Opinion of the Court. to sell shingles to him, and by that means his business was totally destroyed, to his damage in the sum of $15,000. 1. The complaint in its statement of the first cause of action is radically defective, in this: that it does not allege that any damage has resulted to the plaintiff from the acts complained of, and for that reason the demurrer will be sustained. 2. The gist of the second cause of action is that the plaintiff has been damaged by diminution of trade in consequence of the action of the association in raising the price of shingles; and the third cause of [596] action is similar, the complaint being that a shrinkage of the plaintiff's business was caused by the action of the association in suspending the operation of mills controlled by it, so as to prevent an overstocking of the market. Both of these causes of action appear to be predicated upon a notion that because the plaintiff was a buyer and exporter of shingles he had a vested right to the benefit of unrestrained competition for trade among manufacturers, and that the plaintiff has a vested right at all times to have a surplus of shingles on the market so that he may enjoy that advantage in buying to supply the demands of his customers, and that by depriving him of these benefits and advantages the association has committed a legal wrong, and deprived him of valuable property rights, for which he is entitled to recover damages. There is no allegation in the complaint that the price of shingles fixed by the association is higher than the reasonable price, considering the necessary cost of production, and allowing something for the value of the timber to the owners of the land upon which it grows, and a reasonable profit to the manufacturers, nor that the wants of consumers have not been promptly supplied. On the contrary, the pleader has boldly advanced the selfish theory that, unless conditions are maintained so that a middleman or speculator may operate with profit to himself, he has a right to compensation in damages from the owners of mills who refuse to operate for his benefit, or to sell the product at prices satisfactory to him, regardless of losses which may result to them from such operation. It is a well-known and lamentable fact that for half a century loggers have been permitted to cull the magnificent Opinion of the Court. forests of this state, wasting the greatest of her natural endowments, by cutting fir and cedar trees recklessly, sending only the best logs to the mills to be manufactured into lumber for shipment to market in distant states and countries, leaving the residue to decay upon the ground, or give additional energy to the destructive force of forest fires in the summer months. They have paid but little for stumpage, and frequently their hired laborers have been defrauded of their wages. Unrestrained competition has been the means by which this state has been stripped of its wealth. Cedar trees standing and growing in our forests are a blessing to the state, and they ought to be preserved, at least until their value is appreciated, so that the crop which has required many centuries of time for its perfection will be worth to owners of the land something more than the price which a farmer may reasonably expect for his annual production. It seems ridiculous that while land producing wheat, hay, vegetables, or fruit in this state usually brings annual returns over and above expenses of cultivating and harvesting of from $10 to $50 per acre, the average market price for a fee-simple title to timber land in western Washington has never yet been above $10 per acre. An association which will check the wanton destruction of cedar trees in this state, by reckless lumbermen, for the benefit of speculators, instead of being condemned, deserves the gratitude of the commonwealth. No principle of natural justice is appealed to by that part of the complaint now under consideration, and I do not think that the act of congress commonly designated as the "Anti-Trust Law of 1890," to which the complaint refers, can be fairly construed so as [597] to make the Washington Red-Cedar Shingle Manufacturers' Association a criminal organization, so long as its operations are properly conducted, and kept within the scope of the object for which the association was formed, as set forth in its constitution, the first article of which reads as follows: "The title of this organization shall be the Washington Red-Cedar Shingle Manufacturers' Association, and its object shall be to secure a full understanding of the conditions surrounding the red-cedar shingle market throughout the United States; the establishing of uniform rules for grading and manufacturing; the establishing of uniform rates and prices; and for purpose of carrying out such other measures as Opinion of the Court. may be deemed for the welfare and in the interest of the manufacturers of red-cedar shingles." There is in this declaration no hint of a purpose to create a monopoly, or to place any burden upon interstate or foreign commerce. The association, judged by the instrument which defines its object and circumscribes its powers, is innocent of any wrong intent, because its object is to influence the conduct of its members, and not to assail the rights of others. Concert of action for mutual protection among farmers or craftsmen or miners whose operations are entirely within the state may indirectly affect the prices or the abundance of commodities brought for sale within the state by importers, as well as commodities produced within the state for sale elsewhere; but associations of persons not themselves engaged in interstate commerce, having no object other than to protect their own rights and serve their own interests in business operations wholly confined within the state, cannot be held to be amenable as violators of the anti-trust law, which is necessarily so limited as to reach only combinations intended to prevent competition in interstate or foreign commerce. The distinction between the business of manufacturing staple commodities for sale to whomsoever will buy, whether for home consumption or transportation to distant markets, and interstate commerce, is very clearly brought into view, and the principle upon which I intend to rest in making this decision is explained, in the opinion by Chief Justice Fuller in the case of U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1-11, 15 Sup. Ct. 253, 39 L. Ed. 329. The sense of that decision is epitomized in the following excerpts: "The relief of the citizens in each state from the burden of monopoly and the evils resulting from the restraint of trade among such citizens was left with the states to deal with, and this court has recognized their possession of that power, even to the extent of holding that an employment or business carried on by private individuals, when it became a matter of such public interest and importance as to create a common charge or burden upon the citizen.-in other words, when it becomes a practical monopoly, to which the citizen is compelled to resort, and by the means of which a tribute can be exacted from the community,--is subject to regulation by state legislative power. On the other hand, the power of congress to regulate commerce among the several states is also exclusive. The constitution does not provide that interstate commerce shall be free, but, by the grant of this legislative power to regulate it, it was left free except as Opinion of the Court. congress might impose restraints. * * * 'Commerce undoubtedly is traffic,' said Chief Justice Marshall; but it is something more; it is intercourse. That which belongs to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States, but that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the state.' Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 189-210, 6 L. Ed. 23; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419-448, 6 L. Ed. 678; License Cases, 5 How. 505-599, 12 L. Ed. 256; [598] Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. Ed. 238; Bowman v. Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 689, 1062, 31 L. Ed. 700; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128; In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545-555, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 35 L. Ed. 572. * Doubtless the power to control the manufacture of a given thing involves, in a certain sense, the control of its disposition, but this is a secondary, and not a primary, sense; and, although the exercise of that power may result in bringing the operation of commerce into play, it does not control it, and affects it only incidentally and indirectly. Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it. * The regulation of commerce applies to the subjects of commerce, and not to matters of internal police. Contracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods to be transported among the several states, the transportation and its instrumentalities, and articles bought, sold, or exchanged for the purpose of such transit among the states, or put in the way of transit, may be regulated, but this is because they form part of interstate trade or commerce. The fact that an article is manufactured for export to another state does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce, and the intent of the manufacturer does not determine the time when the article or product passes from the control of the state, and belongs to commerce. Contracts, combinations, or conspiracies to control domestic enterprise in manufacture, agriculture, mining, production in all its forms, or to raise or lower prices or wages, might unquestionably tend to restrain external as well as domestic trade; but the restraint would be an indirect result, however inevitable and whatever its extent, and such result would not necessarily determine the object of the contract, combination, or conspiracy. It was in the light of wellsettled principles that the act of July 2, 1890, was framed. Congress did not attempt thereby to assert the power to deal with monopoly directly as such, or to limit and restrain the right of corporations created by the states or citizens of the states in the aquisition, control, or disposition of property, or to regulate or prescribe the price or prices at which such property or the product thereof should be sold, or to make criminal the acts of persons in the acquisition and control of property which the states of their residence or creation sanctioned or permitted.” * See, also, Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1-26, 9 Sup. Ct. 6, 32 L. Ed. 346. The more recent decision of the supreme court in the case of Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211-248, 20 Sup. Ct. 96, Adv. S. U. S. 96, 44 L. Ed., does not conflict with the decisions above cited. That case is to be distinguished from the one under consideration by the fact that it involved an agreement between manufacturing firms and corporations located in several states, binding themselves to refrain from all competition with each other for Opinion of the Court. the sale of iron pipe in the 36 states and territories named in the agreement. The history of the hop industry in this state may be referred to as an illustration. There was a time when the production of hops was a favorite industry in this state, but during several years past it has grown more and more into disfavor because it has been unprofitable, and interstate commerce in this commodity has been diminished by reason of the conversion of many hop fields into meadows and vegetable gardens. It may be true that the hop farmers, acting individually and without advice from any one, have, one after another, converted their hop fields; but if they had joined an association of farmers who for general welfare had adopted efficient measures to obtain true information with regard to the supply and demand for hops and other products of the state, and had conformed to an intelligent resolution of the association to meet an increasing demand for onions, potatoes, and hay, instead of continuing to lose the value of their labor and the use of their farms, year after year, by producing [599] hops in excess of the requirements of the market, it would certainly be tyrannical for the courts to punish them for resulting losses of profit by dealers and speculators in hops. In my opinion, it would be equally absurb to apply coercive measures to compel shingle manufacturers to operate their mills without profit to themselves, or to forbid them to have the benefit of cooperation for their own advantage. The demurrer to the second and third affirmative defenses will be sustained on the ground that the object of the association is not unlawful. The anti-trust law was not intended to oppress any class, and it cannot be so construed as to prohibit the right of manufacturers, whether acting individually or in concert, to be prudent, and use common sense in maintaining reasonable prices, and avoiding losses by overproduction. 3. According to the statement of the fourth cause of action, the association appears to have been used for a purpose not suggested by its constitution, and highly prejudical to the plaintiff. In my opinion the complaint states a good cause of action to recover damages for libel, and the only |