200 U.S. Argument for New Haven Railroad. court is allowed to be under § 3 of the Elkins Act, it was not within the purview of that act to wipe away the landmarks and bulwarks of jurisprudence and to permit a cause uncharged to be heard and adjudicated; or to engraft upon a charge that is made one that is wholly different and to which no one has been summoned to answer. Section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act prohibits "undue or unreasonable preference or advantage" and "undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage." As there is nothing in the act which defines what shall be held to be due or undue, reasonable or unreasonable, such questions are questions, not of law, but of fact, Texas and Pac. R. R. Co. v. Interstate C. C., 162 U. S. 219, the violation should be pleaded or alleged. The intent of the legislative body, as expressed in the words of the statute, must control the courts in their construction of such statute. And in seeking this legislative intent resort may be had to every part of a statute, or, when there is more than one in pari materia, to the whole system. Kohlsaat v. Murphy, 96 U. S. 153, 159. The only sections other than § 3 of the act to regulate commerce having any bearing on the policy and intent of the law refer only to: Transportation of passengers or property; Any service in connection therewith; Receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of such property; Terminal charges; Time schedules, carriage in different cars; False billing, false classification, false weighing or false report of weight; The furnishing of cars or other facilities for transportation. The sole intent and spirit of the act is to provide for reasonable rates, equal charges, fair dealing and equal facilities in the "transportation of passengers and property." Section 3 must be read in the light of this spirit and intent, and in clause 2 not to legislate except in these particulars, the intent is plainly manifest. The general subject and purpose of the statute, read as a whole will restrict the meaning of general words in some por Argument for New Haven Railroad. 200 U. S. tion of the statute in order to effectuate the true legislative intent. Pennington v. Coxe, 2 Cranch, 33, 52. Where this intent is found to be limited to a narrower field than the use of certain general expressions would ordinarily imply if considered alone the courts do not hesitate to limit the scope of the general words and expressions so as to conform them to the real legislative intent as gathered from the whole act. Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet. 198; Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 116; Petri v. Commercial Bank, 142 U. S. 644; United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 159 U. S. 649; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290, 320. The words of general scope in § 3 should be so restricted in their meaning as to conform them to the general intent of Congress as disclosed by a consideration of the whole act. Only common carriers engaged in interstate carriage are subject to the provisions of the act and they only when engaged in and about such carriage. McKee v. United States, 164 U. S. 287, 293. This contention is further strengthened by an examination of the Elkins Act which is in pari materia with the original act. They both belong to the same "system." Even if the court below was correct in its view that the provisions of § 3 were properly involved in the case, it erred in the interpretation it gave to those provisions and in the application it made of them to the case under consideration. The only preference or advantage that is denounced by §3 is that which is "undue or unreasonable," which cannot be imputed to an honest transaction made without any intent to violate any law and conforming itself to every principle of legal and moral rectitude and being fully understood by intelligent parties, each pursuing his own business. The reasonableness of the transaction to the Chesapeake and Ohio was governed by the honest consideration imputed to its president by the court below of endeavoring to find a market 200 U.S. Argument for New Haven Railroad. for coal produced on his line. The relator who instigated these proceedings was offered the same rate for his coal. And the evidence shows there was not any discrimination. The imputation of discrimination by the transaction in question against some or all of the persons concerned with Kanawha coal destined for points beyond the Capes, is not only unfounded; but is overwhelmingly disproved by the openness of it to general participation of the operators of the only place held to be discriminated against; and the proof of the negative is in the record, with only a vague imagination against it which can neither discover or suggest the name nor describe the particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality or species of traffic which has been either preferred or prejudiced in any respect whatsoever. The error in the Circuit Court's opinion was in not separating the advantages which must necessarily belong to the stimulation of trade and must necessarily and wholesomely attach to those who become wisely associated in it from that other class of advantages which flow from sinister devices and from improper considerations. An undue advantage must be founded upon an improper consideration. No improper consideration of any kind is suggested for the contract herein considered. To hold that it would be possible for some one to suffer because of a particular transaction does not of necessity thereby make that transaction a discrimination of any kind such as the law has noticed or can notice. For, in fact and in legal contemplation, no person can suffer from a transaction which is honest and legal. If a railroad company takes away its works and track from a station, holders of property located in the abandoned vicinage must suffer. If a railroad company puts its shops or tracks at any place, adjoining property holders of necessity derive an advantage. But any loss suffered on the one hand is damnum absque injuria or rather is no damage at all in legal contemplation; and on the other hand any benefit derived is no discrimination. The question presenting itself for decision is whether or not VOL. CC 24 Argument for New Haven Railroad. 200 U. S. a carrier acting in good faith and with entire honesty and making a contract unquestionable in its legal aspects, can by the mere fact that it loses upon that transaction thereby pass into a stage in which such loss may be legally regarded as an undue preference or advantage to the party who gets the benefit of such loss, or an undue prejudice or disadvantage to some unknown party who has not participated in the transaction. To state this question is to answer it. No wrong can arise from any preference or advantage casually or incidentally flowing out of contracts legal and honest in themselves, for the reason that they are not undue. Nor is any person prejudiced by the granting of a preference or advantage that is not undue to another. It is the undue thing, and only the undue thing, that is prohibited by the Interstate Commerce Act. The undue thing is "that which is not right;" "not legal or lawful;" "improper," as Bacon says, quoted in Webster's Dictionary. This is the sense in which the word "undue" is used in the statute and is the natural interpretation thereof. The court below correctly overruled the motion for the enlargement of the injunctive decree. Every decree of a court should be specific and certain in its character, so that it should clearly apprise the parties to the proceedings of their rights and duties thereunder. This is particularly true of injunctive orders whereby parties are directed to, or are restrained from, the performance of specific acts. This idea of certainty and definiteness is exemplified by the very definition of the term. 16 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 342; 2 Story's Equity, 861; Spelling on Injunctions, § 3; Anderson's Law Dictionary, "Injunction;" High on Injunctions, §1; Robinson v. Clapp, 65 Connecticut, 365; Lyon v. Botchford, 25 Hun, 57; Sullivan v. Judah, 4 Paige, 444; Moal v. Holbein, 2 Edw. Ch. 188; Laurie v. Laurie, 9 Paige Ch. 235; So. Pac. Co. v. Colorado F. & I. Co., 42 C. C. A. 12; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375.. 200 U. S. Argument for New Haven Railroad. So far as the terms of the injunction order that was entered in the case at bar is concerned, assuming that the case was correctly decided by the court below, it complies with the requirements for injunctive orders as laid down in the authorities above cited and is without objection. The enlargement urged by the Interstate Commerce Commission, however, would violate the "first principles of justice.” The injunctions in United States v. Michigan Central, 122 Fed. Rep. 544, and Re Debs, 158 U. S. 568, are not parallel. In any consideration of this transaction the time at which it was made, the conditions under which it was made, and the gigantic nature of the commerce and industry of the country which have rendered such transactions indispensable to society, should not be overlooked. The time was one succeeding crises, when strikes, lockouts and paralysis of trade had deeply affected the whole nation. The conditions which had produced all manner of disorders were starvation and cold and riot and murder menacing the great centers. To stop coal or bread in a city was to organize anarchy. The New Haven Railroad is a great company, moving thousands of tons of freight and thousands of passengers per day. It could not feed itself from hand to mouth. A day's stoppage of its trains meant far more than ruin to itself and paralysis to commerce; to the mails; to the bread of families, to remittances to and from banks; to pensions for invalids; to medicine for the sick; to concerns which embraced everybody of the human society to be served, and everything that concerns society. It meant distraction and damage. To provide coal for its enormous and myriad transactions the company had to make these great contracts. If the reasoning of the lower court is sound, then such contracts can no longer be made with safety, however clothed with legality. If the validity, legality, fairness and commercial wisdom of a contract at the time of its execution do not give it a character that will survive changing commercial `conditions, then the New Haven Road and other railroad companies |