off in safety after a defeat, no small degree of praise seems justly due to the commanding general.

The greatest captain may be guilty of an oversight, and the weakest sometimes behave with conduct and skill; but he cannot be a common man, he must be a great one, who can avoid the consequences of such an oversight.

At this time, in expectation of a movement which Washington was authorized from the character of his enemy to provide against, rather than any other, the two regiments which had been directed from Massachusetts, general Ward's division, to Ticonderoga, were ordered thither on the most direct route, without being countermanded by Congress. The miscellaneous remonstrances and wishes contained in the despatches of Washington, to Congress, considering the tardiness with which such bodies generally legislate on trifles, were assented to with unexpected promptitude. But, nevertheless, there was a lamentable backwardness to be seen in the maintaining of all measures tending to enlarge the powers of the man to whom they had entrusted their possessions, liberties and lives.

The soldiers of the present day, to whom the conduct of a campaign is entrusted, with certain discretionary powers, and armies properly provided with commissaries, paymasters, and other indispensable appendages, whose duties are all properly defined and distinguished from that of the commander in chief; and who find their complaints and remonstrances the subject of immediate attention and redress, by one man at the head of the war department, ought to study the letters of Washington, to understand the multiplicity of vexations which he had to encounter; and the full

value of such a man, at such a time, to the American people.

Among the first evidences of generous confidence in Washington, was a resolution approving his loan to the New-York convention, and trusting to him the entire disposition of his troops. This was passed on the twenty second of July, and, it is not unlikely proceeded as much from a desire to avoid the irksome and perplexing duties which were constantly encreasing upon their hands, as from confidence in him.

On the twenty first of this month, (July,) intelligence of the repulse of the British at South Carolina, was received and the liveliest demonstrations of joy were given by all ranks. Such an event at any time would have been a subject of great national exultation, but happening at this moment when the British were arrayed in their terrours, and their slaughter at Bunker's Hill had almost ceased to be regarded as a defeat, it was of infinite service in quieting the fears of the timid and strengthing the resolute. Resolutions of national acknowledgment were passed, and presented to Gen. Lee, and Colonels Moultrie and Thompson, for their gallantry.

The native strength of character, and noble disregard of popular clamour, so uniformly the distinguishing properties of Washington, were never more conspicuous than at this period, and during the successive disasters of the army under his command, so immediately following what was then thought a great victory.

CHAPTER XIV.

Events of 1776 continued-Necessities of the American army— Backwardness of their supplies-State of preparation-Orders, letters, remarks-Attempt to entice the foreigners from the British service.—Enterprise against the enemy's vessels in the North River.-Battle on Long Island; retreat of the Americans.-Reflections.

The concentration of the forces under Admiral and Sir William Howe, officers distinguished for their talents and experience, was to be the signal for battle. That under the immediate command of Sir William, was to be about thirty thousand men ; sometimes it was less, but at one period it amounted to nearly thirty two thousand. These were chosen troops, well officered; veterans, with a fine train of artillery, and all the necessary appendages of an army in such abundance, as to present the most formidable aspect of any army ever before assembled at once on the continent of America. The total amount of the various divisions, distributed over the country for this campaign, by the policy of Great Britain, exceeded fifty five thousand men; supported by a powerful navy, always on the alert, and ready to attack every defenceless post from one extremity to the other of the Colonies. To encounter such overwhelming preparations, the Americans had but a temporary army, not half equal even in numbers to that of the enemy, undisciplined, unofficered, and unprovided even with ammunition; and no navy except a few frigates, which could only act as privateers. On the arrival of General Howe at Staten Island, the American army did not exceed ten

thousand men, and by the end of August, while General Howe had assembled at Staten Island thirty one thousand six hundred and twenty-five men, it had been gradually and slowly augmented to only seventeen thousand. Of these, a great part were militia, and one fourth part of the whole was sick. The diseases to be expected from the crowded association of new troops during the warmest season of the year, prevailed to an alarming extent, and was rendered still more threatening and destructive from the deficiency of

tents.

But these few were so judiciously distributed on York Island, Long Island, Governour's Island, Paulus Hook, and in the Sound towards New Rochelle, East and West Chester, that while they were secure from any enterprise against them by detachment, they served so completely to embarass the enemy, that he acted with the most exemplary caution: a caution which, though unwilling, was at the same time an unequivocal tribute to the Americans. On the eighth of August the entire force, under the command of Washington, was as follows: ten thousand, five hundred and fourteen fit for duty: sick present, three thousand and thirty nine sick absent, six hundred and twenty nine; on command twenty nine hundred and forty six : on furlough ninety seven; Total, seventeen thou sand two hundred and twenty five. These, it must be remembered, were raw troops, very much scattered, some being fifteen miles apart, and consequently unable to unite suddenly for defence or attack. They might, from their situations, escape a superiour force, but they could not resist in hope of succour. What should have been expected of such an army, opposed to such an enemy? Not to have been swept from the

face of the earth, by the thirty thousand veterans of Europe, would have been the most exalted eulogium upon them.

Experience had taught the Americans how difficult it is to dislodge a powerful antagonist. The design of Sir William Howe had always been supposed by Washington, to be the possession of New York. After much deliberation, it was determined, as the only chance of preventing this, to throw up a chain of redoubts, hazard nothing, and wear away the campaign by ineffectual skirmishing and delay. Such a system would accustom the new troops to stand fire; give them confidence in themselves and their officers; and gradually weaken the enemy who could not supply his losses, while the American army was constantly encreasing in strength, numbers, discipline and experience. The good effects of this system was always conspicuous wherever it was steadily pursued ; the men in the ranks were every hour becoming better soldiers and their officers were acquiring a greater relish and respect for the military character and science.

The Americans, from their want of experience, were not to be trusted in the field. An entrenchment, however weak, was regarded as a defence; and the Bri-tish, from their reception at Breed's Hill, were not particularly anxious to inspect any of the American lines so closely, as to discover their efficiency or inefficiency to withstand an assault. These works, which were thrown up at Long Island, at Haerlem Heights, and round the city, consisted of field redoubts of earth, with a parapet and ditch, with batteries. Slight as were these obstacles, yet the season for the campaign was nearly consumed before they were so far overcome as to allow the enemy to penetrate the country.