest tribunal of a State upon a most important part of its own constitution.

Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court:

In this case, the Circuit Court for the District of Michigan have certified that the follow

Under this act of the Legislature, an association of persons was organized, under the name of The Detroit City Bank.

Another act was afterwards passed by the Legislature, under a power reserved in the first, to amend its provisions. And this act, under certain circumstances, made the stockholders liable for the debts of the association.

*The complainants in this case, hav- [*818 ing become creditors of the association, filed their bill in equity, to charge the defendants as stockholders, under the provisions of the last mentioned act. And in the progress of this suit, the question arose which has been certified as above mentioned.

If we regarded the question as an open one, a more particular statement of the provisions of these acts of the Legislature would be necessary, and also of the transactions which led to this suit. And the point certified would require a very careful and deliberate examination by this court.

But it appears that the same question has arisen in the State courts of Michigan, and been decided in its Supreme Court, upon full argument and consideration. We refer to the case of Green v. Graves, decided in 1844, and reported in 1 Doug. Michigan Reports, 351. In that case the court held, that the banking associations organized under the acts of the Legislature mentioned in the certificate of division were corporations within the meaning of the constitution of Michigan; and that these acts were unconstitutional and void.

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lar act of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealHe must state in his bill, distinctly, the particument; must specify how, when, and in what manner it was perpetrated.

above mentioned, therefore, the question certi- | is holden to stringent rules of pleading and evified cannot be considered as open for argument in this court. The cases of Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Peters, 449, and the two cases of Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134, in relation to the construction of the constitution of Mississippi, stand on very different grounds, as will be seen by a reference to the cases.

Upon this view of the subject, it will be certified to the Circuit Court, as the opinion of this court, that the banking_associations organized under the acts of the Legislature mentioned in the certificate of division were corporations within the meaning of the constitution of Michigan; and that these acts of the Legislature are unconstitutional and void.


tain; capable of proof and clearly proved.
The charges must be definite and reasonably cer-

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If a mistake is alleged, it must be stated with precision and made apparent, so that the court may rectify it, with a feeling of certainty that they are not committing another and perhaps greater mistake.

And especially must there be distinct averments as to the time when the fraud, mistake, concealment, or misrepresentation was discovered, and what the discovery is, so that the court may clearly see whether, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, the discovery might not have been before made.

THI of the

HIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States, sitting as a court of equity, for the District of Maine.

The bill, filed by Stearns as administrator de bonis non of John O. Page, proposed to open and review the accounts of the estate of said Page, which were filed from 1811 to 1816 by his widow and original administratrix, Saralı Page.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Michigan, and on the point and question on which the judges of the said Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and which was certified to this 819] court for its opinion, agreeably to *the The record was very voluminous. There act of Congress in such case made and provided, was a bill, and an amended bill, and amendand was argued by counsel; on consideration ments to the amended bill, and an amendment whereof, it is the opinion of this court, that to one of the amendments to the amended bill. the banking associations organized under the Then there were answers to all these bills, and act of the Legislature of the State of Michigan, exceptions to the answers, and motions for the entitled "An Act to organize and regulate bank-production of books and papers; and a great ing associations," approved March 15th, 1837, and the amended Act entitled "An Act to regulate banking associations, and for other purposes," approved December 30th, 1837, were corporations or bodies corporate within the meaning of the constitution of the State of Michigan, and that these acts of the Legislature are unconstitutional and void; whereupon it is now here ordered and decreed by this court, that it be so certified to the said Circuit Court.

GEORGE B. STEARNS, Administrator de bonis non of John O. Page, Appellant,



Statute of limitations-sufficiency of averments to induce court to open old account.

The general rules stated which govern a court of

equity in opening accounts and sustaining claims Great caution is exercised, and the complainant NOTE. Statute of limitations in equity, in cases of fraud.

which are barred by the statute of limitations.

In cases of fraud, the statute begins to run from the time of the discovery of the fraud. Buchanan v. Brown. Cooke, 185; Pugh v. Bell. 1 J. J. Marsh. 401 Crane v. Prather, 4 J. J. Marsh. 77; Croft v. Arthur, 3 Desaus, 223; Wanburzee v. Kennedy, 4 Desaus, 474; Van Ryn v. Vincent's Ex'rs, 1 McCord's Ch. 314; Hadix v. Davidson, 3 Monroe, 40; Shield v. Anderson, 3 Leigh, 729; Eigleberger v. Kibler, 1 Hill, 121; Haywood v. Marsh, 6 Yerg. 60. In legal actions, the act of limitation commences running when the cause of action accrues, not when the plaintiff, who was ignorant before, comes to the knowledge of his rights. The cases in which the Chancellor will not permit the statute to commence running, until the party discovers his rights, are where the rights themselves are purely equit


mass of testimony filed. After all, the record was deemed incomplete, and a certiorari issued to bring up more.

*It is unnecessary to give an extend- [*820 ed account of all these things, because the opinion of the court is so intermingled with, and founded upon, the facts of the case, that it is sufficient for the Reporter to refer the reader to that opinion.

The defendant below pleaded the statute of limitations, although he answered the bill.

In October, 1843, the Circuit Court dismissed the bill, when the complainant appealed to this court.

| lant, and Mr. Allen for the appellee. Only It was argued by Mr. Evans for the appelsuch parts of their arguments will be given as bear upon the question of limitations.

Mr. Evans's third point was, that the plaintiff is not barred by the statute of limitations, nor by lapse of time.

The questions how far courts of equity are bound by statutes of limitations, and whether ex proprio vigore, or only by rules of their own by analogy to the statute, and how far and under what circumstances lapse of time is a able. If legal rights are pursued in a court of equity, the legal operation of the statute must prevail. Thomas v. Floyd, 3 Lit. 177; Foot v. Farrington, 41 N. Y. 164.

In action on the case, to recover damages for a fraud in the sale of a land warrant, defendant pleaded the statute of limitation, to which plea plaintiff replied that the fraud was not discovered until within three years next to the bringing the suit. Replication was overruled and the plea sustained. Hamilton v. Shepard's Adm'r, 3 Murphy,


It is a mistake to say that the statute of limitations does not run where there is a fraud or trust. Where there is a pure trust in which equity exercises exclusive jurisdiction, or where there is a fraud in which equity exercises a like jurisdiction, it is not within the letter or spirit of the statute.

bar, have been frequently discussed before this and other tribunals.

In many cases relief has been refused; in many cases it has been granted. Many general expressions have been used, and frequent attempts been made to define with precision the principles which govern courts in these cases. But, after all, it comes to exactly this: that there is and can be, in the nature of things, no certain and definite rule on the subject. Each case must depend upon the exercise of a sound discretion, growing out of the circumstances of the case. 3 Johns. Ch. Cas. 586.

What would be said to a bill charging fraud, admitted by the answer, but repelling it by urging, You are too late. True, I defrauded you; whether you knew it or not, I neither know nor care. I have had the fruits of it thirty years, and I set you at defiance. What would the court say? If they would grant the relief, as I think they would, then it follows that mere lapse of time, in such a state of things, is no bar.

The cases maintain this view. Any quantity of them may be found.

Lord Erskine, in Cotterell v. Purchase (For

Hercy v. Dinwoody, 2 Ves. Jun. 90-93, re-rester, 66), says: "No length of time can previews the cases prior to that time, and repeat- vent the unkennelling of a fraud." edly speaks of the circumstances as influencing the decision one way or the other.

What, then, are the particular circumstances, or the nature and kind of circumstances, which have been held to bar relief?

They will be found to be cases where the fraud was known to the party affected by it, and who has neglected, for a long time, to assert his rights.

Or where the circumstances afford a presumption almost irresistible, that the matter was adjusted and settled by the parties in the time of it.

Or where it appears satisfactorily, that evidence has been lost, papers burned, documents scattered, which could throw light upon it, thus leaving it altogether in doubt whether any fraud were really committed.

Or where it is inequitable to grant relief; where there is a want of good faith and con821*] science in the party seeking it; *as where the sureties of an executor were called in, after a long period, to make good the fraud of his testator, etc.; or where the property in question has passed into bona fide hands, large expenditures made, etc.

Where this is done with a knowledge of the party seeking relief, it is a want of good faith to seek it. Where without his knowledge, then it has arisen from want of reasonable diligence —and the court will not permit an innocent man to suffer to help a negligent one.

Or where, on some ground of public policy, it is deemed right not to disturb family settlements and possessions.

But in cases of actual fraud, against the party himself, I know of no case where relief has been withheld, unless the circumstances of the case show clearly and satisfactorily that it was known and acquiesced in, or furnish sufficient presumption that it was settled.

Where is the case that mere lapse of time, without such circumstances, bars relief?

But if it were on a subject matter cognizable at law, and within the cases provided for in the statate, the statute is as positive a bar in a court of equity as in a court of law. Ib.; Rundle v. Alison, 34 N. Y. 180.

If a right be acquired by fraud, and the cause of action be concealed by fraud from the plaintiff, the statute of limitations will only run from the time the fraud is discovered. Taft v. Wright, 42 How. Pr. 1; Prindle v. Beveridge, 7 Lans. 225; Smart v. Waterhouse, 10 Yerg. 94.

Time does not begin to run to bar a bill to be relieved against fraud, until the fraud is discovered; and held, that where a bill was filed to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, and it does not appear when the fraud was discovered, there was no bar. Baker v. Dobyns, 4 Dana, 226 Raymond v. Simmonson, 4 Blackf. 77; Sears v. Shafer, 6 N. Y. 268.

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Lord Northington, in Alden v. Gregory, 2 Eden, 285, says: "The next question is, in effect, whether delay_will purge a fraud. Never, while I sit here. Every delay adds to its injustice, and multiplies its oppression."

So in 2 Ves. Jun. 281, 282. No length of time merely, a bar. See case. And that was a case where no fraud imputed.

So in our own courts, Prevost v. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481: "It is certainly true, that length of time is no bar to a trust clearly established; and in a case where fraud is imputed and proved, length of time ought not, on principles of eternal justice, to be admitted to repel relief. On the other hand, it would seem that the length of time during which the fraud has been successfully concealed and practiced is rather an aggravation of the offense, and calls more loudly upon a court of equity to give ample and decisive relief.”

In Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 560, 561, no length of time, as against a party to the fraud.

*In Warner v. Daniels, I Wood. & [*8 22 M. on p. 111, Justice Woodbury recognizes the general principle, that, where fraud exists, length of time is no bar, and cites several cases, quod vide.

So it will not be a bar if it would work injustice. Other cases cited by Woodbury, 112. The true reason for the rule is stated in Fonblanque on Eq. 260 (marginal, p. 331) in notis: "But though courts of equity will interpose to prevent these mischiefs, which would probably result from persons being allowed to bring forward stale demands at any distance of time to disturb the possessions of others, yet, as its interference in such cases proceeds upon the principles of conscience, it will not encourage, nor in any manner protect, the abuse of confidence, and therefore no length of time will bar a fraud."

He afterwards adds, "Unless it appears that the circumstances of the fraud were known to

If a party has perpetrated a fraud which has not been discovered until the statutable bar may apply to it at law, courts of equity will interpose, and remove the bar out of the way of the other injured party. Booth v. Lord Warrington, 4 Bro. Parl. Cas. 163; S. C. 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. 445; Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 634; South Sea Company v. Wymansdell, 3 P. Wms. 143; Le Loraine v. Browne, 3 Bro. Ch. C. 633, 646 and note; Story on Eq. Pl. sec. 751; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. sec. 1521; Brooksbank v. Smith, 2 Younge & C. 58; Oakes v. Howell, 27 How. Pr. N. Y. 145.

As to limitation of actions in equity cases, see note to Thomas v. Heirs, etc. of Harvie, 10 Wheat. 146.

As to laches, or efflux of time, as a defense in equity, see note to Pratt v. Carroll, 8 Cranch, 471.

the party, and that with such knowledge he has lain by a considerable length of time." Before length of time can operate as a bar, it must appear-be shown affirmatively-that the party had knowledge.

It is important to keep this in mind. Some of the authorities speak of "equitable circumstances" being allowed to repel the bar, from which it would seem to follow, that the burden was on plaintiff; but the true rule is, that time is not of itself merely and per se a bar, but is made so, and may be made so, by the circumstances of the case.

There are numerous other cases, to the effect that time proves no bar, unless under circumstances. 10 Ves. Sumner's edition, 423; 2 Johns. Ch. 252; Pugh's Heirs v. Bell's Heirs, 1 J. J. Marshall; Bertine v. Varian, 1 Edw. Ch. 343.

| et seq.; 6 Ves. 586; 2 Paige, 576; same, in 11 Pick. 331; 3 Paige, 273; and cases in any number cited in Cow. & Hill's Phil. Ev. Discovery of paper written by J. O. P. since bill filed, not denied by answer.

The offer to refer to arbitrators is a waiver of the bar relied upon. This not denied by answer. Baillie v. Sibbald, 15 Ves. 185; Farnham v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 212; 2 Story Eq. sec. 1521, et seq.; 1 Ib. sec. 523, et seq.

Equitable circumstances may be shown to repel the whole effect of the bar. 2 Story Eq. sec. 1524; see note on p. 737.

There are other equitable circumstances in the case, which should do away the effect of the lapse of time. The books and papers are in existence, and intelligible.

This was a reason assigned in Pickering v. Lord Stamford, 2 Ves. Jun. 585. But it apBut where a fraud appears in a stated ac- pearing that the account had been so regularly count, the whole will be opened, though of a kept, that there was no difficulty in ascertaingreat many years' standing. Vernon v. Vaw- ing the personal estate of the testator, etc., dry, 2 Atk. 119; Whalley v. Whalley, 1 Meriv. relief was decreed; and a case, too, where the 436; 3 Bro. Ch. Cas. Am. ed. 1844, 646, 527, note. | Master of the Rolls had said he should be glad This subject has been before the court re-to get rid of it. cently. Attention drawn to it in Lewis v. Beard, decided this term. They refer to McKnight v. Taylor, 1 How. 161, and Piatt v. Vattier, 9 Pet. 416, as containing their views of the general rules applicable to such cases.

It is to be noticed, that all these cases were cases where the circumstances rendered it inequitable to grant the relief-cases of unmitigated neglect, leaving no reasonable doubt of injustice being done by granting the relief sought.

There was no occasion, therefore, to examine the cases where such circumstances were want823*] ing. Adopting the principle *applicable to such a state of facts, and almost the language of an English case, they say the court will not be called into activity, unless where conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence exist on the part of the plaintiff. Certainly. Conscience and good faith, in not disturbing others' possessions, and reasonable diligence, so that no pretence of acquiescence might arise.

But whatever effect is to be given to lapse of time, or the statute of limitations, ordinarily, it is quite clear, from all the authorities, that it does not begin to operate until the discovery of the fraud. It must be full and complete discovery.

In cases of fraud, the statute begins to run from the time of such full and complete disclosure as enables the parties interested to see the nature and extent of the fraud committed. | Croft v. Administrators of Townsend, 3 Desaus. 239; Wamburzee v. Kennedy, 4 Desaus. 474; see also, the cases cited by counsel in 4 Howard, 552; Boone v. Chiles, 10 Peters, 223.

Vague rumors not sufficient. A party possessing imperfect information is guilty of no laches. See cases cited by counsel as before, 4 Howard, 552.

In the case at bar, the discovery was made within six years from filing the bill. So alleged in the bill. Not denied by answer. Is therefore

to be taken as true.

*Time has not obscured the transac- [*824 tions, or only to our detriment. We are the party whom time and death have injured.

The language in 4 Howard is, where the original transactions have become obscure, and by time.

The court must see that time has actually and in fact produced its accustomed effect, before it shall operate.

Above all, where it is evident that no such result has followed, why should effect be given to it?

This case differs from most others which are reported, in this: that the defendant is the original party, with all his faculties and knowledge fresh upon him.

Why then should plaintiff-the estate of J. O. Page-be deprived of its rights? Has he or any of the representatives been guilty of such laches as shall debar him? Upon what ground will the court not be called into activity?

The case furnishes no presumption of payment. It is not a case for presumption. The answer negatives it.

Whatever error or fraud ever existed now exists. Whatever wrong was done remains. It furnishes no evidence of acquiescence. The nature of the wrong, and the mode of doing it, so far as appellants were concerned, and proportions, three eights, forbid almost discovery. The then administrator disposed to peace, a woman. No means of redress then but at law; no means of proof; no opportunity for a discovery from defendant.

It seeks to disturb no innocent person's possessions, but is against the original wrongdoer. It is not against the representatives of the original party, and who may be supposed to be left without the means of defense, etc.. as in Mooers v. White, 6 Johns. Ch. 369. It will scarcely be urged by defendant, that, whatever errors or mistakes were committed, they did not originate in his representations. They could arise from no other source. Nobody else No

The defendant is bound to negative particu- had the means of furnishing the data. larly all circumstances alleged in the bill cal-body else had inducements to falsify. The anculated to avoid the statute. 8 Cow. 360: 3 swer admits that he gave all the information Johns. Ch. 384, 391; Story on Eq. Pl. sec. 754, in his power.

It will be said the answer denies all fraud. This is not sufficient; it does not deny, but admits, the gross errors which are the result of that fraud.

A denial of fraud is not sufficient nor conclusive, if the facts and circumstances are such as to lead to a different conclusion. Howard v. Camp, Walker's Ch. Rep. 427.

Fraud may be presumed in equity, though it must be proved at law. Lord Chesterfield v. Jannsen, 1 Atk. 352; Denton v. McKenzie, 1 Desaus. 300; Warner v. Daniels, cases cited by court, 1 Wood. & M. 103; Watkins v. Stockett, 6 Harr. & Johns. 435; Boyden v. Walker, 2 Ib. 292.

825*] *But if there remains any doubt as to the fraudulent representations of defendant, we are entitled to relief on the ground of mistake. The court will open a settlement made by mistake, though receipts have passed and a note has been given. 4 Desaus. 122.

"But if there has been any mistake, or omission, or accident, or undue advantage, or fraud, by which the account stated is in truth vitiated, and the balance is incorrectly fixed, a court of equity will not suffer it to be conclusive upon the parties, but will allow it to be opened and re-examined." 1 Story's Eq. sec. 523.

In some cases the whole account will be opened, in others a more moderate remedy given. Ib. seq.

And though an account be settled by arbitrators, it is not conclusive if an error can be shown in the account. Patterson v. Pearl, 3 Atk. 530; 1 Madd. Ch. 101.

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*Mr. Allen said, that, where a bill [*826 calls for a general account on the ground of fraud, it is not sufficient to make a charge of fraud in general terms; it should be pointed out, and the point stated. 1 Story's Eq. Pl. 251.

This court will be governed by the decisions of the Sate courts, where the transactions arose in the construction given by them to the statute of limitations. 16 Peters, 455–457.

The statute applies to this case. 1 Mass. Laws, 280, 13th February, 1787; 1 Maine Laws, 297.


This court will not interfere after so great a lapse of time as has passed in this case. Howard, 161, 189. The decisions of the State court upon the subject are found in 3 Pickering, 212, 237–248.

Mr. Justice Grier delivered the opinion of the court:

A brief history of the conceded facts of this case, anterior to the filing of the amended bill, may save the trouble of a more tedious analysis of the bill and answer, with their numerous amendments, and tend to elucidate the merits of the case and the questions decided by the court.

John O. Page, the complainant's intestate, was a merchant in Hallowell, Maine. He built and owned shares in vessels employed in trade, and had a retail shop or store, which, for some years before his death, was managed by his brother, Rufus K. Page. In 1810, John O. Page went to England, leaving his business chiefly in care of his brother, and died there, in February, 1811, intestate, leaving a widow and three minor children. Sarah Page, the widow, took out letters of administration on the estate. She filed an inventory of the property, amounting to the sum of $64,000, and charged herself with additional receipts of cash in the administration accounts afterwards filed, showing the whole amount of the estate to be over $80,000.

There must be error enough upon the bill to show there is reason for it; and if plaintiff proves some of the errors, he entitles himself to a decree. Twogood v. Swanton, 6 Ves. 486. He may take advantage of errors in law, as well as in fact. Roberts v. Kuffin, 2 Atk. 112. Mistake is within the same rule as fraud, both as regards time and reliefs. 2 Younge & Collier, 58, cited in 2 Story's Eq. 739, note. Time does not run against the remedy for a mistake until it be discovered. 4 J. J. Mar- Rufus K. Page claimed to have been a partshall, 77; Bertine v. Varian, 1 Edw. Ch. 343; ner with his brother in the store, by a parol 1 Paige, 564. See, also, 1 Wood. & M. p. 107, agreement with him, whereby John should furcases cited by Woodbury, and remarks show-nish the capital, and Rufus conduct the busiing what is equivalent to a fraud-such as ness, dividing the profits, five eights to John availing himself of false representations of and three eights to Rufus. others, enjoying fruits, etc. The sureties of Sarah Page in her adminisThe relation of these parties was of a fidu-tration bond were Nathaniel Dummer, her ciary character, whether it were a copartnership father-in-law, and Thomas Bond, Esq., her or not—a relation which the courts regard and brother-in-law, who also aided and counseled watch with great scrutiny. Much in any aspect her in settling the estate. In February, 1812, was intrusted to defendant; his control was Chandler Robins, register of the Probate Court, great, his account large. and John Agry, a respectable merchant and ship owner, were mutually chosen by the administratrix and Rufus K. Page to settle all accounts between the estate of John O. Page and Rufus K. Page. By their settlement or award, Rufus was charged as debtor to John*For capital advanced to


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[*827 $10,769.00

1 Story's Eq. 497, note.-"A settled account between attorney and client, or between other persons standing in confidential relations to each other, will be opened more readily than any others; and even, it is said, upon general allegations of error, without any errors being pointed out, when the answer admits errors.' So if a partner, who exclusively superintends | For five eights of profits of store.. 12,934.00 the business of the concern, should, by concealment of the true state of the affairs, purchase the share of the other partner for an inadequate price, the purchase will be held void. 1 Story's Eq. sec. 220; Maddeford v. Austwick, 1 Sim. 89; Smith, in re Hay, 6 Madd. 2; E. I. Leaving a balance due by Rufus to Co. v. Donald, 9 Ves. 275.

Amounting in all to

From which was deducted John's
debt to store

the estate




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