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the fine is “in the eye of the law, a punishment for the offense committed, and not the particular object of the suit.' United States v. More, 3 Cranch, 159, 174. Moreover, appellant could "hardly be allowed to invoke our jurisdiction on the ground that if his appeal were sustained he might be fined on a new judgment.

The term of office had expired before the rendition of judgment by the Territorial Supreme Court, and as to the effect of the judgment of ouster in a suit to recover emoluments for the past, that is collateral, even though the judgment might be conclusive in such subsequent action. New England Mortgage Security Company v. Gay, 145 V. S. 123; Washington & Georgetown Railroad Company v. District of Columbia, 146 U. S. 227.

Appeal dismissed.



No. 78. Argued November 29, 1905.-Decided January 2, 1906.


An attorney was employed to prosecute a claim against the United States; the

contract which was in writing provided that he should prosecute it before the courts, officers and departments of the Government and Congress; that he should receive as compensation a sum equal to a specified percentage of the amount allowed, the payment whereof was made a lien upon the recovery. The prosecution was successful and the amount allowed was collected by the claimant himself. The attorney sued in the state court on the contract and recovered a judgment, his claim being resisted on the ground that the contract was void under $ 3477, Rev. Stat., prohibiting transfers of claims against the United States, and also that being for lobbying services was void against public policy. He also sought a recovery upon a quantum-meruit. He moved to dismiss the writ of error on the ground that there was no Federal question, held in affirming the judgment

that A party who insists in the state court that a judgment cannot be rendered

against him consistently with a statute of the United States asserts, within

200 U.S.

Statement of the Case.

the meaning of $ 709, Rev. Stat., a right and immunity under such statute, although it might not give him a personal or affirmative right, enforceable in direct suit against his adversary, and a writ of error will lie from this court to review the judgment denying the existence of such right or immunity. The contract, so far as it gave a lien on the amount allowed, was void under $ 3477, Rev. Stat., but the provision agreeing to pay the com

pensation fixed was not in violation of the statute and could stand alone. The state court having held, on evidence taken in that regard, that the suit

was not one for lobbying services, this court accepts that view of the


This suit was brought in the Chancery Court of Adams County, Mississippi, the plaintiff being S. Prentiss Knut, defendant in error, and the defendants being the administrator, heirs and devisees of Haller Nutt, deceased.

It was based upon a written contract between the late James W. Denver and the (then) executrix of Haller Nutt, deceased, as follows: "That the party of the first part (Denver) agrees to take exclusive charge and control of a certain claim which the party of the second part (executrix of Nutt's estate) holds against the Government of the United States, for the use of property and for property of which the said Haller Nutt and his estate was deprived by the acts of officers, soldiers and employés of the United States in Louisiana and Mississippi, in the years 1863, 1864 and 1865, amounting to one million of dollars, more or less, and to prosecute the same before any of the courts of the United States, and upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, or before any of the departments of Government, or before the Congress of the United States, or before any officer or commission or convention specially authorized to take cognizance of said claim, or through any diplomatic negotiations as may be deemed by him for the best interests of the party of the second part. And in consideration therefor the party of the second part agrees to pay the party of the first part a sum equal to 33} per cent of the amount which may be allowed on said claim, the payment of which is hereby made a lien upon said claim and upon any draft, money or evidence of indebtedness which may be issued thereon. This agreement

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not to be affected by any services performed by the claimant, or by any other agents or attorneys employed by him. All expenses of printing, costs of court and commission fees for taking testimony are to be charged to the party of the second part, and the party of the second part agrees to execute from time to time such powers of attorney as may be convenient or necessary for the successful prosecution and collection of said claim. No revocation of any authority conferred on the party of the first part by this agreement or any power of attorney relating to the business covered by the same to be valid.”

On the same day the executrix of Nutt executed to Denver a power of attorney, constituting the latter her attorney “irrevocable," for her and in her name and stead “to prosecute a certain claim against the Government of the United States, for property used and for property of which said Haller Nutt and his estate was deprived by United States officers, soldiers and employés in Louisiana and Mississippi, amounting to one million dollars, more or less, before any court of the United States, or before any of the departments of the Government, or before the Congress of the United States, or before any officer or commission or convention specially authorized to take cognizance of said claim, or through any diplomatic negotiations, to collect the same; and from time to time to furnish any further evidence necessary, or that may be demanded, giving and granting to my said attorney full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as I might or could do if personally present at the doing thereof, with full power of substitution and revocation, and to receipt and sign all vouchers and bonds of indemnity or appeal and to indorse all drafts'and vouchers in my name, either by or without indicating it is done by procuration, which may be requisite in the prosecution or collection of said claim, hereby ratifying and confirming all that my said attorney or his substitute may or shall lawfully do, or cause to be done by virtue hereof."

200 U.S.

Statement of the Case.

The petition shows, and it is not disputed, that the plaintiff succeeded to all the rights, whatever they were, of Denver under the above contract, and that as the result of his labors Congress at different times appropriated, on account of the Nutt claim, the sums of $35,556.51 and $89,999.88. 23 Stat. 552, 586; 32 Stat. 207, 212. Prior to the bringing of the present suit the plaintiff had received his “due share” of the first appropriation, but has not received his full part of the last one. He therefore sought payment, in accordance with the contract, for the balance due Kim on account of the said sum of $89,999.88 appropriated to and received by the Nutt estate.

The plaintiff subsequently amended his petition, and asked that in the event of his not being entitled to compensation under the Denver contract he have judgment for such sum as his services were reasonably worth, which he alleged to be $30,000.

Some of the defendants by their answers put the plaintiff upon proof of his case but submitted to the court the question of the reasonableness of his claim for fees.

Three of the defendants while not denying that plaintiff had been recognized by the executrix and subsequent administrators of Nutt's estate as the attorney of record against the United States Government, yet denied any legal liability of the estate by reason of such recognition. They averred that "the original contract and power of attorney as assignee of which petitioner claims to recover from the present administrator 33} per cent of said sum of $89,999.88 were contrary to good morals and public policy, were null and void, so far as they undertook to vest a right to a contingent fee in said Denver, and conferred upon said Denver no rights for the recovery of any fee against this estate which a court would recognize and enforce. And respondents further charge that said petitioner, as assignee of said Denver, occupies no better position than his assignor had, and that as such assignee he has no standing in this court for the enforcement of said void contract, or for the enforcement of any claim whatever for professional services rendered by him, or alleged to have been rendered by him in behalf of said

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

200 U.S.

estate in connection with said claim against the United States Government."

Upon the final hearing of the case in the court of original jurisdiction the chancellor rendered a decree holding that the Denver contract was "violative of the United States statute laws, and being further of the opinion that complainant in the prosecution of said claim under said contract before the Congress of the United States, in procuring and attempting to procure appropriations for the payment thereof, did procure personal solicitations to be made of members of Congress of the United States in behalf of said claim, and for the reasons stated is not entitled to the relief prayed for in his petition, doth order, adjudge and decree that complainant's petition be and the same is hereby dismissed at his cost, for which let execution issue."

Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Mississippi the judgment was reversed, and that court, proceeding to render such decree as in its opinion should have been rendered, adjudged that the plaintiff was entitled “to his prayer for 33} per cent of the amount collected by his administrator, $89,993.83, in full for any advance made by him and all services, less any payments made." 35 So. Rep. 686. The cause was remanded for an account to be taken and for an order directing the administrator to pay to Knut any balance of that per cent unpaid. The accounting was had in the inferior state court, Knut being charged with $10,000 paid on June 10, 1902, and allowed interest. The result was a decree that the plaintiff have and receive from the administrator of Haller Nutt's estate the sum of $22,143.30, with six per cent interest. That decree, upon appeal, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Mr. A. S. Worthington for plaintiffs in error:

The final decree in the state court is based solely on the decision that the contract is not void under $ 3477, Rev. Stat.; this raised a Federal question and this court has jurisdiction. $ 709, Rev. Stat.; Udell v. Davidson, 7 How. 769; Walworth v. Kneeland, 15 How. 348; Daniel v. Tearney, 102 U. S. 415; An

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