The fortification of positions, the marking out of lines of defense, gave the whole initiative of war to the antagonist. He was left at liberty to select the time, place and opportunity for attack, and to make the campaign on conditions of his selection. Thus, with Johnston tied fast to Harper's Ferry, and Beauregard at Manassas, Patterson and McClellan could have combined at Winchester, corked Johnston up at Harper's Ferry, while with McDowell they could have swept the way to Richmond clear at Manassas. The same criticism applies to Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston's position at Bowling Green, Kentucky. President Davis did not agree with this view as to policy or strategy. He was a trained soldier of long and wide experience. He had commanded Southern volunteers at Buena Vista, and he held a large and enthusiastic view of the capability of volunteers, especially of Southern men, inured to arms and accustomed to command a subordinate and inferior race. He did not minimize the vigor and duration of the war, for from the first, while deploring the fact, he insisted that war must result from the attempt of the Southern States to amend and reform the Constitution of 1787, and that that war would be long, bloody and exhausting. But President Davis though a soldier was an agricultural man; he did not fully estimate the enormous force and machine created by modern society, whereby one generation, or one country, can mortgage the future to the rest of mankind for the supreme present. He believed that the supply of cotton was so necessary to modern commerce that the South, which controlled that supply, could dictate terms and require support from nations, whose industries were dependent on her agriculture. He believed that with the strain on the credit of the North, its currency would depreciate, its expenses would increase, until, at last, its finances would break down, and that it would not be able to raise a dollar or a man. Wait, said he, until gold touches 250, and the great monied interests, which are behind this war, will cry for peace to save what they have left. He did not appreciate, as none did, that the bondholders and contractors had got into the position that success only could save them from ruin, and they were forced by necessity to stake everything on success. This divergence of view between the Confederate authorities at the very beginning of the war kept on widening, mutual confidence was absent, and the consequences to the cause of the Confederacy were prodigious and fraught with overwhelming evil. It would seem to have been unavoidable. Mr. Davis and Gen. Johnston were both men of very positive character; both were soldiers of experience; both had thought over the problems of this war which they both deplored and both saw was inevitable, and when, therefore, they arrived at different conclusions on fundamental principles, it is not reasonable to expect either to yield. It was Johnston's duty to have given obedience, prompt and ready. This he did. But he never changed the convictions of his mind as to the proper strategy for the struggle. This is an unfortunate position for a soldier to occupy toward his superior. In the profession of arms, mind and muscle, body, heart and soul must always go together, and he who criticizes his commanding officer will impair his own efficiency, even though ever so zealous to contribute to the success of the common cause, the glory of one's country. Gen. Beauregard had taken command at Manassas about a week after Gen. Johnston had assumed charge at Harper's Ferry, and by correspondence and staff officers a perfect understanding was arrived at, that the first one attacked should be supported by the other. But Harper's Ferry was the place to be supported not to give support. It was an exposed point on the frontier, with its communications, and its base of supplies liable to be cut off on either side at any time. On the 10th of June, Patterson advanced from Chambersburg to Hagerstown with eighteen thousand men. Hagerstown is six miles from the Potomac at Williamsport, and once across the river, Patterson would be as near Winchester as Johnston at Harper's Ferry. At the same time came news that McClellan's advance had reached Romney. Romney is forty-three miles from Winchester, while Williamsport and Harper's Ferry are each about thirty miles from that point; a-half a day's march then by Patterson and McClellan would ensure their junction at Winchester and close Johnston in at Harper's Ferry. On the 15th, the baggage and stores of the troops had been sent ahead. Almost every soldier had a trunk, many of them Saratoga trunks. The Confederates left Harper's Ferry and marched three miles beyond Charlestown, where they bivouacked for the night at Turner's Spring. The next morning, information having been received. that Patterson had crossed the Potomac and was advancing along the valley pike south of Martinsburg, Johnston moved across the country and took position at Bunker Hill to intercept him. Immediately on receipt of the movement of McClellan, Col. A. P. Hill of Thirteenth Virginia, with Col. Gibbon, Tenth Virginia, and Col. Vaughan, Third Tennessee, had been sent to Romney to hinder, delay or prevent further move from that direction. All day of June 17th the Confederates waited Patterson at Bunker Hill, in high spirits of another 17th of June at another Bunker Hill. But Patterson recrossed the river, not on account of Johnston's demonstration, but because some of his best troops had been taken from him. Gen. Johnston then proceeded to Winchester, where he took position on the valley pike three miles north of the town, and was soon rejoined by Hill, who had burned the bridge of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at New Creek and captured two guns and a set of colors, by the hands of Vaughan and the Third Tennessee. At Winchester the army was reinforced and reorganized. Jackson's brigade, of Second, Fourth, Fifth and |