REX V. ALICE CHAPIN. 8. 3 (6) -Offences Personal malice. election, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour." By sect. 20 of the Offences against the Person Act (24 & 25 Vict. c. 100): "Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound, or inflict any grievous bodily harm upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour." 1909. PracticeBallot Act, C. F. Gill, K.C. (with him H. A. McCardie) for the defence.1872 (35 36 The defendant cannot be convicted upon the indictment as Vict. c. 33), framed. In sect. 3 (6) of the Ballot Act, upon which the first Indictment count is framed, the words "or otherwise interferes with," &c., Packet of must be construed in the strictest sense as relating to some offence ballot papers" ejusdem generis as compared with the words "destroys, takes, against the opens," which immediately precede them. The act of the Person Act, defendant in casting a fluid upon the ballot box amounts neither 1861 (24 & 25 to a destruction, seizure, nor opening of such ballot box, nor to Vict. c. 100), ss. 20, 47 any interference therewith at all analogous to the specific offences enumerated in the sub-section. Moreover, the offence contemplated by so much of the sub-section as is embodied in the first count relates solely to the ballot box itself, and not to any papers which it may contain; whereas the evidence of the prosecution all tends to show that the defendant destroyed or attempted to destroy the voting papers contained in the ballot box, but not that she damaged the ballot box itself. The subsection creates two distinct offences: one with regard to the ballot box, the other with regard to a packet of ballot papers. Accordingly, we find the second count charging an offence in relation to a packet of ballot papers, framed upon the same sub-section. But the second count is no better sustained by the evidence than was the first count. The words "packet of ballot papers are technical words, and have no application to a number of loose voting papers lying at the bottom of a ballot box while the poll is proceeding, but refer strictly and solely to the sealed packets of fifties into which the loose voting papers are made up at the conclusion of the poll. "Packets of ballot papers do not come into existence until after the close of the poll. This is clear from a consideration of sect. 29 of the First Schedule to the Act, where provision is made for making up such packets. R. D. Muir (with him W. H. Leycester) for the Crown.-It is true that the word "packet" applies to packets of ballot papers which are made up after the close of the poll, but the word is quite wide enough in its signification to include any packet or bundle or package of ballot papers wherever they may be. GRANTHAM, J.-I am satisfied that the offence alleged to have been committed is correctly charged in the first and second counts of the indictment. Breaking a glass vessel containing a noxious fluid over the aperture of the ballot box is an act of interference with the ballot box. The word "packet" must be construed in its ordinary meaning of package or bundle. Under sect. 29 (1) of the First Schedule to the Act, the ballot box itself 4 may be a "packet"; under sub-sect. (2) unused or spoilt ballot REX v. ALICE CHAPIN. 1909. Practice s. 3 (6) Gill, K.C.—There is no case to go to the jury on the third and fourth counts, which are framed upon sects. 20 and 47 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861. With regard to the third Ballot Act, count, which charges an assault occasioning actual bodily harm, 1872 (35 36 there is no evidence of an assault. On the contrary, it is Vict. c. 33), admitted that the injuries caused to Mr. Thorley were purely Indictmentaccidental. In order to establish a case under the fourth count, the prosecution must prove that the defendant acted "unlawfully ballot papers and maliciously," or, in other words, there must be an intent to injure some person, although not necessarily the person actually injured; or at least it must be shown that the probable result would be to injure some person. GRANTHAM, J.—The judgments of COLERIDGE, L.C.J., and of The learned judge, subsequently, in the course of his summing- Solicitor for the prosecution: Director of Public Prosecutions. Packet of -Offences against the Person Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 100), ss. 20, 47Personal malice. CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT. Friday, March 11, 1910. (Before BRAY, J.) REX v. HORNER. (a) Practice-Evidence-Forged telegrams-Post Office (Protection) By the Post Office (Protection) Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 76), (a) Reported by H. D. ROOME, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. REX V. HORNER. 1910. Practice EvidenceForged telegrams-Post Office (Protec Vict. c. 76), knowing the same to be forged shall, whether he had or had not an intent to defraud, be guilty of a misdemeanour . . THE HE defendant was indicted under the Post Office (Protection) Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 76), s. 11, for forging and tion) Act, uttering four telegrams which were sent by him to the editor 1884 (47 & 48 of the Daily Mail newspaper in the name of Walter Kirby, a s. 11-Con- contributor to that journal. It was proved in evidence that the struction editor of the Daily Mail would have accepted nothing of any description from the defendant Horner, but that the telegrams were published in the Daily Mail under the mistaken belief that falsity of tele- they had been sent by Walter Kirby. 8. Intent to deceiveTruth or gram immaterial. George Elliott, K.C. (with him W. Frampton), for the defence.There is no case to go to the jury. A forged telegram means a false document or false instrument, which is false in itself in the sense that it contains false news. It is not sufficient for the prosecution to show that the signature is false, and no evidence has been adduced here to show that the contents of the telegrams were untrue. The accuracy of the document is the test, and until it is proved to be inaccurate there is no case. The prosecution must prove, in order to establish an offence under this Act, that the Post Office was made the channel for passing a false document, that is to say, a document the contents of which were untrue. This contention is supported by Reg. v. Martin (1880) 5 Q. B. Div. 34; 49 L. J. M. C. 11; 44 J. P. 74) and by Reg. v. Whyte (1851) 5 Cox C. C. 290; 15 J. P. 405). C. F. Gill, K.C. (with him R. D. Muir) for the prosecution.It is sufficient to prove an intent to deceive the recipient of the telegram, by inducing him to think that it came from the signatory. The offence consists in sending a telegram in a forged name. It is enough to constitute forgery if a man uses a false name with intent to conceal his own identity (Ex parte Wickham (1894) 10 Times L. R. 266). BRAY, J.-The cases cited by Mr. Elliott are clearly distinguishable from the present case. I shall leave it to the jury. It is necessary to prove an intent to deceive. The gravity of the offence depends on whether the contents of the telegrams were true or false, but that is a matter for me rather than for the jury. The prosecution must elect whether they will call evidence on the point or not. Evidence was then called by the prosecution to show that the contents of the telegrams published in the Daily Mail were untrue; and rebutting evidence was called on this point by the defence. BRAY, J., in the course of his summing-up, said :-The offence is one created by an Act of Parliament, which says "every person REX บ. HORNER. 1910. Practice Evidence tion) Act, Vict. c. 76), s. 11-Con who forges a telegram, whether he had or had not an intent to defraud, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour." You have not to consider here whether he had any intent to defraud or not. For the purpose of this case, forging consists in using a false namea name which the person using it knows to be false, and which he uses with intent to deceive. It would not follow that because he used a name which was not his own that it was a forgery. Forged TeleA man might honestly have a nom de plume, but he must not use grams-Post another man's name without the authority of the real owner of Office (Protecthe name-that is, in this case, without the authority of Mr. 1884 (47 & 48 Kirby. You have to ask yourselves whether he used the name of Walter Kirby with intent to deceive the editor of the Daily Mail into thinking that he was their regular contributor of that name. It matters not whether there was an intent to injure, so long as you find an intent to deceive. If you find that he wrote and despatched those telegrams in a false falsity of telename, with intent to deceive the editor of the Daily Mail, without authority from the person whose name he was using, your duty is to find him guilty. The truth or falsity of the contents is immaterial, in my opinion, to your verdict; but I will leave two questions for you to answer: (1) Assuming the law to be that it is only necessary to prove that the name was forged, and that the name "Kirby" was used with intent to deceive, do you find the defendant guilty or not guilty? (2) Assuming the law to be that it is further necessary to prove that the contents of the telegrams were substantially untrue, do you find them untrue or not? In answer to the first question, the jury found the defendant guilty, and in answer to the second question they found that the contents of the telegrams were in the main untrue. Verdict: Guilty. Sentence: Six weeks' imprisonment in the Solicitors for the prosecution: Lewis and Lewis. structionIntent to deceive Truth or gram immate rial. KING'S BENCH DIVISION. Friday, January 22, 1909. (Before Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J., BIGHAM and WALTON, JJ.) Airton and anoTHER (apps.) v. SCOTT (resp.). (a) Betting-Frequenting and using-Public place-Payment for entrance. By the Sheffield by-laws no person shall frequent and use any public place for the purpose of betting; and "public place" is defined as meaning any recreation ground and any open space to which the public have access for the time being. The appellant attended on a particular day certain athletic grounds and made bets. The public had access thereto on payment. Held, that the appellant was rightly convicted under the by-law, as there was evidence of frequenting and using, and, further, the fact that the public had to pay for entrance made no difference. CASE stated on an information laid against James Airton and an information against Austin Simmonite (the appellants) for that he, James Airton, on the 29th day of June, 1908, at the city aforesaid, unlawfully did frequent and use a public place called Sheaf House Grounds for the purpose of betting, contrary to the by-laws duly made in that behalf, and that Austin Simmonite unlawfully did aid and abet James Airton to commit the offence. The Sheaf House Grounds are athletic grounds, and are accessible to the public on payment of money for admission, and persons are accustomed to go there to train for athletic contests, and on some occasions to play games, and they were accessible to the public on Monday, the 29th day of June, 1908, on a payment of 6d. for admission to the grounds and 3d. extra to the inclosure on the occasion of Messrs. A. Holmes and G. Roberts' 57. 10s. seventy yards handicap for foot runners to be run at the grounds, and, according to the printed programme, to be run in (a) Reported by W. DE B. HERBERT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. |