XIV. extraordinary attention during the absence of the em- CHAP. peror, it was not in his power to employ above half his troops in the Italian expedition, unless he sacrificed the public safety to his private quarrels. At the head of about forty thousand soldiers, he marched to encounter an enemy whose numbers were at least four times superior to his own. But the armies of Rome, placed at a secure distance from danger, were enervated by indulgence and luxury. Habituated to the baths and theatres of Rome, they took the field with reluctance, and were chiefly composed of veterans who had almost forgotten, or of new levies, who had never acquired, the use of arms and the practice of war. The hardy legions of Gaul had long defended the frontiers of the empire against the barbarians of the North; and in the performance of that laborious service, their valour was exercised, and their discipline confirmed. There appeared the same difference between the leaders as between the armies. Caprice or flattery had tempted Maxentius with the hopes of conquest; but these aspiring hopes soon gave way to the habits of pleasure and the consciousness of his inexperience. The intrepid mind of Constantine had been trained from his earliest youth to war, to action, and to military command. When Hannibal marched from Gaul into Italy, he Constanwas obliged, first, to discover, and then to open, a way the Alps. tine passes over mountains and through savage nations, that had never yielded a passage to a regular army". The Alps were then guarded by nature, they are now fortified by are assured (Panegyr. Vet. ix. 25.) that the war was carried on by sea as well as by land: and that the fleet of Constantine took possession of Sardinia, Corsica, and the ports of Italy. 52 Panegyr. Vet. ix. 3. It is not surprising that the orator should diminish the numbers with which his sovereign achieved the conquest of Italy; but it appears somewhat singular that he should esteem the tyrant's army at no more than 100,000 men. 53 The three principal passages of the Alps between Gaul and Italy, are those of Mount St. Bernard, Mount Cenis, and Mount Genevre. Tradition, and a resemblance of names (Alpes Pennine) had assigned the first of these for the march of Hannibal (see Simler de Alpibus). The Chevalier de Folard (Polybe, tom. iv.) and M. d'Anville have led him over Mount Genevre. But notwithstanding the authority of an experienced officer and a learned geographer, the pretensions of Mount Cenis are supported in a specious, not to say a convincing, manner by M. Grosley. Observations sur l'Italie, tom. i. p. 40, &c. CHAP. art. Citadels constructed with no less skill than labour XIV. and expense command every avenue into the plain, and on that side render Italy almost inaccessible to the enemies of the king of Sardinia54. But in the course of the intermediate period, the generals, who have attempted the passage, have seldom experienced any dif ficulty or resistance. In the age of Constantine, the peasants of the mountains were civilized and obedient subjects; the country was plentifully stocked with provisions, and the stupendous highways which the Romans had carried over the Alps, opened several communications between Gaul and Italy's. Constantine preferred the road of the Cottian Alps, or, as it is now called, of Mount Cenis, and led bis troops with such active diligence that he descended into the plain of Piedmont, before the court of Maxentius had received any certain intelligence of his departure from the banks of the Rhine. The city of Susa, however, which is situated at the foot of Mount Cenis, was surrounded with walls, and provided with a garrison sufficiently numerous to check the progress of an invader; but the impatience of Constantine's troops disdained the tedious forms of a siege. The same day that they appeared before Susa, they applied fire to the gates, and ladders to the walls; and mounting to the assault amidst a shower of stones and arrows, they entered the place sword in hand, and cut in pieces the greatest part of the garrison. The flames were extinguished by the care of Constantine, and the remains of Susa preserved from total destruction. About forty miles from thence, a more seBattle of vere contest awaited him. A numerous army of Italians was assembled under the lieutenants of Maxentius in the plains of Turin. Its principal strength consisted in a species of heavy cavalry, which the Romans, since the decline of their discipline, had borrowed from the nations of the East. The horses, as well as the men, were clothed in complete armour, the joints of which were artfully adapted to the motions Turin, 54 La Brunette near Suse, Demont, Exiles, Fenestrelles, Coni, &c. 55 See Ammian. Macellin. xv. 10. His description of the roads over the Alps, is clear, lively, and accurate. XIV. of their bodies. The aspect of this cavalry was for- CHAP. midable, their weight almost irresistible; and as, on this occasion, their generals had drawn them up in a compact column or wedge, with a sharp point and with spreading flanks, they flattered themselves that they should easily break and trample down the army of Constantine. They might perhaps have succeeded in their design, had not their experienced adversary embraced the same method of defence, which in similar circumstances had been practised by Aurelian. The skilful evolutions of Constantine divided and baffled this massy column of cavalry. The troops of Maxentius fled in confusion towards Turin; and as the gates of the city were shut against them, very few escaped the sword of the victorious pursuers. By this important service, Turin deserved to experience the clemency and even favour of the conqueror. He made his entry into the Imperial palace of Milan, and almost all the cities of Italy between the Alps and the Po, not only acknowledged the power, but embraced with zeal the party, of Constantine56. Verona. From Milan to Rome, the Emilian and Flaminian Siege and highways offered an easy march of about four hundred battle of miles; but though Constantine was impatient to encounter the tyrant, he prudently directed his operations against another army of Italians, who, by their strength and position, might either oppose his progress, or, in case of a misfortune, might intercept his retreat. Ruricius Pompeianus, a general distinguished by his valour and ability, had under his command the city of Verona, and all the troops that were stationed in the province of Venetia. As soon as he was informed that Constantine was advancing towards him, he detached a large body of cavalry, which was defeated in an engagement near Brescia, and pursued by the Gallic legions as far as the gates of Verona. The necessity, the importance, and the difficulties of the siege of Verona, immediately presented themselves to the 56 Zosimus as well as Eusebius hasten from the passage of the Alps, to the decisive action near Rome. We must apply to the two Panegyrics, for the intermediate actions of Constantine. XIV. CHAP. sagacious mind of Constantine". The city was accessible only by a narrow peninsula towards the west, as the other three sides were surrounded by the Adige, a rapid river which covered the province of Venetia, from whence the besieged derived an inexhaustible supply of men and provisions. It was not without great difficulty, and after several fruitless attempts, that Constantine found means to pass the river at some distance above the city, and in a place where the torrent was less violent. He then encompassed Verona with strong lines, pushed his attacks with prudent vigour, and repelled a desperate sally of Pompeianus. That intrepid general, when he had used every means of defence that the strength of the place or that of the garrison could afford, secretly escaped from Verona, anxious not for his own but for the public safety. With indefatigable diligence he soon collected an army sufficient either to meet Constantine in the field, or to attack him if he obstinately remained within his lines. The emperor, attentive to the motions, and informed of the approach of so formidable an enemy, left a part of his legions to continue the operations of the siege, whilst, at the head of those troops on whose valour and fidelity he more particularly depended, he advanced in person to engage the general of Maxentius. The army of Gaul was drawn up in two lines, according to the usual practice of war; but their experienced leader, perceiving that the numbers of the Italians far exceeded his own, suddenly changed his disposition, and reducing the second, extended the front of his first line, to a just proportion with that of the enemy. Such evolutions, which only veteran troops can execute without confusion in a moment of danger, commonly prove decisive: but as this engagement began towards the close of the day, and was contested with great obstinacy during the whole night, there was less room for the conduct of the generals than for the courage of the soldiers. 57 The Marquis Maffei has examined the siege and battle of Verona, with that degree of attention and accuracy, which was due to a memorable action that happened in his native country. The fortifications of that city, constructed by Gallienus, were less extensive than the modern walls, and the amphitheatre was not included within their circumference. See Verona Illustrata, Part i. p. 142. 150. XIV. The return of light displayed the victory of Constan- CHAP. tine, and a field of carnage covered with many thousands of the vanquished Italians. Their general Pompeianus was found among the slain; Verona immediately surrendered at discretion, and the garrison was made prisoners of war58. When the officers of the victorious army congratulated their master on this important success, they ventured to add some respectful complaints, of such a nature, however, as the most jealous monarchs will listen to without displeasure. They represented to Constantine, that, not contented with performing all the duties of a commander, he had exposed his own person with an excess of valour which almost degenerated into rashness; and they conjured him for the future to pay more regard to the preservation of a life, in which the safety of Rome and of the empire was involved. and fears While Constantine signalized his conduct and va- Indolence lour in the field, the sovereign of Italy appeared insen- of MaxeRsible of the calamities and danger of a civil war which tius. raged in the heart of his dominions. Pleasure was still the only business of Maxentius. Concealing, or at least attempting to conceal, from the public knowledge the misfortunes of his arms, he indulged himself in a vain confidence, which deferred the remedies of the approaching evil, without deferring the evil itself. The rapid progress of Constantine was scarcely sufficient to awaken him from this fatal security; he flattered himself, that his well-known liberality, and the majesty of the Roman name, which had already delivered him from two invasions, would dissipate with the same facility the rebellious army of Gaul.- 62 58 They wanted chains for so great a multitude of captives; and the whole council was at a loss; but the sagacious conqueror imagined the happy expedient of converting into fetters the swords of the vanquished. Panegyr. Vet. ix. 11. 59 Panegyr. Vet. ix. 10. 60 Literas calamitatum suarum indices supprimebat. Panegyr. Vet. ix. 15. 61 Remedia malorum potius quam mala differebat, is the fine censure which Tacitus passes on the supine indolence of Vitellius. 62 The Marquis Maffei has made it extremely probable that Constantine was still at Verona, the 1st of September, A. D. 312, and that the memorable æra of the indictions was dated from his conquest of the Cisalpine Gaul. |