stitution of the State then in force provides that no irrevocable or uncontrollable grant of privileges shall be made and that all privileges granted by the legislature, or under its authority, shall be subject to its control; nor is the legislature deprived of this control because the contract was not made by it but by a municipal corporation, as the latter is for such purpose merely an agency of the State. San Antonio Traction Co. v. Altgelt, 304.
5. Effect of prior consolidation of corporations on subjection of franchise to provisions of new constitution.
Where, after a new constitution has been adopted, a railway, chartered prior to such adoption, is consolidated with other roads or accepts new privileges, all contracts, privileges and franchises conferred are sub- ject to the provisions of the new constitution. Ib.
6. Effect of prior consolidation of corporations on subjection of franchise to provisions of new constitution.
Where a corporation chartered prior to the existing constitution of a State is wound up and all of its property, contracts and obligations trans- ferred by ordinance to a new corporation, the ordinance must be con- strued in connection with the constitution and the provisions for further control therein contained. Ib.
See JURISDICTION, A 14;
LOCAL LAW (MINN.) (N. C.);
NATIONAL BANKS, 1; REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 1;
Interference of Federal court by habeas corpus with trial in state court of per- sons in military service of United States accused of crime.
An officer and an enlisted soldier in the military service of the United States were indicted for murder and manslaughter and held for trial in a state court for having killed a citizen of the State who was not in the service of the United States, the alleged crime having been com- mitted within the State, on property not belonging to, or under the jurisdiction of, the United States. On a writ of habeas corpus from a Circuit Court of the United States it was contended that petitioners were seeking to arrest the deceased for felony under the laws of the United States and that he met his death while attempting to escape, and as therefore the homicide was committed by petitioners in the discharge of their duties, the state court was without jurisdiction. On the hearing there was a conflict of evidence as to whether deceased had surrendered or not, and it was conceded that if he were not a fleeing felon the ground for Federal interposition failed. Held, that the Circuit Court properly declined to wrest petitioners from the custody of the state officers in advance of trial in the state courts. Ex parte Crouch, 112 U. S. 178, applied. Drury v. Lewis, 1. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 11,
12, 13, 15-20;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 1; JURISDICTION;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE;
TAXATION, 1, 4;
TITLE, 1.
CRIMINAL LAW.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6, 9;
DISCOVERY.
See EQUITY, 2.
DISCRIMINATION.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 2.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
See CORPORATIONS, 1, 2 (Speer v. Colbert, 130);
MORTGAGE ANd Deed of TruST (Warner v. Grayson, 257); NEGLIGENCE (Looney v. Metropolitan R. R. Co., 480); WILLS (Speer v. Colbert, 130).
DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP.
See REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12;
See MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF TRUST.
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 18.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS. See BRIDGES;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9; TAXATION, 3.
1. Jurisdiction; grounds for,-Adequacy of remedy at law.
Notwithstanding averments in the bill of fraud, conspiracy and violation of trust, if the action is really one of trespass or trover to recover damages for wrongful cutting and conversion of timber from complainant's
lands, and there is no question of defendant's financial responsibil- ity, and the recovery of a money judgment and not of specific prop- erty is sought, complainant's remedy at law is adequate and equity has no jurisdiction; nor can equity take jurisdiction merely because of the difficulty of proving the case on account of various devices alleged to have been used by defendants, or because the principal defendant is an executor of a party, whose estate is solvent, alleged to have been the chief wrongdoer. Complainant, in an action at law of this nature, is entitled to the same inspection of books and papers that he could have in a suit in equity. The holder of permits to cut timber from certain specified government lands, who willfully and fraudulently cuts from other lands, is not a trustee ex maleficio as to timber wrongfully cut, but a mere trespasser and liable for damages in action at law, and equity has no jurisdiction either on the ground of trusteeship or accounting. Prevention of multiplicity of suits is not a ground for equity jurisdiction if all persons must be made parties, whether the suit be at law or in equity, and where a class does not exist of which a few can be made defendants as representatives thereof. United States v. Bitter Root Co., 451.
2. Discovery as ground of equity jurisdiction.
Discovery, although now seldom the object of a suit in equity, and not always sufficient to uphold a suit when the full information is obtain- able by proceedings at law, was a well-recognized ground of equity jurisdiction. Southern Pacific v. United States, 341.
3. Right of appellate court as to dismissal of bill in equity where objection of adequate remedy at law first raised there. Although a suit in equity cannot be maintained where there is an adequate remedy at law, and this objection may be taken for the first time in the appellate court, still, if not raised until then, the court need not, if the subject matter of the suit is of a class over which it has juris- diction, dismiss the bill; and so held in regard to a suit brought by the Government, under an act of Congress, to recover from a railroad company the value of lands erroneously patented to and sold by it to numerous persons, some of whom were made defendants as representa- tives of the class, the bill also praying for cancellation of patents, quieting of titles, discovery and accounting. Southern Pacific v. United States, 341, 354.
EXEMPTIONS.
See TAXATION, 4.
FEDERAL QUESTION.
See JURISDICTION, A 9;
PRACTICE AND Procedure, 4.
FISHERIES.
See HAWAIIAN FISHERIES.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
FRANCHISES.
See CORPORATIONS, 4;
See CORPORATIONS, 3;
PUBLIC LANDS, 7, 8.
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10.
GARNISHMENT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10.
GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS. See TAXATION, 5.
1. Strict construction in favor of public.
Only that which is granted in clear and explicit terms passes by a grant of property, franchises or privileges in which the Government or the public has an interest. Statutory grants of that character are to be construed strictly in favor of the public; whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld; and nothing passes by implication. Water Com- pany v. Knoxville, 22.
2. Right of municipality, under contract with waterworks company, to estab- lish its own waterworks.
Although the contract in this case between a waterworks company and a
municipality provided that no contract or privilege would be granted to furnish water to any other person or corporation, the city was not, in the absence of a special stipulation to that effect, precluded from establishing its own independent system of waterworks. Ib.
HAWAIIAN FISHERIES.
1. Fishing rights of owner of an ahapuaa.
Damon v. Hawaii, 194 U. S. 154, followed to effect that under the Hawaiian Act of 1846, "of Public and Private Rights of Piscary," the owner of an ahapuaa is entitled to the adjacent fishing ground within the reef, and that the statute created vested rights therein within the saving clause of the organic act of the Territory repealing all laws of the Republic of Hawaii conferring exclusive fishing rights. Carter v. Hawaii, 255.
2. Effect of omission to establish right to a fishery before Land Commission. The Land Commission of Hawaii was established to determine title to lands against the Hawaiian Government, and, as that Commission rightly treated fisheries as not within its jurisdiction, the omission to establish the right to a fishery before that Commission does not prejudice the right of the owner thereto. Ib.
1. Rates; application of prohibition of Interstate Commerce Act as to charge by carrier of less than published rates-Illegality of contract for sale and transportation of commodity—Immateriality of intent to violate prohibi- tions of act--Scope of injunction against violations of act—Binding force on courts of ruling of Interstate Commerce Commission.
(a) A carrier, not expressly authorized so to do by charter obtained prior VOL. CC-41
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