corrupt hands, Mr. Franks has suggested that it be formed into a general fund for the education of the youth of both sexes, and the support of poor of the city. the The chief facts to be borne in mind relative to the city companies are the following: 1. That the whole of the companies, with the exception of the Goldsmiths, Stationers, and Apothecaries, have ceased to exercise any control over the trades they bear the title of, or to which they may be considered allied. 2. That nearly the entire site of the city of London belongs to these powerful and disgracefully-conducted monopolies. 3.-That most of the property has been jobbed or under-let to the private friends of the respective courts. 4. That the courts of the companies are mostly controlled by stockjobbers, parsons, and lawyers. 5. That the whole of the bequests, in lands, houses, and money, left in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, has increased from fifty fold to a hundred fold. 6. That the population of all the parishes within the jurisdiction of the city of London amounts only to 123,198. 7.---That the annual revenues of the City Companies exceed £1,000,000. Of these Companies, there is scarcely one in the immunities of which the liveries at large are allowed fairly to participate, and in which the election of the master, warden, and courts are made conformably with the constitutional laws and charters. They are mostly managed by cabals, consisting of two or three families and their favourites, who have succeeded to the possessions and privileges of their societies, with a regular, and, apparently, as indefeasible a claim as any legitimate despot succeeds to his sovereignty. To these authorities the liveries have hitherto bowed, with the patience of serfs, and submitted not only to be deprived of the more substantial enjoyments of their respective corporations, but also to be disseized of their elective franchises, in the appointment of masters, wardens, assistants, and committees. The chief reason which can be alleged for this supineness, is the ignorance in which the liverymen have been kept of the rights and powers they legally possess. With one or two exceptions, the charters of the companies have never been published, but, for reasons too obvious to mention, have remained under an impenetrable veil, either among the records in the Tower of London, or the strong boxes of the several courts of assistants, whose uncourteous demeanor, together with that of their clerks and underlings, to members seeking information, is only equalled by the patient endurance of the latter, in submitting for so long a period to their usurped authority. The advantages that would result to the liverymen and freemen by the restitution of their ancient rights, those rights of superintending their fiscal administration, and of choosing their officers and courts, (if the last be a legal part of their institution) are both numerous and important. In the first place, the governors would be made responsible to the governed, and a few individuals no longer be allowed to pervert the revenues and influence of the societies to their own private purposes of favouritism, intrigue, and aggrandizement. Secondly, and agreeably to their original institution, every member would be equally and alike a brother of the fraternity, eligible to elect and be elected to all places of trust, patronage, and emolument. Thirdly, exclusive and disqualifying by-laws, intended to deprive the general body of the liverymen of their rights, could not be enacted; neither could arbitrary and oppressive fees on apprenticeships, freedoms, and liveries, be enforced: these unjustifiable extortions have been often screwed up and levied, merely to minister to a lavish expenditure in objects wholly foreign to the interests of the fraternities. Finally, an efficient and watchful control would be established over the management of the numerous charitable trusts, and ample revenues of the companies. The last would be one of the most important advantages resulting from the re-establishment of the general rights of the fraternities. The practice of self-auditing and self-election has long precluded the members of the companies from a knowledge of their own affairs; and it is only by the recent inquiries of the Charity Commissioners, that authentic information has been obtained of the magnitude of their revenues, patronage, and possessions. From these inquiries it appears that nearly the whole of the land and houses in London has been left in trust of the City Companies, for charitable uses; that they also possess, in the same capacity of trustees, in the country, numerous manors, estates, messuages, church livings, and tithes of parishes; that the revenues arising from this property amount, in several instances, to £20,000 or £30,000 per annum, and that not one-twentieth part of this income is expended on the poor, or other objects for which it was benevolently bequeathed. It is seldom the courts increase the amount of their eleemosynary disbursements; notwithstanding the vast augmentation of value in the trust-property, they neither multiply the objects of their charities, nor increase the allowances originally fixed by the donors, in total ignorance of the future produce of their bequests. The objects on which the surplus revenues are principally expended, consist of the expenses of committees, law-agency, and surveyors' charges; in pretended repairs and improvements; in ostentatious buildings; in luxurious feasting for the parties and their friends; and in extravagant pensions and gratuities to favourite servants and dependents. For these purposes the revenues are never too much generally too little,—and they are compelled to resort to the monstrous expedient of taxing their disfranchised brethren, to supply the deficiency. CORPORATIONS OF CITIES AND TOWNS. A reform of municipal institutions is an undertaking only second in importance to that of the general government. The power of the barons against which corporations were directed, has yielded to that of the state, and the remnants of these confederacies, by the assertion of ancient immunities, tend to disturb the peace and order of the realm. They are too insulated amidst the general wealth and population to strengthen the executive power. They represent no great social interest; the real aristocracy of cities and towns keeps aloof from them, either from disgust at their petty cabals, or contempt for their paltry duties. Instead of being the enlightened governors within their respective limits, they are only oppressors; instead of being faithful trustees, they are notorious plunderers of the widow and orphan; instead of being the centres of local government, of police and judicial administration, they are the sources of disorder, tumult, and prosecution. Wherever we find a corporation, we may generally rely on finding a town ill-governed-the inhabitants divided into rancorous parties--the prisons dilapidated and without discipline the quarter and petty sessions of the peace ill-conducted-and every office of dignity or authority, from the worshipful recorder to the turnkey, filled up, not from the fitness of the individuals selected, but from personal connexion or influence. All these evils have mostly their origin in one source-the absence of popular control: with hardly an exception the members of all corporations are self-elected; hence their interests are partial, not public; hence every office is made a job of, every magisterial function, whether the granting of a license or the adjudication of an assault, is made a favour or an offence. That these prefatory criminations have some foundation, we shall endeavour to show by briefly glancing at the constitution and management of some of the principal corporations. Our notice will necessarily be very brief, and not at all proportioned to the magnitude of the subject; but perhaps we shall be able, aided by our previous representations, to give a general idea of the existing state of municipal institutions, which may lead to more perfect and comprehensive inquiries. We shall commence with the corporation of the city of London, not only because it is under our more immediate observance, but because it is the first in rank, antiquity, and importance. The corporation of London, we believe, is more popular in its constitution than any other in the empire. It is formed, as is well known, on the model of that of the state, consisting of three orders; but it is superior to the state, in the absence of those gross incongruities in its constituent bodies which impair the excellence of parliamentary representation. We may also observe respecting the city corporation, that it is more pure and perfect in its practical administration than any other municipal body of the kingdom. We are well aware what we are now stating; we make the assertion with a full knowledge of city jobbing— of the London Bridge committee--of the Gresham Lectures-of Mansion House dinners-and of the well known fact that from £4,000 to £5,000 per annum is expended by the committees of the Common Council alone; still we affirm that in no other corporation, nor in the general government, nor in the Colonies, is so much work performed at so small a cost. The duties of the corporation are very great, not only in matters relative to the magistracy, police, and local improvements of the city, but also in those which relate to the commerce, navigation, and shipping of the port of London; and in the due discharge of many of which the kingdom at large, as well as the metropolis, is deeply interested. That these functions should be all executed without expense, without remuneration direct or indirect, is what no reasonable person can expect. Notwithstanding these excellences, the metropolitan corporation is full of anomalies, or, if the reader pleases, defects. We cannot stop to enumerate all these, nor to comment upon them, but we will mention the two principal. First, as regards the local boundary or civil jurisdiction of the corporation. This comprehends only the nucleus or inner circle of this vast metropolis; all the living portion, the great mass of the opulence, respectability, and population of the capital, is placed without the curtilage of corporate authority, which includes within its legislative cognizance little more than an assemblage of shops, counting-houses, offices, wharfs and warehouses. The evils that result from this cause, whether as respects the conflicting powers of the county and city magistrate, the police, or the composition of the elective bodies of the city, are too well known to require description. The second great anomaly we shall notice, is that which respects the qualification of the city constituency. As this is now regulated by the statute of the 11th George I. neither residence nor householdership confers the right of suffrage either for a member of the corporation or of the House of Commons. Freemen and liverymen constitute the only two classes of electors, the former of the aldermen and common council; the latter of members of parliament, lord-mayor, and chief city officers. Now it certainly appears indefensible that a householder should not share equally in the local government with the freemen and liverymen. The rights of both freemen and liverymen may be obtained without any direct or permanent interest in the weal of the city. Freedoms are acquired by purchase or gift, as well as by birth or apprenticeship. The rights of the livery or badgemen depend on still less valid qualifications; they are conferred or not at the pleasure of the courts of assistants; or the franchises of the livery may be acquired by purchasing a certain dress, in some companies at an exorbitant price, and in others no money will purchase it, unless the party be known to have imbibed a certain political or religious faith.* If there be injustice in withholding elective rights from householders, the civic disfranchisement of resident freemen is still less defensible. Several of the livery companies were only made such within the last century. None of the companies form a part of the corporation; nor is it necessary the liverymen should be resident in the city; yet in them is exclusively vested the power of choosing the city officers and the members of parliament. Such an anomaly exists in no other city * Evidence in support of the Franchise of Resident Freemen, p. 26. in England. Of the twenty-four cities represented in parliament, there is not one, with the exception of London, where the freemen are disqualified by statute from choosing their representatives. The utility of the existence of many civic immunities at all is very questionable; they are often an obstacle to the general prosperity and the free exercise of industry. According to the present law of the corporation respecting resident housekeepers carrying on trade in the city of London, they are called on to pay £34: 11; they cannot continue without being also free of a company, which increases the amount of money paid to £50. The Reform Bill, by conferring the parliamentary franchise on householders, will correct some portion of the injustice we have represented. Corporation of Bristol.-This corporation ranks the second in the kingdom, and its defective constitution has been practically exemplified during the late tragical proceedings. The civil government of the city is vested in the corporation, consisting of a high steward, the mayor, recorder, aldermen, sheriffs, common council, town-clerk, chamberlain, and subordinate functionaries. The mayor and sheriffs are chosen annually on the 15th of September. The sheriffs are elected from the members of the common council, which body is limited, by the charter of Queen Anne, to forty-two. There are twelve aldermen chosen by the twelve wards into which the city is divided. They are constituted preservers of the public tranquillity, with the power of justices of the peace, and enjoy all the privileges and authority of the aldermen of London. In point of opulence, the Corporation of Bristol is supposed to rank among the most wealthy bodies corporate of the kingdom. In 1778, Mr. Barrett estimated the annual income of the Corporation at £14,000, arising from the several estates they possess, from those for which they act in trust, with the rents of the several markets, the profits arising from town duties, and other sources of income. It has subsequently increased, Mr. Evans conjectures, in his History of Bristol, to £18,000. There is little doubt it is a great deal more from the augmented value of property, and the Corporation having abandoned, without the city, the former practice of letting their estates on lives, with merely fines for renewals. A considerable portion of the city estate is derived from the charter of John, and claimed by them under the title of "lords of the waste," and including what is now Queen-square, Princes-street, King-street, and part of St. Augustine's Back, the Key, Grove, and the Back. Out of the Corporation income £1,500 is annually given to the mayor for the better support of the dignity of his office, and £500 to each of the sheriffs. Between £3,000 and £4,000 is expended in salaries and other expenses incidental to the municipal government of the city. The finances of the Corporation are managed by the chamberlain of the city, which office is one of considerable trust and importance. He gives a bond of £3,000 for the execution of his duties with care and fidelity, and is obliged, by the statute, to render an |