failure to so.recognize it was a violation of § 1, Art. IV., Constitution of the United States, and act of Congress, May 26, 1790, Rev. Stat., § 905. See Chi., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710; St. L. Ry. Co. v. Bartels, 56 S. W. Rep. 152; Railway Co. v. Thompson, 31 Kansas, 194; Fithian v. Railroad Co., 31 Pa. St. 114; Railroad Co. v. Crane, 102 Illinois, 249; Plimpton v. Bigelow, 93 N. Y. 601.

The provisions of the Florida statutes were strictly complied with and the statutes are valid. King v. Cross, 175 U. S. 396; Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U. S. 341. The Florida record was valid on its face. Maxwell v. Stewart, 21 Wall. 71. Foreign corporations doing business by agents within a State are treated as residents of the State, and debts due from them to non-residents are garnishable in that State. Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts, 165 Illinois, 592; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 53 N. J. Eq. 468; Selma R. Co. v. Tyson, 48 Georgia, 351; German Bank v. Am. Fire Ins. Co., 83 Iowa, 491; Consens v. Lovejoy, 81 Maine, 467; Root on Garnishment, § 245; C., B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 31 Nebraska, 629, and cases cited.

Unless the full faith and credit contemplated by the provisions of the Federal Constitútion, and the Federal statutes quoted, be given, the plaintiff in error must suffer by twice paying the same debt. It has no alternative.

If defendant in error was aggrieved at the Florida judgment, his remedy was by appeal or other appropriate proceedings in the Florida court. The Florida judgment could not be attacked collaterally in another forum. Laing v. Rigney, 160 U. S. 542.

There was no appearance for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action to recover a debt admitted to have been due to the plaintiff, the defendant in error. But it was agreed

in the trial court that a suit was brought by one Brock against the plaintiff in Florida, in which the railroad company, the present plaintiff in error, was summoned as garnishee, judgment was recovered against the latter as such for the sum now in suit, and the sum paid by it into court, all before the present suit was begun. The proceedings in Florida were strictly in accordance with the laws of that State. The railroad company did business there and was permanently liable to service and suit, and the defendant, the present defendant in error, was notified by such publication as the statutes of Florida prescribed. He was not, however, a resident of the State, but lived in Alabama, and the Supreme Court of the latter State affirmed a judgment in his favor on the ground that the Florida court had no jurisdiction to render the judgment relied on as a defense.

Whatever doubts may have been felt when this case was decided below are disposed of by the recent decision in Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215. There the garnishee was only temporarily present in Maryland, where the first judgment was rendered, and the defendant in that judgment was absent from the State, and served only as the defendant in error was served in Florida. Yet the Maryland judgment was held valid, and a decision by the Supreme Court of North Carolina denying the jurisdiction of the Maryland court was reversed. In the present case the railroad company was permanently present in the State where it was served. In view of the full and recent discussion in Harris v. Balk we think it unnecessary to say more.

Judgment reversed.

200 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

CINCINNATI, PORTSMOUTH, BIG SANDY AND POMEROY PACKET COMPANY v. BAY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OHIO.

No. 174. Argued December 15, 1905.—Decided January 2, 1906.

Where it appears from the record of a case in a state court that a Federal question was raised, and, in the absence of an opinion, it appears from a certificate made part of the record that it was not raised too late under the local procedure, and that it was necessarily considered and decided by the highest court of the State, this court has jurisdiction to review the judgment on writ of error.

A contract is not to be assumed to contemplate unlawful results unless a fair construction requires it; and where a contract relates to commerce between points within a State, both on a boundary river, it will not be construed as falling within the prohibitions of the Sherman act because the vessels affected by the contract sail over soil belonging to the other State while passing between the intrastate points. Even if there is some interference with interstate commerce, a contract is not necessarily void under the Sherman act if such interference is insignificant and merely incidental and not the dominant purpose; the contract will be construed as a domestic contract and its validity determined by the local law.

A contract for sale of vessels, even if they are engaged in interstate commerce, is not necessarily void because the vendors agree, as is ordinary in case of sale of a business and its good will, to withdraw from business for a specified period.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Ledyard Lincoln, with whom Mr. Julius L. Anderson was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

The contract is void under the Sherman act.

Repeated attempts have been made to restrict the broad and general language of the statute, but the Federal courts and especially this court have uniformly held that the act means just what it says and cannot be confined to unreasonable restraints nor such as were condemned by the common

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

200 U.S.

law before its passage. United States v. Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290, 312, 340; United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505, 573, 575; United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. Rep. 271; S. C., 175 U. S. 211; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 331, 402; Ches. & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States, 115 Fed. Rep. 610, 619.

The commerce restrained was interstate. Both the Portsmouth Company and the Bays were engaged in steamboating between ports in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio and Kentucky. Nor was the element of restraint merely ancillary. Tuscaloosa v. Williams, 127 Alabama, 110, 119.

It cannot be questioned that the transportation of persons and property from one State to another is interstate commerce. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196; Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 345.

The transportation of goods on a through bill of lading from one point in a given State to another in the same State by way of an adjoining State or Territory is interstate commerce. Hanley v. Kansas, 187 U. S. 617.

The States of Kentucky and West Virginia extend to low water mark on the Ohio side, so that even boats plying directly from Syracuse to Cincinnati without stopping at intermediate points would necessarily at ordinary stages of the river pass through parts of West Virginia and Kentucky. Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479; Hanley v. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 374; Booth v. Hubbard, 8 Ohio St. 243; McFall v. Commonwealth, 2 Metcalf (Ky.), 394.

Contracts not relating directly to interstate commerce, but local in their nature, have been held not within the prohibition of the Sherman act, although the parties contracting in fact sold commodities or solicited business beyond the state line, as the contract must affect interstate commerce directly and not remotely or incidentally. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U S. 1; Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578; Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604. But see United States v. Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290, 325; Lufkin v. Fringeli,

200 U. S.

Argument for Defendants in Error.

57 Ohio St. 596; Monongahela Co. v. Jutte, 210 Pa. St. 288, and cases cited in note; 74 Am. St. Rep. 235, 273; Bement v. Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 92.

The Sherman act prohibits any contract in restraint of trade which would be illegal at common law. As to what would be illegal see Horner v. Graves, 7 Bingham, 735, 743; 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 850, and as to rule in the State of Ohio see Lange v. Work, 2 Ohio St. 519, 528. See also United States v. Addyston Pipe Co., 85 Fed. Rep. 271, and cases cited, p. 290; Texas v. Southern &c. Co., 6 So. Rep. 888; Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666; Emery v. Candle Co., 47 Ohio St. 320; State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137; South Chicago v. Calumet, 171 Illinois, 391; Anderson v. Jett, 89 Kentucky, 375 (a case of competing steamboat lines).

The two packet companies who signed the contract were not engaged in private, but in quasi-public business, and therefore any restraint upon such business would be prejudicial to the public interest and cannot be sustained. United States v. Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 333; Gibbs v. Baltimore, 130 U. S. 396. The Federal question was raised properly and in time.

If the Federal or jurisdictional question be raised for the first time in the assignments of errors in the Supreme Court of the State, the question is presented in time. Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 189 U. S. 301; Land & Water Co. v. San Jose, 189 U. S. 179; C., B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 231; Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U. S. 334, 339; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44, 56.

Mr. Lawrence Maxwell, Jr., and Mr. Joseph S. Graydon for defendants in error:

No Federal question is presented or was properly raised. The vessels affected by the contract were not engaged in interstate commerce. Hanley v. Kansas City Railway, 187 U. S. 617, does not apply. See Lehigh Valley v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192. The court will not assume facts to make the contract illegal. Herpolsheimer v. Funke, 95 N. W. Rep. 687;