of general Hull. On the 14th I delivered the Indians all the goods in the factory store, and a considerable quantity of provisions which we could not take away with us. The surplus arms and ammunition I thought proper to destroy, fearing they would make bad use of it if put in their possession. I also destroyed all the liquor on hand soon after they began to collect. The collection was unusually large for that place, but they conducted with the strictest propriety till after I left the fort. On the 15th, at nine in the morning, we commenced our march; a part of the Miamies were detached in front, and the remainder in our rear, as guards, under the direction of captain Wells. The situation of the country rendered it necessary for us to take the beach, with the lake on our left, and a high sand bank on our right, at about 100 yards distance. We had proceeded about a mile and a half, when it was discovered the Indians were prepared to attack us from behind the bank. I immediately marched up with the company to the top of the bank, when the action commenced; after firing one round, we charged and the Indians gave way in front and joined those on our flanks. In about 15 minutes they got possession of all our horses, provisions, and baggage of every description, and, finding the Miamies did not assist us, I drew off the few men I had left, and took possession of a small elevation in the open prairies, out of shot of the bank or any other cover. The Indians did not follow me, but assembled in a body on the top of the bank, and, after some consultation among themselves, made signs for me to approach them. I advanced towards them alone, and was met by one of the Potawatamie chiefs, called the Black Bird, with an interpreter. After shaking hands, he requested me to surrender, promising to spare the lives of all the prisonOn a few moments consideration I concluded it would be most prudent to comply with his request, although I did not put entire confidence in his promise. After delivering up our arms we were taken back to their encampment near the fort, and distributed among the different tribes. The next morning they set fire to the fort and left the place, taking the prisoners with them. Their number of warriors was between four and five hundred, mostly of the Potawatamie nation, and their loss, from the best information I could get, was about 15. Our strength was 54 regulars and 12 militia, out of which 26 regulars and all the militia were killed in the action, with two women and twelve children. Ensign George Roman and Dr. Isaac V. Van Voorhis of my company, with captain Wells, of fort Wayne, are, to my great

ers.

sorrow, numbered among the dead. Lieutenant Lina D. T. Helm, with 25 non-commissioned officers and privates, and 11 women and children, were prisoners when we separated. Mrs. Heald and myself were taken to the mouth of the river St. Joseph, and being both badly wounded, were permitted to reside with Mr. Burnett, an Indian trader. In a few days after our arrival there, the Indians all went off to take fort Wayne, and in their absence I engaged a Frenchman to take us to Michillimackinac by water, when I gave myself up as a prisoner of war, with one of my serjeants. The commanding officer, captain Roberts, offered me every assistance in his power to render our situation comfortable while we remained there, and to enable us to proceed on our journey. To him I gave my parole of honour, and came on to Detroit, and reported myself to colonel Proctor, who gave us a passage to Buffaloe; from that place I came by the way of Presque Isle, and arrived here yesterday.

CRUIZE OF THE SQUADRON UNDER COMMODORE RODGers.

Letter from Commodore Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy. United States' Frigate President, Boston, Sept. 1, 1812. Sir, I had the honour yesterday of informing you of the arrival of the squadron, and have now to state the result and particulars of our cruize.

Previous to leaving New York on the 21st of June, I heard that a British convoy had sailed from Jamaica for England on or about the 20th of the preceding month, and on being informed of the declaration of war against Great Britain, I determined, in the event of commodore Decatur joining me with the United States, Congress, and Argus, as you had directed, to go in pursuit of them.

The United States, Congress, and Argus did join me on the 21st; with which vessels, this ship, and the Hornet, I accordingly sailed in less than an hour after I received your orders of the 18th of June, accompanied by your official communication of the declaration of war.

On leaving New York I shaped our course south-eastwardly, in the expectation of falling in with vessels, by which I should hear of the before mentioned convoy, and the following night met with an American brig that gave me the sought-for information; the squadron now crowded sail in pursuit; but the next morning was taken out of its course by the pursuit of a British frigate, that I since find was the Bel

videra, relative to which I beg leave to refer you to the enclosed extract from my journal; after repairing as far as possible the injury done by the Belvidera to our spars and rigging, we again crowded all sail, and resumed our course in pursuit of the convoy, but did not receive further intelligence of it, until the 29th day of June, on the western edge of the banks of Newfoundland, where we spoke an American schooner, the master of which reported that he had two days before passed them in latitude 43°, longitude 55°, steering to the eastward. I was surprised to find that the convoy was still so far to the eastward of us, but was urged, however, as well by what I considered my duty, as my inclination, to continue the pursuit.

On the 1st of July, a little to the eastward of Newfoundland bank, we fell in with quantities of cocoa-nut shells, orange peels, &c. which indicated that the convoy were not far distant, and we pursued it with zeal, although frequently taken out of our course by vessels it was necessary to chase, without gaining any further intelligence until the 9th of July, in latitude 45° 30', longitude 23°, we captured the British private armed brig Dolphin, of Jersey, and were informed. by some of the crew, that they had seen the convoy the preceding evening, the weather was not clear at the time, but that they had counted 85 sail, and that the force charged with the protection consisted of one two-decker, a frigate, a sloop of war, and a brig.

This was the last intelligence I received of the before-mentioned convoy, although its pursuit was continued until the 13th of July, being then within 18 or 20 hours sail of the British channel.

From this we steered for the island of Madeira, passed close by it on the 21st of July, thence near the Azores, and saw Corvo and Flores; thence steered for the banks of Newfoundland and from the latter place (by the way of Cape Sable) to this port, it having become indispensably necessary (by the time we reached our own coast) to make the first convenient port in the United States; owing, I am sorry to say, to that wretched disease the scurvy having made its appearance on board of the vessels, most generally to a degree seriously alarming.

From the western parts of the banks of Newfoundland to our making the island of Madeira, the weather was such, at least six days out of seven, as to obscure from our discovery every object that we did not pass within four or five miles of, and indeed for several days together the fog was so thick

as to prevent our seeing each other, even at cable's length asunder, more than twice or thrice in the twenty-four hours.

From the time of leaving the United States until we arrived here, we chased every vessel we saw, and you will not be a little astonished when I inform you that, although we brought to every thing we did chase, with the exception of four vessels, we only made seven captures and one recapture.

It is truly an unpleasant task to be obliged to make a communication thus barren of benefit to our country; the only consolation I individually feel on the occasion being derived from knowing that our being at sea obliged the enemy to concentrate a considerable portion of his most active force, and thereby prevented his capturing an incalculable amount of American property that would otherwise have fallen a sacrifice.

I am aware of the anxiety you must have experienced at not hearing from me for such a length of time, but this I am sure you will not attribute in any degree to neglect, when I inform you that not a single proper opportunity occurred from the time of leaving the United States until our return.

Mr. Newcomb, who will deliver you this, you will find an intelligent young man, capable of giving such further information as you may deem of any moment: he will at the same time deliver you a chart, shewing the tract in which we cruised: annexed is a list of vessels captured, re-captured, and burnt.

The four vessels we chased and did not come up with were the Belvidera, a small pilot-boat schooner supposed to be an American privateer, the hermaphrodite privateer brig Yankee, which we lost sight of in a fog, but whose character we afterwards learnt, and a frigate supposed to be British, that we chased on the 28th ult. near the shoal of George's Bank, and should certainly have come up with, had we have had the advantage of two hours more day-light.

On board of the several vessels of the squadron there are between 80 and 100 prisoners, taken from the vessels we captured during our late cruize. The government not having any agent for prisoners here, I shall send them to commodore Bainbridge, to be disposed of in such manner as best appears to be the interest of the United States, and which I hope may meet your approbation. With the greatest respect, I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

The hon. Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

JOHN RODGERS.

Extract from the journal referred to in the preceding letter. June 23d. Pleasant breezes from N. N. W. to W. S. W. at 3 A. M. spoke an American brig from Madeira, bound to New York, the master of which informed me, that four days before (in lat. 36. long. 67) he passed a fleet of British merchantmen, under convoy of a frigate and brig, steering to the eastward; I now perceived that this was the convoy of which I had received intelligence prior to leaving New York, and shaped our course east in pursuit of them. At 6 A. M. (Nantucket shoal bearing N. E. distant 35 miles) saw a large sail in N. E. standing to S. W. which was soon discovered to be a frigate. The signal was made for a general chase, when the several vessels of the squadron took in their studding sails and made all sail by the wind (on the starboard tack) in pursuit: at a quarter before geven, the chase tacked, made all sail, and stood from us, by the wind, on the same tack; at half past 8 he made signals, when, perceiving we were coming up with him, he edged away a point or thereabouts, and set his top-gallant studding sails: at 11 cleared ship for action, in the expectation that we would soon be up with the chase; the breeze about this time however began to incline more to the westward and became lighter, which I soon discovered was comparatively an advantage to our opponent: at a quarter past 1 P. M. the chase hoisted English colours: at 2 the wind veered to the W. S. W. and became lighter at 20 minutes past 4, having got within gun shot of the enemy, when perceiving that he was training his chase guns, and in the act (as I suppose) of firing, that the breeze was decreasing, and we now sailed so nearly alike, that to afford him an opportunity of doing the first injury to our spars and rigging would be to enable him to effect his escape, I gave orders to commence a fire with the bow chase guns, at his spars and rigging, in the hope of crippling one or the other, so far as to enable us to get alongside. The fire from our bow chase guns he instantly returned with those from his stern, which was now kept up by both ships, without intermission, until 30 minutes past 4 P. M. when one of the President's chase guns burst, and killed and wounded 16 persons, among the latter myself. This was not however the most serious injury, as by the bursting of the gun and the explosion of the passing box, from which it was served with powder, both the main and forecastle decks (near the gun) were so much shattered as to prevent the use of the chase gun on that side for some time; our main deck guns being single shotted, I now gave orders to put our helm to starboard and fire the starboard broadside, in the expectation of disabling some of his spars, but did not succeed, although I could discover that his rigging had