tain, and then the whole three booted and kicked from Manassas to the fortifications of Washington; no man could have remodeled and remoraled these broken debris of armies from September 2, to September 15, 1862, and made them fight as he did, but a great soul. But McClellan fell below the measure of the greatest, because he did not know how to estimate the value of his own people and the force of his adversary at a given time. Before Richmond in 1862, he certainly ought to have pushed forward and taken his adversary's base. At Sharpsburgh in September, 1862, he ought to have captured Lee's army, but his fine mathematical intellect too clearly appreciated the quantities of the problem; given so much force, so much will, so much numbers on one side, and an indefinite quantity of will on the other, he could not tell what the result of the collision would be. Therefore, he had no collision. In August, September, October, November, 1861, he kept his raw levies in his camps. He drilled his men, he instructed his officers in never ceasing schools, where he made old soldiers drawn from all the armies of the world his drill masters. He had the most accurate dress parades, he had the most regular reviews, and he sacrificed everything to the style, the pomp, the parade of war. The soldiers of fortune he drew to him from the refuse of the armies of the old world—the Sigeles, Blenkers, Sir Percy Windhams, all the adventurers from everywhere, knew more about drill and style and appearances than the American vol unteer. They were deficient in brains; they became rattled in battle, they had not the faculty of becoming cooler and concentrated in high excitement. The South had only a few of such men; the North had many of them, and not one stood the test of use and time, not one ever achieved any high renown or position. While McClellan was thus organizing his raw levies on the Potomac, the War Department at Richmond was demoralizing Johnston's seasoned soldiers at Manassas. Before the concentration of the Army of the Shenandoah with the Army of the Potomac, it had been discussed between Generals Johnston and Beauregard whether the line of the Rappahannock would not be a better line than that of Manassas and the Potomac. A Federal column moving up the valley could cross the Blue Ridge at several passes-at Chester's Gap from Front Royal, or Brown's Gap to Madison court house, and would be two marches nearer Richmond than an army at Manassas Junction. And a movement to take up the line of the Rappahannock was being discussed when McDowell precipitated the decision by selecting Bull Run for the line of battle. As the spring of 1862 advanced, it became clear that as soon as the roads would permit, McClellan must move. Gen. Johnston did not have a convinced opinion as to a Federal advance by land on the line of the Virginian railroads. The command of the water absolutely held by the Federals, and the navigable rivers which pierced the side of Virginia, the Potomac, the Rappahannock, the York and the James, gave at a dozen points places for bases of operation which could not possibly escape the attention of McClellan. One day a group of young officers were in Gen. Johnston's Adjutant's office at Centreville, and Col. George W. Lay, his aid-de-camp, was delivering a discourse on strategy. Lay had been Gen. Scott's military secretary and aid for years, and had probably as large a view of the science of war, and of this particular war, as any man living. He had the map of Virginia before him, and was demonstrating to his circle of ardent and inquisitive auditors the folly and impracticability of an attack on the lines of Centreville and an advance to Richmond by that route. The way to Richmond is this, said he, putting his finger on City Point, and Richmond can only be taken by an army operating south of the James. Gen. Johnston had entered the room without attracting the attention of the absorbed auditors or the speaker. He here broke in: "Col. Lay, don't you think it unadvisable to make such a discussion; you cannot know who may be evesdropping." And that conversation ceased. But as the spring opened, Johnston apprehended that McClellan might march down on the north bank of the Potomac, pass his army rapidly across below Acquia creek, where he could move promptly to Fredericksburg, and would be three days nearer Richmond than Johnston. Therefore, on March 9th, he withdrew from the lines at Centreville just as McClellan advanced to feel his force, and took position behind the Rappahannock, |