and entitled to reside thereon, which right was confirmed by the acquiescence and permission of the Government of the United States, and that the cattle now owned by them or by the plaintiff herein, as hereinafter set out, now graze upon the lands included within the said reservation by the express permission of the Indians residing and entitled to reside thereon, and of the Government of the United States.

IX. That a large number of the said cattle are annually killed and consumed as food by the children of the Indians so residing on and entitled to reside on the said reservation, and who are under the care of the said Jesuit Fathers, as aforesaid, and by the fathers in charge of the said children and assistants employed by them in the work of educating the said Indians, and that others of said cattle are annually shipped to Eastern markets, and the income derived from the sale of the same is devoted to, and used exclusively for, the work carried on by the said Fathers on the said reservation, of educating the said Indians, as herein before set out, and that all the said income is consumed in the said work.

X. That a large portion of the work of rounding up the said cattle, branding and otherwise caring for them, slaughtering and shipping the same, is done by the Indians residing on the said reservation, under the direction of the said Fathers, and that the said Indians are enabled by this employment to earn in part a livelihood, and are instructed and gain experience in the business and occupation of cattle raising and are encouraged themselves to engage in it, a business for the conduct of which the said reservation is particularly adapted.

XI. That prior to the year 1895 all property, so as aforesaid acquired by the said Jesuit Fathers, was conveyed to the plaintiff herein, to hold the same in trust for the said Jesuit Fathers, and that by such conveyance it now has the legal title to all of the cattle acquired by the said Jesuit Fathers on the said reservation and the increase thereof. And plaintiff avers that it is and at all times since its organization has been an institution of purely public charity, and that all of the cattle now

owned by it, or which have been owned by it since the year 1895, or at any time, have been and are used exclusively for educational purposes, as herein before set forth.

XII. And plaintiff further avers that it is its purpose in the future to devote all cattle now on the said reservation, or which it may acquire thereon, and any income derived from the sale of the same, to the same purposes to which they have heretofore been devoted, as hereinbefore set out, and that it has no purpose now, nor has it had at any time any purpose, to devote any portion of said cattle or any income derived from the sale of the same to any purpose other than the education and training of the Indians residing or entitled to reside on the said reservation, and that it never has made and does not contemplate making any profit out of the raising of the said cattle, with the intent to devote the same to any other purpose.

XIII. And plaintiff avers that, notwithstanding the facts aforesaid, the defendant, County of Missoula, which is one of the counties of the State of Montana, through its treasurer, annually since the year 1897 has demanded of the plaintiff that it pay to the said county taxes upon all cattle owned by it and being upon the said reservation, and threatened to seize and sell the said cattle or so much thereof as might be necessary to satisfy the taxes demanded unless the same should be paid.

XIV. That pursuant to such demand and to prevent the seizure and sale of the said cattle, or so many thereof as might be necessary, the plaintiff, under protest, on or about November 23, 1898, paid to the said county and to its treasurer, who turned the same over to the said county as taxes claimed by it to be due on account of cattle owned by the said plaintiff on the said reservation for the years 1897 and 1898, the sum of $1,257.48; that the plaintiff, under protest, on or about November 22, 1899, paid to the said county and to its treasurer, who turned the same over to the said county, as taxes claimed by it to be due on account of cattle owned by the said plaintiff on said reservation for the year 1899, the sum of $867.82; that the plaintiff, under protest, on or about November 26, 1900, paid

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

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to the said county and its treasurer, who turned the same over to the said county, as taxes claimed by it to be due on account of cattle owned by the said plaintiff, on the said reservation for the year 1900, the sum of $661.20; and that plaintiff, under protest, on or about November 26, 1901, paid to the said county and to its treasurer, who turned the same over to said county, as taxes claimed by it to be due on account of cattle owned by the said plaintiff on the said reservation for the year 1901, the sum of $321.95, and plaintiff avers that it neither had nor owned any cattle "at any time since 1895," in the county of Missoula, State of Montana, except such cattle as it held on the said reservation as hereinbefore set out, and that the said taxes were exacted of it upon the said cattle. "All of which were reared on the said reservation and fed on grasses and herbage grown thereon."

XV. And now plaintiff avers that the defendant is indebted to it on account of said payments, by it made, as herein before set out, in the sum of three thousand one hundred and eight and 45/100 dollars ($3,108.45), with interest on the sum of $1,257.48 from the 23d day of November, 1898, amounting to $345.66; for interest on $867.82 from the 22d day of November, 1899, amounting to $169.35; for interest on the sum of $661.20 from the 26th day of November, 1900, amounting to $75.55; and for interest on the sum of $321.95 from the 26th day of November, 1901, amounting to the sum of $11.03.

Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment for said amounts, together with interest as above set forth, and for its costs.

Mr. T. J. Walsh for plaintiff in error:

The Circuit Court had jurisdiction as the case was one arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 821; New Orleans v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135; Gold Washing Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199; Briscoe v. So. Kansas Ry., 40 Fed. Rep. 277; Manigault v. Ward, 123 Fed. Rep. 707; Illinois v. Adams, 180 U. S. 28; Illinois Central v. Chicago, 176 U. S. 646; Railway Co. v. Rail

200 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

road Co., 68 Fed. Rep. 2; Railroad Co. v. Davis, 132 Fed. Rep. 629.

The case comes under the rule that property of Indians is not taxable by the State. Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 757; although it is conceded that the right to taxation extends to property of people other than Indians on the reservations. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 26; Wagoner v. Evans, 170 U. S. 588; Truscott v. Land & Cattle Co., 73 Fed. Rep. 60. With regard to property on the reservations in which the Indians are interested the power does not exist. Cosier v. McMillan, 22 Montana, 489. The Indians are interested in the cattle; they are used to support them, and to tax them would be equivalent to taxing the income of the land, which would be the same as taxing the land itself. Income Tax Case, 157 U. S. 259; State v. Collector, 20 Atl. Rep. 292.

The property is a part of the means used by the General Government to carry out its powers. As to what the mission has accomplished and what it does to aid and assist the Government, which has appropriated money to carry on the work, see Treaty with Flathead Indians of July 16, 1855; Revision of Indian Treaties, 383; Smead's Report of September, 1898; Part I, Ann. Rep, Secy. Interior, 1901, Indian Aff. 260; Vol. 18, House Doc. 56th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 220; Rep. Commissioner Ind. Aff. 1892, p. 294.

The State can do nothing that will destroy or impair the efficiency of the guardianship of the United States over the Indians, State v. Cooney, 80 N. W. Rep. 696; United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 431, or to tax any means or instrumentality of the Government. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Page v. Pierce County, 64 Pac. Rep. 801; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573.

The cattle are property devoted to educational purposes. Book Agents v. Hinton, 19 L. R. A. 289; State v. Fisk, 87 Tennessee, 233; New Haven v. Trustees, 22 Atl. Rep. 156; Hospital v. Birdsall, 42 Atl. Rep. 853; Sisters of Charity v. Chattam, 9 L. R. A. 198; State v. Johnson, 43 Atl. Rep. 573; Casiano

v. Academy, 64 Texas, 673; People v. Barton, 63 App. Div. N. Y. 581.

The property being vested in a purely charitable association is under all the circumstances of this case impressed with a public character. Mormon Church Case, 136 U. S. 1.

When Federal jurisdiction is invoked on account of legislation claimed to impair the obligation of a contract, it is not necessary to prove the existence of a contract, but only that the Indians claim to have an interest in the cattle. Railroad Co. v. Citizens' Co., 166 U. S. 557; nor is it necessary to point out the specific provision of the Constitution or the treaty or statute under which the claim is made. Crystal Springs Co. v. City, 76 Fed. Rep. 153; Bridge v. Hoboken, 1 Wall. 116, 143; McCullough v. Commonwealth, 176 U. S. 102, 118.

There was no appearance or brief filed for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

There is nothing on the face of the complaint above set forth to show either the existence of any question involving the construction or application of the Federal Constitution, or that the constitutionality of any law of the United States, or the validity or construction of any treaty made under its authority, was drawn in question. This must appear in the complaint by the statement in legal and logical form, such as good pleading requires. Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 191 U. S. 405, 413; Spencer v. Duplan Silk Co., 191 U. S. 526, 530. It must appear that the suit really and substantially involves a controversy of such a character. This pleading seems simply to be a claim that the plaintiff is exempt from taxation on the cattle which it owns, because it is an institution of purely public charity, and it would seem from that fact that it was claiming such exemption under some act of the State of Montana, and that its right to recover back these taxes depended upon a statute of that State.