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evidence of the improbability of there being mines to create any disturbance to the purchaser. Such an improbability, however, should not rest upon slendor and inadequate evidence. If there is a legal reservation of mines, and mines are supposed, or even suspected to exist, it would be hard to force a title upon a purchaser, which might expose him to the complete waste of his estate. There was, in the case of Seaman v. Vaudrey, a stipulation in the deed of reservation, that the right to work the mines was exercisable without incurring any liability for damages. No compensation short of the amount of purchase money, might satisfy such a case as this. In such instances, extraordinary caution is required, and still stronger evidence of the non-existence of mines should be adduced, in order to compel the performance of a contract. It is quite enough, in all cases, where there is no probability of there being any mines, that the purchaser should be subject to the caprice or ignorance of individuals, who, in spite of appearances or the dictates of experience, may choose to embark upon a wild adventure in search of minerals which are not to be found. The fact of improbability, therefore, should be based upon such competent and substantial evidence as may justify the Court in exposing a purchaser to such a risk.

IV. On the other hand, if a vendor make false representations to a purchaser with respect to the advantages of an investment, it will amount to fraud, and the purchaser may be relieved in equity by a decree for setting aside the contract, or even the conveyance. (a)

In the great case of Small v. Attwood, (b) the vendor was charged with making or authorizing false statements, upon a treaty for the purchase of extensive iron mines and iron works, with respect to the cost of manufactured pig iron. The contract was silent upon the subject. A difference of 16s. per ton was stated to exist between the explanations of the defendant, and the actual cost. This would have produced a difference of £14,000 a year in the account of the concern. Similar mis-statements were charged with respect to the conversion of the metal into refined iron, blooms, and rods. Lord Lyndhurst, C. B., decided, that a case of mis-statement with the knowledge of the party, in other words, that a case of fraud had been proved against the defen lant, and that the contract should be rescinded. But it was ultimately decided in the House of Lords, that such a case was not sufficiently proved.

In the above case, there was a disturbance of the stratification in an important part of the coal mines, amounting either to an actual fault, or producing similar consequences. The defect was discovered some months previous to the conclusion of the negotiation. The defendant did not sanction this concealment, but he was aware of the defect, and evaded the questions put with respect to the mine being a perfect mine. But the learned Judge

(a) Edwards v. M'Leay, Coop. 308.

(b) 1 Younge, 407.

held, that the purchasers, in taking possession, must have known immediately the circumstances connected with the fault, and that it was too late, after the expiration of six months, to file a bill for setting aside the contract. (a)

It is no objection to a bill for setting aside a contract that the purchasers have been in possession, and have made great alterations in the property. It is enough that they act fairly in the management of the property, and take the natural exercise of the rights of supposed owners. (b)

V. The purchaser of an estate sold under a decree in Chancery is enti tled, as a general rule, to be let into possession from the quarter day preceding his purchase, on paying the purchase money before the succeeding quarter day. (c) But this rule has been held to be inapplicable to the case. of a colliery, in which the accounts of the concern were settled monthly, and in which there was no such thing as a quarter day; for the profits of such property may produce more in one quarter than in the preceding ten years. A colliery is a trade, and not merely a property in land. The purchaser was, therefore, declared to be entitled to the profits from the commencement of the month in which he purchased, paying his purchase-money in the course of that month. (d) A person is not considered to be an absolute purchaser until the confirmation of the master's report. (e)

In the above case of Wren v. Kirton, a colliery had been put up to sale under a decree, and £23,000 was offered by a bona fide bidder. The sale was defeated by setting up a fictitious bidder. The property was again put up three times. On the two first occasions £12,000 and £6,000 only were offer. ed. On the last occasion it was sold to a trustee for the agent and manager of the colliery for £15,000. The motion to confirm this sale was opposed.— Lord Eldon observed, it was a very difficult and important case. If it had been an original sale, and the agent had purchased in the name of another person, very slight circumstances would have induced him, even at some risk, to have set that aside-as it was the duty of the agent, if he meant to bid, to furnish all the knowledge he had to those who were to sell. A reg ular proceeding in the master's office, which produced a bidding of £23,000 by a responsible person, was met by a very improper transaction in setting up a man of straw to defeat the sale, which occasioned the loss. In general, the Court will at some risk put the property up again, if the sale has not been properly conducted. (f) The difficulty was the danger of further loss by the re-sale. He added, he would not hesitate to open the sale, if the least advance upon £15,000 was offered; but without such an offer, there was nothing leading him to suppose, it would ever again reach the sum originally bid. An order was accordingly made, but with considerable reluc

(a) Ibid, 503.

(b) Ibid. 506.

(c) Marfill v. Rudge, 2 You. and C. 566,

(d) Wren v. Kirton, 8 Ves. 502. Williams v. Attenborough, Turn. and Russ. 70, (e) Twigg v. Fifield, 13 Ves. 517. Garrick v. Earl Camden, 2 Cox, 231.

(f) See Watson v. Birch, 2 Ves, Jun. 53.

tance, to confirm the report, unless before the first seal an application should be made to open the biddings, with security to answer the difference between the produce of the re-sale, and the sum of £15,000. (a)

The practice of opening biddings in sales under decrees in Chancery has often been justly reprobated. On one occasion, Lord Eldon said, during a period of nearly half a century which he had passed in the Court, he had heard one and all of its judges lament the introduction of the practice. (b) It is now, however firmly established by numerous cases, and almost daily experience.

But the rules with respect to opening biddings do not apply to the sales of mines. In the case of a colliery, an order for opening the biddings was made by the. Vice Chancellor, but it was discharged by Lord Eldon, who observed, that land kept generally the same value; but collieries were liable not only to fluctuations in value, but to destruction; they were like land in a country liable to earthquakes. A gain, upon a re-sale of the property the purchaser might be tired of his bargain before he has completed his purchase; and although the Court might compel the final bidder to pay the money, the process was such, that in a great many cases, it was more for the interests of the vendors to abandon the bargain, than to put in force the process of the Court. Not even a bona fide bidder can, in any case be said to have any right to open the biddings.-The question was, whether regard being had to the nature of the property, the circumstances of the case, and the general interest of the suitors of the Court, not to the interests of purchasers, so much advantage was held out as to induce the Court to open the biddings. (c)

In the above case, the purchase could not be confirmed for a considerable. time, and it became necessary to take into consideration who should have the intermediate management. It was finally agreed that the purchaser should work the colliery under the superintendance of the trustees. It was observed by the Court, it would have been folly in the purchaser if he had not insisted on having in some measure the management; for if, between the day of bidding and the confirmation of the purchase, the value of the mine had fallen from accidental causes injurious to the working, from some rival coal mine, or a destructive inundation, still, if the title had been completed at the time his report was confirmed, he would have been compelled to take the property without entering into the question, whether the management had been advantageous or disadvantageous. It was added that if the management had been advantageous, to discharge a purchaser under such circumstances, upon giving him his costs merely, without making some allowance for the expences incurred in the management, would be treating

(a) 8 Ves. 502.

(c) Williams v. Attenborough, Turn. and Russ. 70.

(5) Turn. and Russ, 75.

him in a way very detrimental to the general interests of all those who have collieries to dispose of, through the intervention of this Court. (a)

VI. In a case of alum works, there was a covenant by the lessee, to leave stock of a certain amount upon the premises. There was a fair ground of suspicion, that he did not mean to perform this covenant. Lord Eldon decided, that, though there might be compensation in damages, there was a reference to that sort of enjoyment for which the landlord had stipulated after the expiration of the term, and he decreed, by way of quia timet, the performance of the covenant. This decision was afterwards confirmed in the House of Lords. (b)

A Court of Equity will also, in certain cases, appoint a receiver or manager. (c)

It has been decided, that the Irish Statute, 11 and 12 George II. c. 10, does not authorize the appointment of a receiver over mines in the possession of the respondent; and that the Court will not order, upon a mortgage petition, the letting of any property which was not producing rent at the time when the receiver was appointed. (d)

A Bill in Equity may be brought for determining questions of disputed bonndaries in mining fields. (e)

(a) Ibid.

(b) Ward v. Duke of Buckingham, cited 10 Ves, 161.

(c) Jefferys v. Smith, 1 Jac. and W. 298. Norway v. Rowe, 19 Ves, 144. Rowe v. Wood,

2 Jac. and W. 556.

(d) Frere v. The Hibernian Mining Comp. 2 Hog. 30,

(e) Sayer v. Pierce, 1 Ves. Sen. 232.

DECREES

OF THE

SUPREME GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO,

From the Year 1821 to 1848.

Extracted from the Printed Volumes, Published by Authority, to and including the Year 1838, and from the Official Publication of the Laws in the Newspapers of the City of Mexico, from 1839 to 1847, inclusive.

DECREE.

Reduction of the duties on Silver.

22d November, 1821,

THE Sovereign Provincial Governing Committee of the Mexican Empire having taken into consideration the deplorable and decaying condition of the mining business and the urgent necessity there is for extending to this important branch, whatever remedies lie within its power, that may contribute to its greater prosperity, have deemed it proper to decree and do decree :

1. That the duties of one per centum, tythe, and the seigniory tax of one real be abolished.

2. That the duty of of 8 maravedises on each marc of silver which is now collected on the refining of bullion, which may be subjected to such operation, be likewise abolished.

3. That the duty of 26 maravadises imposed upon every marc ofmixed bullion which is now recovered by reason of the loss or waste of silver in the smelting rooms be also abolished.

4. That the duty of four eighths on the coined price of silver and of a half an eighth on the coined price of gold which is now collected, under the name of bocado in the Mint, be likewise abolished.

5. All the duties which were imposed on bullion of gold or silver and on coin, during the period of the revolution are equally abolished.

6. As an only contribution, there shall be recovered a duty of 3 per cent. on the true value of silver, and the same upon gold, this tax being collected in the same manner as was formerly the tax of one per cent. and the tythe.

7. In the Mint established at the capitol there shall only be collected two reals on each marc of silver, and the same on each marc of gold, as the

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