Order. This cause came on to be heard on the tran script of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi, and was argued by counsel; onconsideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the 141*] *said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed, with costs; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said Circuit Court, with di rections to award a venire facias de novo. sissippi." As the complainant still retains the undisturbed possession of the property without even a threat of molestation, this allegation would seem to have been inserted in the bill not as containing in itself different grounds for BENNET R. TRULY, Complainant and Ap- an injunction, but rather to give some plausi pellant, V. MOSES WANZER, Jabez Harrison, and John Judgment for consideration of sale-collection The preceding case of Rowan & Harris v. Run nels reviewed and confirmed. The general principle with regard to injunctions after a judgment at law is this: that any fact which proves it to be against conscience to execute such judgment, and of which the party could not have availed himself in a court of law, or of which he might have availed himself at law, but was prevented by fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or his agents, will authorize a court of equity to interfere by injunction to restrain the adverse party from availing himself of such judgment. Hence, where a party has remained for ten years in the undisturbed enjoyment of the property which he purchased, it was no ground for an injunction to stay proceedings for the recovery of the purchase money, to say that the original purchase was void by the laws of the State, but that he had neglected to urge that defense at law, or to say that he had heard that some persons unknown might possibly at some future time assert a title to the property. Such an injunction, if granted, must be dissolved. HIS TH was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi. The facts in the case are sufficiently set forth in the opinion of the court. The case was argued by Mr. Crittenden for the appellant, and Mr. Coxe for the appellees. Mr. Justice Grier delivered the opinion of the court: It is not easy to apprehend or appreciate the grounds upon which the complainant in this case has invoked the aid of a court of chan cery. bility to the charge of fraud and thus veil the naked deformity of his case. formity That a note, given for the purchase of negroes brought into the State of Mississippi after 1833 (when the constitution was adopted), and before 1837 (when the Legislature imposed penalties to enforce the constitutional prohibition), was not void, has been decided by this court in the case of Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Peters, 449, and again at the present term in the case of Rowan & Harris v. Runnels. But even if the alleged illegality of the contract would have constituted an available defense to the payment of note, it would be a strange abuse of the functions of a court of equity to grant an injunction against the recovery of a judgment at law, because a purchaser with a full knowledge of his defense had omitted or was ashamed to urge it. It may be stated as a general principle, with regard to injunctions after a judgment at law, that any fact which proves it to be against conscience to execute such judgment, and of which the party could not have availed himself in a court of law, or of which he might have availed himself at law, but was prevented by fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or his agents, will authorize a court of equity to interfere by in junction to restrain the adverse party from availing himself of such judgment. See 2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 887. It is too plain for argument that none of these conditions can be predicated of the present case. The complainant has had the undisturbed enjoyment of his purchase, without challenge of its title, for ten years; and it is with a bad grace that he now invokes the aid of a court of equity to shield him from the payment of the consideration, on the allegation that he had neglected to urge an unconscionable defense, or that he had heard that some persons un He purchased some negroes from one Her-known might possibly at some future time as bert, in 1836, to whom he gave two notes in payment. On one of these, suit was brought and a judgment obtained, which has been paid and satisfied. The other remains unpaid, but the complainant has been summoned as garnishee of Herbert in a suit by Wanzer and Harrison, in which a judgment has also been obtained, and an execution issued; and he now asks the interposition of a court of equity, not only to protect him from the judgment and ex ecution, but also to restore to him that portion of the consideration which has been recovered by due course of law. a sert "There is no power, the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be extended, unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate and commensurate remedy in lamages. The right must be clear, [*143 By the laws of Louisiana, where there has been a judicial sale of the succession by a probate judge, a creditor of the estate, who obtains a judgment, cannot levy an execution upon the property so transferred, upon the ground that the sale was fraudulent and void. He should first bring an action to set the sale aside. The purchaser under the judicial sale having filed a bill and obtained an injunction upon the creditor to stay the execution, it was an irregular mode of raising the question of fraud for the creditor to file an answer setting it forth, and al leging the sale to be void upon that ground. He should have filed a cross bill. Exceptions to answer upon this account were properly sustained by the court below. But if the court below should perpetuate the injunction, upon the defendants' refusal to answer further, the injunction should be free from doubt, in leaving the creditor to pursue other property under his judgment, and also at liberty clearly reserve these rights to the creditor it goes too far, and the judgment of the court below a cross bill. must be reversed. HIS TH injunction does was an appeal from the Circuit Court | of the United States for the Eastern District of I misiana, sitting as a court of equity. As the merits of the case were not involved in the decision of the court, it will only be necessary to give such a narrative of the facts as will illustrate the points of law upon which the decision turned. On the 24th of November, 1837, James S. Douglas, of the State of Louisiana, made his last will and testament as follows: I, James S. Douglas, of the parish of Concordia, and State of Louisiana, being feeble in body, and knowing the uncertainty of this life, but of sound and disposing mind and memory, do make and publish this my last will and testament. First. I direct that all my just debts be paid as soon after my *decease as my execu-[*144 tors shall realize the same from the real and personal estate intrusted to their care and management. Second. Reposing the utmost confidence in my beloved wife, Emeline Douglas, I hereby constitute and appoint her executrix, and my brother, Stephen Douglas, and my friend, Passmore Hoopes, executors of all my estate, real and personal, lying and being in the State of Mississippi. Third. I also appoint my brother, Stephen Douglas, and my friend, Passmore Hoopes, executors of all my estate, real and personal, lying and being in the said State of Louisiana. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, this twenty-fourth day of November, one thousand eight hundred and thirty[Seal.] seven. (Signed) James S. Douglas. This will, being duly attested, was admitted to probate in Mississippi on the 25th of December, 1837, and letters testamentary granted. It is not necessary to follow the proceedings in Mississippi further. In 1838, May 26th, in the State of Louisiana, before Richard Charles Downes, parish judge in and for the parish of Madison, ex officio judge of probates, came Stephen Douglas, presented his petition, setting forth the death of his brother, James S. Douglas, as happening in November, 1837; that he made his last will and testament, wherein he appointed the said Stephen Douglas and Passmore Hoopes testamentary executors of his estate in Louisiana; that probate of the will had been made in Claiborne County, Mississippi; therefore, praying letters in pursuance of the testament, and an inventory; whereupon, the judge ordered that, upon probate of the testament, an inventory be taken. On the 30th of March, 1839, the will was prov ved in Louisiana, as it had before been in Mississippi. Amongst other claims against the estate, Stephen Douglas, the executor, filed an account, claiming a debt due to him of $53,150.42. On the 31st of October, 1839, Emeline Douglas, the widow, was appointed guardian of her four children, and Archibald Douglas, a younger brother of Stephen, was appointed under-tutor or guardian. A family meeting was called, and attended the parish judge, which advised the sale of the plantation and slaves, implements, cattle, etc., at the head of Lake St. Joseph's, to satisfy the balance due to Stephen Douglas, the executor. The sale was accordingly ordered by the parish judge, and took place on the 23d of March, 1840, when Mrs. Emeline Douglas and Archibald Douglas became the purchasers. On the 1st of April, 1840, Emeline Douglas obtained a judgment in her favor against the estate for $76.634.74, and, on the 22d of April, the parish judge ordered another sale to take place for the purpose of paying this debt. *On the Sth of June, 1840, the parish [*145 judge made sale of a plantation called Buck Ridge, slaves, cattle, corn, etc., all of which belonged, jointly, to James S. Douglas, the deceased and Stephen Douglas, the executor. This ! property was purchased by Emeline Douglas | answer cannot, by law, be inquired into in the and Archibald Douglas for $83,000. In December, 1840, and January, 1842, Ford, a citizen of Virginia, obtained the three following judgments against the executor, in the Circuit Court of the United States, viz.: the one judgment obtained on the 23d of December. 1840, for $9,180, with interest, at the rate of eighty per cent. per year, from the 15th of January, 1838, on one half thereof, and from 15th of January, 1839, on the other half thereof, be sides costs. On the 21st of December, 1842, Archibald Douglas, Maxwell W. Bland, and Emeline, his wife (late Emeline Douglas), filed their bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, against Christopher Ford and the marshal, praying for an injunction to stay further proceedings under the judgments, and that they might be quieted in their possession of the property which they had purchased. On the 30th of December, 1842, an injunc tion was issued accordingly. On the 21st of April, 1843, Ford filed his answer, in which he alleged that the proceedings under the will, as well in Mississippi as in Louisiana, were the result of fraud, collusion, and combination, in consequence of which they were null and void, and passed no title to the complainants. The answer then proceeded to set forth, with great particularity, the acts of which he complained, and concluded as follows: "This respondent, having answered the allegations in said petition set forth, prays this honorable court that the said petition may be decreed to be dismissed, and the injunction had and obtained in this case may be dissolved, and a judgment rendered against the said petitioners and the sureties on their injunction bond for damages, according to law. That this honorable court make such other judgment, orders and decrees, as may be found legal and proper, to declare void and null the sales relied on in said petition; to finally dissolve the said injunction with legal damages in favor of this respondent; to dismiss said petition and relieve this respondent from the opposition of said petitioners; to order the marshal to proceed to 146*] *the sale of said property under the said three writs of fieri facias, for the satisfaction of said judgments of this respondent; and that this respondent have judgment for his costs. "And this respondent will ever pray, etc. (Signed) Christopher Ford." On the 22d of April, 1843, the following exception to the answer was filed: present suit or proceedings instituted by the said plaintiffs. And the said plaintiffs not admitting any of the facts or matters set forth and alleged in the said answer of the said defendants, but, on the contrary, denying and protesting against the truth of all and every part thereof, and alleging that the truth thereof cannot be inquired into in this action, pray that they may have the benefit of their injunction, and that the same may be made perpetual, etc. (Signed) John R. Grymes, for plaintiffs. And on the same day and year aforesaid, to wit, on the 22d day of April, 1843, the following agreement was filed: Douglas et al. V. C. Ford et al. } Circuit Court of the United States, Eastern District of Louisiana. It is agreed that this case may be set down for argument on the matters of law arising on the petition and answer, as on an exception to the answer; and that if the judgment of the court, on the matters of law, should be for the defendant, the plaintiffs may join issue on the facts, and the testimony taken in the usual manner. The plaintiffs to be at liberty, at any time before hearing, to file special exceptions in writing. (Signed) John R. Grymes, for Plaintiffs. On the 22d of April, 1843, the cause came on for trial upon the plaintiffs' exceptions to the answer of the defendant, and on the 24th the following order of court was entered of record: Monday, April 24th, 1843. The court met pursuant to adjournment. Present, the Honorable John McKinley, Presiding Judge; the Honorable Theodore H. McCaleb, District Judge. Christopher Douglass et al. Christopher Ford et al. V. } The consideration of exception filed in this case to the answer of the defendant was this day resumed before the court, the complainants not appearing either in person or by his solicitor, and F. Houston, Esq., for the defendant. Whereupon, the arguments of counsel being closed, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court, that the exception of the [*147 complainants to defendants' answer be sustained, and that the defendant answer over. Archibald Douglas et al. V. Chirstopher Ford et al. } The defendant, Christopher Ford, by his counsel, declines to answer further in this case the bill of the plaintiffs, relying and insisting on the sufficiency of the ample and conclusive answer filed by him in this cause, and the utterly null and void character of the title set up by said plaintiffs, apparent on their said bill, and the record of the mortuary proceedings of the succession of the said James S. Douglas, deceased. The defendant having declined to answer further in this case, and to submit it to the court to render such final decree in the case as may appear to them to be proper, it is there The said plaintiffs except to the answer filed by the said defendants in this behalf, because fore ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the the matters and things set forth in the said | injunction heretofore awarded in this case be, and the same is made perpetual; and it is | James S. Douglas, at the time of his death, further ordered, adjudged and decreed, that and liable to the satisfaction of the executions the plaintiffs recover the costs of suit, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to any action he may think proper. From this decree Ford appealed to this court. The cause was argued by Mr. Bibb for the appellant, and Mr. Meredith for the appellees. Mr. Bibb examined the facts very minutely as they were presented in the record, with a view of sustaining the charge of fraud, and then proceeded: The appellant assigns the errors following, as appellant on the record: 1. The judge erred in sustaining the exception to the answer, and also in giving relief upon the bill; thereby, in effect, decreeing that the plaintiffs could, as complainants in equity, ask the court to aid them in consummating their unfair practice of frauds, appearing on the face of their bill and exhibit referred to as part of their bill. 2. The judge erred in adjudging that the matters of fraud and collusion, alleged in the answer of the defendant, now the appellant, were not defenses competent, fit and proper, legal and equitable, to be inquired into in the suit prosecuted by the plaintiffs, now appellees. 3. The court erred in sustaining the bill, and in giving any relief to the complainants upon the bill. 4. The court erred in the nature and extent of the relief given to the said, complainants. 5. Upon the face of the bill and exhibit referred to, as the evidence of the title claimed by the plaintiffs, it appears that the plaintiffs had no title, had not capacity to become purchasers, that they had paid no consideration, and that the proceedings in the Parish Court were had, done, and procured by fraud and collusion, and combination between the said 148*] Emeline and Archibald Douglas, *Stephen Douglas, the executor of the will and testament of James S. Douglas, and others, with intent and for the purpose of delaying, hindering, and defrauding the creditors of said testator, James S. Douglas, and Christopher Ford in particular; and therefore the bill should have been dismissed. 6. Upon the bill and transcript of the proceedings in the Parish Court of Madison, Louisiana, exhibited by the plaintiffs in the court below, as the evidence of their title, it appears that the title pretended by the said plaintiffs is invalid, prohibited by the policy of the law, denounced and interdicted by the principles of equity; and therefore the bill should have been dismissed. 7. The bill does not contain any equity; made no case proper for the aid of a court of equity. Having set forth the facts which are relied on in the answer, most of which are proved by recorded proceedings in the two courts respectively-the Court of Probate, in Mississippi, and the Parish Court of Louisiana-it remains to inquire whether these matters of fact were admissible defenses for the defendant against the bill and relief prayed. The property levied upon by the marshal was confessedly of the estate of the testator, against Stephen Douglas, executors of James S. Douglas, unless the complainants, Emeline Douglas, one of the testamentary executors, now Emeline Bland, and Archibald Douglas, they being the tutrix or guardian and underguardian of the infants, have, by color of the sales and purchases had and contrived by fraud and collusion, and without ever making payment, under their collusive fraudulent doings, changed the title, and are above the powers of a court of equity in relation to the frauds. At the threshold these questions are presented: Does a report that a person was the best bidder for lands and slaves at public auction, advertised for sale for cash, change the title and vest it in the bidder, without any report of payment of the price, without any receipt for the purchase or evidence of payment, without payment made, and without ability in the bidder to make payment of the price? Does the report of a sale of lands and slaves, as having been made by a parish judge in the State of Louisiana, to a bidder at the price of $83,000, shield and defend the bidder from all inquiries as to his fraud, collusion, art, and part in procuring a fraudulent judgment and order of sale; and also as to the facts of nonpayment of the purchase money, his inability to pay, and that the bidder had never been let into possession? The complainants, Archibald and Emeline, to maintain their bill, and their exception to the answer of the defendant, Chrisopher Ford, are under the necessity to assert the affirmative of these propositions. *The record of the proceedings in [*149 the Parish Court of Louisiana, offered by complainants in equity as evidence of their title to the property levied upon by the marshal to satisfy the executions, contains no report of the payment of the prices which they bid; the complainants offer no proof of payment; their bill does not allege payment; the sum was above their circumstances and ability to pay in cash; the record abounds with evidence of fraud and collusion; the answer charges, that the design, end, and aim of the whole proceeding to judgment and sale was by a sham sale and colorable purchase, to protect the property from the creditors of the testator, whilst Stephen Douglas yet is the possessor of the estate as before the pretended sale. The transcript of the proceedings in the Probate Court of Claiborne County, Mississippi, corroborates and multiplies the acts of fraud and collusion; and the averments in the answer of Christopher Ford, if true, leave no room to doubt the fraud. Shall these pass without inquiry, without ex amination, without trial, upon a bill brought by two of the confederates in the fraud and collusion, asking a court of equity to call its moral powers into activity to protect them and their confederate in the fruits of the fraud? By the exception to the answer, and the decision of the judge below, the frauds are said not to be proper subjects of inquiry "in the present suit or proceedings instituted by the said plaintiffs." The exception, as taken and sustained, implies that the matters and things set forth in the answer may be inquired into in some other suit, in some other proceeding. Does the attitude of Mrs. Douglas and Archibald Douglas, as complainants in equity, ensconce them from reprobation for having art and part in the fraudulent and covinous proceedings which they make the groundwork and gravamen of their accusation and prayer for relief? The maxim in equity is, a complainant must come into the court with clean hands. I propose to comprise my argument, as to the principles of law and equity which should rule the decision of this appeal, under these general heads: 1. The effect of fraud in contaminating and avoiding all proceedings and acts, as well semijudicial as judicial, had and done, contrived and procured, by fraud. 2. That the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, to carry into execution and full effect their judgments and decrees, is plenary; and that the jurisdiction of the court of the United States, to execute the judgments in favor of said Ford, the appellant, is not to be remitted and referred to the tribunals of the State of Louisiana, to give him execution and satisfaction of these judgments. 3. That, upon the face of the transcript of the proceedings in the Parish Court, as exhibited by the plaintiffs, now appellees, they were 150*] *incapable, and prohibited by the policy of the law, and the established principles of equity, to become purchasers at the sales therein mentioned, and by their own showing have not the title to the property mentioned in their bill. 1. As to the effect of fraud. Lord Chief Justice De Grey, in delivering the answer of the judges to a question put to them in the Duchess of Kingston's case, expressed the opinion of the judges thus: "Fraud is an extrinsic, collateral act, violating the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice; as Lord Coke says, avoiding all judicial acts, ecclesiastical and temporal." The Duchess of Kingston's case, 20 Harg. State Trials, 602, Cobbett's ed. 594. A decree of Exchequer, that a will was duly proved which was obtained by fraud, relieved against in chancery, by Lord Hardwicke. Barnsley v. Powel, 1 Ves. Sen. 120; and Ibid. 286, 287. Where a fine and non-claim is levied by fraud, a court of equity will relieve against the fine; per Lord Hardwicke. Cartwright v. Pultny, 2 Atk. 381. An original bill to set aside a decree obtained by gross fraud, sustained by Lord Chancellor Macclesfield. Loyd Mansell, 2 P. Williams, 74, 75. At law, defendant may plead that the judgment against his testator was by fraud and covin. If a decree was by fraud and covin, the party may be relieved against it; not by rehearing or appeal, but by original bill. By Lord Hardwicke, Chancellor; Bradish v. Gee, Ambler, 229. "Equity has so great an abhorrence of fraud, that it will set aside its own decrees, if founded thereon." 13 Viner, Fraud (Aa.), pl. 9, 10, p. 543. "Equity will never countenance demands of an unfair nature; in this case it was to have an allowance for attending at auctions to enhance the price of goods; nor will equity suffer them to be set off against fair and just demands; and a cross bill for that purpose was dismissed with costs." 13 Viner, p. 544, pl. 13. In chancery, between Richard Fermor, plaintiff, and Thomas Smith, defendant, to set aside a fine levied by said Smith, by fraud and covin, to bar the plaintiff of his inheritance. The proclamations and five years had past; Smith, the tenant for years, all the time continuing in possession, and paying rent until his term expired, and then he claimed the inheritance, and to bar the plaintiff by force of the said fine and proclamations and five years. On the hearing of the case, the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, because it was a case of great importance, and considering that fines with proclamations were general assurances of the realm, referred the case to all the justices of England and the barons of the Exchequer, all of whom met (except two) and consulted, and resolved that the plaintiff was not barred, because of the fraud and covin. And it was said *that the common law "doth so abhor [*151 fraud and covin, that all acts, as well judicial as others, and which of themselves are just and lawful, yet, being mixed with fraud and deceit, are in judgment of law wrongful and unlawful." And various examples and precedents of decisions are cited. Fermor's case, 3 Coke, 77, 78. Chancellor Kent, in the case of Reigal v. Wood, 1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 406, said: "It is a well settled principle in this court, that relief is to be obtained, not only against writings, deeds, and the most solemn assurances, dut against judgments and decrees, if obtained by fraud and imposition." In the case of Kennedy v. Daley, 1 Schoale & Lefroy, 355, Chancellor Redesdale relieved against a decree obtained by fraud and imposition, and declared it should have no effect. And that a fine levied and non-claim, by a trustee to a person having notice of the trust, shall not bar the cestui que trust. a And in the case of Giffard v. Hort, Ibid. 386, he held decree, obtained without making parties of those persons who were known to have rights in the estate, to be fraudulent and void as to those not made parties, and a purchaser under the decree, with notice of the defect, not to be protected by it. The fraudulent decree was in the Exchequer. Lord Redesdale laments numerous proceedings in the Exchequer, at a time when that court was oppressed with business, and could not take time for full investigation and right decision, whereby advantage was taken by such proceedings to defraud persons of property to which they were entitled. "It was one of the crying grievances of time. A systematic use has been made of the decrees of a court for the purpose of effecting fraud; and it has been as much a swindling contrivance to deprive a family of its estate, as any of those contrivances which swindlers practice upon unwary young men. I shall therefore think myself bound to struggle to the utmost of my power to relieve against such oppressive combinations." Giffard v. Hort, 1 Scho. & Lef. 396. Certain it is that distant creditors, legatees, |